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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with communication planning for national 
development: specifically with the problem of utilising a developing 
country's communication resources to support an integrated programme 
of social, political and economic mobilisation. The research which it 
describes sets out to construct, and test, an operational planning 
framework, to include among its parameters decision-making processes 
and political factors as well as planning strategies for communication. 
Following a literature search, a number of guiding principles in 
support of communication planning are hypothesized. These principles 
are then evaluated, modified and categorised, through comparison with 
selected communication projects and surveys, at levels ranging from the 
local to the national and regional. Subsequently, on the basis of this 
analysis, an experimental planning framework is devised, which is con- 
structed around two basic axes: the first defining planning participants 
(including both planners and decision-makers), and the second defining 
the sequence of planning. A particular emphasis in elaborating this 
framework is on the relationship between communication and development 
planning, and on interactions between the various sectors concerned with 
national development. 
An account is then given of a field test of the experimental frame- 
work in a developing country (Afghanistan); during which independent 
evaluations of both the framework and of its application were carried out. 
Following an analysis of these evaluations, the framework is modified and 
a revised version proposed. Finally, an attempt is made to relate the 
planning framework to current concerns with popular access to communi- 
cation resources, and participation in communication planning and manage- 
ment, as a guide to future application and evaluation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 
PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Research Objectives 
This thesis is concerned with communication planning for national 
development: specifically with the problem of utilising a developing 
country's communication resources to support an integrated programme 
of social, political and economic mobilisation. It is therefore 
primarily operational, action-based research; its objective was to 
evolve a planning strategy which would catalyse the contribution of 
communication resources to the development process, while recognising 
the variety of constraints, particularly those of political action and 
decision making, which exist in real world situations. It set out to 
isolate an approach which, although based upon recognised planning 
techniques, particularly those of systems analysis, nevertheless still 
retained sufficient flexibility and pragmatism to respond sensitively 
to external pressures, many of them unpredictable or irrational. 
As I shall explain later, the research was not based on a trad- 
itional hypothetico-deductive design, proceeding from the formation of 
stated research hypotheses. It was, nevertheless, logical and 
scientific in intent, within the constraints of its subject matter; 
it began by setting out hypothetical planning principles, which it 
used to construct an experimental planning model. If there had been 
a formally stated hypothesis, this would have proposed that it is 
possible to evolve a communication planning instrument, to be used at 
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the national level in developing countries, which embodies both 
technical planning supports and elements of policy formulation and 
decision-making. The objective of the research, however, was not 
simply to ascertain whether such a planning model was feasible, but 
also to assess its limits, and the kinds of circumstance and environ- 
ment in which it might be usefully employed. 
Selection of Research Area 
My basic motivation for choosing this particular area of research 
was one of professional development: since 1966, I have been concerned 
with the planning of communication systems and institutions, particularly 
in the developing world. In late 1976, this responsibility was both 
formalised and extended through the creation, within UNESCO, of a 
Section of Communication Planning and Studies, of which I was designated 
Chief of Section. The appointment coincided with an emerging inter- 
national interest in communication planning as a significant field of 
communication research, in response to a number of pressures and trends 
which are described in Chapter II. A particular emphasis was upon the 
need to plan, in a coherent and comprehensive way, for national communi- 
cation systems, embracing not only the mass media, but also their 
relationship to a variety of audiences within processes of social and 
economic development. 
Rationale for the Research 
The main rationale for selecting this research topic, however, 
quite apart from a personal motivation, was one of need; from an 
early review of the literature, it was apparent that, in this new 
field, little was available in the way of 'established methodologies, 
and existing planning designs and techniques had to be adapted to the 
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communications environment. For this purpose, the most evident 
instrument upon which to draw was that of systems planning. Since 
the fifties systems planning, extended by computerized processes, 
has become the basis of most technological design, including tele- 
communications. It has, however, been found to be less effective 
an instrument in the design of systems with a human rather than a 
technological bias, and among these are included communication systems, 
both mass and interpersonal. The experience of those responsible for 
planning such systems is that, while technical components are adequately 
approached through networking and systems analysis, social planning is 
far, less amenable, and the processes of policy formulation and decision- 
making, in particular, are less than responsive. Those who plan communi- 
cation systems, therefore, tend to adopt one of two approaches. The 
first is to assume the validity of systems analysis and specific 
planning techniques, and to evolve strategies in much the same way as 
these would be evolved for any major industrial enterprise. The dis- 
advantage of this approach is that it usually fails to take account of 
unforeseen human factors (political or personal). The second approach 
is more pragmatic: planning is confined to short-range operational plans, 
with little prior assessment in terms of the specification of objectives, 
evolution of alternative strategies and so on. In the past, this has 
been the most common pattern for communication planning, especially at 
the project level; communication in general (apart from telecon»unica- 
tions) has been markedly uninfluenced by planning and management theory 
borrowed from other contexts. 
This situation produces something of a dilemma. On the one hand, 
it seems unfortunate, if techniques which have been found to be prac- 
tically useful in other fields cannot equally be applied to the communi- 
cation sector. At the same time, planning for its own sake is clearly 
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wasteful; the main business of planning is implementation, and if poli- 
tical and decision-making strands cannot be included in its parameters, 
not only are opportunities being wasted, but negative results may well 
be expected. 
When I began this research, relatively little attention had been 
paid to the application of planning theory to communication problems, 
except in the area of educational technology. My working hypothesis 
therefore proposed that with due care a marriage of the two approaches 
might be possible, and some new techniques might usefully be evolved, 
not merely in such a way that they avoided confrontation with decision- 
making and political processes, but. actually assisted such processes, 
by directing them towards a greater rationality. The research was 
therefore directed towards creating a planning framework which included 
decision-making as well as planning axes, and towards testing this 
framework in real-life situations. 
Time Frame of the Research 
The time frame of the study was from January 1976 to June 1980. It 
was initiated during nine months of full-time research leave, taken 
from January-September 1976 and spent in the East-West Communication 
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, and in Europe. During this period, apart 
from my longer-term attachment to the East-West Centre (between February 
and May 1976), I also maintained contacts with, and made visits to, 
the Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, USA; 
Syracuse University, USA; and the Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, UK. The remainder of the research was carried 
out on a part-time basis. Field work was planned and undertaken 
between October 1976 - January 1978, and the thesis was completed 
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between February 1978 - July 1980. Regular dialogue was maintained with 
the Open University, UK, throughout the entire period. 
Methodology 
The methodology evolved for the research is described in Chapter III, 
in broad outline, and particular aspects are discussed in context as they 
arise. 
In summary, however, I began by isolating a number of concepts, which 
appeared to be important to communication planning and which might eventu- 
ally be used as criteria in devising an experimental planning model. These 
were partly drawn from a review of the literatures of communication and 
of planning, and partly from my own personal experience as a media planner 
and manager. Subsequently, I grouped these concepts according to a simple 
model, which distinguished between the design of planning (i. e. the prod- 
uction of planning models or instruments), and the planning process (i. e. 
the ways in which such models are applied in practice). 
I then attempted to check and expand these key concepts, by reviewing 
the ways in which they appeared to be illustrated in specific experiences 
of planning for communication. I did so by selecting eight recent communi- 
cation projects, for which a reasonably comprehensive body of data on 
planning processes was available, and by analysing these to see where each 
concept, and the preliminary categorisation, was adequately supported, 
and where it was deficient. I then modified and expanded the concepts 
into the form of a series of hypothetical planning principles (13 at this 
time). 
The next step was to take this analysis a stage further, by investi- 
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gating a communication planning survey which had taken place some years 
earlier in Thailand; as the objectives of this survey (a pre-investment 
study for the development of educational mass media) were similar to the 
basic objectives of my own research, this provided a useful check on the 
research project as a whole, and furnished more information on the plan- 
ning process than was available from the project case studies. 
From this second analysis, a revised and consolidated list of 17 
hypothetical planning principles was established. 
, 
The next, critical stage was to use these principles, and other guide- 
lines derived from the case studies,. to evolve a general model, or frame- 
work, for communication planning. This was deliberately kept simple, in 
the form of a two-dimensional matrix, since it was to be used as the basis 
of a field test in a particular situation, during which it could be moni- 
tored and evaluated. The opportunity for this test occurred in Afghanistan, 
where, in 1977, UNESCO was asked to prepare a national communication plan 
covering an eight-year period, embracing all communications media. My own 
Section of Communication Planning and Studies was entrusted with this request, 
and for this purpose, I developed my basic model into a specific planning 
scenario. The survey was undertaken by a team of specialists, and it was 
monitored throughout by two independent evaluators, one concerned mainly 
with the utility of the planning instrument, the other with team planning 
processes. 
Once the survey was complete, I compared and analysed these two evalu- 
ations, before returning to the planning model, to see how useful it had 
proved as a tool, and how it might be further modified. I discovered that, 
in general, it had been a useful guide, but'the very fact that it was based 
on existing planning conditions and practices meant that it could only be 
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developed to a certain point: it was rooted in a centralist plan- 
ning tradition, and could only be partially adapted to more modern, 
participatory forms. 
Consequently, in the final stage of the research, I considered 
the more recent themes of access and participation in communication, 
envisaging approaches to planning which might be contemplated in the 
future. 
Contents of the Thesis 
The progress of this research is described in detail in the 
thesis. In Chapter II, I review the historical development of 
communication planning, and then describe, in Chapter III, the 
methodology which I employed. Chapters IV -V develop a set of 
hypothetical planning principles, through an analysis of earlier 
surveys, and in Chapter VI a preliminary planning model is evolved. 
Subsequently, Chapter VII describes the application of this model 
in Afghanistan, and its simultaneous evaluation. In Chapter VIII, 
the planning model is further refined, within its inherent limita- 
tions, and in Chapter IX implications for the future are considered. 
-'16- 
Full references are provided to works quoted or drawn upon in the 
text, and four annexes include summary descriptions of the projects 
reviewed, the planning design used in Afghanistan, and the two indepen- 
dent evaluations conducted of this design. 
Definition of Basic Concepts 
Before embarking on the thesis proper, however, it should be helpful 
to consider some of the basic concepts with which the research was con- 
cerned. In a new field, questions of definition are usually critical: 
there is a need, not simply to define and localise the area of research, 
but also to ensure consistency and comparability in the use of terminology 
and the understanding of concepts. In this section, therefore, the 
critical terms of communication planning, communication policy, and 
development are defined: not in order to claim any special validity or 
universality, but so as to describe their use within the study, and 
especially their interaction and interrelationship. 
Communication Planning 
Communication is a concept elastic enough to include interpersonal, 
institutional and mass communication forms; and if it is viewed primarily 
as a process, it can be understood in very broad terms. The Preface to 
the "Handbook of Communication" (Sola Pool, Schramm, Frey, Maccoby, Parker, 
1973 p. v. ) describes it as one of those "relatively few fundamental and 
- 17 - 
encompassing processes through which virtually any social event can he 
portrayed". 
However, the study of communication is a different and more restricted 
concern, which is largely a matter of perspective; seen as a field of inves- 
tigation, rather than as a discipline, it can have a variety of entry points. 
From the viewpoint of the psychologist, communication is a need, comparable 
with other basic human needs. From a more philosophical viewpoint, it is 
seen as a right (leading characteristically to discussions of information 
flow and equilibrium). From the aesthetic viewpoint, it is a creative 
activity. 
Communication planning adopts primarily a socio-economic view; character- 
istically it treats communication as a resource, capable of being allocated, 
conserved and re-distributed like other resources. This perspective can be 
broken down further still. In the first place, while the term communication 
is not intended purely to imply mass media, it is used here to denote the sum 
of those media channels and institutions which have a technological base. This 
is because the emphasis upon communication as a natural resource implies a 
commodity which is subject to production, marketing and distribution in some 
way. However, the understanding does go beyond that of mass media; it 
includes other technologically based items, such as computers, information 
systems, telecommunications and telephony (which have quite a different 
audience relationship from broadcasting or the press). Moreover, it goes 
beyond the basic premises of technology to include those aspects of human 
communication (information flow, diffusion. etc. ) which arise out of or 
surround the technological base, and which may also be the subject of planning. 
Communication planning, therefore, implies the preparation of both long- 
range and short-range plans (i. e. strategic and operational) for the efficient 
and equitable use of communication resources, in the context of a particular 
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society's goals, means and priorities, and subject to its prevailing forms 
of social and political organisation. 
A society in this case may be as small as a community or institution, 
or as large as a regional consortium. Obviously the resources of planning, 
the complexity of the planning process and the constraints placed upon it 
will vary in proportion to the planning universe, but it can be argued that 
in essence the same kinds of process apply at each level. 
Planning does not, however, (or should not) take place in a vacuum, but 
in its execution has to take account of characteristic processes of decision- 
making, the allocation of financial and supporting resources, and economic 
and social behaviour. In other words, communication planning is both a 
theoretical and an applied discipline: it is subject to all the forms and 
pressures of compromise which characteristically operate in applied fields. 
Communication Policy 
As such it has a clear derivation from the concept of policy. For 
although communication policies exist in all societies, it is clearly the 
understanding of policy as being framed to provide some kind of social re- 
organisation which has stimulated the growth of interest in the field. In 
the development context, in particular, the view of policies is more pre- 
scriptive than analytical: if a policy is articulated it is in order that 
it may promote some kind of structural or social change. And this orienta- 
tion, in turn, leads to a realisation of the need for planning, in order to 
help translate the policy statement into practical action. 
Communication policies have been defined as sets of norms, standards 
and principles, which govern communication behaviour; particularly at an 
institutional level, they may be both overtly and implicitly expressed. 
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However, their relationship with planning is direct because: (i) planning, 
especially systems planning, is dependent upon the clear formulation of 
objectives; and (ii) objectives cannot be articulated with any precision 
unless overall goals and policies are clearly understood. While policies 
may exist, and be discussed, without planning, planning cannot be expected 
to take place without policies. For this reason, the account of policy 
offered below is of a particular kind. Its bias is not so much towards 
policy per se, or the description and normalisation of communication roles 
in society, but more towards that specific categorisation of policy which is 
an a priori facet of the planning process. It attempts to find a means of 
identifying the priorities, possibilities and pressures without which planning 
becomes an abstract and sterile exercise. 
Development 
The view which the study takes of the communication process is also 
intimately bound up with the concept of development, for it is the develop- 
ing world which is most interested in radical, socio-economic re-structuring, 
and in which the imperatives of the development process are most pronounced. 
The understanding of development adopted here may nevertheless cause 
some difficulty. While there are many definitions of development, unfor- 
tunately most of these are couched in abstract terms. Development, in theory, 
implies a telescoping of change in a given society, which will allow it, in 
a shorter span of time that would be the result of random historical growth, 
to escalate to the living standards, economic climate, social and educational 
level of industrialised societies. In practice, however, development has 
been most often equated with industrialisation and with technological innov- 
ation; it has been measured by the degree to. which an "underdeveloped" society 
matches indices evolved by industrialised countries. 
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This simplistic approach has, of course, been challenged in many 
places, and much greater restraint is now exercised, to the extent that 
not only the appropriateness of a particular technology, but even the 
appropriateness of technology at all, are no longer taken for granted in 
resolving a particular country's problems. Today, at least in theory, 
the preference is to analyse the social environment and goal structure 
of a society and to see what specific prescriptions, among which tech- 
nology is included, can best advance these goals. Questions of the 
quality of life, equity and social participation are now more commonly 
raised than hitherto. 
This is not to say that technical assistance or commercial advisory 
programmes always reflect such discretion, or that task analysis is always 
complete, whether by donor agencies or by the country's leaders themselves. 
But it does reflect a climate of opinion. 
For the purposes of this research an understanding of development 
was needed which did not make too many pre-judgements about the best manner 
in which to proceed. It should be an understanding which did not draw too 
arbitrary a line between the so-called 'developed' and 'developing' countries, 
as a main dilemma is how to use the capacities of the industrialised world 
in less skilled environments, to ensure a transfer of technology which con- 
centrates on endogenous development rather than on a physical exchange. 
By development, therefore, it seemed better to argue from a basic 
notion of reduction in inequalities: of opportunity, of resources, of 
information access, of capability. This kind of inequality is traditionally 
associated with the gap between technologically advanced and technologically 
poor countries, but it goes deeper. Within industrialised societies, there 
are similar inequalities between urban and rural societies, between social 
strata, or between groups. Development can generally be understood 
to attempt the reduction of such inequalities, through a planning process 
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whose objective is to accelerate the transition and to promote internal, 
endogenous growth. Communication planning for development implies the 
use of communication resources and technologies as part of this task. 
Again, this does not imply that the possibility of planning for 
comunication systems in industrialised societies is dismissed, or that 
these alternative planning needs are in any way subordinate. Indeed, the 
majority of the theories and methods which are drawn upon derive from the 
industrialised world, where they were first conceived and nurtured. The 
focus of the research, however, was upon the developing world. 
This focus had substantial implications, and some advantages. In 
the industrialised world, where there is already a long-standing commitment 
to established media industries and infrastructures, policy-making and 
planning are inevitably a matter of re-alignment, gradual shifts of 
emphasis and cautious consensus. In the developing world - in spite of 
the problems raised by centralised planning and dirigistic habits of policy 
formulation - the possibility of radically re-structuring communication 
systems exists to a far greater degree. 
The Reference Frame 
In summary, the context of communication planning is illustrated by 
Figure 1, where a simple Venn diagram shows the basic influences which 
converge in its practice. Communication planning begins from two main 
axes: public and development policy, and the infra-structures of the 
communication system; it is concerned with the potential of communication 
as a mobilising and integrating force within society. 
But it is further conditioned, and catalysed, by technology. While 
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communication is a basic human activity, the incentive to plan for its 
allocation and conservation, and to institutionalize its forms, only 
arises in a society with a developed, or potential, technological base. 
The result is a partial overlay of communication resources and infra- 
structures upon goals of public development policy, catalysed by the 
contribution of technology. Communication planning lies broadly at 
their point of intersection, being (in theory) a process of formulating 
societal objectives, correlating these with the potential of the communi- 
cation system and making use of technology to secure the best possible 
match. 
Nevertheless, while the focus of communication planning lies at this 
central intersection, its interests spill over much more widely. The 
main concern of the field is to plan (at a variety of levels) for a 
communication system: a system being viewed, traditionally, as an assembly 
of parts connected together in an organized way, as an organic unit. The 
process is carried on within society, involving individuals, institutions 
and groups, and it is therefore a human activity system, But there are 
other ways of approaching systems thinking, in more analytic, less des- 
criptive terms. In the words of P. B.. Checkland "The apparently chaotic 
world is best understood as a complex of interlocking systems" (Checkland, 
1972 p. 50). This approach is less utilitarian, as it amounts to saying that 
virtually everything can be interpreted in systemic terms, but it has the 
virtue of emphasizing that any system (including a national communication 
system) is bounded by other systems, and that the overlap between them 
is quite as important as individual system behaviour. 
An analysis of communication planning, therefore, has to take place 
at two levels, assuming two different viewpoints. It has initially to 
focus attention on a particular system of communication and the means by 
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which it can be observed and regulated, but it must also view communication 
in the light of contiguous, or larger systems (such as that of the develop- 
ment process, or the wider social system of which this is a facet). The 
inability to do so has been a source of confusion, inflexibility and in- 
consistency in much communication design. 
Returning to Figure 1, then, this argument implies that research into 
communication planning should extend beyond the shaded intersection area, 
to consider each of the main spheres involved, and especially the balance 
and focus of their relationship. 
Relationships 0 
Figure 2 expresses the relationship in more dynamic terms (adapted 
from Parker, 1973 p. 640). The three nodes are somewhat differently 
presented, but they correspond in general terms to the original triad 
of technology, communication structures and public and development policy. 
Their interaction is, of course, continuous, but it will be seen that 
in this model policy analysis draws (among other things) upon research 
into communication processes and effects, and relates this to technological 
potential in formulating (and advocating) structural change. Other 
influences are also depicted. Communication research both services and 
conditions the growth and character of communication technology; public 
policy formulation moulds (directly or indirectly) media structures, 
depending upon the exercise of control in the society to which the model 
is being applied. All of these interactions had to be considered in the 
thesis and their historical development and association are discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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The search is organised in three strands. First, an account is given of 
the arergence of the field in its public ( most frequently international) 
context, charted by reports and documents produced through a sequence of 
expert and intergoverrnental meetings. Secondly, at a mom conceptual 
level, the evolution of the field is traced through an analysis of its 
ccmpcx-*-nt academic disciplines, which have been drawn together to underpin 
the political debate. Thirdly, an account is given of the practical 
measures which have been taken (again primarily at an international level, 
ttx. augh with increasing national recognition), to translate the emerging 
concepts into action and research prcgramnes. It was considered inportant to 
analyse this sequence of events and processes, because they provided a 
context within which the research proceeded, and which guided its overall 
Objectives. 
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CHAPTERII 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF COMMUNICATION PLANNING 
As part of the preliminary phase of this study, a review was made 
of a number of sources, in the fields of communication research, educa- 
tional media and technology, development theory and planning and manage- 
ment theory. 
A parallel review of the field'of communication planning was, 
however, much more limited, because the field is so recent. Largely, 
this was a matter of tracing the historical development of the field, 
and considering the substantive reports and papers produced over the 
last decade. It is this secondary search which is summarised in the 
present chapter. 
Historical Development 
The history of communication policies and planning is one of gradual, 
sometimes barely perceptible, moves towards integration: towards the per- 
ception of coherent systems in communication. 
The sequence cannot be pinpointed with any accuracy; it is largely 
a matter of growing consciousness. But it is implicit in such documents 
as the reports of UNESCO research meetings on mass communication, which 
often pick up with considerable accuracy the mood of a particular time. 
For example, a meeting of experts on mass communication and society, 
held in Montreal in August 1969, was still groping towards a principle 
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of comprehensiveness in communication research: 
"More comprehensive, system-oriented research into mass 
communication is needed at all levels and in all areas. This 
includes the analysis of media organisation, ownership and 
financial support, the decision-making processes in media 
production ethics, the actual value systems of communicators, 
and their perception of their role in society. The ways in 
which such factors impinge upon the creative process involved 
in media production are of particular interest. It may also 
be useful to enquire into whether it would be advisable to 
bring about change, where indicated, in production and infor- 
mation structures to allow for a wider participation into 
management and decision-making processes on the part of the 
professional working elements of media units. The special 
contexts of the developing countries deserve special attention. 
In addition to the actual process of mass communication 
there is need for research into the goals of mass communication 
systems and their possible future goals. Such "goal research" 
might help to clarify policies and objectives in relation to 
any given society, suggest to policy-makers and practitioners 
new bases for mass media performance, and stimulate more com- 
prehensive theories with regard to mass communication in 
general". (UNESCO, 1969 p. 4) 
The concept of "policies" for communication is already embryonic. 
But two years later, a consultants' committee, elaborating proposals 
for an International Programme of Communication Research, had moved to 
- 28 
a more sharply focused position. 
"If something is socially significant then it should 
be self-evident that we need to know something about it. 
More questions arise: who governs and controls the media? 
Whose interests do they serve? What resources do they use? 
What is the nature of their products? What needs are being 
met and what are not met? These are just some of the general 
questions that should be central within any programme of 
communication research ........ 
In short, we need the kn%rledge that only research 
can provide before we can develop adequate communication 
policies. Ideally, such policies should be based on "total" 
knowledge, (i. e. on the operation of the media in the wider 
social-economic-political setting) and on "public" needs 
rather than on "partial" knowledge and "private" needs 
as is so often the case at present". (UNESCO, 1971 p. 4) 
The commitment went deeper, of course, than communication research 
or even communication: it was part of a general preoccupation with dev- 
elopment. But it had the effect of moving communication interests into 
specific and action-oriented fields. On the one hand, it produced the 
concept of "policies" - statements of communication behaviour at the 
societal level, which assume a direction and an impetus for communi- 
cation systems. On the other hand, it introduced the concept of planning 
for communications, at a level which was more complete and holistic than 
ad hoc or institutional planning. 
Policies (and the word is used with good reason in its plural form) 
are primarily political statements; they may be expressed finally as 
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goals and targets (indeed they must be, if planning is to proceed), but 
they derive from assumptions about the philosophy and social structure 
of their environment. The discussion of policies which has been heard 
in the seventies has normally occurred at a national, often international 
level; it relates to such issues as the balance of information flow, the 
transfer of technologies, and the activities of transnational enterprises. 
The discussion of planning, on the other hand, is less polemic: it is 
more concerned with the construction of frameworks and methodologies 
which assist the rational interpretation of policy. 
The first 'official' description of communication policies is 
usually attributed to a UNESCO document 'Report of the Meeting of 
Experts on Communication Policies and Planning' - Paris, July 1972. 
It read: 
"Communication policies are sets of principles and norms 
established to guide the behaviour of communication systems. 
Their orientation is fundamental and long-range, although 
they may have operational implications of short-range signifi- 
cance. They are shaped in the context of society's general 
approach to communication. Emanating from political ideaol- 
ogies, the social and economic conditions of the country and 
the values on which they are based, they strive to relate 
these to the real needs and prospective opportunities of 
'communication'. 
Communication policies exist in every society, though 
they may frequently be latent and disjointed, rather than 
clearly articulated and harmonized. What is proposed, there- 
fore, is not something radically new, but rather an explicit 
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statement and deliberately prospective formulation of 
practices already established in society". (UNESCO, 1972 
pp. 8-9) 
One needs practice in the reading of international reports, which 
are framed in a particular set of circumstances; they tend to reflect 
a careful consensus of opinion, and hence of political systems, even 
when participants attend expert meetings in a personal capacity. 
Thus, descriptions of communication policy may appear, prima facie, 
to be little more than a rationalization of existing practices. In fact, 
the text is saying something rather different. It is admitting that, 
without a clear analysis and articulation of existing structures and 
influences upon communication, we cannot plan at all in any meaningful 
or realistic way. Indeed, the same document goes on to discuss impli- 
cations for planning: 
"Beyond policies is strategic planning, which deter- 
mines the alternative ways to achieve long-range goals and 
sets the frame of reference for shorter-range operational 
planning. Strategic planning translates into quantified 
targets and systematic approaches the general objectives 
of communication policies ...... 
Generally, the meeting noted two diametric positions between which 
individual countries would chose intermediary positions: 
The intrusion of planning on communication services 
exclusively when the emergence of new technologies requires 
regulation and definition, or when broad new communication 
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services are required which will not be provided by a 
market economy; 
The integrated centralized planning of the communication 
sector in all its dimensions as an essential part of the 
political and state-building process. 
In reality strategic planning of communication would 
take place under constraints which operate to a greater or 
lesser degree in all societies. One difficulty encountered 
in long-term strategic plans is due to the rapid changes in 
technology and "consumer" attitudes. Another difficulty is 
that the goals, objectives and social functions for communi- 
cation may require modification with changing economic and 
social conditions. A third difficulty arises from the fact 
that communication inevitably involves a blending of public 
and personal initiatives. Very often multiple objectives 
are being presented: the communication media are not simply 
providing a specific service or product: they will have to 
accept a variety of demands from economic, social, political 
and creative points of view. Planning procedures therefore 
have to be devised to accommodate this variety of objectives 
and to consider future technological developments. 
At the same time, it was emphasized that such con- 
straints should not be an argument to the point where govern- 
ments and media enterprises neglect or reject the importance 
of strategic planning, otherwise a situation arises in which 
long-term commitments are made without due consideration of 
their implications. These are decisions which require public 
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acknowledgement and deliberate choice; they cannot be left 
entirely to the initiative of engineers, lawyers, or other 
specialists. 
Operational planning translates policies and strategic 
plans to the commitment of material and human resources, into 
administrative and operational structures, into categories of 
programme output and ways of involvement beyond the prod- 
uction/distribution process itself (co-ordination with other 
agencies, reception, feedback). It covers recruitment and 
training of manpo: Jer and co-operation with specialists or 
institutions which may contribute essential services (tech- 
nological institutes, industry, statistical and research 
services, etc. ). 
Strategic planning and operational planning are one 
continuous process, not merely the drafting of plans which 
are presumed to be definitive. While one plan is being applied 
the next one is in preparation, and there is continual feed- 
back from this preparation to actual operation in the light 
of changing needs and technologies. This is, of course, a 
primary responsibility of "management", but management will 
need the advice and guidance of professional communication 
planners. 
Conceptually, it would be most satisfactory if action 
could go successively through the indicated stages: policies, 
strategies, operational planning, budgeting. In reality, how- 
ever, planning and operational application can precede the 
formulation of policies. The emergence of new technologies 
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particularly striking in the communication field, the initiatives 
of powerful enterprises, either publicly or privately owned 
and externally generated, and the immediate needs of communi- 
cation networks to extend their range and improve their quality 
lead to action wherein the long-range effects have never been 
considered. Engineers and regulatory agencies often are not 
aware of the fact that their decisions, made within a limited 
context to achieve immediate ends, may determine the future of 
communication for decades to cone. If operational planning and 
policies are not co-ordinated considerable wastage and conflict 
may result". (Ibid, pp. 12-13) 
Although it is quoted at length, there is naturally a good deal still 
unsaid in this presentation. It does not attempt (nor could it, in its 
context) to cope with such questions as: what happens when the analysis 
of communication policies apparently reveals structures and pressures 
which work against individual or even collective goals? By what means 
and mechanisms are communication policies re-oriented and re-directed, 
and under whose authority? 
There is, however, in these statements a clear recognition of a 
functional relationship: policies determine the context and objectives 
of planning; planning articulates and embodies policies. What is absent, 
largely for political reasons, is an admission of the fact that policies 
are more than sets of norms; they must (if they are to be more than 
abstract descriptions) include an evaluation of political structures, the 
means of arriving at and regulating policy. 
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Academic Evolution 
It should also be useful to look at those academic trends which 
have led to some consensus of thinking on communication policy and 
planning. To do this, we introduce a new diagram, Figure 3, which 
traces the academic evolution of the field. In this diagram, four 
tiers are proposed, approximately chronological. The first tier 
simply depicts the traditional, pre-industrial separation of the 
academic world into humanities, sciences and mathematics. The second 
tier (mainly 19th and early 20th Century) shows the emergence of 
the social sciences, technology, and applied mathematical fields, 
which generally grew out of, or around, the rise of industrialization. 
The third tier isolates those more recent disciplines (themselves 
derivative from the second tier) which are most directly relevant to 
communication planning: these had their main origins in the 1930s, but 
there has been a considerable enlargement of their range since the 
sixties, prompted mostly by increasing social, economic and commercial 
pressures. 
This is in no way a definitive diagram: it depicts only that gradual 
focussing down of knowledge and skills which has led to the communication 
planning field (the fourth tier). 
Component Disciplines 
In Figure 3 the outlines of the field's evolution are summarized in 
such a way that systemic relationships are emphasized. Something further, 
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however, must be said about content. It is important to examine the 
field's component parts - utilizing the three main spheres of communi- 
cation research, technology and the applied social sciences (including 
development and public policy analysis). In this way, the elements of 
'policies' and 'planning' and their interaction should become better 
differentiated. 
The discussion begins with communication studies, because the main 
drive towards communication planning has come from communication prac- 
titioners and researchers: it is they who share most readily a convic- 
tion of the importance of communication in human life. 
0 
Communication Studies 
There is a temptation, in historical accounts, to delve back too 
far to find where concepts are born. However, some of the preoccupa- 
tions of communication planning do reflect traditional approaches and 
tensions in the organization of knowledge, such as are mirrored in the 
university curriculum. The original renaissance perception of education 
was an integrated view but, as the boundaries of academic enquiry widened, 
a need to specialize was felt and the original holistic attitude was 
corrupted. This is a process which is mirrored in Figure 3. 
During the twentieth century, the dangers of over-specialization 
were again recognized, mainly because the compartmentalisation of knowledge 
tended to inhibit transfer from one speciality to another. Some areas of 
scientific enquiry were advanced largely because of such transfers (e. g. 
studies of the sun benefited from the combined efforts of astronomers, 
physicists, chemists and geologists. Moreover, problem-oriented 
fields 
such as educational and economic planning have had, necessarily, to pool 
the contributions of economics, sociology, management studies, etc., 
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because these were all components of the problem under review. 
Communication planning falls within this category: indeed communi- 
cation research in general is an aggregate of a number of disciplines 
which have been gradually added to its repertoire. 
Communication studies tend to be both holistic and divisible; the 
field is multi-disciplinary, but not always inter-disciplinary. Some 
aspects of virtually all research fields impinge upon it: physical 
theories are the basis of technical progress (theories of light, sound, 
etc. ); the applied sciences and technology inspire modern mass communi- 
cation forms; the social sciences touch upon communication processes and 
effects; the humanities are concerned with content and creativity. 
In pre-war years, relatively little research into communication was 
carried out, apart from studies of propaganda or media-commissioned 
audience exposure and readership studies. There was also some early work 
in the belles-lettres tradition which mostly contrasted majority and 
minority cultures, as in essays by T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis. 
The impetus of the Second World War brought advances on many fronts. 
Electronics and information theory inspired some of the process models 
which were popular in the forties. Studies of innovation acceptance, 
especially in agriculture, pointed towards post-war diffusion models. 
The work of behavioural psychologists promoted learning theories which 
became important in instructional media, in studies of perception, and 
in skills training and indoctrination. 
One significance of these new advances was the opportunity which 
they sought to create far more scientific approaches to communication 
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theory, using laboratory techniques and statistical and survey methods, 
as distinct from the pre-war discursive strain. The antithesis between 
descriptive and 'scientist' approaches proved extremely divisive in 
later years. 
By the late forties, the tradition of dealing with mass communi- 
cation was becoming entrenched, partly inspired by fashion, partly by 
the availability of finance. The biggest financiers of media research 
have always been Governments (especially in defence contexts) or the 
media industries themselves, a pattern which has had a good deal to 
do with research bias. But within such limits, the diversity was con- 
siderable. . 
Nevertheless, right up to the sixties and beyond, much of the debate 
among communication researchers mirrored the old argument of the sciences 
versus the humanities. There were differences of*attitude (and discrep- 
ancies in results) between research conducted under controlled conditions 
in the laboratory, and impact and opinion studies conducted in the external 
world. There were adherents to the principle of scientism, those who were 
looking for rigour in experimental design; and there were those who felt 
that the variables were too great for such a restrictive view to be taken. 
From the point of view of communication planning, what was missing 
was a sense of direction: a problem-oriented approach, stressing the social, 
and especially the developmental, relevance of communication policy. 
However, from the early sixties some of the earlier basic concerns 
of communication research - with content, objectivity, scientism - changed 
as encounters with the developing world and the imperatives of technical 
assistance (into which communication researchers were increasingly drawn) 
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focused attention on what communication might, in controlled circu, 7stances, 
achieve. A trend initiated by Wilbur Schramm's classic book "Mass Media 
and National Development", written in 1962 and published in 1964, drew 
together commentators of very different persuasions. In Schramm's own 
words: 
"We must remember that the full power of mass communication 
has never been used, in any developing country, to push economic 
and social development forward. This is the really exciting 
question .... the challenge of the evidence presented 
here". 
(Schramm, 1964 p. 271) 
The strongest impetus for change came from a belief that mass media, 
because of their scale and penetration, could solve telescopically massive 
educational problems in the developing world, though initially claims were 
made for the potential of communication which were rarely matched in per- 
formace. Schramm's contention that no country in the developing world 
had yet realised the full potential of mass communications still, on the 
whole, holds good; it was confirmed, for example, by a recent study by 
Katz and Wedell. 
"Broadcasting in the Third World would be better served 
if its managers were to be more independent in their judgements; 
were not to take for granted the suitability of solutions dev- 
ised elsewhere; and were to think imaginatively about the pot- 
ential contribution of the resources they command to the 
development of their countries". (Katz and Wedell, 1977 p. 245) 
However, though the opportunities raised by the mass media were 
sometimes uncritically assessed, they were soon tempered by experience. 
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And while the tempering has been salutary, the sense of commitment - 
of the possibility of harnessing communication to specific social 
and developmental ends - has persisted. 
Nor has it been confined, in recent years, to the developing world. 
Partly as a result of field experience, partly as an extension of 
functional analysis to communication behaviour, a new tradition of 
research has grown up which firmly links communication studies with 
social policy issues, sees the international ramifications of communi- 
cation, and is both critical and objective about communication waste. 
Some of this research deals with international perspectives, 
especially information flow (e. g. that of Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974 and 
Schiller, 1976). Some concentrates on the relationship between communi- 
cation and social structure (e. g. Halloran, 1974), economic and market 
forces (e. g. Smythe, 1977), political organisation (e. g. Blumler and 
McQuail, 1968), cultural content (e. g. Williams, 1965 and Hall, 1975), 
or a combination of a number of these perspectives, as in the work of 
Golding and Murdock (1977). Much of it is Marxist-inspired and con- 
ceptualised. But all of it moves away from earlier preoccupations with 
content, to emphasise the primary importance of context. 
This rather protracted discussion of the growth of communication 
research has been necessary, because it illustrates the evolution of 
conditions necessary to communication planning. Communication studies 
have produced over the years some descriptive paradigms of communication 
processes and some empirical methods for their analysis. But until a 
sense of the need for communication policy emerged - articulating both 
the understanding of communication's role in social and political 
processes, and the belief that communication resources could, and should, 
be mobilized in the support of societal goals - the need for communication 
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planning did not arise. Once the motivation was there, other fields 
were also seen to be relevant (as happened earlier in the case of 
economic and educational planning, upon whose models communication 
planning is evidently dependent and derivative). 
Development Theory 
The link between communication studies and the communication plan- 
ning field is patently the social sciences, and especially economic and 
development theory. It is from economic studies that much of the impetus 
towards planning came in the first place, and certainly the particular 
view of communication highlighted in this study. 
Development studies - like communication planning - have partly 
grown out of experience: out of dissatisfaction with early theories of 
economic growth and the procedures of technical assistance. 
Our original conception of development, as a process of moderniza- 
tion, has been so much modified in recent years that it has become almost 
unrecognizable. The founding premise was that for development to take 
place, an analogue had to be created in a developing country of a modern 
industrial state, and in order to consolidate this process and to 
establish adequate controls emphasis must be laid upon centralized 
planning forms and the creation of fixed term development plans with 
precise goals. 
Experience led to a revised understanding. The influence of the 
modernization theory was that priority lay with the establishment of a 
stable, industrial sector, supported by a range of metropolitan institu- 
tions. Given this base, at some stage a take-off point would be reached, 
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after which development could continue under its own momentum. It was 
assumed that, after the industrial base had been established, there 
would be a 'trickle-down' effect moving from the centre, gradually 
touching the whole population. But in practice this did not occur. 
The urban metropolis often thrived, but the rural poor were untouched 
and often became poorer. New problems were created - in particular 
migration to the cities and the emergence of new ghettoes. 
It took a long time for this reality to be acknowledged. But once 
it was accepted, new kinds of development policy had to be evolved. This 
time, the main thrust was upon rural development and the integration of 
rural projects. The centralized planning structures and fixed develop- 
ment plans remained, but their contents changed: they had less to say 
about industrial growth and short-term benefits, more about social inte- 
gration and appropriate technologies. At least in conception, if not 
always in practice, they were concerned more with the recipients of devel- 
opment programmes, and new concepts - of dialogue, of access and partici- 
pation by development users - were introduced into the discussion. The 
evaluation platform was itself widened, and simple economic indicators 
were extended to include indicators of social and cultural growth. The 
process is incomplete, but the shift in emphasis now seems to be entrenched. 
It has led, in particular, to the philosophy of the New International 
Economic Order and to the concepts of an 'alternative' or 'another' devel- 
opment, based on the encouragement of self-reliance rather than on the 
transfer of resources and technologies within a traditional global prod- 
uction and distribution system. It is summarized in many texts, one 
example being the excerpt below from a project proposal for a United 
Nations Development Strategy for the Eighties and Beyond. 
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"Briefly, the NIEO... aims at providing the kind of 
international economic relations which would ensure favour- 
able conditions for the development of each society, be it 
in the North or in the South. The new concepts include the 
recognition that development cannot be reduced to economic 
growth, as necessary - if purposeful and socially sound - 
as that may be, but that it is rather a human-centred 
process aiming at satisfying human needs, both material and 
non-material, through self-reliance, endogeny, harmony with 
the environment, and structural transformations". 
(Development Dialogue, 1978: 1 p. 107) 
Applied Social Sciences 
Influential from a different viewpoint - that of methodology and 
technique - have been the management sciences. 
These too have grown out of experience, in an attempt to improve 
casual and improvised approaches to the creation of institutions, prod- 
uction and distribution systems. 
In earlier days, the emphasis of the management sciences was upon 
systems planning, but the purity of this approach was soon contaminated 
by contact with real-world industrial problems, and a more pragmatic 
line was substituted. It was clear that in the majority of cases business 
management could not be reduced to an arbitrary and absolute set of rules: 
too many uncertainty factors and value-based assumptions intruded. 
A particularly useful aspect of management and business studies from 
the point of view of the communication planner was the area of decision- 
making and policy formulation, and the more controlled approach seen in 
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small group interaction studies, conflict resolution, and techniques for 
group planning. But other applied social sciences have also made their 
separate contributions. At the macro level, it is evident that the 
communication policy maker and planner must draw upon the field of 
sociology (especially the study of innovations), of political science, 
of psychology and the behavioural sciences, of organization and decision- 
making theory. 
At the level of communication sub-systems, the list of potential 
borrowings is wider still. A field such as educational technology, for 
example, is of considerable value; the most complete project analyses 
available to date derive from the field of educational media, simply 
because it is here that systems thinking and application have gone 
further and traditions of evaluation are stronger. The same is true 
of studies of agriculture, health, population, etc., as seen from a 
communication standpoint. In some heavily promoted fields such as popu- 
lation studies, there is already a considerable literature on communi- 
cation issues, including the planning of appropriate communication 
support systems. 
Technology 
The final group of influences is in the realm of technology itself, 
including both hardware and software considerations. 
In communication planning, we are particularly concerned with the 
transfer of communication technologies from the industrialised to the 
developing world. The term 'transfer' is used here mainly because it 
is accepted terminology in the literature bf technical cooperation, 
though even its proponents recognise its weaknesses. CV Vaitsos (1970) 
said of technology transfer that it was either a very loose concept, or 
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one which showed a limited understanding of the context of technological 
development: it might even be considered diplomatic usage, giving a tone 
of respectability to what was usually a straightforward commercial process. 
Behind it, at any rate, is a fairly crude assumption: that the difference 
between developed and developing countries is measured in indices of 
technology. It is technology (in the broadest configuration of hardware, 
techniques of production, and sustaining infrastructures of management 
and information systems) which has produced, and maintains, the industrial- 
ised world; to bridge the gap, a whole technological environment has to 
be 'transferred' in some way. The transfer may be effected through com- 
mercial channels, or it may be 'donated' (not necessarily with disinterest) 
through technical assistance programmes. 
This is a simplistic and possibly a somewhat arbitrary description, 
and one has to bear in mind that communication technology does not fully 
correspond to industrial technology. The products of communication tech- 
nology are ideas, information or messages rather than physical products, 
and the problem is not simply one of designing or selecting a technology to 
suit local conditions: there is often a basic dispute as to what consti- 
tutes the production need. Nevertheless, the description does seem to 
match, in general terms, early communication transfer experience. 
In the earliest stages (during the 50's and 60's) communication 
technology was often treated in the same way as any other technology. 
There was an emphasis on hardware, which was the basis of most project 
approaches at that time, whether they were commercially sponsored or 
part of aid programmes. However, the sale or donation of equipment was 
often accompanied by the provision of foreign experts, who took with 
them into the developing world prescriptive models of excellence based 
upon their own professional experience. Often this was done with the 
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very best intentions; the work of the BBC (acting on behalf of the 
British Government) is a case in point. The organisational model of 
the BBC is based upon quality and sophistication of personnel, a variety 
of audiences, and a balance of political tensions, which is alien to 
most African states: yet it was often imposed, in post-colonial times, 
without question (cf. Golding, 1977). The same was true of the French 
broadcasting pattern in colonial territories (cf. Cruise O'Brien, 1976). 
Nevertheless, more than a decade ago, technical assistance became 
generally more self-critical, and a period of transition began which was 
marked by a greater realism in promoting new technologies, together with 
greater rationality in reviewing their appropriateness. Some of this 
change in attitude came from the experiences of technical assistance 
programmes in general; in communication, other influences were also at 
work - curriculum reform, management by objectives, systems analysis - 
which changed the premises upon which recommendations were made. 
The growth of realism was certainly salutary, and most of the projects 
of the late 60s and 70s benefited from it. Some of the earlier uses of 
mass media were stimulated by uncritical promotion, claiming that mass 
communications could help resolve almost any problem from shortages of 
schools and teachers to mass illiteracy. Though the claims were dubious; 
they have never been adequately investigated, because, while the poten- 
tial of mass media was publicised extensively, far less was said about 
the system costs involved. Because governments were unwilling to commit 
large resources to the creation of educational mass media systems, 
because technical assistance programmes could not (or would not) cope 
with the volume of investment required to introduce or renovate a mass 
media system, action was promoted on a limited and experimental scale, 
on the premise that once the pilots had proven themselves, they could 
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be expanded. What was not ref.,,, gnised was that the pilot project caul, 
only prove itself within itS 
-', w, rn 
limited environment. The majority 
pilot schemes introduced at time were of short duration or of 
limited impact (and this to industrialised as well as to d IC. l- 
oping countries). One can iý7tance educational television in Niger, 
CCTV in Ateneo de Manila in Phillippines, educational radio in 
Thailand, educational televi:; -, n in New Delhi. Without the advanti(p: 
of economies of scale, they ',, uld not maintain themselves; lacking 
prehensiveness, they did not rtjrnish convincing evidence about larq(-- 
scale futures. 
The new realism, then, rr;, r, unted to being more exact about what, might 
be expected of a particular l,, rrftunication system. Not surprisingly, 
attention turned to smaller Eiironments, compact countries and city 
states, where a whole educatit, y,,, 11 system might be influenced withiiº a 
measurable time by a media sý; t(1, º which was within the economic resources 
of the country itself or of n technical assistance programme. A number 
of success stories in educati*111a1 mass media stemmed from this new 
realism: El Salvador, Singafu, º p, the Ivory Coast (or equally, the Open 
University in the United Kinij, $(mº, which itself operates as a closed and 
controllable system). 
Appropriate Technologies and Ioi, iigenous Development 
All of this led to a dirrp, "ent understanding of 'technology' and 
hence of the concept of transc . 
The concept of 'technolc+uv' itself, once with exclusively har%ý. ware 
implications, was now taken tcs include aspects of knowledge, skill,, 
experience, education and orgaliizational structure, all of which NO 
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heightened importance when technology transfer was considered. Of 
special significance was the evolutionary line of low-cost, self- 
help, intermediate, alternative and appropriate technologies (all 
of these concepts with differences of nuance, according to context 
and derivation, but all endeavouring to add a social and a cultural 
dimension to innovation). To quote from an OECD publication: 
"The idea here is that the value of a new technology 
lies not only in its economic viability and its technical 
soundness, but in its adaption to the local social and 
cultural environment. Assessing the appropriateness of a 
technology necessarily implies some sort of value judge- 
ment, both on the part of those who develop it and those 
who will be using it, and when ideological considerations 
come into play, as they often do, appropriateness is at 
best a fluctuating concept ... (Jequier, 1976 p. 19) 
Such approaches go well beyond the traditional framework of tech- 
nical assistance and technology transfer. In fact, 'alternative' 
technologies may be seen as antithetical to many aid structures, because 
they are founded on the premise that technology should be an endogenous 
creation of the countries themselves. The new approach is summarized in 
a keynote address to a seminar held in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1978, given by 
Francisco Sagasti: 
"The increasing importance of technological progress 
in the economic growth of industrialized countries has been 
accompanied by a rapid concentration process, to the point 
where a few firms and government agencies dominate the 
majority of research and development expenditures and control 
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a substantial share of the existing stock of technology 
particularly in the dynamic industrial sectors ... 
We still have to explore and understand better the way 
in which technology is being used as a dominant factor in 
North-South economic relations, but it is clear that the 
United States of America, the Western European countries, 
Japan, and even the socialist countries of Eastern Europe 
are primarily interested in offering their technology - 
coupled in some cases with food or capital - in exchange 
for the natural resources, the energy and the markets of 
the Third World. In exceptional cases Third World countries 
may be capable of furnishing their own capital and of prov- 
iding their own food, but in all cases they will require 
access to the S and T (Science and Technology) knowledge 
that they are not capable of producing. 
Therefore, against the possible benefits of science and 
technology for development - conquering disease, improving 
productivity, devising new materials and, in general, over- 
coming the constraints of nature - it is necessary to weigh 
the limitations imposed by the way in which S and T are 
inserted into an inequitable world order ... 
All of these constraints on the use of S and T for 
development - which are the product of long historical 
processes closely intertwined with the emergence of under- 
development - point out that Third World countries must 
organize themselves to develop their own endogenous S and T 
capabilities and to devise appropriate responses to the 
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pressures of the industrialized nations, thus establishing 
the basis for autonomous development". (Development Dialogue, 
1979: 1 p. 6) 
The New Technologies 
Another dimension for communication planning - and a new potential - 
is the new technologies. Technical developments in the communication 
sector (especially the silicone chip and the development of microprocessors) 
have revolutionised both macro and micro forms, so that there are now 
greater possibilities for both the large communication system (e. g. the 
satellite), or for small-scale systems which favour individual and com- 
munity (e. g. the portapak camera, the video-cassette recorder). The 
tendency of the sixties was to consider only forms of mass communication, 
and mostly television; we are now concerned far more with information 
technologies going beyond mass media (computers, teletext systems), 
with micromedia and small-format technologies, and with integrated del- 
ivery systems which re-animate older media such as radio. 
What is also important, however, is our attitude to technology, not 
merely as the instigator and precursor of mass communication forms, but 
as a planning instrument in its own right. In the past, we have tended 
to regard technology as the prerogative of the engineer, who invents new 
technologies in a vacuum, so that the planner can subsequently build 
around them. In the absence of defined communication policies, this is 
inevitably the case. But if societal needs are clearly expressed and 
objectives made specific, then the technologist can be included in the 
communication planning process. It is in-such a context that experi- 
mental work with solar energy cells began for television, and it may be 
argued that the growth of interest in small-format media stems from a 
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realization by the technologist of demands made by users as well as by 
producers. A new development over the past five years has been the 
emphasis upon access to media by users and audiences, and upon partici- 
pation in production processes. Recent technologies make this develop- 
ment possible, through their production of cheaper, more automatic, 
more portable and miniature media tools. In a wider sense, if the 
technologist can be a part of the communication planning team from the 
outset, then complete technical systems may be designed to user specifi- 
cations. Moreover (and this is not specific to communications) elec- 
tronic and computer technologies can be directly contributory to the 
planning process, making it more sophisticated, faster and more capable 
of formative evaluation through simulation. 
Currently, therefore, the potential : of the new technologies and 
the change in attitude towards technology transfer has produced a new 
political platform - that of self-reliance and endongenous development. 
Recent international conferences, like the Intergovernmental Conference 
for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and Programmes for Communication 
Development (held at UNESCO, Paris, in 1980) have been based upon this 
concept: the next triennial programme of UNESCO also underwrites the 
concept emphatically. This concept encapsulates much of what has just 
been argued - new attitudes to technical cooperation, new opportunities 
for technological development, a new balance in international forces. 
It is a flexible concept, with which communication planning has neces- 
sarily to deal. 
Systems Approaches 
Finally, and perhaps most relevant of all, are the planning techniques 
deriving from system approaches. The main source of such studies was in 
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the area of systems engineering, which is essentially a post-war pheno- 
menon. It merged two traditions: of operations research, and of 
systems analysis. The first was more concerned with the rational 
utilization of existing technologies and resources, the second with 
integrated planning, research and design; but both shared similar tools 
of analysis, of logic and presentation. 
For many years, the application of systems techniques in contexts 
outside industry and technology was not foreseen, but by the sixties, 
the habits of systems thinking had extended to many other areas. Society, 
the polity, institutional forms were increasingly viewed in terms of 
systemic relationships, and patterns-of interaction and influence investi- 
gated. Here, not only the methods of analysis, but also the techniques 
of presentation (in models and systems diagrams), proved increasingly 
useful. The kind of multi-dimensional planning which takes account of 
human as well as technological systems and attempts to accommodate un- 
certainties of social and political behaviour, and the ability to make 
schematic representations of activities and parties involved in decision- 
making, were to prove invaluable. 
The Practice of Communication Planning 
In developing a planning methodology, however, more pragmatic con- 
siderations are also necessary. In essence, the rationale for development 
planning is that development, irrespective of the economic or social 
premises upon which it is founded, demands means of utilizing and con- 
serving resources, and co-ordinating the institutions which manage 
resources, in an integrated fashion. This is a position which is 
accepted by the majority of developing countries, of whatever political 
persuasion. The particular argument for communication planning is at 
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one remove from this central principle, being that: (i) communication 
resources, especially communication media, are comparable with other 
material and human resources; (ii) they are potentially significant 
within the development process, both as an economic activity in their 
own right and as a means of furthering other economic, social and 
educational activities; (iii) as such they will benefit from a planned 
and integrated approach; and (iv) suitable methods and structures need 
to be found to promote this integration. 
It has to be admitted at the outset, however, that work on communi- 
cation planning has been slow, restricted by both practical and methodol- 
ogical difficulties. " 
The theme of policies is probably more exotic and certainly more 
publicized than that of planning. UNESCO has, for example, organized 
three Intergovernmental Conferences on Communication Policies: one for 
Latin America and the Caribbean held in Costa Rica in 1976; a second for 
Asia held in Kuala Lumpur in February 1979, and a third for Africa held 
in Yaounde in July 1980. A similar exercise is planned for the Arab States, 
and possibly for Europe . Confrontations at the political level, largely 
arising from those policy issues which surround questions of information 
flow, technology transfer and the evolution of a New International Infor- 
mation and Communication Order, have made the earlier plans for an ordered 
sequence disputable, if not obsolete. The pattern of the future may well 
be changed by the outcome of the International Commission for the Study of 
Communication Problems (a group of scholars and practitioners brought 
together by UNESCO after its 1976 General Conference), and by the 1980 
Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and 
Programmes for Communication Development, which produced a consensus 
proposal for the establishment of an International Programme for the 
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Development of Communication. 
These conferences are, nevertheless, in a somewhat different trad- 
ition. As political fora, they discuss a wide range of issues surround- 
ing communication (information balance, research orientations, training, 
etc. ), and come up with generalized recommendations, but they do not 
attempt to devise detailed policy statements. Before anything approach- 
ing such coherence can be envisaged, national policies must first be 
formulated and that situation is far from a reality. UNESCO has published 
a number of national communication policy studies, but these again tend 
to be descriptions of communication practice and philosophy: they are 
fragmented and relatively uncritical accounts of how communication agencies 
operate within set patterns of legislation. 
The issues which are raised here are of a different order. They 
are concerned with developing mechanisms for the re-planning, re-orienta- 
tion and re-formulation of communication systems, in the light of state- 
ments of policy which are specific enough to set parameters for future 
planning. That is an exercise which, while it inevitably operates within 
a political arena, attempts to take both the analysis and the prescrip- 
tion further than general policy boundaries. And for this, specific 
methodologies and techniques are needed. 
There has been, so far, some groundwork in the development of 
economic guidelines for communication inventories, on the organization 
of communication planning data bases, and a study of communication 
indicators (covering social and cultural as well as economic dimensions) 
was completed by the Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex, in 1977 leading to a conference review by UNESCO in 1978 and to 
an interim publication (UNESCO, 1979b). A very useful activity also 
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undertaken for UNESCO by the East-West Communication Institute, Hawaii, 
was a review of planning methods in other disciplines (economics, 
education etc. ), evaluating their relevance to the communication field, 
and this was later extended to a more detailed study of methodological 
adaption. There have also been a number of discursive anthologies and 
bibliographies of writings on the subject, usually attached to working 
conferences, and some prototype training programmes have been initiated, 
based on simulation planning exercises. Project workshops in Asia, 
Latin America and (in 1981) Africa are to be followed by an experimental 
course at the international level in 1982, designed to lead to more 
extensive post-graduate and post-experience courses. 
There is, in this record, a sense of hesitancy, of fragmentation. 
This is not necessarily an indictment; we are embarking upon a new 
area of planning, and practical innovations are slow to materialize, 
even after the theoretical groundwork has been laid. The concept is, 
however, explicit (with some financial backing) in the new International 
Programme for the Development of Communication, proposed by UNESCO in 
1980. 
The Reality of Policy Formulation 
A good deal has been said of the link between policies and planning, 
hardly anything of the acceptance of a policy platform in the first place. 
In the past, the communication sector has not generally been treated as 
a coherent sector in its own right, and it has not been accorded a parti- 
cularly high place in the development hierarchy (a recent review of 
bilateral and multilateral technical assistance showed, for example, that 
communication development accounted for less than 0.5% of the total 
development allocation). It is, moreover, a field in which widespread 
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activity by the private sector is the norm, and by inference, in the 
public sector some potential for profitability, or at least self- 
sufficiency, is also commonly assumed. For communication policies to 
emerge, there must be a positive drive towards them, which has to be 
both motivated and financed. 
This study is concerned with planning under conditions of technolo- 
gical opportunity, and it is evident that this drive can be of several 
kinds. It can, for example, be a response to commercial or market forces; 
the disciplines of the applied social sciences, of technology and of 
economics, came about partly because, once industrial structures were 
created, there were market incentivEFs to study them further and plan for 
their optimization. However, this kind of drive has been mainly respon- 
sible (at least in capitalist countries) for more limited forms of opera- 
tional planning - in communication, as in other fields. We are talking 
here of something rather different - of an integrated approach to communi- 
cation planning which is concerned with the allocation and conservation 
of communication resources at a national level, and for this both social 
motivation and concomitant social policy are needed, with the possibility 
and acceptance of some regulatory means. This is something which has 
been associated, since the early years of this century, mainly with the 
socialist countries; but it has been encouraged, in the years since the 
Second World War by the imperatives of the development process, according 
to which countries which may be in no way socialist in political philosophy 
have nevertheless accepted the need for State intervention, responding to 
the stress of modernization. 
In the developing world, communication planning is able to emerge as 
a focus of activity, not because the problems are necessarily more acute, 
but because the possibiity of integrated planning for a comprehensive 
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sector like communication can at least be envisaged. In the industrial- 
ized world, outside of the socialist countries, communication industries 
are in many cases commercial, privately owned or corporately structured 
(especially in North America), and even where issues of public respon- 
sibility are legislated for, these are usually approached according to 
an individual medium or industry, rather than collectively. In the 
United States, where the vast majority of media industries are privately 
owned, the potential for regulation is particularly limited: usually to 
matters of technical behaviour (e. g. frequency allocation) or to anti- 
monopolism. Investigations such as those conducted by Congress are 
political reviews, outside the Government's administrative structures. 
In the United Kingdom, the mechanism of the Royal Commission is similarly 
detached, its powers only recommendatory; again it is characteristically 
organized by industry or medium, and where controls exist (such as in 
the Press Council) these are often voluntary, the creation of the industries 
themselves. At best a corporation structure is evolved, as with the BBC. 
In the developing world, however, an acceptance of development imperatives 
has usually vested a far greater responsibility in planning ministries, 
co-ordinated in the bulk of cases by an economic planning board or its 
equivalent. While there is little tradition anywhere of treating communi- 
cation as a coherent sector, or even as a significant sphere of development 
activity, structurally at least the potential exists in the developing 
world for a more comprehensive deployment of communication resources. 
Moreover, planning for communication in the developing world usually 
begins from a less entrenched position than in the West, consequently with 
less lobbying. 
The Reality of Methodology 
An equally important check against reality has to be made in the 
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field of methodology. It would be unwise to view systems analysis and 
its application to communication planning problems in an uncritical way, 
without recognizing doubts which have been expressed (in other fields 
where it has been applied, such as business studies) as to its viability. 
Such doubts are illustrated in the following statement by Martin Landau. 
"It can be stated, in summary, that any indiscriminate 
legislation of end-states is as foolhardy as the indiscrim- 
inate application of means. Unless we understand the field- 
determined character of both, there will be those to pay the 
price of our conceit: for it is no more than to erect dream 
worlds even as we watch real ones collapse. A means-end 
relationship is an empirical proposition, a hypothesis into 
sheer speculation, but we lose the opportunity to observe 
consequences, and hence to build the knowledge that is needed. 
Effective development strategies depend, therefore, on accurate 
descriptions of systemic conditions and upon the construction 
of means-ends arrangements that are contextually or systemi- 
cally relevant". (Landau, 1972 p. 173) 
This is not an isolated quotation, and it seems clear that there 
are practical limits to the capacity of the planning process when deal- 
ing with human activity systems. These limits are of various kinds. 
Some are contextual, especially political (e. g. the nature of the society 
in which planning is expected to take place, and the philosophy which 
it adopts towards both communication and regulation in general). Others 
are institutional; planning can only operate successfully at specific 
levels (depending largely upon the control which the planner has over 
implementation). Others still are human, deriving. from human caprice, 
irrationality, self-interest and fallibility (all the planning in the 
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world cannot compel a decision-maker to adopt rational criteria in 
making final judgements). 
All of this has a major implication: that the parameters adopted 
for planning must face up to the challenge of realism, and adapt their 
premises accordingly. In consequence, they must also be reflected in 
research methodology. 
0 
- 60 - 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Once the initial literature search had been completed, the next 
stage, of devising a research strategy, inevitably involved some degree 
of compromise. While the strategy adopted should be based upon scienti- 
fic method, it must also be flexible; it was important to recognise and 
distinguish between variables in the planning process, but without rely- 
ing too heavily upon their separation, their dependence or independence. 
What was being tested was an operatibnal approach used within a compos- 
ite, real-life system, not a formal or mechanistic planning instrument. 
Delimitation 
The selection of research methodology therefore began with an exer- 
cise in delimitation. In the first place, it was important to specify the 
elements of the overall planning sequence which were to be considered, and 
these are perhaps best described diagrammatically. 
In figure 4 the main elements of the planning and implementation 
process are summarised, in terms of a traditional systems model. They 
run from a preliminary gestation period, through stages of policy formula- 
tion, strategic planning and operational planning, to eventual implementa- 
tion and evaluation. In Figure 4 the area considered central and critical 
to communication planning is enclosed by a box. 
The gestation period, while important, cannot be legislated for in 
any precise sense; it is therefore excludad. Similarly, implementation 
and evaluation - although they must be planned in advance, in the sense of 
creating enabling structures - are still generally outside the limits of 
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the initial planning process. Attention was therefore to be concentrated 
on the phases of policy formulation, strategic planning and operational 
planning, as the main components of the formative planning process. 
At the same time, the research need, as opposed to the planning need, 
would inevitably extend beyond this central core, if it were accepted that 
planning is not a self-contained activity, but intended to lead to prac- 
tical and appropriate action. This would require the research strategy to 
include the area of implementation, since it is only through the evaluation 
of results that the adequacy of planning can be assessed and planning models 
refined. Thus, while the boxed section of Figure 4 defines the central 
concern of planning, research into planning would necessarily have to con- 
sider the whole sequence. 
This argument led to a second delimitation, which contrasted planning 
theory and practice. 
The distinction was between the conduct of planning and planning 
surveys (i. e. the production and implementation of plans), and theories 
of the planning process (i. e. the formulation, testing and refinement of 
methodologies of planning). Naturally, there is a close relationship 
between the two: methodological studies serve to catalyse the production 
of adequate plans, and the success of the latter is to some extent measured 
by the adequacy of the former. But this research was not to be concerned 
primarily with techniques of planning, or planning theory per se; it 
sought to develop an operational framework within which various planning 
styles and methods might be accommodated, according to prevailing societal 
values and planning traditions. In this process, if one accepted the 
basic distinction drawn by Middleton (1980) between rational/comprehensive 
planning (which moves in a predominantly linear and ordered sequence from 
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needs assessment through to evaluation), and incremental planning (which 
moves in small steps towards a consensus based on bargaining arrange- 
ments), the probability was that the rational/comprehensive mode would 
be emphasised, because it reflected the dominant pattern in the devel- 
oping world, and was therefore the most attuned to reality. At the same 
time, it was hoped that the framework, as it emerged, would be flexible 
enough to accommodate to new and innovative planning styles, which extend 
beyond simple strategies of resource allocation, and in the final chapter 
of this thesis, the implications of the research are reviewed in terms 
of participatory, transactive and other radical planning approaches. 
In research of this kind, however, strategy is determined by des- 
ired outcomes; where models are constructed, their formulation is governed 
by the kind of operational instrument which is ultimately sought, and 
this in turn places an emphasis upon their practical testability. 
In this case, the desired outcome was to develop a planning strategy 
which would lead to (i) rational planning (in the sense of logical, con- 
sistent plans meeting predetermined objectives), and (ii) planning capable 
of implementation, carrying within itself both the motivation and the 
means for follow-up. 
Such a strategy would clearly have to include both the design of 
planning tools (i. e. instruments of planning for both general and specific 
circumstances) and their application (i. e. the planning process would also 
have to be considered, to ensure relevant expertise in planning teams and 
the encouragement of consensus among lead figures (planners and poli- 
tical decision makers) and participants (the audience who are the sub- 
jects of planning, and who have an ultimate stake in the results of the 
plan). Additionally, the strategy must include means of evaluation, which in 
--3 
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this context was likely to imply, mainly, formative evaluation and the 
evaluation of processes (i. e. an assessment of the planning design as 
it emerged, and the subsequent monitoring and evaluation of its use). 
Quantitative and statistical techniques, and methods of summative 
evaluation, were less likely to be employed (for reasons described later 
in this chapter, when the research strategy is compared with more ortho- 
dox and controlled research designs. ) Methodology needs are summarized 
in Figure 5. 
Basic Assumptions 
To develop the research strategy a stage further, it was then nec- 
essary to make some more specific astumptions as to eventual outcomes, in 
terms of the planning product. 
The first assumption was that the creation of a planning model should 
be prefaced by an elucidation of basic planning concepts, derived from 
relevant literature and from personal experience, but evaluated and modi- 
fied, as far as possible, through a detailed analysis of project case 
studies and of earlier planning surveys, and expanded, on the basis of 
this analysis, into a series of hypothetical planning principles. 
The second assumption was that it would not be possible to evolve a 
planning model to suit all conditions and circumstances, even when these 
were confined to the developing world and focused on national level progr- 
ammes. Accordingly, two steps in model construction were envisaged: the 
development, initially, of a generalised planning model (which would be 
termed a framework), and its subsequent adaptation, conforming to the 
demands of a particular environment, into a specific planning design (which 
would be termed a scenario). The terminology employed here was derived 
from planning literature, but employed in a novel sense: the term 'framework' 
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was chosen because it suggested an overall frame, or context, for plan- 
ning, while the term 'scenario' had a more particular-and local implication. 
The third assumption was that the refinement of the planning model 
would depend upon field-testing and evaluation, which would ideally be a 
continuous process. At each stage of application, the local scenario 
should be evaluated carefully, and the results of this evaluation used 
to redefine both the framework from which it originated, and further adapta- 
tion into new scenario forms. 
These assumptions were not hypotheses; while they would be tested to 
some extent experimentally in the ensuing research design, they were essen- 
tially guidelines for model construction. 
Research Strategy 
Given these assumptions, it was possible to evolve a more detailed 
research strategy, which is illustrated in Figure 6. Essentially, in 
the process which it describes, secondary analysis (of projects and actual 
planning surveys and exercises) was to be used as a guide in developing 
a generalised planning model or framework, which was then to be adapted for 
a particular field test. (In this case, it is important to note that the 
field test was an actual planning survey, devised to come up with a viable 
plan; it was not a pilot or laboratory study). Following the sequence of 
Figure 6, the various stages of planning were then to be evaluated, results 
analysed, and the. final stage of implementation monitored and evaluated. 
This was the ideal model upon which the research was based. However, 
one deviation occurred at a later stage, which should be acknowledged as 
early as possible. A field test was actually carried out in Afghanistan, 
and research into the methodology employed continued as far as the stage 
of production of operational plans. The original intention was to extend 
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the study through to the stage of implementation, and to use the evalua- 
tion of results achieved (including some elements of summative evaluation) 
as a long-term means of assessment and adaptation. In the event, for 
reasons described later in the thesis, the stage of implementation was 
not reached, because of a series of political disturbances in Afghanistan, 
and field research was necessarily broken off after the planning phase 
had been completed; checks on the environmental factors associated with 
implementation were therefore not possible in this case. 
In future, however, it should be possible to use the design in a 
different location, as the basis of a new scenario, in order to pursue 
the research to its logical and necessary conclusion. 
Comparison with Orthodox Educational Research 
It should be useful, at this stage, to compare the research strategy 
employed with other research approaches, as it was clearly different in 
character from the norm of educational and of much social science research. 
While it employed standard research, instruments (the case study, the con- 
struction of models, field experiments), it was not concerned primarily 
with the explanation of observed phenomena, nor was it able to operate in' 
limited environments, with controlled variables, Nor could it be based 
upon a traditional hypothetico-deductive method, or proceed from the 
formation of research hypotheses, Such hypotheses seek to explain rela- 
tionships between phenomena and are generally limited in scope, dealing 
with expected relationships between known variables. Here, the intention 
was not to explain events, but to invent and operationalise a means of 
planning for structural change. 
At the same time, many of the criteria and assumptions of the hypo- 
thetico-eductive method were retained, and the approach was, 
in intention, 
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logical and scientific. The degree to which the methodology adopted was 
comparable with more traditional approaches can be seen in Table l, where 
the stages of a more orthodox educational research experiment are com- 
pared with the communication planning study. 
It is acknowledged that the hypothetico-deductive approach to edu- 
cational research design has not been without its critics. A number of 
commentators have attempted to show that the social sciences are different 
in kind from the natural sciences, that they are less susceptible to 
scientific rigour, that they require intuitive and empathetic as well as 
intellectual means of understanding, and that, in the case of action and 
operational research, especially when pitched at a macro level, not only 
are quantitatively-based research methods not always appropriate, but the 
definition and separation of variables is not always possible (cf Bantock, 
1965 pp. 153-174). The intention in Table 1, however, is not so much to 
draw an arbitrary distinction between two research approaches, as to 
characterise a typical approach to an educational problem which is micro 
in character, amenable to statistical enquiry, and testable in a relatively 
direct fashion, and then to compare this with the. strategy of the present 
research. 
On the evidence of Table I it will be observed that there is a good 
deal of similarity between the two research strategies, so much so that 
in most cases the same terminology can be used to identify each major phase 
of activity. In the case of the educational research design, the first 
concern is problem definition, in the sense of narrowing down a field and 
problem area: this is followed by a literature review. This is succeeded 
(in Phase Two) by the construction of hypotheses (sometimes with the assist- 
ance of exploratory pilot studies), and the establishment of analytical 
procedures whereby these can be tested. Subsequently, in Phase Three, 
- 70 - 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF RESEARCH DESIGNS 
EDUCATIONAL 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
COMMUNICATION PLANNING 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Define the problem I. Define the problem 
äw ° 2. Review the literature. 
wz zWQh 2. Review the literature ` 
:L 
öi ö~ o1 
3. Set up and conduct " 3. Hypothesise basic planning 
ö pilot studies W concepts and principles 
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3 
N 
=N 5. Decide on analytic 
o ° of case studies and surveys 
~ z procedures N wö 5. Construct planning model 
V) N: Q- g in light of above 
C) a- o- 
L 
6. Define population and J 6. Adapt planning model to 
w ä select representative 
W L Z specific environment for C) ö samples CD p field testing 
w 7. Select or develop N ¢ 7. Evolve evaluation y LU V) method of measurement = w strategy 
c o a o 
8. Collect data 8. Apply model in field test U 
L, and evaluate application 
process S 
0 
Ö 
c1- r'n 
U- _ F- 
= 
Lei.. 
04-- 
9. Process data 9-- Correlate and analyse 
evaluations 
W 
N 10. Test hypotheses for 
W 
V) L6 
0-4 
statistical signifi- W cance W V) < 
ä a a. 
11. Interpret results 10. Modify planning model in 
12. Examine educational light of evaluations 
implications b 11. Evolve strategy for further 
ä Q testing and evaluation 
x v 
º- x v, Lu 12. Examine implications for 
W Of W communication planning 
I (A I i- ,¢ 
development 
a z Cl- 
z 
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the hypothesis is operationalised: a-population determined, a sample 
chosen, and means of measurement and assessment devised. From this 
point, in Phase Four, data collection proceeds, which is then processed 
and analysed (in Phase Five), and the results tested for statistical 
significance, before interpretations are made and inferences drawn 
(Phase Six). 
The communication planning research design also begins with problem 
definition, though here the intention is to focus down, and set parameters 
to, a problem which is already known, since it is the mobilising force 
behind the research. 
0 
In the second phase, however, there are more radical differences 
between the two strategies. In the case of the communication planning 
research, it was not possible to set up experimental or pilot surveys, 
but only to hypothesise, from secondary data and personal experience, a set 
of basic planning concepts, which were then validated or modified by com- 
paring them with project case studies or earlier planning surveys. They 
were then expanded into a list of planning principles, which were employed, 
not to formulate research hypotheses, but to help construct a general 
planning model - in this case, described as an 'operational framework' for 
planning. 
In later phases, there was again a greater identity between the 
two approaches. In both cases, the next step was one of operationalisation: 
the adaptation of the general planning model to a particular set of circum- 
stances in which it could be field tested, in much the same way as a 
hypothesis has to be operationalised to match a particular problem or 
environment, with testability as a major criterion. In the communication 
planning context, the framework was specifically adapted to become a 
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planning 'scenario', built around the demands, characteristics and con- 
straints of a particular setting. Although precise means of measurement 
could not be devised, it was nevertheless possible to develop a means of 
process evaluation, which monitored both the deviations from the scenario 
during the field test, and the psychological and group processes experien- 
ced by the planning team, as well as patterns of decision making. This 
corresponded to the phase of 'application'. 
Subsequently, the correlation and analysis of the two evaluations 
corresponded to the phase of data processing, and the modification of 
the planning design to that of interpretation. 
0 
In summary, therefore, while the research strategy adopted was 
innovative and to some extent pragmatic, its approach was still similar, 
in fundamentals, to more orthodox research designs and should bear com- 
parison with these. 
Phasing of the Research Strategy 
To revert to the main argument, the next methodological step was to 
break down the activity sequence of Figure 6 into more detailed steps. 
This is illustrated in Figure 7 and the phasing evolved is related below 
to its time frame. As stated earlier in this chapter, while the original 
intention was to evaluate the Afghanistan project throughout its period 
of implementation, in the event this proved impossible. Consequently, 
this stage of the research has been eliminated from Figure 7. An 
expanded account of the methodology employed will be found later in the 
text, as each phase is described in detail, but it is considered important 
at the outset to present an overview of the methodological base, as a guide 
to the study's organisation. 
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Phase One 
(January - March 1976) 
This phase involved a preliminary search of the relevant literature 
in the fields of communication research, communication policies and plan- 
ning; the theory of planning and management; and the field of development 
studies. 
Phase Two 
(March - September 1976) 
(i) The hypothesisation, from a literature search and from personal ex- 
perience, of a number of guiding concepts for planning, set within 
a simple matrix, which might be'used to initiate model building. 
(ii) The evaluation and modification of these concepts, through the- 
selection and analysis of a sample of eight communication projects 
at a variety of geographical and institutional levels, to identify 
common conditions, problems and constraints. (The term 'project' 
was understood here as a communication activity which had been 
planned, implemented and evaluated - i. e. it had reached a 
definite stage of realisation). Although the focus of the research 
was upon communication planning at a national level in the develop- 
ing world, it was considered that, initially, a wider cross-section 
of projects could be helpful. The analysis was based upon secondary 
data alone. 
(iii) The expansion of the basic concepts, as a result of (ii) above, 
into a list of hypothetical planning principles. 
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(iv) A parallel review of a communication planning survey, to isolate 
particular problems, difficulties and constraints. (A 
'survey' denoted the preparation of a comprehensive communi- 
cation plan. Such an analysis, therefore, was likely to 
reveal more of the conduct and techniques of planning than 
a project analysis). 
(v) The revision, and consolidation, of the hypothetical list 
of planning principles, taking account of (iv) above, and 
oriented towards model building. 
0 
(vi) The construction of a theoretical framework for communication 
planning, pitched at a national level and oriented towards 
development objectives. 
Phase Three 
(October 1976 - May 1977) 
In this phase, the framework was used as a base for the construction 
of a planning scenario, to be utilised in a field survey. This survey was 
pitched at a national level, conducted in Afghanistan. 
Phase Four 
(May 1977 - January 1978) 
Phase Four involved the monitoring and evaluation of this communi- 
cation planning survey in the field. (The writer acted as project officer 
for the survey and visited the survey team in Afghanistan on three occasions). 
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Phase Five 
(February 1978 - June 1979) 
In this period the evaluations of the Afghanistan field were 
compared and analysed. 
Phase Six 
(July 1979 - January 1980) 
The final phase comprised: 
(i) A refinement of the framework, taking account of the preceding 
evaluation. 
(ii) The formulation of general conclusions on the validity of the frame- 
work, and its implications for communication planning research and 
application. 
The writing of the thesis has been organised in such a way that 
its presentation, and chapter headings, follow this sequence. 
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CHAPTERIV 
PLANNING PRINCIPLES: 
PROJECT CASE STUDIES 
The development of a planning framework was approached with some 
caution, prefaced by the isolation, as hypotheses, of a number of guiding 
concepts for communication planning, their correlation with earlier projects 
and planning surveys, and their expansion into planning principles. 
This exercise was based on the second of the assumptions proposed in 
Chapter III. There it was argued that at least two steps would be needed 
in formulating a planning instrument: the creation, in the first place, of 
a generalised model or framework; and its subsequent adaptation into a 
local planning design or scenario. 
At this stage, a further assumption was also considered necessary: 
that a distinction should be made between the design of a planning frame- 
work, and its application. In other words, certain concepts would probably 
relate mainly to the theoretical development of a planning model, while 
others would be more concerned with constraints and difficulties attached 
to the planning process, once a planning team was in existence. Thus, by 
extension, certain guiding principles for planning would also be more 
theoretical or technical in character (e. g. on the formulation of objectives), 
while others would consider socio-political or psychological factors (e. g. 
relationships with decision makers, or the supervision of multi-disciplinary 
planning teams). While both kinds of experience would probably be found 
in an analysis of specific case studies, it was thought that the construction, 
in advance, of a simple model for their categorisation would be helpful, 
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both in the examination of data and their eventual use in constructing an 
operational framework. 
The original model proposed for this purpose was extremely simple, 
and is reproduced in Figure 8. Essentially, this separated out the two 
elements of design and application, and further divided each into activi- 
ties of model building (i. e. framework design) and model adaptation (i. e. 
scenario construction) on the one hand, while assigning the planning process 
(i. e. scenario application) and report production to the second segment 
of the diagram. In this way, the sequencing already proposed in Figures 
6 and 7 was retained. 
0 
This model was then used as a matrix, within which'to isolate some 
key planning concepts which, it would seem (on the basis of personal 
experience and planning literature), should be reflected in further model 
building. 
Key Concepts 
Using the matrix as a guide, project reports, planning literature, 
personal conversations and correspondence were explored to suggest critical 
experiences in each dimension, This led to a broad, and unorganised, 
selection of potential guidelines, initially more than fifty, which were 
reviewed to see where overlaps and duplications occurred. On this basis, 
a revised list of 31 points was produced. 
This list was still considered too diffuse for analytical purposes, 
and a further reduction was made, following an exercise in concept mapping. 
In this process, associated, principles were clustered, and an attempt was 
made to define the nature of each cluster, by using a few key words: in 
this way it was hoped that the essence of a concept would be exposed, but 
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CHAPTER III 
IN: t1 FOR PAGE 80 
These concepts were not formulated subjectively, although they have to same extent 
been ranked and interpreted through personal experience. Essentially they derive 
fron a range of literatures: fron educational technology, planning theory, 
evaluation, business and nanagenent studies, political theory and philosophy. 
Thus, the concept of comprehensiveness is integral to the systems approach and 
to rational-carprehensive views of planning, as are questions of timing, phasing 
and sequencing (cf Kahn, 1969, Johnson, Kast and Fosenzweig 1973. ), 
'; 
opposing 
and critical views stress realism and flexibility in planning (cf Caiden and 
Wildavsky 1974, Benveniste 1972, Wiseman, 1978). 1phasis on the clarification 
of objectives is Damm throughout the literature of educational technology 
and curriculum design (of Bloan, 1956, Gagne, 1965 and, fora recent review, 
Aowntree, 1974). Questions of interdisciplinarity, team working and group 
organisation are ergahasised in the literature of social and business organisation 
(cf Miller 1976, Bandura, 1977). There is a considerable modern literature on 
user involvetent, acres and participation (cf Etzioni 1968, Freire, 1972, Enzen- 
burger 1974, and, for a review in the eamiunication field, Bordenave 1977, and 
Berrigan, 1977). Wile the need for evaluation is now incorporated (at least as 
a theoretical principle) into most project approaches (cf Jamison and McAnany, 1978), 
the recent literature of evaluation itself stresses realism, the it rtance of 
individuals in decision raking processes, and the need for flexible and utilisation- 
&icusea strategies (cf Borich 1974 and Patton 1978), in much the same way that . 
current literature on social organisation and innovation also emphasises a pragmatic 
approach (cf Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein 1971, Pettigrew 1973 and Van Gunsten 
1976). but it is perhaps the literature of disjointed-incrementalist planning 
VAdch most eac'hasiees the need for flexibility and a blend of planning styles in 
dealing with specific policy and planning situations (of Lindblom, 1968; Archibald, 
1970; Galloway and Mahayani 1977; Bates 1978). 
Even in this abbreviated t of the derivation of concerts, overlaps between 
disciplines can already be perceived, reflecting a growing convergence of thinking 
on plaryning news and priorities . In fact, many of the concepts could have 
been clustered further stills ...... (back to original text). 
., 
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not made too specific through premature verbalisation. 
In fact, these concepts could have been clustered further still; many 
of them were interlinked (that of need, and devolution, for example; or 
flexibility and realism). But a further reduction was not attempted, for 
two reasons. In the first place, all the concepts are connected - they 
are all aspects of an-emerging view of the planning process. And in the 
second place, the purpose of isolating them was to help pinpoint clear 
and utilitarian principles. To group them too closely at this stage might 
hinder this process, by moving too radically away from specific perspectives 
of planning. 
0 
In Figure 9 the key concepts are placed within the basic matrix of 
Figure 8. A simple commentary on each is given below, but it should be 
emphasised that these commentaries are still at the level of hypotheses, 
and are in no way prescriptive. 
Framework Design 
Flexibility 
This implies the need for a planning framework to avoid dogmatism, 
over-dependence on external models, or restriction to a limited set of 
planning techniques. For a framework to be practically useful, it should 
be capable of adapting to a variety of contexts. 
Comprehensiveness 
This suggests that communication planning should be considered 
holistically, not setting out to emphasise the claims of a particular 
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medium or technology, or acting solely in the interests of a single sector 
or project. Much project planning is limited in this way, beginning only 
at the operational level, with a technical proposal for a television service, 
a film institute, a rural development campaign. The danger with this kind 
of planning is that it may lead to duplication, or even run counter to the 
overall objectives of the educational or social system of which it is a 
part. 
Reflection of Need 
Planning should begin from a genuine assessment of need, rather than 
from the predispositions of donors ahd decision-makers. Otherwise communi- 
cation systems may be created which are irrelevant to, and hence rejected 
by, their audiences. 
Devolution 
Planning should broaden its base of participation as far as possible, 
avoiding excessive centralisation and dirigism, and ultimately extending 
as far as individual users. 
Clarity of Objectives 
For planning to proceed efficiently, objectives must be stated 
precisely, wherever possible quantified or expressed in measurable terms 
(e. g. of behavioural change). 
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Scenario Construction 
Maximisation of Resources and Infrastructures 
Existing resources and infrastructures should be used wherever 
possible. While a new institution may be simpler to plan, it can be 
wasteful, not simply in the sense of duplication, but also in discarding 
an accumulated reservoir of experience. 
Timinn 
Planning should pay careful attention to timing, both in initiating 
the planning process, and in phasing its component activities. 
Coordination 
Mechanisms for coordination and cooperative working should be built 
into planning design and legislated for in advance. 
Scenario Application 
Primacy of People 
In planning and decision-making people are more important than tech- 
niques; the planning process has to allow for their quality and creati- 
vity, and provide latitude for manouevre. 
Support 
The support of decision makers and people in positions of influence is 
necessary for planning to proceed effectively and lead to implementation. 
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Realism 
Conversely, recognition has to be given, in adapting and applying a 
planning model, to the limitations of people, processes, institutions 
and infrastructures. 
Interdiscip11narity 
Communication, as a mixed field, involves a number of specialisms, and 
allowance has to be made for these to work together in multi-disciplinary 
teams. 
0 
Report Production 
Eva l«ation 
In the preparation of plans for a communication system, means of 
evaluation should be included, to allow for reconsideration and revision 
of the system in the light of experience. 
Comparison with Project Case Studies 
MVI$1 D I= 1OR PAGE 84 (F LLL MI DING... C+QARISON Wnb PIXIMCr CASE STUDIl) 
All these concepts were derived fror, research literature, reinfcrced and 
filtered by personal experience, and they were therefore already partly 
substantiated as guiding concepts. But each existed at a general level 
of abstraction; what was being looked for in this case was not so much 
valiaation, as a carg arison with real-life situations, leading to their 
definition aril forni elation with greater precision, in the context of Com- 
munication projects. It, was ii ortant... (BACK TO ORIGINAL TF? Cr CN PACE 
Ss) . 
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realism and incrementalism in planning 
(cf Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974). 
Emphasis on the clarification of objectives is common throughout 
the 
literature of educational technology (cf Bloom, 1955 and Gagne, 
1965), 
and there is an equally voluminous literature on evaluation (cf Popham, 
1974). Questions of interdisciplinarity, team working and organisation 
are emphasised in the literature of social and business organisation, 
espcially in the work of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations 
(cf Miller, 1976), and there is a considerable modern literature on user 
involvement, access and participation (cf. Berrigan, 1977, for a review 
in the communication field). 
What was being looked for here, -however, was not only validation, 
but also a comparison with real-life situations. It was important, in 
constructing a viable and practical planning model, to see how far such 
concepts were actually borne out in actual planning situations, and how 
far they were critical to implementation. At the same time, each con- 
cept needed to be stated, and amplified, in more specific terms, as a 
working principle. 
It seemed necessary, therefore, to conduct a more disciplined exam- 
ination of a selected number of projects, rather than embark upon a search 
for verification. 
Two kinds of case study were likely to be of assistance. The first 
was of the project review or evaluation: detailed descriptions of projects, 
evaluations of their planning and implementation. The second was of the 
planning survey: records of earlier attempts at planning in the communi- 
cation sphere. 
The remainder of this chapter, and the chapter which follows are 
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devoted to such analyses. 
Project Case Studies 
Projects are, in general, based upon project documents: particularly 
in the case of projects financed through technical assistance, the donors 
demand a coherent description of goals, objectives, and means of implemen- 
tation. Increasingly, too, evaluation studies are also required by donors, 
though these are most frequently summative reports on project results, 
rather than accounts of planning and impleimmentation. 
Consequently, a reasonable spread of potential subjects was available, 
even though many of the descriptive data were fugitive, and some criteria 
were needed for their delimitation. In an exercise of this kind, with 
specific outcomes in view, random selection seemed inappropriate. 
Criteria 
Several basic parameters might be considered. There was firstly a 
geographical criterion: was a representative, world-wide selection of 
projects required? Secondly, there was a functional parameter: should 
the project be concerned with communication structures in general, with 
mass communication structures, or with a particular use of communication 
(e. g. for education)? Thirdly, there was a question of level of devel- 
opment: was the reference frame to be confined to developing countries? 
Fourthly, there was an institutional criterion, defining the scope of the 
project; which level, or levels, of organisation and scale were of interest? 
Fifthly, there was a political criterion: should a variety of socio- 
political backgrounds be included? Sixthly, there was a criterion of data 
sources and data availability. And finally, there was a question of 
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number: how many cases could be accommodated in a preliminary analysis? 
Evolution of Parameters 
These criteria were of two kinds. There were firstly criteria to 
be applied by the researcher, to delimit the choice of potential subjects; 
these defined the range and character of possible projects. Secondly, 
there were external criteria which acted as constraints upon the research, 
limiting freedom of choice. 
In the first category were parameters such as geographical location, 
function, level of development, institutional setting, political context. 
In the second were questions of data access and constraints of number. 
The first category was naturally the most critical, and in settling 
upon relevant criteria, it was necessary to return to expected outcomes. 
What was being sought was a range of project experiences through which a 
wide variety of concepts could be investigated; the emphasis should there- 
fore be on comprehensiveness, rather than on representativeness. The 
objective was not to devise a statistical, quota-based sample of projects, 
or to secure comparability, but to spread the enquiry as widely as possible. 
From such a perspective, geographical variety appeared to be a valid 
criterion. At the same time it need not be imposed too rigorously, by 
insisting upon an exact sampling of regions. 
Something similar might be argued for function. Communication deals 
in particular with processes and forms assisted by technology; a special 
focus is therefore on mass communication media and their utilisation. But 
this broad focus also embraces a range of communication applications - to 
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broadcasting, to education, rural development etc. - and a planning design 
should be able to accommodate each or all of these. 
The parameters of level of development, and of institutional setting, 
were less straightforward. It could be argued that, since the study was 
to be mainly concerned with communication planning at a national level in 
developing countries, the choice of case studies should reflect the same 
bias. However, it was also considered that, in analysing projects, there 
need be no attempt to secure comparability: the planning concepts which 
were being analysed were general, not confined initially to a particular 
social, economic or institutional setting. And if this premise was accepted, 
then it would seem that the original- matrix for the selection of case studies 
should also be broad and should probably include both developing and indus- 
trialised examples, as well as a range of institutional settings. In 
support of this view, it could also be said that more information is 
available on planning and decision-making processes in industrialised 
societies than in the developing world, and that smaller institutional 
settings are likely to furnish more specific data than national levels. 
The position was not clear-cut, and it was considered carefully before 
research proceeded. Finally, however, it was decided to include i. n the 
original matrix for the selection of case studies both developing and 
industrialised countries, and a limited range of institutional settings. 
In the event, three basic institutional categories were retained: the 
large-scale or national; the small-scale or institutional, and the consortium 
(to cover inter-institutional arrangements). The last category may seem 
forced, but it does in fact represent a form of organisation which is 
fairly common, and which raises special problems of coordination and 
association. 
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This range provided a matrix for choice which was expressed as 
follows: 
NATIONAL SYSTEMS CONSORTIUM INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGD, IENTS SETTINGS 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AßC 
INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES DEF 
In completing this matrix, it was also assumed that a geographical 
spread of projects would be reflected, and a range of functions. 
The question of political context has been left deliberately until 
last. This posed special problems; in theory, at least, the same kind 
of variety should be assumed as for geographical location. In practice, 
however, the communist world was eventually excluded because of extreme 
difficulty in securing adequate data. While descriptive accounts of 
projects in communist countries exist, they are rarely complete or 
unambiguous in presentation, and file references, personal interviews 
or data verification proved impossible. Such projects were not finally 
reflected in the matrix (though this did not mean that the eventual planning 
design would necessarily be inappropriate to a socialist society). 
Turning to the criteria of data collection and number, several 
constraints were apparent. In most cases, projects are not monitored 
throughout the stages of policy formulation and strategic planning, and 
where such accounts exist (for example, as part of a project evaluation) 
they are often compiled post-hoc, with decision-making processes either 
glossed over or pre-digested. Moreover, in the case of some developing 
country projects, for reasons of political sensitivity, there is a 
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tradition of reticence in recording such formative processes. 
Consequently, in selecting projects, it was important to choose cases 
for which either extensive descriptions already existed (including evalua- 
tion data), or projects which had been well documented throughout their 
history, and to which direct access might be obtained through reference to 
sponsors, administrators and evaluators. 
It was not considered important (or feasible) for any real degree of 
comparability to exist between these cases. The data were largely secondary, 
and few evaluations had been completed, originally, with an accent on plan- 
ning or decision-making strategies. ' Comprehensiveness was more important, 
and descriptive and subjective accounts were extensively used. in deter- 
mining planning principles, intuitive judgements and observations based on 
experience are often the most useful. 
Number was a final constraint. While a selection of projects was needed, 
to give a reasonably broad canvas for analysis, it was impracticable to make 
this list too large. From the basic matrix it was clear that at least one 
project must be chosen to exemplify each category (i. e. a minimum of six 
projects). But as the research was intended to focus upon national-level 
planning within a developing world context, it was considered that this 
category (A in the matrix) should receive greater attention. A minimum of 
three projects at this level was therefore suggested, which brought the 
total number of case studies to eight. 
The Selection Process 
A large number of projects were considered, and in selecting among 
them, the criteria cited above were employed; the most significant con- 
straint proved to be data availability. However, an interim list of 
possibilities was compiled, as follows. 
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NATIONAL CONSORTIUI4 INSTITUTIONAL 
Singapore Educational Asia-Pacific 
Media Service Institute for 
Broadcasting 
Devel op, -iment 
(Kuala Lumpur) 
Malaysia 
DEVELOPING Malaysian Educational Centre for Pro- 
Media Service duction and 
COUNTRIES Training in Adult 
Education for 
Television 
(Singapore) 
Satellite Instructional 
Television Experiment 
(SITE) (India) 
Educational Radio in 
Thailand 
Instructional Tele- 
vision in American 
Samoa 
INDUSTRIALISED 
COUNTRIES 
The Open University of 
the United Kingdom 
Educational Broad- 
casting in Australia 
(Australian Broad- 
casting Commission) 
Educational Broad 
casting in the UK 
(British Broad- 
casting Corporation) 
Telekolleg, (Munich) 
Educational Broad- 
casting in Japan 
(Nippon Hoso Kyokai) 
Asian hass Commu- 
nication Informa- 
tion and Research 
Centre (Singapore) 
Group Resources of 
Women, (Tobago) 
Centre for Educational 
Technology, University 
Sains Malaysia 
Film and Television 
Institute of India 
International Broad- 
casting Institute 
(now International 
Institute of Communi- 
cations) 
Agency for Instruct- 
ional Television 
(USA) 
European Broadcast- 
ing Union 
Public Broadcasting 
in the USA 
Children's Television 
Workshop (USA) 
Haviaian Public Tele- 
vision 
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This list had then to be reduced by two thirds (although the same 
degree of reduction was not necessary in each category). The reduction 
required was as shown below, with the number of potential cases itemized 
first, and the number required given afterwards in brackets. 
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 6 (3) 4 (1) 3 (1) 
INDUSTRIALISED 
COUNTRIES 5 (1) 4 (1) 2 (1) 
As anticipated, some bias became evident during this review. A large 
proportion of the projects was concerned with educational media, and this 
emphasis could be accounted for in two ways. Firstly, at the time when the 
study was initiated, more research work had been done in the field of edu- 
cational media than in general communication fields - particularly work on 
issues of technology transfer and exercises in evaluation. Secondly, my 
own experience had been mainly in the educational media field, and it was 
through personal contacts that access was secured to a number of original 
project documents, semi-official evaluations, files and memoranda, which 
were likely to be of particular interest in analysing planning processes. 
It was acknowledged that, not only could much of this bias not be 
removed, but it would also be unproductive to attempt to do so. For 
information about early planning processes, some kind of personal network 
was essential, and a detailed knowledge of past events, although sub- 
jective, could still be of value in interpreting policies and decisions. 
However, some attempt to mitigate this bias was necessary in making 
the final selection. I thought it important to reduce the apparent emphasis 
-93- 
upon Euope and Asia, where I had spent most of my professional life, and 
to select projects which, even if familiar, were no longer under my direct 
influence or supervision. Bearing these two provisos in mind, the final 
matrix proposed was as follows: 
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPING Singapore Educational 
COUNTRIES Media Service 
SITE 
Satellite Instructional 
Television Experiment 
(India) 
Asia-Pacific Insti- 
tute for Broadcast- 
ing Development 
(Malaysia) 
GROW 
Group Resources of 
Women (Tobago) 
El Salvador 
ITV System 
INDUSTRIALISED Open University (UK) 
COUNTRIES 
Agency for Instruct- 
ional TV (USA) 
Childrens Tele- 
vision Workshop 
(USA) 
In this final selection a reasonable spread of geographical, functional 
and political variables could be claimed. While some bias towards educa- 
tional projects was still apparent, in the final analysis the determining 
factor was data availability. Extensive published materials, including 
detailed evaluations, were available for the ITV system in El Salvador, 
the Open University and the Children's Television Workshop, and a recent 
study had been made of the Agency for Instructional Television. Reasonable 
materials were also available on SITE (Satellite Instructional Television 
Experiment) in India. 
The Singapore Educational Media Service, the Asia-Pacific Institute for 
Broadcasting Development, and Group Resources of Women (GROW) were all projects 
known to me, and both file references and unpublished evaluation data were 
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available. I also had a long-standing, though intermittent, connection 
with the Indian satellite experiment, and had worked (as a senior producer) 
with the Open University during its formative stages. 
Literature Search 
Initially, a literature search was made, to obtain as complete a 
range as possible of background documentation. In most instances, there 
was considerable material on evaluation, and generally good documentation 
on operational planning and implementation (since these occur at a point 
when commitment to a project is firm, and a record has necessarily to 
be kept of project development). Fa'r less was available on strategic 
planning, and even less on policy formulation and management, while what 
could be found often appeared to be a post-hoc rationalisation. 
Unfortunately, research into planning is interested in precisely those 
areas where the least data are available. The focus of interest is on the 
planning process; implementation records are of interest mainly as they 
cast light on the satisfactoriness or otherwise of the early planning 
design, and evaluation data are of most use when they include elements of 
process evaluation, including the monitoring of administrative and decision- 
making processes. Such evaluations are still rare. 
The next task was therefore to re-sift the available data, and to 
supplement it where there were discernible gaps. Personal requests were 
made to agencies, organisations and sponsors for additional material; in 
some cases a continuing correspondence or personal dialogue was initiated, 
and additional bibliographic references were sought. 
The collected data was then categorised, according to the concepts 
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summarised and sequenced in Figure 9. 
Nature of the Projects 
A fuller description of each project appears in Annex 1, but it should 
be useful at this point to characterise them in brief. 
The Singapore Educational Television Service (now the Singapore 
Educational Media Service) began operations in 1967: it was attached 
to the Ministry of Education, producing educational television programmes 
for transmission over the national broadcasting channel. The Service was 
conceived as an aid to educational reform, and a support to curriculum 
renovation; it emphasised utilisation and evaluation, and drew heavily 
on the teaching force in programme planning and production. Although a 
national service, it was dealing, in the Republic of Singapore, with a 
very limited population; while early transmissions, directed towards 
Lower Secondary classes, reached 81% of their target audience, this still 
involved an audience of only 64,000. 
The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), in India 
is one of the best known of recent media experiments; for a period of a 
year, from 1975-6, it broadcast programmes for four hours daily to rural 
audiences in 2,400 villages across six states, using a loaned, NASA 
satellite, which was part of an experiment in direct broadcasting tech- 
niques. Programme production was by a number of agencies, under the overall 
supervision of All-India Radio, and the experiment gras fully eval- 
uated; it was seen as a test of national capacity in both hardware and 
software domains. 
The introduction of instructional television into El Salvador in 1969 
- 96 - 
was also conceived as part of a comprehensive educational reform programme; 
technical assistance was provided by USAID, and an extensive evaluation of 
the system was carried out by the Institute for Communication Research, 
Stanford University. Television programmes were gradually introduced, 
in step with curriculum renovation, and a massive effort was made in the 
area of teacher training. 
The Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (originally 
the Asian Broadcasting Training Institute) was a regional venture, with 
UNESCO sponsorship and the backing of the Asian Broadcasting Union. 
Working frone the base of the Malaysian National Broadcasting Training 
Centre, it set out to create a full programme of training courses for 
Asian broadcasters, at an intermediate and advanced level, in a new 
institute in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time it also extended basic 
training in Asian countries, using mobile training teams. 
GROW Group Resources of Women), in the island of Tobago in the 
Caribbean, was pitched at a totally different level. Stimulated by 
International Women's Year, it sought to use communication media in 
the island community, emphasising small-format media, local radio and 
press, as part of a social development process, tackling in particular 
problems of migration, unemployment and reduced morale. 
The Open University, in the United Kingdom, is another internation- 
ally known project; in 1971, it began teaching students at a distance, 
using a mix of correspondence courses, broadcasting, local study centres, 
summer schools, and a variety of other ad hoc aids, to bring university 
degrees within the reach of mature students who did not necessarily have 
academic qualifications and who could only work part-time. 
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The Agency for Instructional Television, in the United States, was 
a consortium project, which grew out of earlier experience in setting 
up instructional television libraries. Incorporated in 1973, it brought 
together a number of State education agencies, to pool resources for the 
development of common-user materials, with production contracted to sel- 
ected production agencies, but with corporate planning and extensive pre- 
testing. 
Finally, the Children's Television Workshop is best known for its 
'Sesame Street' programvme, which began transmissions in November 1979. 
The workshop, sponsored by a number of agencies, most of them private, 
set out to produce high-quality chil'ren's programming, t,,, hich could Still 
reach wide audiences (including ghetto audiences); it placed a great deal 
of emphasis on formative programme research, relying on an effective inter- 
change between producers and researchers. 
The summary given in Annex 1 (which should be consulted at this stage) 
is in no way an exhaustive history or evaluation; it is mostly a distil- 
lation of the main sequence of events during the planning stages of each 
project, and an account of scope, objectives and functions. Its purpose 
is to give the reader, who may be unfamiliar with the projects' evolution, 
a succinct account of their character and workings, prior to their exam- 
ination in the light of planning concepts. It should be noted in partic- 
ular that the projects are discussed from their origins until the end of 
the year 1976 only (i. e. the point at which the analysis of data was 
carried out). 
In certain cases, extensive studies were produced after this date, 
notably the various evaluations of the SITE experiment. These have, 
however, been utilised only where they throw light on formative planning 
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processes, and changes in planning structure after 1976 (e. g. within the 
Open University) are not recorded unless they also illuminate this earlier 
period. 
In the section which follows, each of the hypothesised planning 
concepts is taken in turn, and reviewed in the light of the project case 
studies, to see where they are supported, modified or unconfirmed. Full 
references are provided in the reference bibliography at the end of the 
thesis. 
FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
Flexibility 
In the projects considered, a rigid, theoretical approach was gen- 
erally avoided; there were few suggestions that a master plan should be 
evolved, to be followed without variation. The fact that the planning 
approach generally matched an orthodox systems sequence was rarely pressed 
(it was made more explicit in the cases of the Open University, of the 
AIT and of El Salvador, but probably this was as much the result of an 
assimilated systems planning tradition as of a specific planning metho- 
dology being adopted). 
Within the Agency for Instruction Television, the cohesion of its 
staff and clientele led to a far less structured planning process. In the 
view of John Middleton: 
"The general planning philosophy is pragmatic and 
responsive, not prescriptive. AIT does not have a master 
blueprint for the future. There is no written five- 
year plan. Instead, the agency's planning procedure is 
very much like what Harlan Cleveland has called 
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"improvisation on a general sense of direction". 
(Middleton, 1979 p. 101) 
The decision-making processes of the AIT were equally pragmatic. 
"Operating a consortium project requires a form of manage- 
meat that is particularly flexible and responsible. It must 
support action at all stages of project development without 
establishing bureaucratic constraints. It must establish 
accountability without rigidity, and it must revolve around 
rapid and effective decision-making mechanisms". 
(Ibid, p. 99) 
The CTW exhibited similar flexibility, largely because it operated 
tviithin a closed system. Its organisers were implicitly confident of 
their general goals, and variations in policy did not need justification 
to a wider audience. 
Richard Polsky characterised Lloyd Morrisett's approach to planning 
(at one of the main architects, and guiding representative of the Carnegie 
Corporation) as follows: 
"During the planning period he initiated a process of 
checks and balances that was used each time an important 
decision was to be made. Usually this process involved a 
preliminary study first, such as the feasibility study of 
the project proposal. The purpose of these studies was to 
determine the desirability and feasibility of embarking on 
a particular course of action. From these investigations 
came written documents articulating the significant findings, 
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and these documents in turn were scrutinised by specialists 
who made further recommencdations, some of which were adapted. 
Then the decisions were made. " (Po1sky, 1974 pp. 98-99) 
Can such an approach be considered a planning 'model'? Gerald Lesser 
was dubious in the case of CTW. 
"Sesame Street's model, like all models, may simply be 
imaginary, a pretence that we understand something ý; e do not. 
We may wish to believe that a model we understand is at work 
because it makes us confident that we can achieve similar 
success by following the model in the future. On the other 
hand, believing that a program's success has resulted from 
a combination of personal genius, luck and good timing makes 
it seem accidental and difficult to duplicate. As uncomfor- 
table as the notion may be, Sesame Street's success probably 
resulted from just such a combination. " (Lesser, 1974 p. 240) 
At the same time, it was obvious that Morrisett's approach was a 
personal variation upon the rational - comprehensive mode of planning, 
serving to emphasise that external models may act as sources of inspira- 
tion, even sources of methodology, but not as blueprints. This is implicit 
in the systems approach: 
.a 
model which depends upon the definition of 
objectives, derived in turn from an analysis of problems, is bound to 
be independent, since no two countries will share identical problems. 
This concept was reinforced by most of the projects reviewed. The 
Open University planners and its early staff members looked at a variety 
of distance models around the world, especially in the United States, but 
produced their own variant; as early as 1968, the report of the Planning 
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Committee emphasised a shift away from a media em phasiis to a corres- 
pondence base. An American writer, commenting on the University's 
character in 1974, had this to say: 
"The Open University's potential contribution to higher 
education, then, may not reside exclusively in its economic 
and technological dimensions. So far from the OU having to 
borrow from existing institutions, in the best case we may 
look forward to a situation in which the OU helps the rest 
of us reconsider our curricular assumptions". (Birnbaum, 
1974 p. 42) 
Some of the projects were virtually new creations: the Childrens 
Television Workshop, or SITE. Others built upon precedent, but in an 
innovatory way (the AIT, for example, grew out of the earlier NIT and 
NITL, but was transformed in the process). Both of these adopted a 
pragmatic attitude towards earlier models, avoiding their mistakes, where 
identifiable, and building upon their successes. 
So the OU developed its course team approach and the CTW its producer/ 
researcher axis. Those responsible for the first design of El Salvador 
worked in the knowledge of earlier failures in American Samoa (many of 
the same personalities had been involved in both). Other projects were 
slower to learn how to initiate. Singapore probably placed too much 
emphasis in its early stages upon the European and especially the BBC school 
broadcasting model, partly because its principal adviser stemmed from a 
BBC background, but soon learned to adapt. GROW was less fortunate. 
Devised as an experiment in community media, it was deliberately left 
without sharp objectives or precise focus, 'in the belief that the community 
itself would supply a sense of direction. Rather too late in its develop- 
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ment, it realised that local forms do not parthogenesise: initiatives 
arise spontaneously only in a productive and nurturing atmosphere. 
SITE occupied a midway position; dominated at first by an external 
systems model, it came to grips, possibly too late, with indigenisa- 
tion. The AIBD was both successful and unsuccessful in avoiding 
external influence. As an organisation it had to be innovatory; its 
founding premise was that it should create a unique form of regional 
institute. It adopted new attitudes towards course construction 
(stressing modularity at a time when this was still novel) and based 
its training programme specifically upon regional need. Where it 
apparently failed, at least in its early stages, was in being unable 
to shake off the narrowness and professional mystique of broadcasting 
itself. This was not so much the result of an over-dependence upon 
external models, as an over-dependence upon Western broadcasting 
philosophy. In some ways it was probably inevitable, as the broad- 
casting organisations which it represented were themselves strongly 
influenced by that same philosophy: - that 'professional' production 
and technical quality are critical, that archetypal organisational 
patterns exist in broadcasting from which departure is fraught with 
danger, that the 'practical' qualities of broadcasting are removed from, 
and superior to, the preoccupations of research (cf Golding 1977). 
It was in the consideration of the CTW project that the transfer 
of communication models and technologies from the developed to the devel- 
oping world was most directly discussed. At the time of the analysis, 
in 1976, communication technology transfer was not being studied system- 
atically; it was not until 1977 for example that the UNESCO Collaborative 
Project on Technology Transfer and Communication was begun (including, 
incidentally, as one of its case studies an investigation of the adapta- 
tion of 'Sesame Street' to Mexico, in the series 'Plaza Sesamo'). But 
- 103 - 
Polsky had already, in 1974, isolated a key factor in successful transfers: 
basing the approach on a method of problem-solving, rather than a direct 
replication. 
"Can the Workshop's formula for success be transferred to 
a new situation in public television? Of course the factors of 
timing, money, planning, the skills and power of the key planners, 
and the generous element of luck can never be duplicated exactly. 
But one important lesson of the Workshop experience is the way 
the project's architects approached their problems and solved 
them. Not having a formula to copy, they selected their goals 
carefully, analysed what would be needed to reach them, and 
continuously refined and clarified them as the project devel- 
oped. Planners of subsequent projects might try following this 
approach to problem-solving. (Op. cit. p. 112) 
However, in the developing world, flexibility may also be important 
for other reasons. Organisers work in the knowledge that policies may be 
changed overnight, for reasons of political expediency. The AIBD, for 
example, saw several shifts of emphasis, as new potential donors cane upon 
the horizon, each with a separate network of interests to he accommodated. 
In Singapore, the Service rarely knew in advance what its likely resources 
would be; it had necessarily to create proposals with shifting parameters. 
This pragmatic emphasis is probably not surprising in the communi- 
cation field. Hedia management and production are themselves character- 
ised by rapid decision-making, and a willingness to accommodate (sometimes 
to thrive upon) crisis, because deadlines are endemic to the production 
process. In communication, at whatever level, circumstances change very 
rapidly: the whole thrust of technology is towards accelerated change. 
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The circumstances of communication planning at the project level, 
however, often force a set of pragmatic responses, in which compromises 
and short cuts have to be made in order to allow development to take place 
at all. This was recognised both by the Open University, and by Singapore, 
where artificially imposed deadlines enforced the compression of timescales 
for planning to a difficult if not impossible degree. The main thrust 
of the project's controllers (in both cases) was to respond to the critical 
pressure, but at the same time to try to reinstate the possibility of a 
rational planning sequence as soon as possible. Hence, in the Open Univ- 
ersity, even at the time of the project's greatest pressure, an iterative 
planning cycle was already being devised by a group of systems analysts, 
and planning was seen by the organisers as essentially a long-term and 
structural need. 
In Singapore, too, many short-cuts were taken to meet deadlines, but 
the decisions made at this time were not considered inviolate, and mech- 
anisms for adaptation were created (for example, through a network of 
advisory committees, and through the evaluation system). 
The AIBD provides an excellent example of flexible planning strategy; 
it continually reshaped its planning structures as its own conditions 
changed. SITE came to similar conclusions , after an early period during 
which (under the influence of the technologists) an over-simplistic systems 
approach was in danger of emerging. In the first days of preparation for 
SITE, systems analysis dominated in the ranks of the social scientists as 
well as of the engineers. Subsequently it was admitted that, while commun- 
ication planning is best seen as an integrated exercise, different planning 
methodologies may be used to advantage for different aspects of the overall 
design. In engineering, relatively straightforward systems techniques may 
be applied; in the planning of materials production, evaluation, and 
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training, mixed techniques are necessary, because of the greater emphasis 
upon human and creative Factors. Here a socio-psychological approach, 
stressing structural and organisational aspects of planning for innovation, 
appears more relevant. 
But flexibility should not be confused with improvisation. It has to 
operate within known parameters, a framework of generally accepted goals, 
and a set of structures which can handle decision-making, including means 
of arbitration. In GROIN, policy-making was certainly flexible, but so 
lacking in retaining structures and overall direction that very little 
decision-making was finally made: the project was left to find its identity 
by random processes. 0 
This kind of open-endedness is very'different from the case of 
El Salvador, where long-term orientations were clear enough for subsi- 
diary changes of direction to be accommodated within the overall frame- 
work (e. g. on the administrative location of the ITV service, and on 
the location and control of the main production complex). There is a 
balance to be struck between flexibility and pre-planning, and a need 
to avoid crisis planning when possible. If a general systemic line, an 
overall framework which sets parameters for planning flexibility, does 
not exist, outcomes are likely to be diffuse and ambivalent (as occurred, 
for example, with GROW). To say that one should not place excessive 
reliance upon a particular planning methodology does not mean that one 
need not be conscious of the existence of planning method. 
Comprehensiveness 
One of the main arguments advanced in support of integrated communi- 
cation planning is that it forces planners to see projects in their over- 1 
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all social context. Unlike operational planning, it does not start from 
the assumption that a project is, by definition, necessary and needs only 
a technical plan for development. It begins by querying the rationale for 
the use of communication media in relation to a range of social and edu- 
cational problems. 
There seem to be two ways in which planning pitched at the operational 
level may be limited or biased. The first is that it may overemphasise 
a particular medium or technology. The second is that it may concen- 
trate on a specific project to the exclusion of other environmental con- 
siderations. Each of these possibilities was considered in turn. 
0 
Two of the projects reviewed appeared to reflect an emphasis, not so 
much on a particular communication technology, but on communication technology 
per se. These were the AIBD, and GROW. 
In the various project and background documents produced in support 
of the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, a substantial 
emphasis was placed upon the contribution which media might make to devel- 
opment, but for the most part it was unspecific. Its arguments for train- 
ing were, in fact, far more convincing than for communication itself as 
a development tool, and the viewpoints adopted were, understandably, those 
of committed broadcasting professionals. It was this overemphasis upon 
communication, on behalf of a particular clientele, which produced some 
of the most significant tensions between the Institute's planners and its 
potential sponsor (the United Nations Development Programme). Only in later 
stages did its organisers, as the result of a self-educational process, 
become more sensitive to issues of development communication. 
According to several of its evaluators, GROW exhibited the same fault; 
- 107 - 
Hosein; for example, concluded: 
"Grow made the mistake of thinking communication first, 
development after". 
(Hosein, 1975 p. 45) 
Its original conception (in the UNESCO work programme) had a strong 
media focus, and while a report produced by an original consultant (Kinane 
1973) certainly did not overemphasise media use (on the contrary, communi- 
cation was hardly mentioned at all), the approved project document, upon 
which the execution of internationally sponsored projects -is necessarily 
based, was a wide-ranging but ambivalent document. The media emphasis was, 
however, firmly retained by the principal expert attached to the project, 
who came from a professional Canadian broadcasting background and saw his 
role very much in media development terms. The relationship of communi- 
cation to social and development goals remained unclear for some consid- 
erable time; the confusion actually intensified as the project continued. 
In the original project formulation, the notion of media as a tool for 
meeting specific objectives was pressed. 
"The all-important point here was that media were not seen 
as an independent element, but as an indispensable tool which they 
themselves would have to learn to master in order to achieve strongly 
desired objectives. " (Solomon, 1975 p. 23) 
But the difficulty in defining these objectives led to considerable 
ambiguity in assigning a viable media role. A UNESCO Secretariat visitor 
in April 1975 concluded: 
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"As a preliminary to setting objectives on a scale which 
could be attempted in the time available, the first need was 
to determine the precise nature of GROW. Some difficulty has 
been experienced in defining the exact relationship of devel- 
opment tasks to media, ... 
" (Hancock, 1975 p. 2) 
Among the other projects, SITE was a more difficult case to pinpoint. 
Throughout much of its history, the project had a hardware emphasis: re- 
inforced by its origins within the Indian Space Research Organisation and 
NASA. any of the objectives set for the demonstration were technical, 
concerning in particular the adaptation of technology to Indian conditions 
and production potential. The starting point was television; the project 
was conceived more as an exercise in what television technology could achieve 
in a rural setting than as an attempt to analyse fundamental problems and 
match technologies to their solution (in such a case, radio would have been 
given a stronger emphasis, and satellite technology might not, at that time, 
have figured at all). Yet in its implementation, the technological bias was 
not as extreme as had been feared, and the ISRO team at Ahmedebad showed 
itself very sensitive to social needs. Their examination of technology was 
within a broad management and utilisation framework, and for this reason 
what was learned had a wider application than might otherwise have been 
expected. 
In face, the case of SITE was transitional: the project gradually 
moved away from concentration on a single dimension, towards greater 
understanding of its social and educational context. A number of other 
cases exhibited the same sensitivity. 
A principal strength of the El Salvador project, according to its 
evaluators, lay in its function as only one strand of a sustained programme 
of educational reform. 
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"The Salvadorean experience underscores the argument that 
the ITV or any other instructional technology must be conceived 
in terms of broad system needs or objectives. ITV was not simply 
imposed over traditional practices and structures in El Salvador; 
rather, it was coordinated with other major changes in the country's 
school system. " (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 164) 
The British Open University was first promoted as the 'University 
of the Air' and originally envisaged as a media-based university, but 
later, at the entry point of the Advisory Committee and especially of the 
Planning Committee, broadcasting media were assigned to a subordinate 
function, as the result of a more disciplined analysis of student problems 
and motivations and a greater emphasis upon the need for interpersonal 
communication. 
The history of the Singapore project was similar; while from the out- 
set television was strictly interpreted in terms of curriculum assistance 
(and indeed the Service pressed for curriculum revision as part of its 
developmental process), it subsequently redefined its functions and became, 
five years after its inception , the Singapore Educational Media Service. 
Likewise, AIT was comparable. Its focus of attention was upon tele- 
vision (with support materials), but it was the context of television use 
which was most important: programming was the concern of educators, devised 
in response to articulated educational needs. 
In these cases, communication media were demonstrably part of an 
instructional design, within which specific relevance could be argued for 
each component. This position is less true of projects which operate in 
looser systems. Even so, in the case of the Children's Television Workshop, 
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while no multi-media programme was originally envisaged and a good deal of 
the impact of the project depended upon the American cultural veneration 
of television, a great deal of attention was focussed on the objectives of 
the workshop and upon what television might, or might not, be expected 
to achieve towards attaining these objectives. 
Understandings of the social role of a project can grow, and in doing 
so they often extend well beyond the sphere of communication. The Open 
University was quick to see that broadcasting was only one component in a 
mix of teaching strategies, all of which related to broader educational 
oIj ctives. But a sense of the other systems of which it was a part were 
slower to emerge - for example, its relationship to other educational 
broadcasting initiatives, to the wider adult education world, or to the 
growing network of distance learning systems, focused by the work of the 
Centre for International Cooperation and Services. Even at the outset 
several commentators concluded that the success of the Open University 
would ultimately depend on the ability of its planners and organisers to 
perceive its role in relation to these broader needs and traditions, 
especially the educational system of the UK as a whole. 
"The term most often applied to the OU by those who 
observe it from outside is 'innovative' ... The real point, 
however, is not the innovations themselves, but their effect 
upon Britain's established and slowly evolving educational 
system: for they bring to that system certain concepts which 
are not only foreign, but to some extent opposed to its basic 
canons. " (Van der Eyken, 1974 p. 28) 
"The tradition of adult education in Britain is old and 
deep; it is also ambiguous. It has roots in both radical 
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democracy and a much more conservative ethic. The idea that 
only an educated citizenry can assume its responsibilities for 
self-government is different from the view that the nation's 
elites have the moral task of education. Both ideas co-exist 
in the OU ... 
" (Birnbaum, 1974 p. 34) 
In fact the Open University was probably more sensitive in its formative 
stages to such issues (at a time when many personalities were involved in 
policy making and planning) than later in its history, when it had become 
an entrenched, closed system, managed by its own academics. Its problems 
eventually became localised, more often related to strategies for survival 
in a competitive higher educational world, than to educational and social 
philosophy. 
This was particularly marked in the context of communication. The 
University tended to see broadcasting only in relation to its own courses, 
and not from the perspective of all educational and minority users of broad- 
casting. It devoted relatively little attention to the impact of new com- 
munication technologies, preferring to leave broadcasting considerations to 
its BBC partner, and it is partly for this reason that it later encount- 
ered so many problems over access to transmission time. This is an excellent 
illustration of the need to establish project identity in a broad and 
creative framework. 
Reflection of Need 
The concept is closely allied to that of devolution which follows: 
whether or not the reflection of need is genuine depends largely on the 
existence of adequate mechanisms for needs determination. The concepts 
are taken separately, however, because one is best approached in theore- 
tical, the other in technical terms. 
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The first problem is: whose need is to be reflected? Every project 
has planners, sponsors, consumers, each of whom has a perception, explicit 
or implicit, of what is his need. Is the need which is finally to be 
reflected a synthesis of all these separate demands, or is it (in the 
spirit of Western democratic philosophy)the need of the user which counts 
at heart. And is there, in any case, any real conflict or discrepancy 
between all or any of these demands? 
Reflection of need is consequently an underlying concept and criterion, 
but the implications for planning are largely (i) to find means of defining 
the concept - e. g. through needs assessment techniques which establish 
objectives; (ii) to find means of translating it into practice - e. g. 
through the creation of mechanisms which involve all parties in the planning 
process, not simply planners and decision makers; and (iii) to find means 
of evaluating success or failure. These implications are discussed in 
other, derivative concepts - such as that of devolution; that of clarifying 
objectives; or that of evaluation. 
In many senses, therefore, the examination of this concept is neces- 
sary in order to lay foundations for more specific principles which follow. 
But in doing so, there are other distinctions to be made Qn the perception 
of need in different environments, particularly in the developed and the 
developing world. 
Clients and Users 
A first, fundamental distinction is between different attitudes to 
communication users. The notion that communication resources, their plan- 
ning and production, should be extended right down to the level of the 
individual is very recent, so much so that it is discussed mainly in 
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Chapter IX of this thesis, which looks forward to the future. As the 
discussion of devolution will show, the idea of user involvement raises 
considerable problems, both structural and philosophical. 
Even in the industrialised Western world, where there is a long- 
standing tradition of open discussion of such issues, there are relatively 
few precedents for genuine public involvement (at the individual level') 
in policy making and planning. One very difficult constraint is imposed 
by the question of scale: especially in national communication systems, 
how can this be achieved, except through a network of committees which 
are'unlikely to be genuine popular representations? It is for this 
reason that so much stress has been placed in recent years on the locali- 
sation of media systems, which should, in theory at least, allow for a 
readier access by local communities to political processes and a better 
identification with strategies. 
But in the developed world, while formulae for needs determination 
are by no means universal, at least there are ample precedents at the 
level of client involvement. 
In the projects reviewed, most planning strategies were based upon 
a thorough analysis of client opinion, often through direct solicitation. 
The Children's Television Workshop, the Open University, the Agency for 
Instructional Television all followed an approach in which theoretical 
concepts, although important to project development, were nevertheless 
validated as far as possible by a process of needs determination which 
tended to play down external pressures, and emphasise user needs. 
The forms of this determination varied: from the publication of 
Government papers, in the case of the Open University, to meetings of 
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clients, in the case of the AIT, or to the special series of seminars 
convened by Gerald Lesser in the case of the CTW. John Middleton 
characterised the AIT process as follows: 
"The use of the materials developed by AIT depends on 
the degree to which they meet widely shared and significant 
educational needs. The business of determining needs is 
in itself complex, combining elements of educational design 
with the politics of negotiation. Then come the tasks of 
forming a consortium and of producing materials that meet 
the requirements of many agencies and still maintain 
quality and integrity of purpose. All of this is accom- 
plished in a sequence of activities carried out so that 
the users of the materials are involved in the substan- 
tive aspects of development. This sequence - the consor- 
tium development process - is more than a set of procedures. 
It is also (as was observed earlier) a style of work re- 
flecting commitment to the ideal of consortium participation. " 
(Op Cit, 1976 p. 23) 
In the third world, however, a special difficulty arises from the 
nature of political control. User participation implies forms of demo- 
cratic action, of freedom to dissent, of pluralism, which are by no means 
invariable in the developing world, whatever the predominant political 
philosophy. Different understandings of the nature of access, or of the 
acceptability of forms of control, frequently cloud the communication field, 
and they are discussed more exhaustively in Chapter IX. Incompatibility 
between Western and other versions of communication freedom has compromised 
many recent international forums, especially those of UNESCO (where the 
adoption of a declaration on fundamental principles of mass media became 
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a major political issue). Without entering into value judgements, it 
is important for the communication planner to understand the basic 
political mores of the communication environment in which he is working. 
User participation is not an abstract right, but one subordinated to 
cultural context. Thus, in the case of the GROW project, one observer 
argued that, when its originators were considering project orientations, 
there was a totally different understanding of what was implied by 
community media in the Tobagonian context from what would be accepted 
in the Western industrialised world. 
"It is significant that when she (Sheilah Solomon) attempts 
to draft a set of suitable objdctives, she begins her draft with the 
words "Communication is to be used to persuade women that they 
have a vital role to play in society ... " The inclusion of the 
word "persuade" shows that she is thinking of the project in 
development communication terms exclusively. She sees the project 
as being concerned to develop self-help, but linked to external 
development objectives, not to self-knowledge and the realisation 
of latent potential in individuals. " (Hancock, 1975 pp. 2-3) 
Technical Assistance 
A further distinction between the industrialised and the developing 
world arises from the fact that, in the Third World, many projects are 
carried out under a technical assistance umbrella, which means that the 
issue of need is also clouded by the aspirations, and perceptions, of 
donors and financing agencies, quite apart from the imperatives of a devel- 
opment plan. 
In the case of the GROW project in Tobago, for example, it has already 
been suggested that the project arose, not so much in response to demands 
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from Tobago society, as to the theoretical concerns of an international 
agency, looking for a context in which to locate an 'access' project. This 
is not to say that the need was not latent in Tobagonian society, but it 
was not made operational, nor were the circumstances of the project's 
creation centred primarily upon this need. 
It may be argued that, in some senses at least, some of the other 
projects fell into the same category. The concepts underlying the AIBD 
were very much dependent upon arguments expressed in a working paper 
prepared by the UNESCO Secretariat for a meeting of experts held in 
Bangkok in 1966 and substantially endorsed in the final meeting report 
(UNESCO 1967); this paper envisaged'a systemic relationship between national, 
regional and international broadcasting training. 
There was no overt reason to challenge this formula, but it did not 
coincide with established practice in the Asian region, nor with the habits 
of bilateral sponsors. A new concept of this kind takes longer to crystal- 
lize than the span of a single meeting or even a sequence of meetings, and 
the evolution of the AIBD was for many years hampered bya preference among 
national broadcasting organisations for foreign-based as opposed to national 
or regional training. It is only in more recent years that the positions 
adopted by the Bangkok meeting, and corroborated by a subsequent meeting 
of experts held in Malaysia, have found acceptance. 
SITE, in India, may also be placed to some extent in the category of 
the 'theoretical' project. It was called a 'demonstration': an experi- 
ment to assess the practical viability of a theoretical construct. It was, 
in many senses, carried by the massiveness of its political support, the 
volume of international interest, and the care of its executors. However, 
as a project it could be said to be imposed, as a theoretical perception 
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of popular need, rather than as an articulation of popular demand. 
Even from this limited sample, it would seem that in the developing 
world the. situation as regards 'needs' and their determination is some- 
what different, and that political forces cannot be so easily discounted. 
The reasons for this position are complex. In the first place, the 
level of communication consciousness (and of planning and systems 
consciousness) is not so keen as in the industrialised world. The popu- 
lation, including planners and leaders, is not so exposed to communication 
forms and alternatives, and traditions of planning are less well established. 
The developing world has had to -learn from its industrialised counterparts 
and sometimes it has found the planning forms of the West unsuited to its 
own situations; it has therefore begun to look for alternative approaches. 
Secondly, mechanisms for consensus are not so well developed: in 
many countries, confrontation at the sectoral level is sidestepped by 
allowing each sector independent action. There is often a tradition of 
mutual non-interference which is ill-suited to communication planning across 
a broad front. Moreover, consensus in the wider understanding - involving 
user consultation - is generally unknown in the developing world, especially 
in ex-colonial countries, and traditions of unilateral action are more 
commonly found. 
Thirdly, the tradition of politicisation in all matters affecting 
national development is already strong in the developing world, and this 
factor must be included in any planning design. In the majority of cases, 
the local development ministry or economic planning board is the most 
powerful agency and must be involved directly in any plans for change. At 
the same time, the interests of technical assistance agencies - whether 
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bilateral or multilateral - also have their impact. There is a natural 
tendency among such agencies to emphasise commercial or political 
factors, so that these enter into the planning dialogue. Among the bilat- 
erals, economic issues (e. g. equipment-related projects) have tended to 
dominate; among the internationals, political issues are more common (the 
promotion, for example, of a particular platform - such as access to the 
media, or the right to communicate - which figures prominently in an 
agency's programme). 
Each of these conditions changes, to some extent, the context in 
which needs are determined. The identification of need may, in the 
developing world, be either locally' determined or appear as the joint 
effort of a particular country and of a donor agency (or group of agencies). 
In some cases, the process may be very s riilar to that found in indus- 
trialised world projects: based on a method of problem analysis. This 
was the case in El Salvador and in Singapore, where a planning apparatus 
comparable with those of the West was assembled to set objectives and 
define an operational progranime. It was also found in SITE, where a com- 
plex network of planning committees was devised and the process of setting 
objectives generally modelled on accepted systems approaches. The SITE 
example was particularly interesting in that, in spite of the political 
pressures and forces which were instrumental in creating the project, 
planning mechanisms were still evolved to temper the political motivation 
and create a unified programme. 
In the case of technical assistance projects, it is also common for 
needs determination to be entrusted to an expert team, working with local 
counterparts and representing both the interests of the country concerned 
and of the donor agency. In the case of El Salvador, for example, the 
project was initiated by an AID-financed feasibility study, and followed 
up by successive expert missions at each stage of development. 
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However, when we come to the other examples - to the AIBD and to 
GROW - we can perceive other forces at work. For these were in their 
origins, not so much based on needs determination as on a desire to call 
attention to, and emphasise, platforms, strategies and theoretical 
approaches which were, for one reason or another, currently fashionable. 
Such attempts may be justified (at least in theory) when promoting 
concepts which have been formulated at an international level and nominally 
accepted, but which have not yet entered into the consciousness of indivi- 
dual Governments, planners and communication agencies. But it should be 
acknowledged that, on its own, the promotional device is not justifiable 
unless it is coupled with, or followed by, a more sustained and detached 
analysis of need. In the case of the AIBD, this more exhaustive analysis 
followed, spread over a period of years; in the case of GROW, the theoretical 
formulation (framed internationally, pressing a universal 'need' for access 
to the media and community involvement) was transposed with much less ease 
to the local situation. 
Devolution 
This concept has several dimensions. For planning to illuminate and 
reflect genuine need, it has to be decentralised, forced away from the 
traditional top-down planning model with its circumscribed cadre of 
participants. But this decentralisation can exist at a number of levels, 
ranging (as was seen above) from the involvement of clients and institu- 
tional users of a system, to more participatory forms which emphasise 
public access. These levels of devolution are not so much hierarchial, 
as arranged along a continuum of time and social philosophy; they reflect 
changes in political thought, and corresponding changes in patterns of 
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social organisation. 
None of the projects considered made any real attempt to involve the 
individual user in its planning and policy making processes. In theory, 
GROW set out to do so, but failed utterly. However, some of the projects 
in the industrialised world had more success in achieving a restricted 
kind of devolution, reflecting the clearer focus of the debate in the 
developed world. Mostly, this amounted to the creation of means to assure 
client involvement in organisation and management. 
This was particularly true of the AIT, the CTW and the Open University 
- each of which was essentially a closed system, with a restricted clientele. 
"A vital feature of AIT design-procedure is client 
involvement throughout. As noted above, these clients are 
the education decision-makers, not the eventual audience. 
Involvement begins with the needs determination process 
and continues through production. At every stage consor- 
tium agency opinions are heeded. (Middleton 1979, p. 98) 
But within this planning base, the development process was clearly 
stated. 
"Two phrases are used at AIT to help describe the 
process by which promising ideas become projects: needs 
determination and curriculum consensus. Each represents 
an attitude or philosophy. "Needs determination" is 
used in place of the more common phrase "needs assessment". 
AIT does not formally assess the needs of education; that 
is, it does not undertake a complete review of state 
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and provincial curricula. Instead, AIT works with education 
agencies to determine areas of curriculum where there is 
significant need for improvement and where school television 
can play a role. Thus, the AIT list of program priorities 
is not a comprehensive statement of the needs of education 
in the U. S. and Canada. It contains, instead, areas of 
need where there is "curriculum consensus". 
(Ibid, p. 28) 
The Open University found itself in a more difficult position in 
that, while it remained a closed system, its users were by definition 
isolated from each other. It began'by organising itself along traditional 
university lines, which proved in many ways impracticable (from a general 
management point of view, not merely in terms of participatory forms). 
Later it attempted to create more open forms of management, but in doing 
so experienced considerable problems. 
When a university has no students on its campus, and a sizeable 
faculty membership, the traditional mechanisms of an academic Senate may 
prove to be unworkable and the committee structure which emerges in its 
place equally ponderous. An insistence upon participation may, in the end, 
lead to inertia in decision-making. And while strategies for student 
involvement have been devised, through regional forums, and these affect 
short range planning, it is difficult to see how they can have a sub- 
stantial effect upon long-term policy. 
Perhaps the Open University encountered the problem most specifi- 
cally in its attempt to find a working relationship between central and 
regional entitites. It began rather late to consider its devolutionary 
needs, and this late start affected later developments. 
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"It is a matter of debate whether the University has 
struck the right balance between the regional structure 
and the central structure. To some extent this was inevi- 
table, in view of the fact that there was no coherent plan 
for the regions - they evolved ... " (OU Consultancy Service, 
1976 p. 6/12) 
However, it has since been argued that only through the regional 
structures can the factors of student engagement and liberalised planning 
be catered for. At the same time, the University depends for its cost- 
effectiveness on factors which are mainly associated with centralisation 
(cf. production and distribution). - The resolution of this tension - 
classic in fields where effectiveness is based, theoretically, upon 
central direction and mass production - 'is at the heart of the modern 
communication planning dilemma. 
A case may in fact be made, in certain instances, for a restriction 
upon, rather than a liberalisation of, open planning forms. Polsky con- 
cluded of the Children's Television Workshop: 
"The planning operation was not an exercise in democracy. 
The demands for the project did not come from the people. In 
fact there was no real demand for the project until after it 
had completed its product. " (Op. cit. p. 108) 
In other words, in the CTW model consultation was widened to include 
all those sectors of society which, it was felt by the organisers, might 
contribute something within their specialist roles to the setting of 
Workshop goals and objectives, but there was no attempt to introduce 
parent or child participation at the planning stage. 
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In each of the cases above, however, the understanding of the tern 
'user' was relatively restricted. In the more recent literature of 
access and participation, it implies the democratisation of media, and 
the opening out of media channels and management to the public at large. 
A major difficulty with this version of user-involvement is that it has 
tended to become an article of faith, which breaks down in its specific 
application. At the level of the community media experiment it may be 
practical enough, but when extended to, say, the level of the national 
broadcasting organisation, it produces immediate logistical and organi- 
sational problems. In the BBC 'Open Door' experiment, for example, the 
original position taken up by producers of the Community Unit - that they 
should act only as technical consultants, not intruding their experience 
upon amateur users - was modified by practical experience so that they 
assumed a more significant advisory role. Even the process of selec- 
tion poses its difficulties; when there are more aspirants than available 
air-time, some kind of quota system has to be introduced. The difficulty 
was summarised by Frances Berrigan, in her review of community media 
experiments in North American and Europe: 
"As the activity moves away from the simpler stages into 
a consideration of the future development of the medium, real 
problems come to light ... There is the question of the value 
of participation itself, and the difficulty of developing self- 
programming groups which carry on their activity once the 
animation process has ended. What is the structure which will 
give access to the equipment for those who want it? And which 
will allow participation at whatever level the individual 
chooses? Can participation at any of the levels, community, 
local, regional or national, bring about democratisation of 
the communication and information flow, or is it just an 
- 124 - 
exchange of one select group for another? What is the structure 
which will allow meaningful dialogues to be set up and which 
will be effective? Is participation in the media a way to over- 
come passivity? Because video seems to be within the grasp 
of every individual the problems it poses crystallise thoughts 
about 'access and participation' to the mass media as a whole". 
(Berrigan, 1977 p. 212) 
The problem is therefore classic - of combining liberalisation with an 
adequate infrastructural base, to allow initiatives to develop without them 
being stifled because of a lack of basic technical expertise. It has been 
the experience of the various cable systems, for example, that the mere 
provision of an open access channel, by itself, is not enough; for the 
channel to be utilised and to make a sigiiificant community contribution 
some basic training programmes for users also have to be devised, and some 
elementary infrastructural support. The earlier distinction - between the 
relatively restricted involvement of users in a closed system, as contrasted 
with the difficulties of genuine democratisation - also applies in the 
developing world. But there, the situation is compounded by other social 
and political factors. In the case of a relatively closed system - such 
as the AIBD - user involvement in decision-making and management is 
possible, provided that it can be afforded (it has not happened in the 
AIBD for economic rather than political reasons). The situation is roughly 
analogous with that of the AIT. 
The situations of El Salvador and of Singapore were similar to that of 
the Open University; as originally envisaged, they were confined to formal 
educational levels and operated in specific instructional settings. In both 
cases, over the years more was done to involve teachers in the basic planning 
process (in Singapore, for example, teacher/users were soon brought into / 
programme planning committees). 
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Even in a massive experiment such as SITE, some user involvement was 
possible at the level of the various sectors concerned with project 
development, or with regional organisers, but clearly the involvement of 
the rural population for whom the experiment was intended was unmanageable, 
apart from the adaptation of a certain amount of needs assessment research, 
to determine appropriate programme (rather than system) choices. 
It was, however, in the context of GROW that the greatest paradoxes 
were apparent. GROW was defined as a community project; it was seen as 
an attempt to transpose principles of democratic access and participation, 
devised experimentally in the developing world, to a novel Third World 
setting. Yet in practice it probably exhibited less in. the way of 
participatory forms than most of the other projects considered. Partly 
this was due to inadequate management, to' diffuse objectiv^s, and to the 
absence of those retaining structures which have already been remarked 
upon as necessary to all community projects. But there were also other 
reasons. 
In its first planning stages, the GROW project attempted to bring about 
a full exchange of viewpoints. The pre-survey brought together both formal 
and informal community groups, to explore specific proposals, producing 
an atmosphere which was described by one observer as 'electric' (Solomon, 
1975). Plans were made later for a regular committee-structure, to ensure 
liaison between the project and other development concerns. However: 
"Little attempt was subsequently made to build on this 
foundation, or to use contacts and confidence won through inter- 
personal communication to develop media inputs into the devel- 
opment programmes. " (Solomon, 1975 p. 49) 
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In the case of a special activity (a community newspaper) which 
finally dominated the project, it was reported (of the associate media 
adviser) that: 
"He assumed that their present attitude of non-involvement 
was the normal situation in Tobago, and made little attempt to 
involve them in the planning or execution of the newspaper 
venture. The work previously done by local committees was not 
brought to his attention, so that the newspaper, when it did 
appear, represented not a continuation of group involvement but 
a departure from it". (Solomon, 1975 p. 61) 
. 
In other words, devolution in the developing world is not simply a 
matter of transposing ideas of community access and development, and 
setting up ideal structures. The concept of involvement may be so new 
within a society, so contrary to traditional patterns of social organisa- 
tion, that new and innovative forms are needed, created specifically to 
match an analysis of the society's goals. This is not a mechanistic 
process; it has to determine how far the concept of community animation 
is relevant in the first place, and if so, under what conditions. 
Clarity of Objectives 
The importance of framing objectives is well accepted within the 
literature of systems planning and of evaluation, and its consideration 
here is mainly to establish how, in certain projects undertaken during 
the past decade, the task was approached and what difficulties were 
experienced. The methodology of setting and defining objectives has 
necessarily to be part of the framework design which follows. 
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In virtually all of the projects reviewed there was some mention of 
objectives and of their function. There were differences, however, in 
the degree of formality with which these were expressed. In certain 
contexts, the listing of objectives is a formal requirement at the stage 
of project preparation (e. g. within the UN system). Consequently, project 
documents for the AIBD and GROW contained such lists, though this did not 
necessarily mean that they were used as significant instruments within 
project thinking. 
In El Salvador, the time at which the project was conceived, the 
fact that it benefitted from a considerable volume of US advice, and the 
nature of its evaluation meant that much of both project documentation 
and evaluation literature was couched in the language of curriculum devel- 
opment and educational reform. In this case, the planning of the project 
was very definitely conceived in terms of framing objectives and searching 
for appropriate solutions. Thus: 
"El Salvador's decision-makers had three somewhat contrad- 
ictory objectives in planning their Educational Reform; they 
wished to expand enrollments at the postprimary level; they 
wished to hold down budget increases, and if possible, to 
decrease costs per student; and they wished to improve the 
quality of education. If only the first two objectives were 
to be met ... ITV and the reform were unnecessary ... However 
ITV, introduced in the context of the reform, did satisfy the 
objective of improving quality. " (Mayo et alia, 1976 pp. 159-60) 
In the CTW, the approach was perhaps even more marked; after several 
extended staff meetings, a single unified document was developed: 'The 
Instructional Goals of the Childrens Television Workshop'. This goal 
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statement served as the producers', writers' and researchers' prime point 
of reference. 
Singapore stemmed from a different tradition; it also came at an earlier 
time, and its original documentation did not use the same language. Never- 
theless, one cannot assume that it is only when projects refer in specific 
terms to objectives that a process of planning through objectives is actually 
being considered. The style of planning in Singapore was actually more in 
keeping with the spirit of rational-comprehensive planning than a number of 
other projects which technically follow the systems formula. For example 
a major difficulty for GROW was the fact that its objectives were enumerated 
to satisfy a form (i. e. a prescribed document) rather than a need. On this 
point several observers were in agreement: 
"It would almost certainly have been better not to have had 
a project document at all, but the forms of technical assistance 
dictate conditions and so a whole range of objectives was included 
in the hope that the community itself would, in the first year of 
the project's life, isolate specific priorities. " 
(Hancock, 1975 p. 3) 
"Project documents are no doubt expected to conform to pre- 
determined outlines, but in retrospect (and for the future) it 
might have been safer to allow the specific project areas to 
emerge from the work in the field while laying down concise and 
unambiguous objectives. " (Solomon, 1975 p. 15) 
Other projects were more at liberty to devise their own approaches. The 
AIT, working with a closer-knit nucleus of personalities, preferred to let 
its objectives crystallise as a function of its programme development pattern, 
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rather than to evolve a detailed structural plan. John Middleton summar- 
ised the process as follows: 
"The AIT development system incorporates many - but not 
all - of the generally accepted features of 'scientific' 
instructional design. The basic design steps typical of this 
approach are: determine educational need and the context in 
which they are to be met, set objectives, conduct audience 
research, design prototypes to verify objectives, test revise 
and test again until objectives are met. The AIT version is 
technically weak at certain stages: objectives are not always 
clear, testing is partial, and testing after initial revision 
is generally lacking. But AIT design procedures are strong 
in other areas, notably learner verification and analysis of 
the context in which materials are used. They are especially 
strong in involving and satisfying users of the materials. 
(Op. cit. p. 98) 
The Open University also followed a less formal approach (partly this 
was forced upon it by the nature of its original planning documents); it 
nevertheless attempted later to state its goals with more precision, and 
at the level of course production a more standard curriculum model was 
generally employed. SITE, from its earliest stages, worked through 
statements of objectives; these were included (for both programme and 
technical areas) in the original Memorandum of Understanding between 
NASA and the Indian Government. 
Clearly, irrespective of formal terminology, the quality and precision 
of objectives are extremely important. 
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In consequence, their formulation is a technical exercise which 
raises a number of problems of articulation, of ranking and sequencing. 
P 1ultiple objectives which attempt to cover all the tasks of a project 
can be confusing if there is no real discrimination between them. 
Probably the most coherent illustration of this problem occurred with 
GROW. 
"Lack of clarity on ultimate objectives is the missing 
link that would have served to unify the bewildering grab-bag 
of Immediate Objectives, Areas of Activity and Specific Activi- 
ties, listed for communication input ... Although they are not 
necessarily conflicting, it is, still confusing to have four 
separate sections of the project document attempting to clarify 
what the project will in fact do ... The overall result is that 
the devil has a wonderful opportunity to quote scriptures for 
his own purpose - in other words, anyone can find justification 
for concentrating on any one aspect to the exclusion of others; 
one can also claim to be so paralysed by overwhelming expecta- 
tions that one can do nothing at all. " (Solomon, 1975 p. 14) 
The lack of focus in the GROW project was quite deliberate: the project, 
as a community project, was not meant to lay down a direct, activist line. 
The point was in fact directly acknowledged in Tobago: 
"I recognise that to frame the objective in the unequivocal 
way I have suggested would be to adopt a frankly activist approach ... 
I recognise too that the imprecision of the document stems not 
from a drafting failure but from the amalgamation of different 
philosophies of the methodology to be adopted by the project. " 
(Solomon, 1975 p. 18) 
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But the same writer suggested that this partisan position might have 
been justified by the clear rationale which it would have given for 
specific media strategies. 
"If, however, the overall objective had been made unmis- 
takably clear, it might well have been possible to select for 
media treatment those aspects of all areas which best served 
to illustrate, or stimulate, initiative, self-reliance and 
self-education. " (Ibid, p. 17) 
Although the GROW project was clearly a special case, it was still a 
good example of how important it is for objectives to he clearly and 
unambiguously expressed; moreover, from the point of view of the evalu- 
ator, unclear objectives are problematic, because they do not offer a 
clear guide as to what should be evaluated. The generalised objectives 
encountered in the project documents of the AIBD were similarly unhelpful; 
they were a catalogue of possibilities, not a concise statement of project 
direction. 
The problem appears to be one of framing objectives in such a way 
that they avoid being (i) vague goals, which can hardly fail to be approa- 
ched - to some extent (as with SITE); or (ii) exhaustive lists, from which 
in practice some selection will have to be made (as in the AIBD and in 
GROW); or (iii) over-directive and highly specific statements, which may, 
if they are formulated too early in the development of a project, inhibit 
later growth. This is an issue with which any planning framework must 
deal, including a consideration of sequencing - i. e. at what stage are 
general goals sufficient, as a direction pointer; and when should these 
be translated into quantifiable targets, or specific, behaviourally- 
oriented tasks. 
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But this does not mean that objectives will not change, in definition 
or in emphasis, as projects develop. From an original catalogue of object- 
ives, some may in practice achieve heightened prominence and others be 
underplayed. In the original India-US Agreement for SITE, for example, 
a number of general, instructional and technical objectives were listed; 
under the 'general heading' the following were included. 
"General objectives: 
The general objectives of the experiment are to: Gain exper- 
ience in the development, testing and management of a satel- 
lite-based instructional television system particularly in 
rural areas and to determine optimal system parameters. 
Demonstrate the potential value of satellite technology in 
the rapid development of effective mass communications in 
developing countries. 
Demonstrate the potential value of satellite TV broadcasts 
in the practical instruction of village inhabitants. 
Stimulate national development in India, with important manag- 
erial, economic, technological and social implications. " 
(Cowlan et alia 1973, p. 35) 
In the event, it could be argued that, of these, the first was the 
most important: it was the experience of system design which was most 
valuable. 
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"None of us engaged in this experiment view it as an 
optimal operational system nor do we believe that one year's 
experiment will bring about large measurable social changes 
in the country. However, we do believe that through this 
experiment we will be able to learn how an ongoing system 
ought to be configured, installed and managed, and what are 
the necessary conditions for the programme to be effective. " 
(Yash Pal, 1974 p. 3) 
Nonetheless, change should come about in response to genuine refine- 
ments of strategy, not simply to political shifts, as happened to some 
extent in Malaysia. The AIBD, through its various stages of project 
formulation , constantly redefined its objectives without any real changes 
being reflected in the project's organisätional structure or in its programme: 
mostly these were made to satisfy the wishes of sponsors and the changing 
personalities associated with the Institute. So, in earlier project 
descriptions, the concentration was upon broadcasting; in later versions, 
the term 'communication' was generally used. Specific strands of activity 
were added or deleted as the emphasis moved from pure training to include 
(in theory) aspects of research and formative evaluation or information 
transfer. These could be meaningful changes, representing valid changes of 
philosophy; on the other hand, they could be purely tactical manoeuvres. 
If the latter, they could only confuse project planning, not being assimi- 
lated into the planning process. 
SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
Maximisation of Resources and Infrastructures 
In most of the projects considered at least some attempt was made to 
capitalise upon the strengths of what was already available in the way of 
1 
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infrastructure. 
The AIBD is a particularly good example. Even in its earliest days, it 
set out to map its functions in relation to other projects, but in later 
years, starved of funds, it maintained its identity almost entirely 
by working through existing institutions. In fact, although the Institute 
is a legal entity, it still has no independent physical existence; it operates 
in borrowed premises (in the campus of the Malaysian National Broadcasting 
Training Centre), it draws heavily upon national personnal, and it finds 
resources through a network of donors, bilateral and multi-lateral. 
Conversely, the Open University 'saw itself originally not so much as 
a user of existing institutions (apart from the BBC), but as potentially 
threatened by them. The Vice-Chancellor, Walter Perry, was convinced that 
the University's most urgent problem was one of academic equivalence, to 
ensure the respect of the traditional academic establishment. Undoubtedly 
a good deal of doubt and ill-informed criticism was expressed in the early 
days by local authorities and adult education bodies - and from other sources 
too (e. g. publishers, who felt disturbed by what they saw as a rival publish- 
ing organisation). However, once the University had concentrated its 
energies upon winning over opposition , many of these anticipated tensions 
were dissolved. The publishers, for example, modified their attitude, once 
they realised that the OU had no intention of entering the textbook bus- 
iness and that the University could in practice considerably extend the 
range of the higher educational book market. Such difficulties might have 
been settled earlier had the original planners gone more deeply into extra- 
mural relationships. 
Problems of this kind arose less obviously in El Salvador, because 
the ITV system was dealing with formal education, which already had its 
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fixed structures, and where coordination rather than institutional con- 
nection was needed. Nevertheless, there were some difficulties: 
"Also at issue during the early stages of ITV was where 
to place overall responsibility for the new system. The 
Salvadoreans, aware of the many bureaucratic obstacles within 
their own Ministry of Education, argued for a new executive 
agency directly under the President ... The USAID represen- 
tatives, on the other hand, were wary of granting the project 
too much administrative autonomy ... The debate was not 
settled on the merits of the argument, however, but rather by 
the fortuitous naming of Beneke as Minister for Education in 
July 1967, which ensured that IYV would receive strong support 
at the highest level. " (111ayo et al, 1976 p. 28) 
Singapore's position was similar to that of El Salvador, and the CTW 
and the AIT were both designed to maximise, often to exploit, existing 
initiatives. But somewhat different problems arose in the cases of GROW 
and of SITE, which were least successful in this regard. 
At first sight, the situation should have been simple for GROW to 
resolve: as a community project, most of its resources were to hand and 
could be enlisted through personal contact. In practice, relatively 
little was done. It is still unclear why the radio resource of Trinidad 
and Tobago was not properly used (all the documentation suggests that it 
was available), and virtually no contacts were built up with Tobagonian 
community projects, apart from personal relationships set up by Olive 
Sawyer (a retired teacher, who had spent many years in the island). The 
community newspaper which was ultimately produced had more of the format 
of a tourist gazette and was actually printed outside Tobago. 
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In SITE, sonne of the same difficulties occurred at a macro level. 
An original split between ISRO and AIR meant finally that some broad- 
casting resources were inadequately exploited (e. g. the Poona Film and 
Television Institute, which was devoted almost entirely to training for 
the terrestrial expansion of television) , and opportunities for co- 
operative working were lost. The same difficulty occurred in the con- 
text of evaluation. 
"The initial design of the experiment called for a social 
evaluation to be conducted. Till two years ago we hadn't even 
begun. There were a number of agencies and university depart- 
ments who, off and on, expressed a mild interest. We were torn 
between the need for keeping the evaluation experiment inde- 
pendent of us, and for ensuring that something did get started 
... (Yash Pal, 1975 p. 5) 
It seems that for the pooling of resources between institutions 
working in the same general field more than goodwill is necessary: 
structures, and finally means of arbitration, are required (a point 
taken up in the discussion of coordination below). 
Timi n 
Timing and phasing are critical elements in the systems planning 
tradition. They imply not simply the timing of the planning process as 
a whole, but also the phasing of activities within this process, in 
such a way that essential correlations are reflected, while still allowing 
an adequate interval for the completion of each task. 
It was not expected, in a review of projects already several years 
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old, that much detail would be revealed about problems of phasing. How- 
ever, it was thought that the timing of the overall planning process, 
and the phasing of principal blocks of activities - especially the 
relationship between policy formulation, strategic planning, operational 
planning and implementation - might be reasonably illustrated. 
Initiation of Planning 
The first question concerned the optimal point at which planning 
should begin, and this seemed, in these projects, to depend mainly on 
environmental considerations. 
0 
This has sometimes been expressed as the 'right time, right place' 
principle. It was stated quite explicitly by John Middleton in his evalu- 
ation of the Agency for Instructional Television. 
"In sum, when AIT was formed, two necessary conditions 
for action existed: a widely shared need for higher quality 
school television; and a proven model to meet this need - the 
NIT consortium approach ... The relative speed with which 
the agency was formed after the Atlanta meeting ... testifies 
to the notion that the time is ripe for action". 
(Middleton, 1979 p. 94) 
This does not suggest that the 'right time' is a matter of accident; 
on the contrary, it is seen as the outcome of careful preparatory work. 
In Singapore, in India, in the United Kingdom, initiatives were also 
seized opportunely, as preparatory work which had been in progress for 
some years apparently resulted in a suitable context for action. SITE 
was constructed around the potential availability of the ATS-6 satellite; 
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the Open University (in the terms of Harold Wilson's first proposal) was 
floated as an ideain a speech delivered in Scotland in 1965. In Singapore, 
the members of the Audio-Visual Unit at the Teachers Training College had 
been working on the idea of educational television since 1956, and their 
proposal was first mooted in 1963; by 1965-6 sufficient interest had been 
generated for the proposal to be acceptable, after the then Permanent 
Secretary for Education returned from a visit to the Centre for Educational 
Television Overseas in London. The Children's Television Workshop, insti- 
gated by Joan Cooney in 1967, came at a time when there was a growing 
concern for the state of children's television programming: 
"(it was) sensed that American parents would be receptive 
to a new kind of television show that was cleverly produced but 
contained traditional instructional goals whose use in school 
could be easily appreciated by adults ... Although parents were 
not actively advocating such a show, many felt a need for it 
and would welcome its arrival. " (Polsky, 1974 p. 106) 
Identifying the 'right time and place' appears to be a matter of 
correctly assessing opportunities and of determining prevailing moods. 
But what was originally opportune can become less so over the years. 
Singapore suffered considerably when funds earmarked for educational 
television expansion were diverted to defence (following the announce- 
ment of British withdrawal in 1967), and the original impetus given to 
the AIBD by a succession of international meetings was dissipated as 
years passed, before anything solid had been achieved. It seems to be 
important, when a suitable context for action occurs, that it is exploi- 
ted without delay. On the other hand, issues cannot be forced prematurely, 
or over-theoretically. GROW, in Tobago, was promoted mainly as a demon- 
stration project; Tobago was selected as a location more because it met 
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a series of social and economic criteria than because it exhibited a 
basic drive towards such a programme. 
Is there any common pattern to this principle? 
In most of the projects analysed, there was a considerable interval 
between the first floating of an idea and its political acceptance. In 
the case of the Open University, this interval was at least four-five 
years (much longer, in fact, from the first stirrings of the concept in 
the thirties); in the case of the AIT the period of evolution amounted 
to seven years. In Singapore, first soundings in the fifties led to 
more specific proposals in 1963, with a delay of three years thereafter. 
In El Salvador there was a four-year gestation period; in India, something 
like nine years passed before the Memorandum of Understanding with NASA 
was signed in 1969. 
These were not periods of complete dormancy, nor did discussions 
proceed at a constant pace. But at some critical stage in the develop- 
mental period, a point was reached at which the idea took a concrete hold, 
and thereafter the tempo increased. 
This is a difficult process to control, and the best attempt at 
doing so, among the projects analysed, was probably made by the Children's 
Television Workshop. This had the advantage of being mainly a privately 
sponsored project, under the control of a small elitist group whose interest 
and influence, once secured, was enough to carry the proposal through its 
policy-making stages. Yet, even here the interval between Joan Cooney's 
dinner proposal to Lloyd forrisett and Lewis Friedman (of WNDT) and Carnegie's 
eventual financial commitment was still almost two years: three and a half 
years elapsed before the commencement of 'Sesame Street' transmissions. 
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Policy Formulation and Strategic Planning 
The project review also illustrated some of the general problems of 
phasing in the planning process, especially the relationship between its 
main components (cf Figure 4 in Chapter III). Of particular significance 
were problems of compression and condensation of certain stages. Overall, 
it seemed to be the stages of policy formalisation and strategic planning 
which were the most neglected, or rushed, because they were caught in a 
planning bottleneck. While the gestation period is of undetermined length, 
once this has crystallised, there is often considerable political pressure 
to move to an operational planning stage and to implementation without 
allowing time for the strategic planning process in which various options 
are considered. In a number of cases, the interval between an original 
policy decision and between operational 
planning 
was too short, and too 
little attention was paid to the exploration of options. 
Among the projects analysed, the Children's Television Workshop appeared 
to be the most sensitive to this problem. Polsky reported: 
"The Workshop was not planned in a crisis atmosphere. 
Two full years passed between the time the project was con- 
sidered and the time it was publicly announced. An addi- 
tional year and a half passed before 'Sesame Street' went 
on the air. The project's architects developed a plan that 
ensured that money and time would be available for a year 
and a half of pre-broadcast experimentation, which they hoped 
would increase the project's chance of success. This thorough 
and unhurried approach to problem solving was characteristic 
of all the planning ... for the project. " (Op cit p. 104) 
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Among the other projects, El Salvador managed to maintain a reasonable 
period for strategic planning, and the AIT was again cushioned by its 
unique decision-making processes. But in the cases of SITE and the Open 
University, the consideration of policy alternatives and options was 
rushed. In India, technical options were comprehensively explored, but 
software aspects received much more cursory consideration. The Open 
University, while it explored the social aspects of distance learning in 
some depth, paid far less attention in its formative stages to strategic 
options or to the magnitude of the operation being proposed. The work of 
the Planning Committee, which laid the real basis for action, was con- 
fined to nine months, and still many issues were left to be resolved 
pragmatically. 
0 
The case of the AIBD was rather different. While there was no shortage 
of time in which to explore fundamental principles, conflicting pressures 
from external agencies led to an over-emphasis, too early, on mechanistic 
considerations and far too little on policy matters (e. g. the relationship 
between broadcasting, broadcasting training and the development process). 
Partly this was due to the lack of .a suitable 
forum within which such 
discussions might take place. Nevertheless, throughout the project's 
history, a series of arbitrary policy dead-lines were imposed, usually 
prompted by donor requirements, which meant that the many policy documents 
were rushed through, their nature mostly conditioned by questions of format. 
In Singapore, and in Tobago, the time available for policy review and 
strategic planning was certainly inadequate. The gestation period in 
Singapore was lengthy and proposals were meticulously prepared by staff of 
the Audio Visual Unit of the Teachers' Training College. But once con- 
sensus was reached, policy decisions followed quickly and arbitrarily, with 
little detailed consideration of their means of implementation. In essence 
- 142 - 
the policy decision amounted to little more than an agreement to mount 
educational television; it was left to the project's planners to inter- 
pret this more specifically, in a very short space of time. 
Operational Planning and Implementation 
Similar trends were evident at the operational stage. In El 
Salvador, a real attempt was made to provide a reasonable 
implementation period, with nineteen months of run-up time. (There was 
an additional advantage, in the Salvadorean case, that the ITV project 
was part of a total educational reform package, and television therefore 
took its place in a larger scheme, with allowances being made for the 
training (in advance) of utilisers is well as producers and teachers. ) 
Similar conditions obtained for the AIT, which in practice adopted 
the tempo of its members' capacities. In general, the AIBD also had 
some operational latitude (though this was mainly because planning and 
programming within the AIBD always had a conditional character). 
Other projects were not so fortunate. In SITE, crisis planning was 
the rule, with some leeway provided by the late delivery of the satellite, 
but with no firm implementation schedule (except in the technical sphere, 
which was well programmed and pursued). In the event, the reality of a 
launch date forced the implementation stages. 
In Singapore, although there was finally little slippage, the interval 
allowed for operational planning and implementation was highly compressed, 
and it is surprising that opening transmission dates were actually met. 
Only eight months were available from the decision to launch the service to 
its inception: this period had to cover building, equipping, training and 
programme production. The organisers were saved, in all probability, by 
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the smallness of scale of the project and the limited size of the Republic. 
The Open University was also troubled by over-compression; it had 
little more than eighteen months from the appointment of a nucleus of 
executives to its original courses (the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor 
only came in 1969, for an opening date of 1971). Networks produced for 
planning and implementation were often in arrears and no detailed devel- 
opment plan (important for a project of such a scale) existed. 
Finally in Tobago, no real attempt was made, in the early stages, to 
map the implementation of the project at all; the introduction of even a 
bar chart plan came only half-way through its first phase (after some 
stirrings from the Trinidad National Commission for UNESCO and the UNESCO 
Paris Secretariat). 
In summary, therefore, each stage of the planning and policy making 
process demands adequate time; but quite as important is the relationship 
between phases. Unless suitable safeguards are provided, strategic and 
operational planning will be collapsed and implementation rushed through 
once a policy decision is taken. 
Coordination 
Coordination is a concept fully explored in the literature of manage- 
ment and organisation, and the main purpose of the project review, in this 
instance, was to provide examples of needs and problems. 
Coordination needs are both internal and external; they exist both 
within organisations, and between them (in relation to other institutions 
with parallel or associated roles - i. e. insitutions which are part of the 
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same overall communication system). 
They also exist for a variety of purposes. The most commonly expres- 
sed is the avoidance of duplication, and the improvement of communication 
channels between individual organisational units. But the function of 
coordination may also be interpreted much more positively, as an attempt 
to avoid conflict (by meeting crisis situations in advance), and to create 
a pattern of cooperative working through consensus. 
Although few of the project evaluations dealt specifically with 
coordination problems (excepting Middleton's study of the AIT (1979) 
and Polsky's of the CTW (1974), there were many incidental references 
to difficulties encountered. 
In most instances, some attempts were made to set up formal mechan- 
isms for co-ordination. Harold Howe, at the inauguration of the Children's 
Television Workshop, is reported to have said, 
"What is being launched here is the result of a highly 
complex interplay of committees and sub-committees. " 
(Pol sky, 1974 p 3) 
Internally, the Open University became a complex structure of inter- 
locking committees, dealing with aspects of course production, management, 
finance, forecasting, etc. In a less complex way, El Salvador and 
Singapore did the same. But however complex the structure, the formal 
mechanism is unlikely to cover more than the surface of coordination 
needs, and informal networks are also essential. So, in the AIT: 
"The communication needs of an agency like AIT are large. 
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In everyday operations, a large number of individuals are tied 
into AIT operations by telephone and by mail. These include 
educators in school agencies, broadcasters in public television 
stations, consultants on various projects, television production 
agencies, print and film duplication shops, evaluation teams ... 
This informal communication network is a significant factor in 
the accomplishment of a large volume of work by a small staff". 
(Middleton, 1979 p. 87) 
Moreover, the situation is not static: there is constant change and 
adaptation, in response to shifting demands, as in the Open University. 
"No one tidy chart can illustrate the complexity of the 
real situation because various objectives of the institution 
impose different infrastructures: consequently the system exists 
in a perpetual state of conflict. When the conflict is con- 
trolled to a state of creative tension, then the whole system 
works; the problem is to ensure that conflict does not become 
destructive. The University's efforts to modify the structure, 
through two major reviews, have resulted in improvements to 
the functions of one or more parts of the concomitant infra- 
structures. Further improvements can probably only be achie- 
ved by amending the existing charter". (OU Consultancy Service, 
1976 p. 3/5) 
In essence, it would appear that coordination is a matter of contin- 
uous, pragmatic adjustment between formal and informal networks. The 
formal network is important because it provides a framework within which 
personal interaction and role adjustment can take place. But informal 
channels are also needed, to provide additional flexibility, (while the 
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formal network is constantly developing and adapting). 
For this reason, it seems important that coordination should be 
treated positively, even creatively, emphasising consensus and the 
possibility of achieving, through cooperative action, results which 
could not possibly be the work of a single agency acting on its own 
initiative (i. e. something approaching the concept of interdisciplinarity, 
to be discussed later). John Middleton characterised this view in 
relation to the AIT: 
"The concept of consensus limits the degree to which - 
and the manner in which - AIT is an agency of educational 
innovation. AIT staff members see themselves as working in 
partnership with the schools to develop educational materials 
that fit needs as determined by school officials. The 
mission is not to "intervene" or to impose on education from 
the outside. Rather, AIT is a partner in reform and 
improvement initiated by persons within the structures of 
education. This non-reformist approach fits well with the 
consortium funding policy. Funds to support projects come 
from decision-makers legally responsible for the schools, 
not from external agencies intent on innovation and reform 
from outside (such as universities or federal agencies). 
A state or provincial agency's participation in the 
needs determination process tends to lead to "psychologi- 
cal ownership" of the project. When a consortium series 
goes into use in the schools, it is common to find it 
presented to the community as a project of the state or 
province. AIT is often cited only in the credits on the 
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television program or in the teacher's guide. From the per- 
spective of AIT, this is the way it should be. (Op cit pp. 28-29) 
Coordination is frequently considered only as part of the imple- 
mentation process, not of policy formulation and planning. It may appear 
easier, on the surface, to reduce the number of participants in planning 
and decision-making, but this can also produce problems at a later, 
operational stage, which could have been avoided had they been tackled 
earlier. If policy is formulated at a senior level, and the co-ordination 
of sectoral policies regarded as a subsidiary, largely technical process, 
as a result, the same arguments may have to be repeated in a number of 
situations and protracted attempts made to arbitrate between positions 
which may differ only marginally. While policy formulation may appear to 
be easier if restricted to a small group of decision-makers, it will help 
considerably in practice to enlarge the original membership of this group. 
Consensus is more easily achieved before sectoral attitudes have hardened. 
This is especially true of relationships with external agencies. A 
project does not exist in a vacuum,, (as argued in the discussion of 
comprehensiveness), and its success will frequently depend upon the skill 
with which it establishes compatible boundaries, avoiding duplication 
and capitalising upon the strengths of related agencies to make up for 
its own deficiencies. The majority of the projects considered took care 
in this respect, often ingeniously. The AIBD, for example, was much 
concerned in its earliest days with an apparent overlap of training functions 
with bilateral agencies, on the one hand, and with a regional agency based 
in Singapore (CEPTA TV, the Centre for Production of Adult Education 
Programmes for Television) on the other. The bilateral problem was offset 
by making special efforts to enlist the support of those Western training 
agencies (for example, the BBC) with which it might have appeared to be in 
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competition, and a network of personal relationships was created with 
other training institutions, in an attempt to avoid political difficulty 
through an extension of professional camaraderie. 
However, one major failure of the AIBD was its inability to establish 
a productive relationship with the Development Support Communication 
Service in Bangkok. Some of this difficulty can be traced to differences 
in philosophy between the two organisations (the DSCS was concerned with 
development support, and minimised infrastructural development, especially 
of mass media industries). But it was compounded by the fact that the 
AIBD came into being largely as a UNESCO initiative, while the DSCS was a 
UNDP/UNICEF creation. Since UNDP, as a United Nations programme, was both 
a major supporter of UNESCO and a principal sponsor of AIBD activities 
(at least in its formative stages), the repercussions of this separation 
were considerable. 
In Singapore, the Educational Television Service, as a national agency, 
had less to fear from external agencies, but was at some pains, from the 
outset, to involve all branches of the educational administration, and 
eventually, of development ministries. Moreover, a potential conflict with 
the broadcasting organisation, TV Singapura, was avoided by early consul- 
tation, especially by enlisting the goodwill of the then Director General 
of TV Singapura. Originally, school broadcasting (in radio) had been the 
prerogative of the broadcasters, but it was abandoned, following the 
secession of Singapore from Malaysia, because of poor utilisation. There 
was an urgent need for good relations, as a main broadcasting channel was 
to be used for ETV distribution. 
In the case of El Salvador, communication channels already 
existed between the Salvador Government, the Ministry of Education, and 
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the US Agency for International Development (for example, the aid agency 
withdrew its original insistence upon a project pitched at the primary 
level after hearing arguments by the Salvadoreans for a secondary start). 
But in the United Kingdom, the Open University was placed, initially, in 
a difficult relationship vis-a-vis traditional universities and with the 
adult education movement. Although welcomed by some agencies (who were 
uninterested in part-time, external degree programmes - the University of 
London was one example) others resented the OU as an interloper, a 
possible means of lowering standards, and a potential rival for limited 
funds (a position exacerbated by the fact that the Open University 
received its funds directly from the Department of Education and Science, 
rather than through the University Grants Committee). This early distrust 
was eroded, at least in part, by the University's insistence upon equiv- 
alence in its academic qualifications (through the use of external exam- 
iners), and perhaps more so by the use of tutors and counsellors in a part- 
time capacity, most of them drawn from the higher and adult education estab- 
lishment, and the use of university premises for summer schools and of 
further education centres for study groups. 
The Open University also avoided what might well have been a difficult 
relationship with the BBC (unused to a 'partnership' relationship, after 
a long-standing tradition of independence in educational programme-making), 
by involving them as equal colleagues from the earliest stages of policy- 
making. (In this way the University's own organisational development was 
also aided, in that it had access to a management nucleus upon which it 
could draw for a variety of planning functions). 
SITE was a more complex case. Created through the work of a series 
of interlocking committees at a Ministerial level (originating with NASCOM), 
it apparently became bogged down in the formalities of coordination with- 
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out resolving some major issues until very late in its development. Chief 
among these was the problem of responsibility for the production of progr- 
ammes, which (according to the Rules of Business of All-India Radic) was 
an exclusive prerogative of the broadcasting organisation. The position 
had not been challenged previously (school television programmes in Delhi, 
and agricultural programmes in the Delhi area, were under AIR control); and 
the extension of the right to produce was fought lengthily and bitterly 
for several years. In the event ISRO (the space agency) produced a series 
of science programmes from two of its own studios, and was also largely 
responsible for an in-depth programming experiment in the Ahmedebad area, 
but this agreement was secured only after a period of in-fighting, and the 
problem was acute enough to delay the stock-piling of programmes for the 
satellite to quite acute proportions. 
Until quite late in the day, there appeared to be some feeling that 
this was an ISRO rather than an Indian project; the position was not helped 
by the fact that, at an earlier stage, ISRO and AIR had produced rival 
plans and estimates of cost for satellite introduction as compared with 
other forms of broadcasting expansion. When genuine inter-agency involve- 
ment came, it sometimes came too late. It is surprising how little, in 
the final demonstration, certain agencies were involved in SITE: for 
example, the Film and Television Institute of India, based in Poona, 
nurtured by UNESCO and the Ford Foundation as a prototype broadcasting 
training project and an experiment in developing techniques of formative 
evaluation. 
In contrast, the Children's Television Workshop was remarkable for 
the way in which it exploited the strengths of related agencies, while 
reducing its dependence upon their weaker links. The Workshop, for 
example, utilised the legal, administrative and distri15ution capabilities 
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of the Public Broadcasting System in the USA on behalf of 'Sesame Street' 
and its later programmes, but rejected any formal connection with the 
programme-making agencies of public broadcasting. It also involved members 
of the educational establishment most effectively, through the series of 
seminars arranged by Gerald Lesser. 
To what extent can questions of co-ordination be legislated for? 
Formal co-ordination processes can be planned in advance; informal co- 
ordination processes evidently cannot, but their significance can still 
be acknowledged (e. g. by providing adequate opportunity, within the 
formal structures, for informal dialogue to take place). 
Moreover, plans can be quite explicit about the exact nature, functions, 
responsibilities and levels of representation of at least the formal co- 
ordinating structures (points considered in later principles). This was 
done in Singapore and in the AIBD; it has also been institutionalised in 
the Open University. 
However, legislation on its own is insufficient. The least succes- 
sful project in this regard appeared to be GROW. GROW began with no 
real sense of identity or cohesion; it was meant to evolve a more precise 
role within its first year of operations, bL! t in practice, made very little 
attempt to do so. It remained, on the whole, a coterie project, with little 
relationship, explicit or implicit, with other development initiatives. 
Yet GROW was not planned in this way. It was only during the imple- 
mentation stage that the priority attached to coordination needs lapsed. 
"The project document should spell out the need for a 
local liaison group to work closely with the project team 
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throughout the life of the project ... Within such a group 
it 
should be possible to determine priorities which are valid for 
the society and to agree on strategies which are within the 
comprehension and technical grasp of the population... 
The GROW project did in fact adopt this valuable approach in 
its pre-project investigations and early stages, but its 
significance as an integral part of project implementation 
was apparently not appreciated, and the liaison group was 
allowed to disappear ... 
(Solomon, 1975 pp. 24-26) 
Support 0 
The acceptance of projects depends to a large extent on the status 
which they are accorded in political and decision-making circles, and 
the extent to which advocacy is handled at an appropriate political 
level. The emergence of SITE, for example, owed a good deal, not only 
to the personal commitment of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, but also to the 
identification of the project with that forward-thinking image which the 
Indian Government was anxious to promote, coupled with a stress upon 
improving communication conditions for the isolated rural population which 
was a major political platform. Added to this were pragmatic factors. 
The satellite would allow for at least an interim period of rural communi- 
cation, at a time when plans for terrestrial coverage of television broad- 
casting were long-term and already retarded; it would do so, moreover, with 
hardware costs substantially underwritten by the American Government and 
NASA. A second factor was the possibility during the satellite experiment, 
for the Indian Prime Minister to be seen in person by the rural people, and 
therefore to make direct political appeals (something which would be 
impossible through a programme of personal visits). Chitnis explained: 
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"Just 15 days after the beginning of SITE the Indian 
Independence Day was celebrated. On this day it is cust- 
omary for the Prime Minister of India to hoist the national 
flag on the historical Red Ford and address the nation ... 
For the first time SITE made it possible for villagers in 
2,400 villages to witness the event live on their telev- 
ision screens ." (Chitnis, 1976 p. 4) 
Such a high-level interest could sustain the impetus of the project, 
even when it was beset by internal agency rivalries and coordination 
difficulties; it could sustain it even after Dr. Sarabhai's death. 
The same situation occurred in El Salvador when, by a fortunate co,, -, i- 
bination of circumstances, Walter Beneke (who had first been attracted to 
the television medium during a period as Ambassador to Japan) became 
Minister of Education and was able to enlist the President, Julio Adalberto 
Rivera, in support of its adoption as part of a sustained programme of 
educational reform. 
This level of support was subsequently maintained. 
"A crucial factor in the development of El Salvador's 
ITV system was the support it received from the highest levels 
of Government. Fidel Sanchez Hernandez made the Educational 
Reform the major program of his presidency; and since Salva- 
dorean presidents are constitutionally limited to a single 
five-year term, the ITV system had to be designed and imple- 
mented quickly in order to gain political visibility and 
approval. " (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 165) 
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In the United Kingdom, although discussions of distance learning 
associated with broadcasting had been heard since the nineteen thirties, 
it was the interest of the Labour Government which first promoted the 
Open University (beginning with a speech delivered by Harold Wilson in 
1963). In this speech, he proposed: 
"What we envisage is the creation of a new educational 
trust representative of the Universities and other educational 
organisations, associations of teachers, the broadcasting 
authorities, publishers, public and private bodies, producers 
capable of producing television and other material. " 
(Wilson, 1963 n. p. ) 
Although much of the sustained pressure for the University came from 
others, especially Jennie Lee, Harold Wilson's support continued; not 
only did he legislate for early action (for example through the formation 
of a flinisterial Committee, followed by an Advisory Committee, all within 
the year 1965), but he also paid personal attention to finance. 
This list can easily be multiplied. But the importance of status is 
not restricted to initial project formulation; it demands a continuing 
commitment. El Salvador, for example, saw a period of lower tempo after 
the departure of Walter Beneke from the Education Ministry. Too much 
reliance should not be placed upon an initial boost, especially one suppor- 
ted largely through foreign aid and interest (as happened partly in the 
case of El Salvador, but far more spectacularly in the case of the American 
Samoan instructional television system). 
The other projects reviewed consistently suffered from a lack of 
support at a sufficiently high political level. Singapore spent a decade 
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in its cramped and inadequate original premises, in spite of its success, 
and the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development was similarly 
placed. It received, over the years, consistent support from its host 
country, Malaysia, and was maintained by the enthusiasm of a handful of 
donor agencies, but as a consortium project it was politically vulnerable. 
Being a regional body, the AIBD was necessarily the creation of a consensus 
of Governments, who acted first nationally and only second regionally. It 
was promoted vigorously by UNESCO, but international organisations do not 
have commensurate funds for support; the same was true of the other main 
sponsor, the Asian Broadcasting Union, a regional professional body with 
few resources. Bilateral interest in the project was intermittent (further 
diluted by a lack of interest among technical assistance agencies in 
regional projects, where few bilateral advantages were discerned), and 
even among the Governments of the region, an early competition for host- 
country status did not help to develop unity. Without heavy backing from 
the Malaysian Government, the institution could not have survived so long. 
Fortunately, it did so until the late 70s, when world opinion changed 
and the project finally became a viable intergovernmental body. 
Realism 
An emphasis upon realism in relation to planning and decision making 
processes is a reflection of the disjointed-incremental approach; it 
embodies both caution and pragmatism, recognising that not only may some 
of the results of planning be imperfect, but also that some matters are 
not immediately, or fully, plannable. It acts, therefore, as a check upon 
the creation, and implementation, of planning designs. 
In the first place, it implies that, when basic policy decisions are 
taken, they should not be expressed in so intransigent a way that changes of 
- 15 6- 
direction cannot be accommodated if necessary. This is true of such areas 
as finance. In the case of the CTW, Polsky stated: 
"Morrisett and his associates refused to be locked into a 
budget arrived at early in the project when it later became 
evident that, to accomplish what they wanted to do, substan- 
tial additional money was needed. " (Polsky, 1974 p. 104) 
Some of the early experiences of the Open University were 
also relevant. An indication of structures, and estimates of finance, 
were necessary for policy decisions to be made in the first place, but 
these original estimates could not b` treated as firm. Many of the 
original concepts (for example, the reliance on broadcasting) were mod-i-- 
fied once professional staff, especially the Vice Chancellor, were 
appointed. All the planning partners did not always recognise this limit- 
ation. The Open University was locked into a relationship with the BBC, 
whose planning processes were highly institutionalised, and in conseq- 
uence the University was often pressed for detail (on programme quantity, 
studio use, etc) well before it was in a position to give meaningful 
replies. 
Secondly, certain criteria, or recommendations, which are evolved as 
a result of planning, may turn out, in the event, to be impossible to 
implement. In SITE, original parameters laid down for the selection of 
villages for the experiment included social as well as technical criteria. 
But it proved difficult to obtain an adequate selection which matched even 
basic technical requirements, and in some cases village electrification 
had to be accelerated for the required total to be reached. Not surprisingly, 
many social parameters had to be discarded. 
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Many early decisions, if insisted upon too categorically, may have 
to be reversed later, at a price. In El Salvador, a decision was made on 
studio location, deciding between two centres - one near the capital, 
San Salvador, the other at fifteen miles' distance. Initially the remoter 
site was chosen, because it was to share the same complex as a new national 
teacher training programme. In the end, the more prosaic factor of distance 
(coupled with lower altitude) made work difficult, and finally (in 1972) the 
whole production centre was moved back to Santa Tecla on the outskirts of 
the capital. 
These observations appear to apply to planning in general; they are 
not specific to either industrialised or developing countries. They 
suggest that means have to be created for decisions either to be reversed, 
when they prove wrong, or for some matters to be planned only in broad 
outline, and supplemented later, when more information is available. 
In the Open University, while it was clearly impossible for the 
Planning Committee to come to precise conclusions on the organisation 
of broadcasting, it was also clear that this need would ultimately arise; 
strategic planning, at the least, should allow for necessary professional 
advice to be made available in good time. But this did not happen in the 
case of the publishing, print and audio-visual department of the Open 
University. The overall situation was summarised, in a review of OU 
planning difficulties, as follows: 
"It !; as ic; ipossible to visualise the eventual size and compl- 
exity of the organisation. This resulted in: 
(i) decisons being made on an ad hoc basis rather than by 
lorw-! ard planning, 
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(ii) regions developing individually, not to a regular coherent 
pattern. 
(iii) scale of production not visualised, thus outside printers 
had to be contracted 
(iv) storage and warehousing problems of course materials and 
Home Experiment kits. " 
(OU Consultancy Service, 1976 p. 2/4) 
Realism therefore, seems to imply (i) the objective assessment of 
planning processes and institutions; (ii) the creation of failsafe or 
subsidiary planning mechanisms, to correct or extend planning in the 
light of experience; and (iii) the avoidance of excessive dependency on a 
limited number of institutions or individuals. It is closely linked to 
what is called, in management literature, the principle of redundancy 
(cf. Niskanen 1971, and Landau 1969,1972). Edwin Parker applies this 
principle to communication processes in the following way: 
11 . Redundancy in the institutional structure, may be 
the least understood principle. In attempting to create 
flexible, decentralised institutions that provide reliable, 
efficient services, it should be remembered that the com- 
ponents of organisations (the humans and groups of humans) 
are unreliable. It is quite possible, in theory and in 
practice, to devise reliable systems out of unreliable com- 
ponents, provided there is sufficient redundancy in the 
structure. If one sub-unit of an organisation suffers from 
bureaucratic inertia and fails to adapt rapidly, there must 
- 159 - 
be another unit that can be assigned the task at hand. The 
existence of an alternative unit that could perform similar 
functions is the best way to ensure that the first unit doesn't 
develop the complacency and inertia that is often associated 
with monopoly power. Redundancy may seem a remote goal for 
developing countries that are striving hard to create the 
first organisational unit to accomplish some task. Redundancy 
may also seem counter-intuitive as a way to enhance efficiency 
because it appears insufficient to have duplicate facilities 
or organisations. But redundancy in organisations should be 
neither a remote goal nor a current inefficiency. Organising 
the available production staff *into two or more independent 
production teams should lead to more initiative and a higher 
level of total output than a single production team. 
(Parker, 1977 pp. 66-67) 
This postulates a pragmatic attitude to planning, which might be 
compared with the so-called "Murphy's Law" of engineering. The lavi is 
in three parts, namely: (i) nothing is as easy as it looks; (ii) 
everything takes longer than you think, and (iii) if anything can go 
wrong, it will. Yash Pal, in discussing SITE, specifically mentioned 
this law. 
"The statements of this Law are primarily directed towards 
people who are committed to doing and accomplishing. It is the 
awareness of this which leads to checking and re-checking of 
designs, contingency planning tests and evaluation control, and the 
setting up of an operational system with feedback loops for 
corrective action. Unfortunately many people in developing 
countries, after having lived through decades of inaction 
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and dependence on aid and patronage, use precisely these state- 
ments to kill initiative and perpetuate an atmosphere of hope- 
lessness. Through my experience in SITE I have come to believe 
in the applicability of a form of Anti-Murphy Law on a higher 
plane, given the right catalysis. We have found that some 
things which look impossible are doable. Others which should 
take a year according to past experience and conservative plans 
can be done in four months if we strike a new path. Bottlenecks 
are not like rigid capillaries; they open wide after a threshold 
of effort is crossed. " (Yash Pal, 1975 p. 4) 
In other words realism can als« be interpreted in a more positive 
way, to emphasise that, quite apart from the provision of failsafe or 
corrective mechanisms, there comes a point when fresh thinking is needed, 
to question the established consensus, take a fresh look at objectives, 
return to basic principles. Irrespective of whether planning is right 
or wrong, it also seems important for it not to become a straight-jacket, 
inhibiting the flexibility of those who follow. As Yash Pal again remarked 
in the context of SITE, 
"Even before we are half-way through in our programme 
production activity, I begin to sense dangers of lapsing 
into routine with what were in the beginning considered 
fresh innovations. As soon as things become strictly oper- 
ational, complacency sets in and the initial sparks get 
extinguished". (Ibid, p. 7) 
How far was such an approach characteristic of the projects under 
review? There were examples of ingenious responses to contingencies as 
these arose, and also examples which reflected compromise solutions to 
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situations ol, difficulty. In this way, the Singapore Educational 
Television Service created a separate production unit for educational 
broadcasting, because an earlier experiment with school radio (under 
the umbrella of the broadcasting organisation) had proved unsuccessful; 
it did not, however, attempt to create a separate distribution network. 
In the Open University, the early weakness in the operation of media 
support services led to some remodelling of this section (without tampering 
with the overall system, or even with the production delivery system in 
general). In Singapore again, the less effective functioning of the Teacher's 
Training College Audio Visual Unit led to a separation of this unit from 
the ETV service's operations. In the Agency for Instructional Television, 
each phase of organisation grew out Of, or was modelled in response to, 
an acknowledgement of past limitations. 
It has to be recognised that some crisis planning will occur even in 
the best regulated systems. But the ! positive approac'i taken by Yash Pal was 
also interesting. No difficulty, in his view, needed to be accepted at 
face value, as unnegotiable. In Singapore, the initial proposition - of 
developing a media service in eight months - was superficially an impos- 
sibility, but as with SITE, means were found of meeting deadlines while 
still allowing for the system to catch up upon itself later. The same 
was true of the Open University. David Hawkridge commented: 
"Considerable planning risks had to be taken, in the hope 
that the new project would be quickly and generally successful. 
At the same time, the university found itself obliged to take 
deliberate steps to evaluate and improve upon its first pro- 
totype courses and systems. 
This pattern of development is by no means new in the field of 
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technology, even if it has been rare in education. Countless 
machines have been designed quickly as prototypes, and the 
prototypes have been set to work in conditions which allow 
proper measurement of their efficiency". (Hawkridge, 1974 p. 70) 
Primacy of People 
Recent analysis of task and organisation strategy (cf Miller, 1976) 
emphasise the priority of people over technique, and the significance o 
informal encounters in the planning process. This was amply borne out by 
the projects reviewed: planning and policy making are creative processes, 
whatever techniques they adopt. Thas, Richard Polsky on the CTW: 
"Because the members of this small planning group were so 
competent and worked so well togDther, there was a notable lack 
of false starts and trips down dead ends during the project's 
planning phase and production period. Those guiding the project 
were 'pros' - skilled, efficient and productive, and none needed 
the project to prove his ability since his ability was an esta- 
blished fact before became involved in the ! -Jorkshon. In 
addition, they were aware of their limitations, and were quite 
willing to consult with others who knew more about an important 
question than they did ... (Op Cit p. 97) 
Even more specific are the accounts of individuals critically involved 
in the projects. Joan Cooney of the CTW was described by Pols! -, y: 
"It was her intelligence, organisational ability, tact 
and energy that kept the project headed in the right direction 
... She understood and had the vision of what the program could 
- 163 - 
be ... better than anyone else she could articulate 
it and 
had both the educational and television background to bring 
it together. " (Op cit p. 59) 
And Walter Perry, Vice-Chancellor of the Open University, was similarly 
characterised: 
"Fie was no conservative academic and wanted the University 
to be more adventurous, less stereotyped and younger than the 
traditional university - but he also wanted their respect. Social 
purposes were not paramount. He simply wanted to create a 
University open to anybody, with no entry qualifications, whose 
degrees were of the same standard as others. " (MacArthur, 1974 
p. 14) 
There was general emphasis in the project evaluations on experience, 
dynamism, involvement, creativity, doggedness, humour, (descriptions much 
the same, in fact, as those of good planners outside the communication 
sector). 
Other accounts pinpointed the character of the planning group: 
for example, John Middleton, on the AIT: 
"Decision-making is deceptively casual. Major decisions 
may be reached at lunch, in the hall, in an airport, or at a 
consortium meeting. Consultation among staff is highly in- 
formal: there are relatively few staff meetings. But the 
decision-making process has a firm foundation. Few 
decisions are reached without extensive informal discussion 
among the staff - and with representatives of the consortium 
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agencies. The philosophy and procedures of the consortium 
approach provide a basic framework for decision and action. 
One of the notable features of the AIT style of operation 
is constant self-analysis. Staff members always seem to be 
working at two levels - at what they are doing and at how they 
are doing it. The process through which things are done is 
always under scrutiny. Changes in the process are not made 
casually, and when they are made, results are closely watched. 
(Op cit. P. 100) 
These projects were all set in developed countries, where there was 
an emphasis upon reacting to, sometimes manipulating, the establishment. 
But in the developing country projects, comparable experiences viere 
reported - in Singapore and El Salvador in particular. Conversely, in 
the evaluation of GROW conducted by Sheilah Solomon, there gras an indication 
of what may happen if a planner is, deliberately or otherwise, too low-key 
to be effective. 
"The effect of this ... has been that there has been a 
remarkable lack of continuity and sense of purpose in project 
activities. Emphasis and direction have moved in phases, 
depending on the strength of the personality most closely 
associated with the project at any one time; the Senior 
Adviser merely adopted the protective coloration of each 
phase in turn. (Op cit. p. 37) 
In the GROW case, the main planner was actually an external adviser, 
who was working under instructions not to assume an over-dogmatic role. 
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This raises a problem which will be dealt with extensively in the next 
chapter: planning conducted through technical assistance. Here, the El 
Salvador evaluators commented in a way which may set the tone for sub- 
sequent discussions: 
"The Salvadoreans received technical assistance from some 
60 foreign advisers, representing a number of countries and 
international agencies. The advisers were instrumental in 
getting the reform programmes under way, but their contribut- 
ions varied markedly ... In most instances, the advisers 
themselves had to define their own jobs, and, in a sense, to 
legitimise their presence in El Salvador. To this end, the 
ability to speak Spanish was essential ... Empathy with 
Salvadoreans and their culture as well as flexibility in the 
exercise of one's job - two highly intangible qualities - 
also distinguished the more successful advisers. Technical 
expertise and experience - though given great weight in 
recruiting advisers - did not seem in retrospect to count 
for so much as the basic ability to work well with Salvadoreans". 
(Mayo et alia 1976 p. 52-53) 
So, while similar qualities seem to be demanded of competent planners 
in both the industrialised and the developing world, differences of con- 
text lead to varying emphases upon these qualities and upon their com- 
bination. 
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Interdiscipiinarity 
The most complete experience of this concept was found in the Open 
University and in the CTW, where group working became an intrinsic part 
of their operational method. 
In the case of the Open University, where courses were the product 
of a course team approach, group disciplines could be viewed in two ways: 
as a means of ensuring cross-disciplinary fertilisation; or as a division 
of labour in approaching a complex task. Both viewpoints were considered 
by Norman Birnbaum: 
a 
"The group or team mode of organisation has nothing intrin- 
sically superior about it. Anyone who has suffered through meetings 
of academic cominittees, departments or faculties, will be tempted 
to effect a very slight modification in that citation from The Pick- 
Wick Papers about the law being an ass. However, nothing is 
eternally right about our present academic division of labour. 
The conflicts entailed in course production from the Open Univ- 
ersity may constitute necessary steps on the way to curricular 
re-thinking. The Open University's organisational experiment 
may form a new generation of academics, able to use a far wider 
range of concepts and methods, capable of relating knowledge 
to the aims of enquiry rather than to the rigidities of fixed 
disciplines ... (However) most interdisciplinary ventures ... 
have after a time become centrifugal; the claims of the 
disciplines reassert themselves. This tendency is, clearly, 
not absent at the Open University ... " (Birnbaum, 1974 p. 
42) 
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In the Open University, the course team approach was probably adopted 
because it was the only way to meet production demands and timescales. 
Normal traditions of academic working would not have led to the necessary 
correlation of energies: the course team was not simply a theoretical 
exercise in interdisciplinarity, but also an organisational form which 
worked to tighten deadlines. 
But once the decision to work corporately had been taken, many unfore- 
seen problems arose. For example, a serious uriderstaffing problem arose 
frone the outset because it had not been realised that interdisciplinarity 
is not time-saving. 
S 
"In the first place, nobody had fully thought through the 
numerous implications of requiring academics to work together 
in large cooperative teams. Second, no one had fully pursued 
the implications of having to teach a heterogeneous population 
of students who were mostly trying to study in their part time 
... (Thus) the staffing would ideally have to be increased by 
a factor of at least 3 or 4. " (Lewis, 1974 p. 125) 
Interdisciplinary working also created unfamiliar tensions: for 
example, between academics and producers. 
"The techniques of communication used by the OU also 
need specialised skills and lead to similar tensions. In 
any task needing division of labour it is important to 
have a clear delineation of spheres of responsibility. This 
usually comes from trial and error over a period of time. The 
relationship between the BBC and the academic members of the 
University is defined as an 'educational partnership' ... 
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Suspicion and conflict can sometimes arise when the BBC producer 
urges one approach on media grounds and the academic urges another 
on intellectual grounds ... " (Castles, 1974 p 116) 
There were, apparently, a number of ways of overcoming these problems. 
One was to evolve, and define, explicit roles for members of an inter- 
disciplinary team, and to specify both their rights and their rsponsibil- 
ities. More than anything, this can help reduce those tensions which stem 
from unfamiliarity. Michael Drake observed, of Open University academics: 
"Like most university teachers, they had been accustomed 
to operating in their own little private worlds of the class- 
room and the study. Now they were to be exposed -- their 
writing spurned, their TV and radio performances mocked ... 
In one form or another this happened to every member of the 
team. " (Drake, 1974 p 136) 
In the Open University, part of the original difficulty of the course 
team for the social sciences lay in the reluctance of the team (and 
especially its leader) to establish any hierarchical structures, however 
temporary: in the first course team meetings, there was not even a 
Chairman. John Middleton, on the other hand, was quite specific about 
the benefits which accrued from a precise allocation of roles in the AIT. 
"Operating several projects simultaneously with a small 
staff requires clearly defined roles and responsibilities". 
(Op cit p. 99) 
Equally, for Middleton, continuity of personnel was important. 
- 169 - 
"Continuity of staff also has been a factor in building 
an effective management team for consortium projects. The 
complexities of the task are not mastered quickly: it takes 
time to become a fully functional member of the AIT family, 
one familiar with the consortium process and with leaders in 
education and broadcasting. Key staff members have been 
with the agency an average of eight years. " 
(Ibid n. 100) 
This last is a difficult principle to maintain in the developing 
world, where shifts of personnel are frequent, exacerbated by shortages 
of competent higher and middle-level' personnel. The position is in 
many cases worsened by the experience of training, especially overseas 
training. Frequently, planners and managers who receive overseas training 
as part of the phased development of a project are reassigned on their 
return (being now 'qualified' to assume different, senior roles), so 
that the whole rationale of the training programme is lost. 
This emphasis on group dynamics is important, but it tends to under- 
play the very real advantages which can come from multi-disciplinary 
working, when it is approached in a creative way, concentrating more on 
its outcomes than on the simple avoidance of tension. This kind of 
creativity was seen, on many occasions, in the Open University, particu- 
larly after the course team tradition had been assimilated. But it 
was particularly marked in the Children's Television Workshop, whose 
group working method was deliberately designed to foster departures from 
a stereotype. Joan Cooney described some of the original thinking: 
"Producers believe, or always had until CTW came along, 
in intuition, taste and experience as the means to successful 
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shows. And luck, always luck as the sine qua non of any big 
hit. What we were proposing was that material, as it was 
produced, be tested on the target audience for both appeal 
and educational value; that researchers report back to 
producers; and that producers modify or discard material 
based on these almost continuous reports from the field ... 
(Lesser, 1974 p. xvi) 
Not every member of the team approached the experie; ce with confidence. 
David Connell, the exectuve producer, for example, had many initial qualms: 
"I frankly was sceptical about the idea of researching every 
moment of a television show, and certainly of being told how to 
design it. There was the risk of intellectualising the material 
to death". (Lesser, 1974 p. 133) 
Yet in the end, an open pattern of working developed for CTW members, 
in which a great deal of individual responsibility was combined with 
frequent, informal consultation. 
In establishing such a network of relationships, clearly the original 
selection of personnel was critical; they were picked as much for their 
ability to work together as for their professional qualities. Group goal 
development was considered crucial, and the same criterion also extended 
to the selection of participants for the seminars upon which the identi- 
fication of programme objectives was based. 
"We were bringing thirty people together, and we couldn't 
have academic prima donnas. We needed information out of these 
meetings; we needed real discussion. So there were some people 
we didn't invite to the seminars, even though they were well 
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known, because we suspected they couldn't function well in 
a group situation". (Polsky, 1974 p. 74) 
Here too conflict situations could arise, but once the sources of 
tension were removed, the experience of group working could be very 
productive as a means of focussing disparate energies. No other project 
displayed these qualities so fully. Some were less suited to inter- 
disciplinarity (the AIBD, for example, which operated as a consortium 
across considerable distances); others (like GROW) had no real philosophy 
of team operations. Singapore and El Salvador were less self-conscious 
than the Open University or the Children's Television Workshop, but were 
based on a tradition of corporate curriculum planning. But among the 
developing world projects, it was probably SITE, with a highly complex 
system to devise and implement, that discovered most about the unexpec- 
ted bonuses of forced, interdisciplinary working. 
management and operation system with innumerable small 
feedback loops is the only one capable of performing complex 
jobs. Group loyalties academic antagonisms and conflicting 
interests dissolve once a direction is set and the stream 
begins to flow. People are invariably capable of doing much 
more than their promise in the beginning. Technical virtu- 
ousity is much more prevalent than we imagine. Jobs without 
challenges are botched, or don't get done. Targets with 
challenges are always exceeded. " (Yash Pal, 1975 p. 10) 
Evaluation 
As with a number of other concepts which have been thoroughly explored 
in the literatures of planning and educational technology, the project 
review was intended more to define practical experiences, and so elaborate 
a planning principle, than to seek validation. 
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A distinction should first be made between three kinds of evalu- 
ation: summative (evaluating the final outcomes of a project, and 
specifically its ability to meet stated objectives); formative (con- 
cerned to test and validate materials as they are developed, and improve 
performance while still in the design stages, before a wider production 
and distribution commitment is made), and process evaluation (which 
monitors processes of execution). 
Of the projects reviewed here, several had a good or fair record in 
the traditional field of summative evaluation, though mostly these were in 
the field of instructional media, so that evaluation was mainly concerned 
with instructional effectiveness and learning gain. The El Salvador 
project was continuously monitored over a five-year period by the Institute 
for Communication Research, Stanford University; the results of this evalu- 
ation have since been published (Mayo etalia, 1976). The objectives of 
the evaluation were clear: 
"Our study of El Salvador's ITV system was undertaken for 
three reasons: (i) to evaluate the effects of the new system 
on students, teachers and school administrators; (ii) to con- 
tribute data gained from this research to the future devel- 
opment of the ITV system itself; (iii) to derive general con- 
clusions that might help other nations interested in applying 
ITV or some other instructional technology. These objectives 
were translated into specific research plans that guided the 
collection of field data over four years. " 
(Mayo et alia, 1976 p. 3) 
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Similarly, the Open University and the Children's Television Workshop 
(and in a simpler way Singapore) produced regular and extensive summative 
evaluations, describing learning gains and behavioural change (comparing 
these with comparable evaluations of more orthodox educational programmes 
and institutions. It was not surprising that these evaluations were con- 
ducted, as they were necessary to justify, politically, the premises upon 
which the programmes were founded: in the case of the Open University its 
Institute of Educational Technology had a specific role of monitoring and 
analysing student performance. 
Summative evaluations are classic, and critical to the systems model, 
as part of the cyclic process which leads to revision and project regen- 
eration. Formative evaluation, on the other hand, is much more recent, 
and has been mainly applied to projects in which there is a need to 
evaluate programmes or products as they are developed. The Head of 
Research of the Children's Television llorkshop, Ed Palmer, distinguished 
between the two in the following way: 
"Formative research is distinguished primarily by its role 
as an integral role of the creative production process. It is 
important to maintain a clear distinction between this type of 
research and summative research - that is, research undertaken 
to test the validity of theory, or the measurement of an 
educational product of practice. Research in the context of 
scientific validation is concerned with effects which have been 
hypothesized a priori within the framework of a broader deductive 
system, with the use of empirical and statistical procedures well 
enough defined as to be strictly replicable (at least in principle), 
and with the highest possible degree of generalisability across 
situations. While research carried out within the formative 
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context can possess these same characteristics, it 
need not and it typically does not. The main criterion for 
formative research recommendations is that they appear likely 
to contribute to the effectiveness of the product or procedure 
being developed ... (Palmer, 1974 pp. 326-7) 
In the case of the AIT, John Middleton specified the formative research 
approach employed, and explained why it vias adopted. 
"From discussions with staff members and review of evaluation 
reports and methodologies, it is clear that AIT evaluation is 
primarily intended to make sure, both program and print mat- 
erials meet the users' expectations of technical, creative, 
and instructional quality. Thus far it has not attempted to 
determine the extent to which an entire project achieves 
measurable educational objectives. There are a number of 
reasons for this. One is that the goals of the affective 
education projects are generally stated in terms of the 
kind of classroom discussion each program is expected to 
generate - not the learning expected to take place. Deter- 
mining whether these "discussion" goals are achieved has 
been a major component of evaluation. 
Then too, the conditions under which evaluation is 
conducted make measurement of effects difficult (even for 
formative purposes). A major constraint is budget. Less 
than 10 percent of the Self Incorporated budget, for example, 
was allocated to evaluation, and costs for revision of 
programs were included in this figure. Furthermore, AIT 
has control of materials only during the production stage; 
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thereafter, they are in the hands of user agencies. Eval- 
uation of effects would have to take place after delivery 
of the full materials package to schools; it would require 
serious commitment to evaluation by school administrators 
and a substantial financial outlay by AIT if materials were 
to be recalled, revised, and redistributed. 
(Op cit p. 67) 
In theory, an evaluation research design should include both summative 
and formative components, as was ultimately the case with SITE. The SITE 
experiment was extensively evaluated during its one-year life , and even 
though the evaluation plan was only begun in 1973, after a series of false 
starts, the final tableau included a large input survey, a children's 
survey, a number of planning and management studies, studies of instructional 
programmes, and some in-depth communication studies, such as content analyses. 
"The plan is conceived as an inter and multi-disciplinary 
exercise, involving about 100 anthropologists , sociologists, 
psychologists, educationists and media researchers. It consists 
of two components: formative and summative evaluation ... Studies 
were undertaken to ensure adequate adaptation of this one-way 
communication medium to the requirements of rural Indian con- 
ditions. Feedback provides data on programme impact, audience 
composition, viewing conditions, etc. Summative evaluation from 
qualitative as well as quantitative approaches would provide very 
important inputs which will be necessary for facilitating the 
decision-making process regarding the configuration of an Indian 
national satellite for rural development ... The SITE evaluation 
is conceived of as an ongoing and not as an after-the-event activity. 
(Chitnis, 1976 p. 2) 
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But in practice, constraints of budget and staff do not often 
allow for such a coherent approach, and priorities have to be set. 
David Hawkridge wrote of the Open University: 
"There were many, many aspects of the Open University 
that needed to be evaluated, and some sort of priority list 
had to be drawn up. One way of ordering priorities would 
have been for us to put first the most expensive components 
of the system, on the grounds that what costs most should be 
improved first. Another way viould have been to say that 
problem areas come first, and particularly problem areas 
defined by students who are the chief consumers in the system. 
In fact we did not adopt outright either of these ways 
of ordering priorities. Instead, we helped to persuade the 
university to install 'dials and guages' wherever it seemed 
vital to find out what was happening in the university's 
very complex network. Judgements about the points where 
these measuring devices should be placed were made not only 
by the Institute, but also by many of the University's 
committees, on which the Institute has representatives". 
(Op cit pp. 70-71) 
Unfortunately, as a result of this kind of selective exercise, the 
field of interest of greatest interest to planners, process evaluation 
(involving the monitoring of adminstrative, management, policy and 
planning mechanisms) has been generally neglected. The El Salvador 
evaluations paid some limited attention to this field, compiling an 
administrative history of the project, and in certain cases, case studies 
were compiled, mostly from secondary data, which looked at decision-making 
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processes retrospectively (for example Polsky's study of the CTW and 
Middleton's of AIT, both used extensively in this chapter). But the 
evidence is meagre. 
The development of communication planning as an independent field 
seems very much dependent upon this area of evaluation being extended, 
especially upon monitoring arrangements being made during project planning 
stages. 
The reasons for this need are self-evident. In the first place, 
while the methods of planning may be rational, the relationship between 
planning and implementation may be Tess so; if decisions are taken which 
affect the coherence of the original plan, this in turn changes the 
assumptions upon which further planning rests. Thus, planning is not 
a one-time, rational process, but a continuing activity, in which the 
conditions and parameters for making judgements and taking decisions 
change constantly. This can be described as a kind of 'remedial planning': 
the constant updating of an ideal plan to assimilate modifications 
imposed upon it by experience. 
For this process of remedial planning to be effective, evaluation is 
essential as a means of isolating and validating the assumptions upon 
which the conclusions of planning depend. The point was well made by 
the SITE project and the ITV project in El Salvador. 
A mid-term report on SITE for USAID concluded: 
"Although we are optimistic about the potential for 
success of SITE we are concerned that the information that 
SITE will provide may not be complemented by a searching 
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analysis of the long-term mass communication needs of India" 
... "If ... an objective outside body, such as the Planning 
Commission, fails to continue vigorously with these analyses, 
a great deal of the information value of SITE will have been 
lost even if it is a technical and programming success". 
(Cowlan et alia, 1973 pp. 66-68) 
In El Salvador, too, the shape of the future was less clear than 
was the first five-year plan. To some extent this was due to the 
departure of Minister Beneke from the scene, and a slowing down in impetus 
for the project. There was, of course, always an implicit understanding 
that the ITV component would be extended, and some additional audiences, 
at the further and adult educational and primary levels, were gradually 
introduced to the system. But there was also a question of deciding how 
far some of the original premises upon which the reform was postulated 
were accurate: in particular the decision to begin at a secondary level, 
in an attempt to create more middle-level manpower (a decision which was 
at first queried by the US advisers). The evaluators of the project 
skirted around this problem somewhat carefully: 
"In their original planning documents, Salvadorean planners 
emphasised the country's need for more middle-level technical 
manpower and through the Educational Reform they hoped to pre- 
pare young people for technical jobs in industry and agriculture. 
But by 1972 there were still relatively few technical jobs for 
Third Cycle graduates, who in any case were inclined to stay 
in school rather than enter the job market. If the country's 
high employment rate continues, and if there is no economic 
expansion to match the large increase in school enrolments, 
stud? nts will be forced to reconsider the kinds of middle- 
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level jobs they currently refuse as unsuitable ... 
Though 
conceding that unemployment is indeed likely to be a prob- 
lem for Third Level graduates in the immediate future, 
Salvadorean planners believe that in the long run their 
economy will meet the challenge ... This expectation may or 
may not be fulfilled. " (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 168) 
The argument appears to emphasise the need for planning to be looked at, 
from the outset, in terms which are not time-specific. 'There is a tendency, 
in development programmes which are phased in regular Five Year sequences, 
to concentrate only on the short and middle term. But evidently circum- 
stances do change, and there has to tie some means not only of evaluating 
whether or not original objectives have been met, but also of whether those 
objectives were rational in the first place. 
Conclusion and Articulation of Principles 
On balance, mast of the concepts proposed were reinforced by the project 
case studies, and these provided specific examples which were helpful in 
articulating them further. Some concepts were supported, but not illum- 
inated in great detail; these were mainly concerned with the team planning 
process (more likely to be illustrated in depth by a planning survey 
analysis), or with aspects of policy-making and accommodation to practical 
constraints which, while they probably existed, had not been fully chron- 
icled in the project evaluations. 
Those concepts which were least satisfactorily reinforced concerned 
the reflection and determination of need, and devolution: both of them 
concepts stressed only recently in planning literature. The projects 
based in industrialised countries showed more concern for client involve- 
ment, but the involvement of system users was not fully reflected in any 
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project design. Devolution and decentralisation, when they occurred, 
were mostly at a relatively technical level. And in some of the devel- 
oping country projects, it was difficult to ascertain whether these had 
arisen as a reflection of genuine need, or were the result of fashion 
and advocacy in project development and financing. 
This did not imply that these concepts should automatically be re- 
jetted. Indeed, the political emphasis at present is very much on 
regionalisation, decentralisation and participation. Rather, it signi- 
fied considerable difficulty and inhibition in incorporating such 
concepts, and therefore the need to build into planning designs specific 
aids to strengthen them. They are part of a transitional stage in 
communication development, when the need for change is increasingly 
recognised, but the traditions and inertia of the current system work 
against them. 
The next stage, therefore, was to verbalise the concepts tentatively, 
in the form of planning principles, each of which should embody the main 
features, examples and emphasis of the project analysis. These could then 
be further explored, first through comparison with an actual planning survey, 
and subsequently used as guidelines and parameters in the construction 
of an experimental planning model. They are stated in Table 2. 
"It* intantim in ocs*tructtinq this table was to eon ess each of the basic 
concepts in suche a way that it enbodied the main conclusions of the preceding 
cta14& r arxL clef ined each cmcept according to a perceiveci context and kmx*n 
limitations. With this enranced precision the table could then offer a 
set of gtiýiýciýelirsis fur snoisi =stsuctlon. 
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TABLE 2 
FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
1. Planning design should not be over-theoretical; it should be 
flexible, avoiding the uncritical use of external models. 
2. Planning should focus on the whole communication system under 
review, and not confine itself to particular projects, sectors, 
media or technologies. 
3. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through 
a variety of needs assessment mechanisms. 
4. Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, 
involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis 
on system users. 
5. Planning should begin with the establishment of clear and precise 
communication objectives. 
SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
6. Scenario construction should seek to maximise the use of existing 
resources and infrastructures. 
7. Scenario construction should pay particular attention to timing 
and phasing. 
8. Adequate arrangements should be made in scenario design for the 
cooperative and coordinated working of all agencies involved. 
- 182 - 
TAME 2 (contd. ) 
SCENARIO APPLICATION 
9. In planning, people are more important than techniques. 
10. To be successful, the planning process must have the interest 
of, and access to, influential people in key positions of 
decision making. 
11. In planning, the limits of decision makers, planners, planning 
processes and institutions should be realistically recognised. 
i 
12. In communication planning, interdisciplinary working is important. 
REPORT PRODUCTION 
13. Plans should include mechanisms for evaluation, to allow for 
subsequent revision of the proposals being put forward. 
CLAFM V 
N LW nMKU JC'IORY SLC2ION 
The account given in this chapter may be regarded as an extended case study, 
similar in principle to those already analysed in Chapter IV, but dealt with 
&t greater length and with a greater focus on the planning process. It is 
devoted to a specific oarmunication planning survey (i. e. a review of 
communication resources and conditions, designed to lead to a long-term plan 
for ca nunication develepnent, covering an entire sector rather than individual 
projects). In theory, in an analysis of this kind, it should be possible to 
trace, more accurately and in greater detail than through project- reviews, 
the mechanics of policy formulation and decision making, and the interactions 
involved in corporate or team planning. It should therefore also provide for an 
additional check on the principles articulated in Table 2, an opportunity to 
exparri (and in sans cases, to modify) them, and to add further principles, if 
these seeped justified. The chapter therefore leads towards a revised list 
of principles (presented in Table 4 at the end of the chapter), prior to snbarking 
upon model construction for a planning framework in Chapter vi. in what follows 
(R:. 'I + 'IX) oRucn ,T U) 
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CHAPTERV 
PLANNING PRINCIPLES: 
ANALYSIS Or A PLNINIMi SURVEY 
As a supplement to the case studies in Chapter IV, this 
chapter contains an analysis of a coýilmunication planning survey: 
an exercise designed to produce a coherent over-all plan. In 
principle, in an account of this kind, it should be possible to 
trace, more accurately and in greater detail than through project 
reviews, the processes of policy formulation and decision-making. 
In what follows, the primary emphasis is upon the planning process, 
and no particular emphasis is placed upon the contents of the 
plan produced, beyond what is necessary to provide a context. 
However, compiling such an account was not without its 
difficulties. There have been few comprehensive studies of 
communication systems as a whole, or even sectoral studies of 
such fields as educational communication. While many planning 
exercises have been focused upon individual institutions, these 
are only of limited scope; in addition, few of these studies 
(which are characteristically conducted by one or two consultants) 
have been monitored or chronicled. 
Nevertheless, one case of comprehensive planning was known, 
which had been monitored fairly extensively throughout: this 
was a planning survey conducted in Thailand, concerned with 
educational mass media. It is used here to provide particular 
insights into team planning processes, and as a further check 
on the list of hypothetical principles in Table 2. 
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The analysis is based upon a comprehensive survey, 
completed between December 1973 and June 1974 and undertaken 
by Unesco under a Funds-in-Trust arrangement with the 
Government of the Netherlands. The survey was prefaced by 
a pre-feasibility study mounted in August 1973, which laid 
down guidelines for the main investigation; the study proper 
involved 23 consultants, including two Unesco members. Its 
final report was published in five volumes in June 1974. 
I acted as Team Leader during the study and kept regular 
records of its progress, with notes of individual and team 
meetings. Reference was also made to the official dossiers 
retained from the study, and to several articles produced on 
its experience. 
Further data were obtained through correspondence and 
interviews with team members, with Thai counterparts and with 
officials of Unesco and the World Bank, particularly in 
following up the progress of the study since its completion. 
Background to the Study 
The Thai Pre-Investment Study had its origins in discussions 
between the Ministry of Education and the World Bank, as part of 
negotiations for a major educational loan (in connection with 
the country's Third Development Plan). Educational radio had 
existed in Thailand for over twenty years, under the control of 
the Ministry of Education, and for more than ten years local 
and experimental national educational television transmissions 
had also been conducted. But these were relatively restricted 
in scope, and their educational impact was slight. Consequently, 
in discussions with the World Bank, the possibility of financing 
- 185 - 
a major educational media project was promoted (helped by the 
fact that the Thai officer principally concerned with negotiations 
had a long-standing involvement with, and a one-time responsibility 
for, educational broadcasting). It was tentatively agreed, 
during discussions in Washington in early 1973, that resources 
from the International Development Association would be made 
available for a comprehensive pre-investment study, and in March 
1973 an informal agreement was also reached that Unesco should act 
as executing agency (during a visit to Paris by the same Thai 
official, then Under-Secretary for Education'. 
At this time, no commitment was made as to eventual financing 
of a media project by the Bank, either under IDA or IBRD terms, 
but there was an unwritten understanding of interest on both sides, 
as well as a recognition that more detailed planning would be 
needed if mass media were to have genuine educational significance. 
This is the formal account of the survey's origins. Yet, in 
a similar way to the account given of the genesis of SITE and of 
the El Salvador project, a good deal can also be attributed to 
personalities and their interaction. 
The guiding figure in the survey was the (then) Director 
General of the Department of Educational Techniques, Khunying 
Ambhorn Meesook, who had originally promoted the idea of 
educational radio in Thailand and had developed the educational 
radio service of the Ministry of Education over a number of years. 
She was heavily involved in negotiations with the World Bank for 
the Fourth Education Loan to Thailand, covering a number of 
programme areas, and she was supported by a Unesco adviser, 
Nicholas Bennett, who had considerable experience in the field 
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of educational planning in the developing world. Khunying 
Ambhorn urged the World Bank to include an educational media 
component in the forthcoming Education loan, but the Bank at 
this time was reluctant to embark upon a new field of activity. 
However, as a compromise, it did agree to finance a Pre-Investment 
Study, and the initial preparation for this study was entrusted 
to Bennett. She also enlisted the Unesco Secretariat (myself) 
in the project, on the basis of personal contacts going back for 
several years. 
Relationships in the project were, therefore, more at a 
personal than an official level. While cooperation was officially 
between the Thai Government and Unesco (with the World Bank 
reluctantly involved, but taking a marginal place), in practice 
the development of the survey rested very much with Khunying Ambhorn, 
Nicholas Bennett and myself. The planning strategy adopted was 
worked out during a short pre-feasibility mission, financed by 
Unesco's Regular Programme, during which not only was a detailed 
planning design evolved, but a good deal of essential data was 
also gathered, to facilitate the work of the main team to follow. 
It was during this pre-feasibility mission that the 
composition and sequencing of specialists was also worked out. 
In this case, however, original intentions - to involve Thai 
specialists more fully - were not fulfilled, and far more foreign 
involvement resulted than was anticipated or hoped. 
For these reasons, the Pre-Investment Survey was an unusual, 
if not unique, exercise. Traditionally, an application to the 
World Bank for financing would have been prefaced by a study, at 
the operational level alone, of a project for developing a media 
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service; it would not have attempted to explore the development 
of media in relation to educational objectives and reforms as a 
whole. The fact that the personal and professional convictions 
of the main authors of the survey design were broader in scope 
was more influential in setting up an unusual (at that time) 
method of investigation and planning. Ironically, as will be 
seen later, the very novelty and comprehensiveness of the 
approach probably delayed the acceptance of the project by 
several years, because it departed so radically from World Bank 
traditions. 
Original Objectives of the Study 
The original objective of the study was to produce a 
framework, and elaborate a project, for, the development of 
educational mass media in Thailand; the media system was to help 
improve the quality of educational provision and opportunity at 
both in-school and out-of-school levels, as part of a sustained 
programme of educational development and innovation to which the 
Government of Thailand was committed. 
The outcome of the study was visualised as a complete project 
plan, with the full range of logistical and financial data likely 
to be required by whichever agency finally accepted the project 
(nominally the World Bank). This plan would necessarily include 
a detailed account of the project's objectives, its justification 
(including an economic justification), its organisational and 
institutional framework, some specification of programme and 
materials production, and phased proposals for staffing and 
training, utilisation, evaluation and research. Complete schedules 
of equipment and facilities would also be prepared, and the entire 
project phased across a seven-year period, including a projection 
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of technical assistance needs. 
Apart from developing its own internal logic, the report 
would also have to conform to the procedures of the financing 
and executing agencies involved, which would include (particularly 
for the World Bank) a detailed economic analysis, with some 
consideration of cost benefit and cost efficiency. 
These requirements are common to all projects; the special 
interest of this particular study was its context, and the means 
by which the end result was to be achieved. 
The study was to be undertaken, first of all, within the 
framework of a radical programme of educational expansion for 
Thailand, then being prepared by the Ministry of Education and 
covering both formal and non-formal educational sectors. It had 
therefore to be associated with other educational planning 
initiatives and to be entirely consistent with their proposals 
(some of these were also the subject of Bank negotiations). 
Secondly, it was to be derived from as objective an evaluation 
as possible of the existing educational media system, and was to 
build upon what was already in place, in so far as this was 
considered effective or potentially effective. 
Thirdly, the process by which the project was created should 
reflect maximum involvement of the Thai Government and in particular 
the Ministry of Education.. It should follow a formula of 
cooperative decision-making - by which, once system objectives had 
been established, various alternatives which might meet these 
objectives should be discussed at all relevant government levels, 
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and preferred solutions identified in a step-by-step sequence. 
Fourthly, while the structure and presentation of the 
report would follow the requirements of those agencies which 
were known to be interested in implementation, it should be a 
viable document in its own right, useful and sufficient for 
other sponsors (and also serving as a handbook for project 
realisation). 
To meet these conditions a planning sequence in three main 
phases was devised, as follows: 
(a) a data base would be established which 
would give all necessary information 
for the planning team, both'to evaluate 
the present system and to plan for a 
new one; 
(b) the objectives of the educational and 
social system in relation to media use 
were to be precisely determined; 
(c) the relevance of the present media system 
0 
with regard to these objectives was to 
U, 
CL be evaluated; 
(d) after reconciling (b) and (c) a new set 
of educational media objectives was to 
be determined; 
(e) a matrix of media possibilities for 
meeting or assisting with these 
objectives was to be devised, and 
each variant costed and evaluated; 
(f) the Thai Government was to be asked 
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to compare the alternatives proposed, 
ä 
____. and 
to decide upon preferred strategies; 
(g) those strategies selected were to be 
investigated in greater detail, and 
their cost and potential analysed more 
elaborately; 
Ln (h) a second evaluation by the Thai 
Government should then lead to a 
single preferred strategy; 
(i) finally, this chosen strategy should 
be planned in considerable detail, to 
meet the logistical, financial and 
I-- 
organisational requirements of both 
fO 
0. the Thai Government and other interested 
I sponsors. 
It will be seen that, in this sequence, the final project 
planning stage (which in other circumstances might occupy the 
whole of the time available) came only after a sustained 
process of investigation. No timings were stated in the 
original proposal, because it was known that these would be 
subject to external pressures, but it was assumed that, if a 
total period of one year were available, activities (a) to (e) 
would occupy approximately three months; activity (f) two 
months; activity (g) a further two months; activity (h) a 
further two months, and the last segment (i) would occupy at 
least three months. Such a phasing, it was believed, would 
allow adequate time for consideration of different stages of the 
study by the Thai authorities, in order to reach interim 
decisions. 
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It was also assumed that the study would be carried out by 
a relatively large team of consultants, some of whom would be 
nuclear (i. e. with sustained roles which would continue throughout 
the survey) and others more specialised (recruited to cover specific 
requirements). It was emphasised that, while the team's 
composition could be partly envisaged from the start, for 
specialised roles in particular, some flexibility must be retained, 
to permit changes in direction which could, and should, result 
from the expanded decision-making process. 
Conduct of the Study 
Scheduling 
0 
Plans for the study were first developed during a pre- 
feasibility survey in August 1973, financed under Unesco's 
Regular Programme. Prior to this, informal correspondence 
had been exchanged between the Thai Ministry of Education and 
the Unesco Secretariat, but this was amplified and formalised by 
a four-man mission, consisting of two members of the Unesco 
Secretariat (Communication and Education Sectors), a Unesco 
educational planner based in Thailand, and an external 
engineering consultant. The main purpose of the pre-feasibility 
survey was to expand the study's Terms of Reference (which had 
already been drafted by the Thai Ministry of Education, in 
order to negotiate with the World Bank), but in the event it 
went somewhat further. Principally it did so because, even at 
this early stage, it was realised that pressures of time would 
be considerable, if a full document were to be prepared and 
published by June 1974. 
Accordingly, the pre-feasibility study undertook the 
following tasks: 
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(a) to collect as much data as possible on 
the existing media situation in Thailand 
and to identify future reference sources; 
(b) to evaluate in general terms the existing 
media provision; 
(c) to collate and analyse whatever published 
material was available on the objectives 
of the Thai educational system; 
(d) to relate (c) above specifically to media 
possibilities; 
(e) to prepare an overall matrix of possible 
media strategies, based primarily upon the 
cost of alternative proposals, and to 
furnish notes upon both cost and potential; 
(f) to prepare modified Terms of Reference for 
the study and make proposals for team 
composition. 
Even before the study began, there was some modification 
to the original scheme. It was already accepted, albeit 
reluctantly, that the entire exercise must be completed in nine 
months, rather than the estimated twelve. Activities (a) to 
(e) would still be allocated three months, commencing in October 
1973, with activity (f) reduced to one month. Activities (g) 
to (i) would then have to be condensed into a single, continuous 
period of three months, culminating in a report-writing period 
of one month, during May 1974, with publication and submission 
in June. 
This would inevitably reduce the amount of formal consultation 
with the government, and place a greater emphasis on continuous, 
informal consultations. The original three main phases of the 
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study would virtually be collapsed into two new phases "- 
First Phase - Activities (a) to (e); Second Phase - Activities 
(g) to (i) - broken by a period of discussion by the agencies 
of the Thai Government. This break-point would then become 
the only distinct period of policy refinement, involving the 
elimination of alternative strategies. 
This new phasing was reflected in the drafting of the 
Pre-Feasibility Study, and later agreed between Unesco and 
the Thai Ministry of Education; recruitment of consultants also 
proceeded along these lines. However, political disturbances 
in the country in October 1973 again interrupted the schedule 
at the very last minute, and further modifications had to be 
made, leading to a starting date as late as December 1973. In 
all of this, the terminal date of the study, fixed by the schedule 
of negotiations with the World Bank, could only be delayed 
marginally (by about six weeks, if the Thai authorities were to 
review the study's recommendations prior to meeting the Bank's 
appraisal team). The eventual timescales adopted are shown in 
the table below, which gives both planned dates (as agreed in the 
Pre-Feasibility Study) and actual timings. 
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TABLE 3- PHASING OF THAI STUDY 
Activity Date Planned Actual Date 
(In Pre-Feasibility 
Study) 
Original negotiations on March 1973 March 1973 
Pre-Investment Study with 
World Bank 
Informal discussions with March-April 1973 March-April 1973 
UNESCO 
Pre-Feasibility Study July 1973 July 1973 
Main Pre-Investment October - December 1973 - Study - First Phase December 1973 January 1974 
Consideration of 
alternative strategies 
in Interim Report to February - Thai authorities January 1974 March 1974 
Main Pre-Investment February - Study - Second Phase April 1974 April-May 1974 
Completion and publi- 
cation of final report May 1974 June-July 1974 
Submission to Thai 
authorities June 1974 July 1974 
Appraisal by World 
Bank team August 1974 September 1974 
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The effect of the late start is reflected above as a delay 
in the completion of the Interim Report, in spite of a further 
reduction of the First Phase by another month (fron three to 
two months). The attempt to return to schedule in this way 
was unfortunately lost in the process of consultation with the 
Thai authorities and in decision-making; a month proved, in 
the event, to be quite inadequate. The Second Phase consequently 
began in April 1974 and was again reduced to a two-i7onth period, 
followed by a highly condensed period of report writing in June. 
It can be seen that the mode of operation envisaged in the 
original design was still retained, but only by intense compression 
of time-scales and a reduction in the number, and scope, of 
alternative propositions analysed. 
" 
In order to maintain continuity, a small core group of four 
specialists was employed throughout the period January 1974 to 
May 1974; this included experts in utilisation and transmitter 
engineering. I acted as team leader, but unfortunately I could 
not be spared for the whole of the mission and became virtually 
a commuter to Thailand. The deputy team leader was the 
educational planner and economist (Nicholas Bennett), who was 
resident in Bangkok and had several years' experience of the 
Thai educational and planning system. 
Other consultants were appointed for shorter periods, on an 
ad hoc basis. Of the 23 consultants who finally worked on 
the project (including the Secretariat members) these were 
finally drawn from the following countries: United Kingdom 2; 
Canada 2; Australia 3; USA 3; Singapore. 1; the Netherlands 
1; Greece 1; and Thailand 1. In theory, every consultant 
also had a full-time Thai counterpart, with some experience in 
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his particular specialism. The final range of specialisms 
within the project (some of which were not identified until 
quite late) were as follows: educational media systems; 
educational planning and economics; curriculum planning; media 
utilisation; media in adult and non-formal education; rural 
sociology; media evaluation; media research; educational 
radio production; educational television production; rural 
broadcasting; audio-visual, print and support media; community 
media; development communication; distance education; 
broadcasting transmission systems; broadcasting production 
systems; media administration; architecture; and systems 
analysis. In some cases more than one specialist was recruited 
within a single category, since the project was divided into 
stages which did not necessarily suit every consultant's 
availability. 
The major documents produced in connection with the study were, 
in summary, the Pre-Feasibility Report (report of the pre- 
feasibility study team), the interim Report (first report of the 
main Pre-Investment Team, produced after the first phase of the 
study itself), and the Pre-Investment Report (the final report 
of the main team). The complete Pre-Investment Report was 
published in five volumes (Summary; Educational, Social and 
Media Background; the Project; General Appendices; and 
Technical Appendices), issued in offset by Unesco, Paris. 
Methodology 
It is impracticable in a chapter of this length to review the 
methodology of the study in detail (for which reference should be 
made to the five published volumes, and also to the Pre-Feasibility 
and Interim Reports - cf. Bibliography). But an account can be 
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given of its basic assumptions and working principles. The 
underlying assumption was that principles of coherent systems 
design, and the maximal involvement of the Thai Government, 
could best be followed by a process of gradual elimination of 
alternative strategies. At each stage of differentiation, 
these would be related to educational and social objectives, 
with key issues pinpointed and critical decisions left to the 
country authorities. 
(a) Pre-Feasibility Study 
Thus, at the initial stage of the Pre-Feasibility Study, 
a matrix of media possibilities was prepared, approximately 
costed, and annotated from points of view of both equity and 
efficiency. This matrix was related to main strands of 
production, distribution, and reception. 
A Steering Committee formed by the Thai Ministry of Education 
(including members of other relevant Ministries and departments 
concerned with broadcasting and economic planning) then reviewed 
the Pre-Feasibility Report and its recommendations, before 
isolating seven alternative media strategies to be studied by the 
main team. (The original matrix was in graphical form, with 
axes of Production - distribution - utilisation - and radio - 
television - other media, and contained a large number of media 
permutations. A media strategy therefore represented a 
critical path through the matrix, fixed according to system 
objectives and cost). 
(b) Pre-Investment Study - First Phase 
By the time the main Pre-Investment Study began, a number of 
basic decisions had already been taken by the Thai Government. 
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It was, for example, already decided that broadcast terrestrial 
distribution would be proposed, not satellite or the physical 
distribution of tapes. Similarly, a mix of central and regional 
production centres was envisaged and, very importantly, arguments 
put forward by the Pre-Feasibility Team in favour of an 
independent educational radio transmission network (to offset the 
random nature of commercial broadcasting in Thailand) had 
already been accepted. Finally, requests by the teai-im for 
financial parameters had led to a ceiling of US$ 20 million 
being imposed for the ensuing project. 
The first phase of the main study, which actually began in 
December 1973, had therefore discounted from the outset the 
notion of an ideal system. It was understood that the final 
project must be acceptable to all the varied interests involved, 
not purely a theoretical construct. 
During this first phase three major activities here carried 
out. First, a good deal of relevant information was gathered 
and analysed, relating to the educational system, its problems 
and objectives; the media system and its educational uses; the 
social, cultural and economic situation in different regions of 
the country; the administration of educational projects and 
mechanisms for interdepartmental cooperation (particularly at 
the district and village level); and the spread of reception 
equipment. All available previous research relating to 
educational media in Thailand, their production, distribution, 
utilisation and evaluation, was identified and analysed. In 
addition, information on the current provision of media and 
reception equipment in the schools (and the extent of their 
utilisation) was collected through a specially designed 
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questionnaire survey. 
Secondly, the characteristics of various types of media and 
their applicability to the Thai situation were studied. Through 
this process, combined with an analysis of the existing problems 
and objectives of education and the curriculum reform process, 
objectives of the educational media system for both in- and out-of- 
school purposes were identified and elaborated, including proposals 
on the most effective media for specific kinds of education and 
subject areas. 
Thirdly, on the basis of this analysis, the seven alternative 
strategies considered viable by the Government after its 
consideration of the pre-feasibility survey were analysed and 
evaluated. 
Although these three strands are reported sequentially, as only 
two months were available they had in practice to be conflated, with 
as much interaction between them as could be secured through personal 
dialogue between team members. This interaction showed that, if 
anything, the reduction of media strategies to seven at such an 
early stage had been precipitate; although it had been done to 
mitigate the pressures of team working and of time, in practice it 
tended to confuse the issue by coming down too firmly, too soon, 
in favour of particular media combinations, at a time when overall 
objectives were still diffuse. More rigorous discussion showed 
that the so-called seven strategies were made up of eighteen separate 
media strands, each of them relevant to the Thai situation, but 
capable of being put together in far more than seven ways. It was 
therefore decided to place these, once again, in a media matrix, with 
the same axes as before (of production - distribution - utilisation, 
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and radio-television - other media), and with appropriate 
annotations. This was, in effect, a compromise: it avoided 
premature judgements on the media mix, but presented information 
in a way which was still suitable for decision-making, since it 
could be considered in a graphical format and was similar to the 
matrix produced, and reviewed, by the earlier Pre-Feasibility 
Study. The only difference was that options were fewer and more 
detailed. 
The team commented upon the matrix in relation to its 
educational findings and also indicated, as before, a preferred 
critical path, but left final decisions open to the Thai authorities. 
Its report was presented in summary as well as in its full form, 
as by this time even basic documentation ran to over 500 pages. 
A translation of essential sections and recommendations was also 
prepared. 
(c) Pre-Investment Study - Second Phase 
During February and March the Ministry of Education studied 
the proposals and accepted the strategy preferred by the team, 
with some relatively minor alterations, and on a number of 
occasions the team, or its leaders, met with Ministry committees 
to explain particular points. (The alterations were based on 
financial considerations; they affected such options as the 
distribution of audio-cassette recorders and of TV receivers 
throughout the school system). One issue upon which the team 
found itself at variance with the Thai authorities was that of 
colour v. monochrome television working. On a principle of 
cost, the Ministry of Education opted for black and white 
operations, but the team was anxious to ensure at least colour 
production facilities, as these would be extremely expensive to 
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install at a later stage, involving costly conversions of 
premises, and it was felt that, in time, colour working would 
be inevitable. (This point was conceded after a number of 
exploratory debates). The team had also raised a number of 
specific questions which needed answers before further planning 
could proceed, and the responses to these questions were used 
as parameters for the next planning stage, commencing in April. 
Mostly these questions were on matters of organizational control 
and coordination, and on the physical siting of premises. 
The project had, by this time, been refined to a point where 
its main components were seen as (i) an independent radio network 
for education, consisting of central production resources and a 
subsidiary regional network, serving the interests of both in and 
out-of-school education, including development communication; 
(ii) a limited educational television resource, based on existing 
and projected facilities outside the education sector and phased 
according to national television development plans - again catering 
for both in and out-of-school needs; (iii) experimental work in 
the area of local and community media; (iv) the provision of 
supplementary print and audio-visual materials, keyed to the mass 
media provision; and (v) provision for prototyping and evaluation. 
The main impetus of the system was to be towards the qualitative 
improvement of education and towards social development, showing 
specific linkages to curriculum reform and general development plans, 
with improved interaction between educational and social systems 
as a key goal. 
Throughout April and May, the team was able to concentrate its 
attention on the preparation of a detailed main project and 
associated sub-projects (the reason for dividing up projects in 
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this way was an assumption that, while the main media system 
would probably be financed by a single donor, other donors might 
well be prepared to contribute to particular areas, while still 
accepting the logic of an integrated system as described in the 
report). 
By the end of June, complete project outlines had been 
formulated, including: 
(a) objectives and justification for the main project; 
(b) staffing and training; 
(c) programme and programme preparation schedules; 
(d) equipment and technical specifications; 
(e) details of buildings, including draft 
architectural plans; 
(f) a description of proposed utilisation procedures; 
(g) full recurrent and capital cost information; 
(h) loan and technical assistance requirements; 
(i) proposals for an evaluation system and for 
research procedures; 
(j) an operational plan, including details of phasing. 
Whatever could not be included within the report itself was 
retained in a background dossier. The final report thus had 
two main functions: first, to act as a project request document, 
to be presented to foreign aid donors; and second, to serve as 
a handbook for project implementation, which could be used later 
by Thai officials. 
The report was made available to the Thai Government by July 
1974 and was the substantative document for discussions with the 
World Bank during a review mission mounted by the Bank in the 
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Autumn of 1974. 
Constraints Upon the Study 
The constraints experienced during the study can be divided 
into three categories: those which were realised from the 
outset, but were either felt to be unavoidable or were accepted 
as being negotiable; those which were realised as the study 
proceeded and which were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
counteracted; and those limitations - and errors - which were 
realised in retrospect. They are described below in the same 
order. 
Constraints realised from the outset 
Time 
The main constraint which had to be accepted was that of time; 
it was this which led the pre-feasibility survey team to undertake 
far more in the way of preparatory work than it had anticipated. 
For the same reason, the identification of consultants was begun 
even before the survey had been finally negotiated; and the 
background data which would be needed for the study were also 
identified and stockpiled, as far as was consistent with limited 
local resources. A questionnaire was also devised and sent out 
to schools, asking for information about reception equipment and 
its utilisation, but this had to be done hastily and the 
questionnaire was not piloted in advance. 
In view of the fact that the project was still not implemented 
by the end of 1976, something more should be said on the nature of 
the time constraint. It may well be asked: why was timing so 
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important, if in the end the decision to proceed was deferred 
indefinitely ? The main point at issue was the confirmed 
schedule of overall negotiations with the World Bank, involving 
not only the media project, but also other educational projects 
(and indeed projects outside the education sector, arising from 
the country's Third Development Plan). It was felt by the 
Thai Ministry of Education and Unesco planners that the commitment 
of other sectors of Government and of the World Bank Lo a Pre- 
Investment Study, and even more so to a follow-up investment 
project, was precarious enough for its success to be totally 
neutralised by a delay in completion. The choice therefore 
appeared to be one of proceeding with the study on limited 
timescales, or not proceeding at all. It may be that this 
argument was over-stated, and that reactions to time pressures 
were too subjective, but to those involved they appeared to be 
genuinely convincing. 
It can also be said that the study was concerned, not with 
whether or not to introduce or expand educational media, but 
with how and when to expand them. While part of the study was 
devoted to an analysis of media potential, this was done in order 
to convince donors of their viability; the main executing agents 
were, by inference, committed in advance. 
Leadership 
A further constraint which was known and accepted concerned 
the leader and deputy team leader of the study. The Ministry of 
Education was anxious to make use of my services, as a member of 
the Unesco Secretariat with previous experience in Asia in the 
educational media field and with prior knowledge of the Thai 
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situation. I could not be spared for the duration of the study, 
but it was agreed that I should join it at key points (i. e. for 
several weeks at the beginning and end of each phase, and for the 
whole of the final report writing, totalling a period of some three 
to four months); I would also supervise work, including the hiring 
of consultants, from Paris. My availability was planned as 
carefully as possible to coincide with critical stages of the 
study, but this left little latitude to cope with crises or changes 
of plan. The deputy team leader, on the other hand, was resident 
in Thailand, so that he was always available, but he had neverthe- 
less to combine work on this project with other responsibilities 
for educational planning, and for the negotiation of other World 
Bank projects . This meant that he was normally free for 
consultation, but could not be so much a regular member of the 
team as other full-time consultants. Since the planning and 
direction of the study O re very much the outcome of joint discussions 
between the leader and the deputy team leader, such planning had to 
be confined to periods when both were in Thailand, or conducted by 
correspondence and cable (which necessarily led to some ambiguities). 
Constraints realised during the conduct of the Study 
Phasi. nc 
The first constraint highlighted during the course of the study 
was probably the realisation that, whatever had been done to 
mitigate the pressures of time and limitations on leadership, this 
was not adequate. The study had opted for a model of phased 
development, requiring regular consultations with the Thai Government, 
a model which had (once it was begun) to be continued, otherwise the 
whole scheme would be invalid. This situation was not helped by 
the political difficulties which delayed the project's beginning. 
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There appeared to be no complete solution to the time problem, 
beyond increasing individual workloads far beyond desirable levels, 
and on occasions taking some shortcuts (for example, delimiting 
the range of alternative strategies, or reducing the breath pauses 
scheduled for the Thai Government to take stock, with the 
consequent disadvantage of steering the Government in the direction 
of a particular strategy earlier, and more positively, than would 
have been ideal). 
There could of course be two possible explanations for this 
state of affairs. The first is that this kind of study takes 
longer than anticipated (even longer than originally planned, 
before events curtailed options). The second is that the team 
was in some ways inefficient, being required, or allowed, to 
cover options in too great a detail (or lacking sufficient 
professional experience to cover the ground without extensive 
research, adaptation and acculturation). Both of these 
explanations appear to have some validity, and both are discussed 
later. 
nirprtirin 
The position of the leader and deputy team leader certainly 
caused considerable difficulty. There were periods when the 
deputy team leader had to cope with critical situations and a 
workload quite beyond his expectations: there were also periods 
when full-time consultants felt without direction. Thus a form 
of crisis planning tended to develop, in which periods of intense 
activity often coincided with my return from Paris. This is not 
atypical of studies of this kind, but unfortunately its momentum 
did not always match the dynamic of the planning design (which saw 
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periods of sustained work alternating with relative periods of 
quiet while the Thai Government considered what had been done so 
far). 
It has been argued that consultants of the calibre assumed by 
such a study should be in a position to work unaided, without overt 
direction. In traditional situations this may well be true, but 
the complexity of this study, and the novelty of its subject area 
and design strategy, worked against it. 
Technical Assistance Procedures 
A further constraint stemmed from the procedures adopted for 
project design and for financing. In order to mount projects of 
this nature at all, relatively detailed project documents and plans 
of operation have to be written, and it is often difficult (unless 
the sponsoring agency is extremely sympathetic) to build in very 
much flexibility. In this case, the sponsor was originally to be 
the World Bank, and negotiations and project design followed this 
assumption (e. g. the Bank's proforma costs were used for consultants). 
However, rather late in the day, the Thai Government decided to use 
part of a technical assistance grant from the Government of the 
Netherlands to finance the study (which was better financially for 
the Government, since it did not involve interest repayments, but 
necessitated a new agreement with Unesco under a Funds-in-Trust 
arrangement). In practice the Netherlands Government was extremely 
cooperative in easing administrative procedures, but clearly the 
late change of plan led to difficulties. 
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Consultants and Team Workin 
It was realised during the first planning stages that there 
would be difficulty in hiring specialised consultants, partly 
because of the shortage of time, but particularly because 
consultants were needed for periods ranging from one to six 
months. 
In practice, the difficulties proved even worse than 
expected. There is no readily available data bank of suitable 
specialists, and a good deal depended upon the team leader's oi. n 
experience and upon his personal grapevine. The final 
composition of the team had far too great a preponderance of 
European specialists (not by intent, but partly through unfamil- 
iarity with specialists from other regions, and the related 
fact that often five or six alternative choices were necessary). 
Consultants from developing countries were few; in many 
fields, they apparently did not exist at that time, as the 
disciplines were too new, or too rarefied. Indeed, in some 
areas (e. g. economists specialising in communication media) there 
are still few available specialists in any country, and some 
element of learning on the job has to be accepted. 
One factor which was not seriously predicted (for short 
missions of this kind) was that of culture shock. Two consultants 
left the project after only a few days, apparently unable to cope 
with the culture and with the nature of the study. 
More predictable was a degree of insularity in the team's 
working, which led consultants to group together as a small sub- 
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culture in both working and leisure hours. For reasons of 
convenience they worked in a single open-plan office, and for 
reasons of economy they eithe r occupied the s ame hotel or lived 
in shared apartments. Apart from the deputy team leader, none 
spoke Thai, and while several were interested in the culture 
and made some effort to come to grips with it , others made so 
such attempt. In any case, the pressure of work was against 
such assimilation. 
It can be argued that such a degree of insularity is not only 
inevitable, but has its advantages. Consultants cannot be on 
call for twenty-four hours a day apd they have both a need, and a 
right, to relax in the fashion of their own culture. Moreover, 
this is a two-sided situation; compromises have to be made by 
local counterparts as well as by consultants. Some cultures 
(such as the Thai culture) are private, with a dislike of public 
statement or public intimacy, and decision-making may he associated 
with the extended family, with blood lines, with status, with 
religious practice, as well as with career considerations. It 
could easily be offensive, as well as ill-judged, to attempt to 
break into this pattern over a relatively short period. On 
balance, more could have been done to minimise the effects of 
insularity by providing shared working accommodation (for 
consultants and counterparts) and by selection procedures which 
emphasised cultural adaptability, but the argument should not be 
overplayed. 
The position of counterparts was however critical. It had 
originally been planned that every consultant would have a full- 
time Thai counterpart, and it was hoped that this would both 
reduce the alienation of external experts and increase the Thai 
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involvement. Unfortunately; this 
two officials from the Ministry of 
time to the project, and these had 
team members (especially in areas 
involved, when even part-time Thai 
available). 
did not happen. Only one or 
Education were seconded full- 
necessarily to cope with all 
vhere other ministries were 
personnel were not always 
Such a situation was very damaging, as it restricted the 
involvement of the host country in a study which was premised 
upon maximum involvement. Involvement is something which is 
demanded at all levels: of decision-making, of working 
specialisms, of administration. It is not merely a question 
of motivation or commitment; unless there is a continuous 
sharing at the early planning stage, the rationale behind decisions 
which inevitably include elements of compromise will be forgotten, 
and the process of implementation will be made far more difficult. 
The limitations placed upon involvement therefore produced 
difficulties of many kinds. While reports (or summaries of 
reports) were always considered (and explained) at a senior level, 
there was only limited understanding of the detailed analyses and 
conclusions of the study at more junior levels, and an opportunity 
was lost for a form of in-service training which could have had 
benefits far beyond the reduction of team insularity. This 
situation might have been prevented, had it been possible under 
technical assistance procedures to pay counterpart personnel, but 
the standard assumption is that counterpart contributions are the 
recipient government's responsibility. 
Some other difficulties affecting consultants and counterparts 
were generally anticipated by the team leader and deputy team 
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leader, and by those with prior experience of developing country 
studies involving large teams. Personality difficulties were 
bound to occur, some of them arising from the tensions which 
always arise within a miscellaneous group, but others stemming 
from professional insecurity. In large teams some consultants 
are bound to be better, or more relevantly qualified, than others, 
and this study was no exception. Working in a team setting 
requires a number of skills beyond specialist experience, the 
chief of which are the ability to accept group working and 
corporate decisions, and the flexibility to work outside a 
particular specialism (to make up for inevitable gaps in group 
experience). Such difficulties can only be resolved on the spot. 
It is likely that many of these difficulties were exacerbated 
by the selection procedures adopted by international organisations. 
Consultants can rarely be interviewed; they have to be contracted 
on the basis of paper qualifications, supplemented by personal 
reports if available. Political considerations of nationality and 
of overall team balance also come into play, sometimes as 
importantly as professional experience. 
However, these standard difficulties were compounded in the 
case of the Thai study. As a result of the phased decision- 
making model, in some cases different consultants within the same 
specialism had to be recruited for Phase One and Phase Two of 
the study (since the same expert was not always available for both 
periods). Naturally enough, the second specialist was not always 
in agreement with what had been planned by his predecessor, and at 
times this reaction intensified into a desire to "reinvent the 
wheel". Some consultants engaged upon the second stage of the 
study (which came after alternatives had been produced, and a 
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particular strategy decided upon) tried repeatedly to go back to 
first principles and to query decisions already finalised, and 
while their objections were often perfectly rational, they 
sometimes led to unprofitable discussion and some friction. 
Another difficulty caused by phasing largely affected the 
first period of the study (December 1973/January 1974). It 
was properly a difficulty of system design, although it was not 
understood as such when it first emerged. The difficulty was 
caused by the fact that the objectives of the Thai educational 
system were not in themselves particularly clear, and in order 
to work out suitable media strategies, the whole planning base 
of education had first to be analysed. It was revealed, for 
example, that although there had been a , 
number of changes in 
the country's Development Plan and in its educational development 
goals, these were not reflected in the curriculum, which had often 
remained static even when goals and targets had been radically 
modified. This state of affairs was quickly apparent to the 
educators on the team and was hardly surprising, but it produced 
a feeling of frustration and inadequacy in some of the media 
specialists, who were not able to continue with their work until 
the problem of objectives had been satisfactorily resolved. For 
a few weeks, the problem was not acute, because an evaluation was 
being made of the technical and human capacity of the existing 
media services, but this review could not go on indefinitely; 
thereafter, from a producer's point of view or from that of an 
engineer, it was difficult to understand why the planning process 
could not proceed more rapidly. Media professionals knew only 
too well the inflexibility of the timescales imposed upon the 
project, and realised that they were being called upon to develop, 
within a period of six months, complete plans for a large-scale 
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media system. Given such imperative deadlines they resisted 
very strongly the idea that they should wait for objectives to 
be confirmed, alternatives to be considered and strategies to 
be evaluated before entering into detailed technical planning; 
indeed, in some cases they resisted the concept of presenting 
alternatives altogether, since they felt that, from their own 
experience, they could stipulate what the preferred strategy 
should be. 
In few cases were these constraints altogether surprising; 
it was the extent of the difficulties, rather than their nature, 
which was sometimes unexpected. There were fe,, ý! precedents in the 
field of educational media for working with large teams of people 
on planning exercises of this complexity (mostly team work is con- 
ducted at a practical, operational level), and most problems simply 
had to be met, explored and countered as the study proceeded. 
One aspect of phasing which could be modified in the course 
of the study has already been described in the comments on 
scheduling and methodology; this was a reduction in the number 
of alternative strategies to be explored, and the limitation 
of 'breath pauses', during which the Thai Government was to 
consider interim recommendations. It is doubtful, nevertheless, 
whether this reduction of scope was enough, in view of the other 
pressures experienced. The most difficult period of the entire 
study was that immediately prior to the production of the Interim 
Report (when a vast amount of data had been collected, but could 
not be adequately analysed until the work on educational 
objectives had been completed); at this time many team members 
were anxious, because they could not see the shape of the final 
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product or even the route by which it could be reached. The 
production of the Interim Report therefore represented a major 
hurdle after which matters eased, although perhaps as an over- 
reaction to its pressures, more specific recommendations on 
final media choices were offered to the Thai authorities than 
would have been ideal. 
Limitations realised after the event 
Report Publication 
Several further limitations, or errors of judgment, became 
apparent at the time of report writing and printing. Ideally 
there isa buffer period at the end of a project before a summary 
report is completed: a time when the considerable amount of data 
which has been collected can be sifted and gaps filled, before 
final writing and editing begins. In the case of the Thai study 
this was not possible, and report writing was actually proceeding 
(to meet printing deadlines) as the last planning stages took 
place. 
It may be argued that the report was, in any case, too long. 
However, a call for a reduction in volume is not necessarily met 
by arbitrary cutting of pages; compression would require 
restructuring and careful editorial selection, which takes time 
to achieve. 
Phasing 
This was again a practical reflection of the overall difficulty 
in phasing, which, in spite of numerous adjustments, did not 
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sufficiently allow for the realities of media planning. It 
was clear in retrospect that activities should have been even 
more carefully separated out; probably at the time of 
establishing educational objectives and media strategies, only 
educational planners and educational technologists should have 
been present. These have a common understanding of the nature 
of educational problems, which practitioners do not necessarily 
share. It would probably have been better, even given the 
reduced time scales, to have confined the first phase of the 
study to specialists in educational media systems, educational 
planning and economics, media utilisation, evaluation and 
research, rural sociology and media in adult and non-formal 
education, and to defer the arrival of producers and technicians 
to a second phase. In this way a first stage of the project 
could have established educational media objectives; a second 
stage would have worked out alternative media strategies; and a 
third phase would then have elaborated the final project design. 
Against this, it can be argued that the pressure from 
engineers, producers and technicians to come up with specifics 
was a necessary and productive stimulus, without which the 
urgency of defining objectives would not have been acknowledged. 
But in this particular case, the pressures were too diverse and 
contradictory to be anything but confusing. Moreover, the 
pressure from an engineer or producer is not primarily to declare 
the objectives of a system; it is rather a specific plea of `Let 
me get on with designing a building', or 'What programmes do you 
want me to produce? ' If this situation is not delicately handled, 
any suggestion that there may be more than, one way to achieve an 
objective may easily be construed as a criticism of professional 
competence. 
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An expanded phasing and division of labour would also have 
had advantages for team working, since this would have reduced 
to a minimum the tensions arising from group activities. It 
would equally have given team members more time and leisure to 
associate themselves more personally with Thai counterparts, to 
search them out if necessary, to work with them professionally, 
and to immerse themselves more in the country's educational and 
cultural situation. 
Team Composition 
A further drawback which was not immediately apparent was 
caused by the limited spread of nationalities reflected in the 
team - partly by the paucity of Asian consultants, but also by 
the emphasis upon European tradition. There are two traditions 
in educational media, the European and the American, and creative 
planning for new media systems should ideally blend these two 
traditions more fully than was possible in the event. The 
European tradition is strong on programming and media performance; 
the American is stronger on utilisation, teacher involvement and 
research-based operations. A wider spread of representatives of 
both backgrounds should have produced a better synthesis, and if 
this could have included more Asian experts (who themselves mirror 
the two main strands of American and European influence) the result 
should have been better still. 
Training and Promotion 
It was also apparent that some opportunities were lost for 
training and promotional work. The study would have been an ideal 
milieu for internships for Asian consultants, if this could have 
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been arranged financially; furthermore, if more opportunities 
for promotion had been created (i. e. group lectures and presentations 
of the thoughts of the mission to representative Thai agencies) more 
innovative approaches might finally have been included than was the 
case. 
Data Base 
Like most studies, the survey suffered from a lack of hard 
information, and it was unfortunate that more specific compilations 
of data (certainly a better use of questionnaire surveys) could not 
have been organised. The questionnaire survey which was undertaken 
occupied a great deal of time and energy, but still missed some 
opportunities. Had an evaluator with statistical competence been 
included at a very early stage (i. e. at the time of the Pre- 
Feasibility Study), he might have had the chance to devise special 
formats, which could both produce data for the study and anticipate 
later demands. 
Presentation 
Another difficulty which had been predicted earlier concerned 
the presentation of the report. There is always a paradox in the 
presentation of a complex report (with close reasoning and extended 
references, summarising months of specialist study), if this 
document is also to serve as a basis for decision-making. The 
complete report is needed for project implementation and for 
professional inspection at the agency level, but decision-makers 
cannot be expected to cope with such detail. Alternative versions 
are needed, and fortunately from the outset a summary volume of the 
report was proposed, which could be used for senior decision-makers 
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with restricted time (and in many cases limited interest, if 
the field of educational media was outside their sphere of 
responsibility). However, similar arrangements should have 
been made for preparatory and interim documents (perhaps even 
more important, as these were the basis of critical mid-project 
decisions), and more should have been done in the way of 
translation into Thai. These factors were realised, but the 
necessary logistical support was unfortunately not available. 
Involvement of Financing Agency 
A final constraint did not become fully apparent until quite 
late in the day; this was the lack of involvement of the ultimate 
financing agency (in this case the World Bank). Ultimately, a 
large study involving 23 consultants was followed by a month-long Bank 
review mission, consisting of only six members, some of whom were 
unfamiliar with the political situation of Thailand, did not have 
time to digest the report properly, and were even in some cases 
unfamiliar with Bank policies and procedures (since several external 
consultants were employed). The appraisal mission disagreed with 
a number of elements in the report which had been the subject of 
protracted negotiations with the Thai authorities, and the 
Government declined in January 1975 to accept the mission's judgments. 
Probably this confrontation could have been avoided had Bank 
representatives worked throughout with the main Pre-Investment Study 
Team. As a result of these disagreements, negotiations for the 
actual project were unduly protracted, and ironically projects 
which had received far less attention and study were accepted in 
the meantime with relatively few queries. - Partly this must be 
attributed to the mixed financing arrangements, whereby the Pre- 
Investment Study was financed by one agency (the Netherlands 
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Government), and a second agency (the World Bank) was expected to 
finance the major project to follow. This could only reduce 
the interest and sense of involvement of the World Bank at a 
very critical stage. 
The political difficulties in fact led to final impasse for 
the project. An unofficial attempt to reopen negotiations with 
the World Bank in November 1975 produced a tentative response from 
Washington, but once it was learned that the Thai authorities still 
wished to include an educational television component, negotiations 
were again suspended. There were also further objections in 
Thailand to the desire of the Ministry of Education to set up an 
independent radio network (expressed by the Public Relations 
Department, as the main broadcasting agency of the country, which 
saw an opportunity for expanding its own network being compromised), 
and in the draft Appraisal Report offered by the Bank in March 1976, 
communication media figured only in a pilot radio project addressed 
to rural audiences. 
It was not until 1978 that a major project, which included 
only a radio component, was incorporated into the Fifth Education 
Loan to Thailand. In this project a new radio network was 
featured which was to be entrusted to the Public Relations 
Department. Further delays in processing and recruitment meant 
that the project finally began to move forward only in 1980. 
Comparison with Planning Principles 
The Thailand survey has been described at length because, when 
research was begun, it was probably a unique example of a 
comprehensive planning survey in the communication field, and 
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certainly unique in the amount of data which it furnished on the 
planning process. 
While the survey was not modelled on a particular planning 
framework (apart from the matrix which it used to present cost 
and strategy alternatives), it did implicitly follow the kind of 
organisational sequence which can be reduced to model form. 
The analysis has emphasised planning difficulties, and so 
illuminated that part of the research which is concerned with 
the mitigation, or circumvention, of constraints upon formal 
planning processes. It should be useful, therefore, to relate 
the analysis directly to the planning principles already proposed, 
and to see where further modifications, or expansions, may be 
justified. 
In doing so, the same categorisation is followed as in Chapter 
IV, and the same numbering of principles. 
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Framework Design 
In general the Thai study was not over-theoretical in approach 
(Principle 1); it was not committed to any particular planning 
methodology, but was loosely based upon systems planning concepts, 
and its use of networking was confined, in the main, to the phasing 
of project activities in the final plan. Some care was taken to 
avoid rigid, linear planning designs which are difficult to change 
in mid-stream. Not only do the actual circumstances of planning 
change as they proceed (e. g. in Thailand, there was continuing 
uncertainty as to the scale of whatever project might ultimately 
be envisaged, and the locus of project control), but the actual 
environment of planning, and the results of its early experiences, 
tend to change planning parameters. In the Thai case, the 
planning matrix which was evolved presented some fundamental, 
comparative data on the costs of different media possibilities; 
this attempt to concretise the basic problem stimulated decision 
makers to rethink their needs, and so changed the subsequent 
conditions of planning. This is not necessarily attributable to 
indifference or ineptitude on the part of decision-makers; partly 
it is due to an inherent difficulty in the communication sector 
in visualising the problems and potential of communication 
technologies until they are presented in a concrete form. 
This need for flexibility was also reflected in the final 
survey and planning design. Much of the document was concerned 
with the institutionalisation of a planning framework which would 
be sensitive to change, and at least a few of the project 
proposals were devoted to experimental areas (such as community 
media) which, while located within a common overall structure, 
still provided an opportunity to create an independent momentum. 
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There was, however, some criticism in World Bank commentaries 
upon the report that the organic unity of the project (Principle 2) 
had not been broadly enough conceived (especially the relationship 
between media and curriculum development). Nevertheless, the 
survey report did go much further towards encouraging systemic unity 
than its original Terms of Reference implied, and it deliberately 
expanded its own time-frame in order to define more precise 
educational system objectives than were originally available. 
Ambiguity in such areas as curriculum stemmed largely from the fact 
that, while the survey was taking place, comparable planning was 
being undertaken in the associated fields of curriculum development 
and adult education, and little more could be said about 
relationships until the findings of other planning studies were 
known. 
At the same time, communication as an end in itself was 
substantially played down. In the original Terms of Reference 
for the survey, the media, per se, figured too prominently, and 
television technology in particular was emphasised to the exclusion 
of other components. This emphasis was much softened during the 
survey period, and the relationship of media to curriculum reform, 
social development and community animation was as clearly 
articulated as possible, given the generality of plans and 
provisions for these areas. 
It is debatable whether the project stemmed initially from 
need, (Principle 3), or from political convenience, or both; 
certainly elements of the eventual proposal (especially the 
insistence upon using television for education, upon ! ihich 
implementation ultimately foundered) had a political bias. 
However, the conduct of the study was such that, while political 
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elements were recognised and acknowledged within the project 
design, a determined attempt was still made to relate project 
planning directly to educational and social needs, with a special 
emphasis laid throughout upon the extension of education and 
development to deprived rural areas and to adult audiences. 
In this whole issue the survey was caught, uneasily, between 
the stronger political motivations of the Thai author-ities and 
the more theoretical concerns of the World Bank. 
The survey also did what it would to decentralise planning 
(Principle 4) wherever possible: for example, through the 
introduction of structured means of feedback, through the 
creation of local planning and policy review committees and in 
particular through the introduction of some experimental projects 
in the field of community media. Such initiatives came, however, 
more as the result of team enthusiasms than as the outcome of 
local, political pressures. Thai society is traditional, 
hierarchial and Buddhist, and the concept of devolution, or of 
user involvement, was simply not understood. 
The survey clearly demonstrated the need to proceed through 
a careful articulation of objectives (Principle 5), and much of 
its early difficulty arose from the fact that, at the outset, 
overall educational objectives had been inadequately clarified. 
Much time was wasted (and the specialist talents of technical 
experts under-utilised) because of the necessity to crystallize 
these objectives before specific planning could begin; this 
was justified in the eyes of the team leader and his deputy, 
but not always appreciated as such by other team members. 
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Scenario Construction 
There was a sustained attempt (Principle 6), to make use of 
existing infrastructures where these appeared to be viable (e. g. 
linking communication development to the adult education and 
non-formal education movement, and basing media development upon 
known patterns of social interaction, as revealed by a separate 
sociological analysis). This was not easy, in vievi of the 
complexity and rigidity of the Thai social structure. 
The one major exception to this principle was deliberate: 
the recommendation to create an independent radio transmission 
network for education, rather than rely upon existing broadcasting 
structures. This argument was based upon the demonstrated 
incapacity of traditional broadcasting channels to support 
educational development over a period of some fifteen years. 
It was known at the time that the proposal would cause some 
political dissension, as proved to be the case (with the Public 
Relations Department). Possibly the same recommendation would 
not have been made had the study been an overall national 
communication survey rather than a sectoral analysis; any 
reform of the PRD model was outside the team's terms of reference 
and beyond the Ministry of Education's sphere of influence, so 
that a sectoral or independent solution to the problem had to be 
found. When the project was finally approved, in 1978-9, the 
radio network was placed under the direction of the PRD. 
The timing advantage of the study (Principle 7) was eroded 
during its execution. The association of the survey with the 
negotiation of a major World Bank loan for education was both 
opportune and deliberate, and it coincided with a renewed interest 
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in communication media for national development. But its 
actual beginnings were interrupted by the October 1973 coup, 
and its execution coincided with a period of political 
instability. 
With regard to phasing, the study was rushed; although 'it 
attempted to cope with successive time compressions systematically, 
and reduce its scope of activities accordingly, in the event this 
was not enough. Compromises over timing often have to be 
accepted, but an agreement to reduce time-scales has to be matched 
either by a proportionate increase in resources, or by a limitation 
on planning demands: in Thailand, this was not adequately 
negotiated. 
" 
The major difficulty of the survey was in fact one of phasing. 
Apart from breaking down activities into essential components and 
sequences, basic human interactions have to be allowed for; this 
is not a mechanistic process, but includes some acknowledgement 
of the biases, habits and preconceptions of decision makers at 
various levels. In such cases, systems analysis is only a guide, 
and in the Thai context the time reduction meant that (i) the 
amount of dialogue between planners and decision-makers was 
reduced; and (ii) not enough time was allowed for the implications 
of alternative strategies to be fully assimilated before decisions 
were made. This severely weakened the process of consensus. 
Because the survey was located (institutionally) within the Ministry 
of Education, it was seen by other agencies as a sectoral study, 
even though its Terms of Reference impinged considerably upon other 
sectors (Principle 8). Many attempts were made to enlist other 
agencies in the study, but with limited success. Counterparts 
were not found outside the Ministry of Education on anything like 
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a full-time basis, and the level of these counterparts was in 
many cases inferior. It is doubtful, for example, whether the 
Public Relations Department (as the organisation primarily 
responsible in Thailand for broadcasting services) ever fully 
realised the implications of the survey, since at later meetings 
with the World Bank, the PRD claimed that it had not been fully 
briefed on the team's recommendations and regarded the apparent 
consensus reached on an independent Ministry of Education radio 
network as not being binding. Meetings with the economic 
planning authorities were also, unfortunately, infrequent and 
largely ceremonial, and even within the Ministry of Education 
there was some confusion as to the. survey's role. Thus, while 
a clear set of relationships was exposed in the final report, 
this could not be said to have been even tacitly agreed by all 
concerned. 
All of this impacted upon the issue of coordination. However, 
in the case of technical assistance projects, coordination demands 
go further still. The net must, ideally, draw together financing 
and executing agencies in a properly structured dialogue, and in 
Thailand this patently did not happen. It was unfortunate that 
the original donor (the World Bank) was replaced at the very last 
minute by the Netherlands Government, and while the latter did 
not in any way interfere in the planning cycle, the World Bank 
equally had no direct part in the main planning process. For 
this reason, the Bank's eventual appraisal of the project report 
was inadequately informed, scanty and insensitive to the Thai 
political climate. 
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Scenario Application 
The Thai survey revealed more about the difficulties of team 
working than about individual planners, (Principle 9), but it did 
expand, quite considerably, upon the qualities to be demanded of 
foreign planning specialists. In brief, it suggested that their 
abilities should be as follows: (placed, subjectively, in order 
of importance) 
(a) the ability to work in a team, to respond 
flexibly to arguments advanced by other 
team members, to abide, by corporate team 
decisions. 
(b) adaptability to unfamiliar cultural 
situations and an ability to relate 
to local people at all levels. 
(c) the ability to work beyond a narrow 
professional discipline, and to relate 
academic and professional experience, 
practically, to new environments and 
unfamiliar problems. 
(d) specialist experience and qualifications. 
(e) prior experience in a developing country. 
This is not to say that professional competence is unimportant, 
or prior experience in the developing world; rather, it is to 
emphasise that sympathy and adaptability are the most essential 
qualities. The study fully endorsed the need for status and 
political involvement (Principle 10). It was, from its inception, 
politically oriented; it owed much to the persistence of Khunying 
Ambhorn Meesook, the senior civil servant who worked for several 
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years with officials of the World Bank, trying to gain acceptance 
of the Pre-Investment Study approach (and its financing at low 
interest IDA loan rates). She also influenced successive Ministers 
and Permanent Secretaries of Education to support her initiative; 
her personal position was not always unopposed, but at the time of 
the study she was in a commanding position to push the project 
forward and press for decisions to be made at appropriate times. 
The fact that a senior Unesco planning adviser (Nicholas Bennett) 
was also influential within the Ministry of Education and involved 
in the survey was also significant, in that it eased the study's 
bureaucratic passage. This advantage did not remain, however, 
as Khunying Ambhorn Meesook was later moved laterally within the 
Ministry's hierarchies, and other commitments prevented her from 
figuring regularly in team dialogue. The Minister of Education 
at the time (until his resignation from office, after illness, 
during the survey's execution) was not a strong advocate and did 
not involve himself wich any frequency in the policy issues raised. 
In addition, the survey never commanded a strong involvement 
from other Ministries, fron the National Economic Development 
Board, or from senior politicians and members of Cabinet, so that 
overall the degree of status which it secured must be considered 
mixed. And in the years which came after the Survey, no single 
influential figure emerged to press the project's claims. 
If anything, therefore (Frincipft 1U), a serious aver-_ 
assessment was made of the time and capacity of decision-makers 
to absorb the substance of the material upon which they were 
making decisions, and so to come up with a rational set of 
recommendations. Decisions are not always made solely according 
to rational criteria, and the nuances of decision making, and the 
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manner of weighting priorities, have to be carefully reviewed. 
This was not always the case in Thailand, and even sections of 
the Ministry of Education were often unclear as to the just- 
ification for particular decisions. Nonetheless, the sequencing 
of the project and its breakdown into specific decision points 
had two major advantages: it forced consideration of strategic 
alternatives at critical stages; and it made it impossible for 
the Thai authorities to dissociate themselves from the eventual 
project proposals (as has happened on other occasions, when these 
are developed totally by foreign teams). A comparable lack of 
realism was demonstrated by the planning design, in the 
assumptions which it made about the involvement and participation 
of Thai counterparts. Indeed the weakness of the Thai participation 
was commented upon by a member of the counterpart team: 
"On the counterpart side, we did all we could 
to secure counterparts for the specialists, and we got 
them, officially with written approval, from each 
Individual's superior. In practice, however, it was 
impossible to have the counterparts working with the 
specialists full-time or even part-time, because these 
officials were not released from their normal duties. 
Another weakness in the exercise I must mention 
is the poor coordination among government departments 
which must have been extremely frustrating for our 
specialists. And the last point I should like to 
mention is that officials in my own department who 
were directly concerned with the project, myself 
included, failed to get involved in the Study, partly 
because we still had our normal responsibilities to 
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cope with, but particularly because we found 
ourselves bogged down with administrative chores 
connected with the project. What we should 
have done was to create a completely separate 
administrative unit with a staff working full- 
time in it, and under no circumstances allow 
professional people to get involved in 
administration. Such an arrangement would 
have ensured more active participation on the 
part of the professional staff, and would have 
prevented the criticism that the project aas a 
'foreign experts' project and not a Thai one. " 
(Bhonghbibhat, 1976 p. 67) 
This is not an unusual situation. Very often, a recipient 
Government agrees nominally to release full-time counterpart 
personnel, yet in the event these are only part-time, expected 
to continue with normal functions. A determined stand might 
eliminate this obstacle, but sadly donor and executing agent are 
often at odds. There is at times a tension between the funder 
(who feels that his money justifies him in being autocratic) and 
the executor (who resents his lack of control over finance), 
which inhibits any common platform. 
The level of representation at policy-making meetings was 
likewise an area of difficulty. Because this was a Ministry of 
Education project, on the whole educational representation was 
adequate, but other Ministries, possibly quite deliberately, 
often dispatched junior officers with only limited authority to 
meetings. This failure cannot be attributed solely to the 
Education Ministry; the weakness would seem to lie in the fact 
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that a communication survey was pitched, organically, at a single 
Ministry level, while its sphere of activity lay across a much 
broader spectrum. 
It is not surprising that the Thai study illustr. ted most 
clearly those aspects of planning methodology which concern group 
working and inter-disciplinarity (Principle 12): as one of the 
earliest integrated studies in the communication field it had to 
grope towards solutions, rather than find them ready-made. 
A main difficulty occurred in the identification of consultants: 
both as individual specialists and as group members. Flexibility 
was extremely important; the abrupt departure of two consultants, 
for example, and the inability to replace these immediately, meant 
a complete re-allocation of functions for remaining team members 
and some reordering of roles. This problem is compounded in the 
case of technical assistance projects, where both consultants and 
local counterparts are working together and the complexities of 
group operation become proportionately greater (in reality, two 
groups may be created, each with its own dynamic, and a major 
problem is to establish bridgeheads between the two). In Thailand, 
the following conclusions emerged on matter,: of team working, most 
of them practical and specific: 
(1) The role of consultants must be established at the 
earliest possible stage. In some cases, they will be working 
primarily as advisers, monitoring the basic work and decisions 
of counterparts; in other cases, they may be serving virtually 
as technical consultants, contracted to perform a particular 
task. Irrespective of the pros and cons of each approach, an 
understanding by each consultant of his personal role is important. 
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(2) Patterns of team working should be carefully 
studied and adjusted to suit the particular composition of 
each group. There are no invariable rules to govern the choice 
of, say, open-plan working, the frequency of team meetings, or 
the degree to which direction is needed from the team leader. 
Yet it is important to establish such patterns early, on the 
basis of a sensitive response to the team's corporate identity. 
(3) The principal members of any comprehensive planning 
exercise should be full-time throughout. 
(4) In technical sssistance projects, as representative 
a group of consultants as possible should be obtained for a 
planning team, and this mix should reflect both cultural traditions 
in the industrialised world, and representativeness of the 
developing world. 
(5) Advance briefing and orientation of consultants are 
essential. 
(6) Physical environment is important to team working; 
it should be both studied and, if necessary, argued for (e. g. the 
placing of consultants and counterparts together or in proximity 
to the main institutions involved). 
(7) The appointment of a team leader is crucial; apart 
from wide-ranging professional competence, he must be able to act 
as a sympathetic leader, experienced in group dynamics. 
In a team situation, it is the match of expertise and 
personalities which is most important. For example, in the Thai 
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case, it might be asked whether the planning task would have 
been better served by a smaller team of consultants, operating 
more homogeneously over a longer period, but without the varied 
specialisms which were actually available? Pros and cons can 
be argued for both approaches. 
A larger team of specialists is easier to find, it embraces 
a fuller range of technical disciplines, it has a better, built-in 
capacity to deal with wastage (in the sense that one or two less 
competent consultants will have fewer adverse results overall). 
At the same time, it makes for less continuity, less team 
involvement, and less understanding (because of the relative 
shortness of each consultant's work) of the whole system design. 
Most of the decisions in the Thai study were taken because of 
time pressures, but in another context, should a different 
combination be chosen (accepting fewer consultants for longer 
periods, in the hope that each would cover, through his own 
efforts, fields outside his immediate professional discipline)? 
Part of the difficulty stems from the complexity of planning. 
It has been argued (among others, by the World Bank) that the 
Thai study was too complex in design, and it is true that, for 
some short-term members (and for some casual Thai participants) 
the intricacy of the planning, and the permutations of choice, 
represented a major hurdle. It has to be accepted that more in 
the way of explanation and education should have been attempted. 
But can communication planning ever avoid being complex when, 
apart from being a new discipline, it is also trying to reconcile 
so many variables, including social and political as well as 
economic and technical forces? Moreover, is not a complex design 
often necessary in order to secure flexibility of planning, to 
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avoid premature decisions, preconceptions, unfounded assumptions? In 
such circumstances it may equally be argued that only a long-standing 
acquaintance with the evolution of the planning design, and the para- 
meters affecting its modification and adaptation, will allow consul- 
tants a coherent role. In the case of Thailand, it has already been 
noted that some members who participated in the second stage were not 
fully attuned to its conception and questioned even its basic premises. 
This is not unexpected; however good or bad they were professionally, 
they could hardly have penetrated the intricacies of the design in the 
time available. 
Report Production 
Finally the Thai survey attempted to deal, seriously and compre- 
hensively, with evaluation (Principle 13), bringing appropriate special- 
ists into the planning team and building it into the eventual project 
design. Indeed, the study was, in many ways, ahead of its time in the 
attention which it paid to evaluation, and yet it was still not suffi- 
ciently aware of evaluation demands. In particular, the evaluation 
specialist was not appointed to the group early enough, nor was he avail- 
able throughout; the data which he needed were not available at the 
beginning of the survey, and specific instruments devised to produce 
additional information had not been tested. (The failure of a question- 
naire to include an appropriate Thai word for 'videorecorder', for 
example, led to meaningless returns being supplied by schools during 
a survey of existing audio-visual facilities. ) 
The study also confirmed the need for process evaluation of actual 
planning surveys. Although the survey was chronicle, in goneral terms, 
it is unfortunate that no more systematic monitoring was undertaken. 
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This has been true of most such studies (apart from the limited attempt, 
in El Salvador, to produce an administrative record and history of the 
project). It is relevant to note, for example, that the opinions of 
the El Salvador researchers on consultant selection corresponded to 
the observations made above, but in both cases such judgements were sub- 
jectively based. A critical part of the present research has been direc- 
ted towards such evaluations. 
New Principles 
From the above, it appeared that several of the principles summar- 
ised in Table 2 of Chapter IV could be usefully modified or expanded 
before embarking on further model building. Prior to this, however, 
the experiences of the survey also suggested that some additional 
planning concepts should be highlighted and included as supplementary 
planning principles. These concerned (for scenario construction) 
relationships with special interest groups, especially donor agencies; 
the acquisition of adequate data sources for planning; the education 
of decision makers; arid (for report production) the need to orient 
planning reports towards implementation. 
These new concepts are amalgamated with the earlier version of 
Figure 9 in a new Figure 10 below. They are discussed individually in 
the section which follows, and in doing so, where relevant, the project 
case studies are again reviewed, to see if they throw some additional 
1 ight. 
Scenario Construction 
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Recognition of Special Interest Groups 
The need to recognise the priorities and special interests of funding 
and donor agencies, as well as the variety of agencies involved in planning 
and implementation, was amply demonstrated by encounters with the World 
Bank. This was particularly marked because of the Bank's absence from the 
planning team, owing to a last minute shift in funding for the survey. It 
could be (and was) argued that the degree of economic justification required 
by the World Bank was excessive, but realistically, potential donors have 
their own internal requirements and these needs have to be satisfied. Never- 
theless, an insistence by an agency upon fulfilling, literally, technical 
requirements in the way of project documents can have an unfortunate impact 
upon a project's growth. In the Thai study, an insistence (by UNESCO and 
especially by the World Bank) upon having precise descriptions of consul- 
tancies far in advance, upon following a protracted procedure for clear- 
ances, and especially upon retaining a traditional format for project 
presentation, all proved inhibiting. The classic tradition of project and 
operational planning placed too great a stress on defining a final product, 
and too little on the process of empirical investigation, based primarily 
upon problem definition. 
The need to apply techniques of economic analysis to communication 
planning raised particular difficulties. The donor audience assumed 
thro;: hout by the report was the World Bank, and the Bank traditionally 
insists upon a degree of cost-benefit and cost efficiency analysis which 
is difficult to meet in the communication sector, especially in projects 
which (like the Thai proposal) are concerned more with qualitative than 
with zuantitative gains. Unit costs are relatively easy to derive for 
a for .l school system making use of communication media; they can be 
extra; elated, though less precisely and convincingly, for non-formal 
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audiences. But cost benefit analyses became artificial in situations 
where a communication system is being proposed as the only available 
means of meeting a particular social objective. This was the case in 
Thailand; the arguments for using mass media (their immediacy, wide 
penetration, equity, popular appeal, etc. ) reinforced the view that 
only through such channels could the majority of rural audiences be 
reached, and even in the school sector, they were seen as the only 
rapid means of securing teacher upgrading and an extension of new 
curricula. Cost-benefit calculations were included in the Thai report 
(for example, the relative cost of training teachers by orthodox as 
compared with media-based channels was compared), but the calculations 
were known to be contrived. 
Adequacy of Data Base 
The importance of an adequate data base for planning was also high- 
lighted by the Thai survey; this is a recurrent problem in the communi- 
cation field, especially in the Third World. One of the criticisms made 
of the rational-comprehensive approach to planning is that for it to 
be successful a considerable body of valid data is required, which 
cannot be assumed to exist in developing countries. Two writers on 
development themes conclude: 
"A basic characteristic of poor countries is a pervasive 
lack of essential information. Budgetary data are rarely 
trustworthy ... Statistics are largely unreliable when they 
are available, which is seldom. " (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974 
p. xii) 
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In developed countries, conversely, there is often a surplus of 
data: a more characteristic difficulty is information overload. 
Adequate 
mechanisms exist for the collection and retrieval of a broad range of 
statistical items. 
In the Third World, these procedures are not well established, and 
often special arrangements have to be made. For this reason alone, it 
is important to know the kinds of information needed, so that means to 
obtain it can be created in sufficient time, as well as methods of 
processing the data once collected. 
The adequacy of the data base. provided was questioned by a number 
of participants in the Thailand Preinvestment Study: not so much because 
of a shortage of data, except in some specific areas (such as transmis- 
sion patterns), but because of a lack of prior editorial work, and in 
some cases the non-availability of data in translation (since the majority 
of the team were unfamiliar with the Thai language). The study was for- 
tunate in that a Pre-Feasibility Survey had collected together a consider- 
able amount of background information and had gone some way towards 
assimilating and re-ordering its contents; had this not been done, the 
data problem would have been extreme. But the process was not taken far 
enough, and in particular highly desirable correlations were not made. A 
great deal of energy was originally devoted to examining earlier research 
literature on educational media in Thailand, without achieving any very 
concrete results (these earlier studies were often marginal, and usually 
not comparable owing to the varying methodologies employed). More useful 
for the benefit of the team was a sociological presentation of Thai cultural 
values, especially in rural areas, though the depth of this investigation 
was disappointing. 
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Among the earlier project reviews, a good example of the importance 
of a complete and detailed data base came from SITE, which did far more 
than most projects to collect socio-economic information about its 
audiences, and to use this as a basis for both technical and programme 
planning. But the model according to which villages were to be selected 
for the experiment, employing criteria on village size, composition and 
location, often proved inadequate in specific cases, and many adapta- 
tion had to be made. 
"Out of a total of 35,000 villages in the cluster areas 
we had identified about 3,500 candidate villages to be physi- 
cally visited so as to select the final number of 2,400. The 
selection criteria were quite simple. We needed the villages 
to have electricity, at least a large fraction of them, we 
needed them to be accessible by jeep during most of the year; 
we needed them to have a public building in which the TV set 
could be installed; we needed a nearby location for the antenna 
from where it could look at the satellite without any obstru- 
ction in the way. Further, the villages had to lie within a 
radius of 40 km from a pre-selected sub-centre. There were 
four sub-centres in each of the six clusters. By February 1974 
we had visited about 1,200 of the villages and were horrified 
to find that a very small fraction of these qualified for 
selection according to our criteria ... At this time, therefore, 
a rather horrendous exercise was started: changing the criteria 
back and forth and going over all the village lists all over 
again. " (Yash Pal, 1975 p. 12) 
Motivation 
It also became clear, in the course of the Thai survey, that the 
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involvement of lead figures and decision makers could not be left to 
chance: a positive attempt should be made (and incorporated into the 
planning design) to motivate these key figures, and to educate them 
on communication planning concepts. 
In the first place, far more might have been done to educato 
decision-makers in the overall aims of the exercise and its particular 
approach. Moreover, what was done in the way of briefing and orienta- 
tion was not properly structured. Apart from demonstrations and tutorials 
of the 'teach in' variety, no special promotional or descriptive litera- 
ture was produced beyond a one-volume summary of the final report, and 
the fundamentals of the project - why educational media should be con- 
sidered in the first place - were not widely explored from the outset. 
The concept was also poorly exemplified in the project case studies. 
In Singapore, a few isolated seminars were given; in SITE, study program- 
mes were arranged for senior decision-makers (especially in the technical 
field) and seminars were set up using visiting international personnel). 
In the AIBD some attempts were made to influence opinion during special 
seminars (for leading trainers and administrators) and specific appeals 
were made at ABU meetings, even at regional UNDP meetings. 
In one case, however - that of the Children's Television Workshop 
-a careful promotional programme paid off handsomely. The education of 
decision-makers was part of an overall programme of promotion and publicity, 
compiled with the precision of an advertising campaign and structured 
according to specific audiences. Of particular interest was the series 
of seminars held in Cambridge and New York and organised by Gerald Lesser: 
these were actually double-edged tools, designed primarily to solicit the 
opinion of leading educationists in specific problem areas, but having 
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a secondary spin-off in enlisting their support and 
direct interest. 
It is this kind of educational programme - which educates by 
involving decision-makers in a problem-solving situation - that seems 
the most productive, because it attracts support by making an intel- 
Iectual appeal: it is not merely promotional 
Report Production 
Impl ementabi 1i ty 
Finally, in the context of report production, a concept was suggested 
which is described (somewhat clumsily) as 'implementability'. It suggests 
that a report should be organised and written in such a way that it 
actually facilitates implementation: that it contains within its pages 
the seeds of its own development. What does this mean? At the most 
obvious level, it implies that the recommendations of a report should 
be expressed in concrete terms, indicating how they should be achieved, 
at what pace, with what phasing and so on. It also suggests that means 
of financing should be clearly considered, with projects which are (in 
developing countries) likely to be sponsored externally laid out inde- 
pendently, expressed in formats which their sponsors prefer. 
But at a second, non general, level, it implies that the report 
should include other elements which facilitate implementation, such as 
the training programmes which are needed to provide a reservoir of capable 
personnel. And at a third and non complex level still, it suggests that 
the report should make allowances, not simply for the implementation of 
a project, but for its continuance, once the initial boost of external 
financing, extra resources and expertise is over and the project is left 
to stand on its own feet. It is from this understanding that the modern 
emphasis on self reliance and endogenous development derives: the 
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insistence that it is the development of innate capacity which should be 
stressed by communication planning, rather than the technical evolution 
of what may be a short-lived, externally supported project. 
Much was learned at the simpler levels above froi-im the organisation 
and reception of the Thai report. While an attempt was made to present 
it in such a way that different categories of user could extract the 
information which they most needed, the overall report was too large and 
complex (witness the fact that the World Bank review mission did not have 
the time to analyse or assimilate its contents fully). Some difficulties 
were experienced over final report writing and publication; there was 
inadequate time and finance, and it would have been better had the report 
been completed and published in Thailand, so that final editorial con- 
sultations could have been made. The production of a summary volume 
proved extremely useful, but in future exercises it was clear that far 
more attention should be paid, at the time of project preparation, to the 
format and presentation of reports destined for multiple audiences and 
purposes. Nevertheless, the Thai study did attempt to lay foundations 
for implementation extremely thouroughly. It contained full proposals 
for training at a variety of levels, and in its annexes were included, 
for example, handbooks of how to approach evaluation or the development 
of community media, in forms specifically suited to the Thai environment. 
While the concept of self reliance was not explicitly quoted (the study 
came too early for that), it was nevertheless implicit in its recommenda- 
tions. 
Reverting to the earlier project reviews, to what extent did they 
also illustrate this rather difficult concept? The majority directed 
their planning reports quite explicitly towards their sponsors, and were 
meticulous in putting forward training strategies, detailed operational 
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plans and so on. Both El Salvador and Singapore emphasised local, rather 
than foreign training, following the principle that this was more likely 
to produce specialists with techniques firmly rooted in local problems. 
The El Salvador evaluators commented: 
"In the first five years of the reform, more than 30 
Salvadoreans took advantage of overseas training. The value 
of this training was hard to judge, both for the recipients 
themselves and for the groups that sponsored them. Benefits 
seemed to vary with the applicability of the training experi- 
ence to specific Reform needs, and with the capabilities of 
the participants. The majority of the trainees unquestionably 
profited from their experiences abroad, but many questioned 
afterwards whether this training häd really prepared them to 
do their jobs better than before". (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 54) 
However, the same co: iw stators also had something explicit to say about 
the development of self-reliance, 
"The Salvadorean experience clearly shows the advantages 
of putting local people in charge of developing all aspects 
of a local ITV service, rather than relying on outside advisers. 
El Salvador did receive substantial foreign assistance in the 
early years; but after four years, an experienced Salvadorean 
staff was firmly established, and the outlook for continuing 
and expanding the ITV system was better than in other countries 
that had relied more heavily on foreign experts to do the 
actual production and teleteaching. " (Mayo et al, 1976 pp 166-7) 
1 
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Such an approach has its intrinsic difficulties; it takes longer to 
secure results. 
"it would seem that if a country wants to learn by doing 
(which has advantages over the long term) it must allow enough 
time before going on the air to train production teams, to let 
them gain experience, and to test and remake as many programmes 
as possible. " (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 167) 
The remark was applied to the production process, but it is generali- 
sable to other planning areas. The argument was perhaps best summarised 
by Yash Pal, speaking of SITE. 
"In India, as also in many other developing countries, there 
are a lot of jobs to be done, and a lot of people who want some- 
thing meaningful to do. Somehow they seldom get together. We 
blame it on our educational systems, on the non-existence of 
adequate training programmes. 'Training' is one of the most insi- 
dious concepts in manpower development ... 
If two years ago I had asked a committee to select young 
engineers, fresh out of college, who should be able to organise 
our cluster offices, deal with innumerable technical problems 
in the field, look after logistics, interact with people at 
all echelons of the State Government, and play host to the Chief 
Minister of the State at the time of SITE inauguration, we 
wouldn't have found a single candidate. But this is precisely 
what many have done with credit even though they were recruited 
because they had studied and understood microwave communication 
or video techniques. In fact all of us are familiar with this 
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paradox because very few of us are doing what we were 
educated for ... I have come to believe that if you 
want to retain a degree of freshness in your programmes, 
do not over-professionalise your activities. In fact, 
never leave everything to 'experts' alone when you are 
embarking on something new, because experts, by very 
definition, are wedded to something which is old. " 
(Yash Pal, 1975 p. 12) 
The concept of self-reliance has gained, in recent years, widespread 
political acceptance, such approaches as third country training, unknown 
ten years ago, have become part of *the dogma of technical assistance, and 
international organisations are rapidly bringing the reign of the long- 
term expert to an end, replacing him with short-term consultancies and 
TCDC (Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries). 
While much of the writing attached to the concept is polemic, and 
the reality of TCDC is far from secure its very existence points to a 
mood of change. 
Conclusion 
The experiences of this survey were not noticeably different, 
overall, from the analyses of Chapter IV, and on some points (e. g. the 
importance of lead figures, the importance of timing and phasing, the need 
for flexibility in the design of planning instruments) there was very 
close agreement between them. 
However, because the Thai survey was a planning survey, it naturally 
threw much greater light on the planning process, and it was possible, as 
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a result of this analysis, to refine the expression of those principles 
concerned with scenario application and the presentation of planning 
reports, to make them more precise and utilitarian. Consequently, in 
Table 4, a synthesis is made of both expanded and new principles, as 
a basis for the work of model building which begins in Chapter VI. 
TABLE 4 
FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
1. Planning design should not be aver-theoretical; it should be 
flexible, avoiding the uncritical use of external models. 
2. Planning should focus on the whole communication system under 
review, and not confine itself to particular projects, sectors, 
media or technologies. 
3. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through 
a variety of needs assessment mechanisms. 
4. Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, 
involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis 
on system users. 
5. Planning should begin with the establishment of clear and precise 
communication objectives. 
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TABLE 4 (contd. ) 
SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
6. Scenario construction should seek to maximise the use of 
existing resources and infrastructures. 
7. Scenario construction should pay particular attention to 
timing and phasing. 
S. Adequate arrangements should be made in scenario design for 
the cooperative and coordinated working of all agencies 
involved. 
9. The special interests and preconditions of all interested 
agencies and donors should be reflected in scenario design. 
10. Scenario design should include means of securing an adequate 
data base. 
11. Promotional activities, including the education of decision 
makers, should be included in scenario design. 
SCENARIO APPLICATION 
12. In planning, people are more important than techniques. 
13. To be successful the planning process must have the interest 
of, as well as access to, influential people in key positions 
of decision making. 
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TABLE 4 (contd. ) 
14. In planning, the limits of decision-makers, planners, planning 
processes and institutions should be realistically recognised. 
This implies the careful analysis of decision making patterns, 
the involvement of a broad spread of local personnel, and 
their continuous representation at appropriate levels in 
planning processes. 
15. In the organisation of planning teams, an approach which emphasises 
interdisciplinarity is important. For this to be effective, it 
is important for team members to be assigned specific and stated 
roles and responsibilities. 
PLANNING REPORTS 
16. Plans should be organised in such a way that they facilitate 
implementation. This implies the inclusion of detailed 
proposals for financing, project development, training and 
the eventual achievment of self-support, organised in such 
a way that both donors and recipients are provided with the 
categories of information which they require, presented in 
the format most suited to their needs. 
17. Plans should include mechanisms for evaluation, to allow for 
subsequent revision of the proposals being put forward. As 
part of this design the planning process itself should be 
evaluated. 
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CHAPTERVI 
MODEL CONSTRUCTION: 
ELEMENTS OF AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Model construction for an operational planning design involves two 
components: those who plan, and the planning process itself. It was 
considered, therefore, that the substance of model building would 
be the interaction between these two axes. 
Initially, guidance was sought from the hypothetical principles 
proposed in Table 4. Although they related to all aspects of the communi- 
cation planning process, some were specifically ascribed to Framework 
Design, emphasising flexibility and the avoidance of over-theoretical 
models; holism in planning; needs assessment and devolution; arid the 
importance of proceeding through a clear articulation of objectives. 
Taken together, these suggested, in relation to planning participation, 
that the range of participants should be interpreted as broadly as 
possible, and in relation to planning method that, while focussed broadly 
on systems planning, this should be framed in flexible terms, avoiding 
doctrinaire planning approaches. 
Reduced to its simplest components, therefore, it appeared that a 
planning framework would include a minimum of two strands: one time and 
activity-based, the other distinguishing principal participants. 
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Participants 
A functional division was first made between planning and decision- 
making, since it was a basic assumption of the study that a planning 
framework must accommodate elements of both planning methodology and of 
decision-making, if it were to be a realistic instrument. 
A further distinction which, from the analysis of earlier projects, 
appeared to be of importance was between communication planning and 
development planning, since it had been argued that communication planning 
must be seen within the total context of development planning, and the 
orientations and methodologies of both reconciled. 
At this point, therefore, the participant axis was left with principal 
roles of communication planning, development planning and decision-making. 
In the case of development planning and decision making, further sub- 
divisions could also be considered. Development planning exists at both 
central and sectoral levels: indeed, communication can itself be considered 
one such sector. The overall communication plan has therefore to accom- 
modate, not simply communication structures and organisations, but the 
communication needs of other development agencies. Should there be, in 
this case, a further distinction between central and sectoral development 
planners? 
Oh balance it was felt that, while the distinction would be important 
in preparing a local scenario, practices vary too considerably at the level 
of a basic framework for it to be reflected, at least at this preliminary 
stagel 
In decision-making, there was also a possible further distinction to 
be drawn between political decision-making, and public/user consultation, 
- 252 - 
an issue which was also stressed in the project analysis. The signifi- 
cance of this issue will be elaborated later (especially in Chapter IX), 
but it is still only rarely incorporated in decision-making patterns, 
especially in the developing world, (as Glas'illustrated by the project 
analysis). It seemed advisable, therefore, for the preliminary stage of 
framework construction, to propose a consolidated strand of consultation 
and decision making. 
There was also a question of the organisation of participants. While 
in the developing world, the units responsible for development planning 
are clear (planning ministries, or economic planning units), as are the 
main decision-making units (Minister's and Cabinets, or their equivalents), 
this was less so with regard to communication planning, which, as argued 
in Chapter II, has rarely been seen as a'coherent field of activity, and 
is therefore not reflected as such in organisational terms. However, it 
was assumed that, while the major personalities and agencies involved in 
communication planning might not have been confirmed, at least some nucleus 
could be identified as gatekeeper and prime mover for the communi- 
cation planning exercise. This could be termed the communication planning 
agent, though it might be nothing very elaborate or grandiose. It might 
be a single research institute, a small sub-unit in a development planning 
office, even an external consultant. The main function of this agent, 
however, would be to collect, generate and synthesise information from a 
variety of sources in such a way that it would be useful to the subsequ- 
ent planning process. 
Planning Method 
The second strand concerned the range of planning techniques which 
might be accommodated in the framework. 
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Planning techniques are numerous and varied, but they have been 
categorised usefully (in Middleton 1980) as radical-comprehensive, dis- 
jointed-incremental, transactive and participatory, and radical. These 
represent a gradual movement towards openness in planning, but it is the 
first two categories which are most relevant, as these reflect the main 
current approaches. 
Rational comprehensive planning is dominated by the systems approach: 
it seeks, through rational procedures, to move in a sequence beginning 
with needs assessment and terminating in evaluation. It operates through 
the 'articulation of objectives, the setting of goals and targets, and 
the division of tasks into discrete, 'generally sequential units. It is 
primarily linear, but in the emphasis which it lays upon evaluation and 
the subsequent revision of plans, is also iterative; it does not see any 
planning process as complete or terminal. It proceeds, usually, through 
the establishment and consideration of alternatives, which are weighed 
and compared before selecting an optimal strategy (usually a synthesis of 
alternatives). Its characteristic tools are those of systems planning: 
cost-benefit and cost effectiveness analysis, resource allocation, net- 
working and programme budgeting techniques (e. g. PERT and PPBS), dis- 
counting, input-output analysis. In its modern variants, it also draws 
upon the techniques of futures research, including versions of the Delphi 
approach, scenario construction and trend extrapolation, although these 
techniques are also used within more participatory and radical planning 
styles. 
Disjointed incrementalism is the antithesis of this approach. It 
argues that systems planning does not lead to implementation, because it 
is dealing with artificial issues, ignoring the realities of policy and 
decision-making: that it requires high degrees of certainty of data and 
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theory which are imoossible to secure in developing countries (cf 
Friedmann, 1973). The approach therefore proceeds through a series 
of discrete bargaining arrangements, discarding the coiliprehensive 
systems view in favour of a series of sectoral dialogues, using such 
traditional means as budgeting negotiations (cf Lindblom, 1968). The 
rationale for the disjointed-incremental approach is succinctly stated 
in the following critique: 
"(The) paradox of planning is that it is expected to 
create the conditions necessary for its own success ... The 
stock-in-trade of the planner is the big model. Sometimes it 
appears that the larger and more complex the model (though 
actually it may be no more than a long list of variables) the 
more important the planner ... The planner makes his way by 
talking about the need to consider the future in present dec- 
isions. Yet poor countries have great difficulty understand- 
ing where they are (even where they have been) in terms of 
income, expenditure, manpower and the like. Instead of helping 
solve real problems in the recent past, planners may work hard 
to create what turn out to be imaginary future problems as a 
way of gaining additional influence over forthcoming decisions ... 
... If planning is a universal tool, planners find it reasonable 
to ask why their countries cannot live up to the requirements 
of rational decision-making ... They do not stop to enquire 
whether the apparent successes of planning in richer countries 
may not in fact be attributed to other factors, nor whether the 
tasks confronting those societies are analogous to those in poor 
countries". (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974 pp. 284-5) 
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These two approaches, it was considered, represented the dominant 
pattern in the developing world. At a policy level, the legitimacy of 
the rational comprehensive method is accepted and actually built into 
organisational models for planning. Because of its acceptance in the 
West, and in the work of the United Nations Development Programme and 
other UN agencies, many developing country planners have been taught to 
use only this method. At the same time, the more pragmatic, incremental 
mode reflects reality in many day-to-day environments, particularly when 
one penetrates below the leading, Western-trained, upper cadre of economic 
planners. 
The other planning approaches are particularly associated with the 
West, and are not so much techniques of planning, as responses to a 
growing concern with popular participation. Participatory and trans- 
active planning stress, on the one hand, the involvement of clients and 
users in planning, placing a premium on personal and social satisfaction 
as well as economic good and political equity. At the same time, they 
also stress the importance of planning as part of human growth and 
development. They therefore emphasise maximum decentralisation, micro- 
planning, the creation of a variety of consultative mechanisms, and con- 
siderable reliance on intepersonal dialogue. Such approaches are set, 
principally, in broad-based democratic societies. Radical planning 
goes a stage further still. It either proposes the reduction of the role 
of Government in planning to a minimal level, with control resting with 
the people (cf. Schumacher 1975, and Illich 1973), or it encompasses much 
broader political and social conflicts, including class conflict and 
issues of dependency (cf. Freire 1972). 
On review, it was considered that the framework, supposedly capable 
of adaptation to a variety of political and social situations, should not 
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attach itself to any one planning mode. Nevertheless, being concerned 
with realism, especially the relationship between planning and decision 
making, and being focused on the developing world, on balance it would 
most often be concerned with rational-comprehensive and incremental 
planning: indeed, it might he perceived as an attempt to synthesise the 
two. Framework, and especially scenario, construction would depend heavily 
upon rational planning, as the main source of planning technique. But 
in framework application, stressing the interaction between planners and 
their clients and controllers, it would have to adopt the caution of the 
pragmatist and incremental planner, recognising that forces counter to 
rationality would be at work. 
As a generalised tool, it was unlikely to encompass the political drives 
of radical planning. Issues of participation and access, however, were 
likely to pose a particular problem: in a transitional stage, where themes 
of public and individual participation in planning and Government are 
stressed universally in the developing world, where self-reliance is a 
major international platform, but where practical progress towards these 
goals is inhibited by entrenched political forms, finding a balance bet- 
ween the two would inevitably create a major problem. 
Development Of a Framework 
Consequently, it was decided that the two major strands could best 
be expressed in the form of a two-dimensional matrix. The horizontal 
axis would be one of time and activity: the vertical one of partici- 
pation. 
The sequence of the time and activity axis was already determined, 
but that of participation was less obvious. It was decided that develop- 
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ment planning would be best presented as a central core, occupying an 
intermediate position between communication planning and consultation 
and decision making. Additionally, it was assumed that in the majority 
of cases communication planning would be initiated by a communication 
agency or unit of some kind, and that in most cases this unit would 
continue to be the prime moving force. Thus, it would be best placed 
at the top of the axis. The matrix finally evolved was therefore as 
shown in Figure 11. 
In each of the boxes in this matrix a summary of major activities 
had then to be inserted. Although each of these entries would be in 
itself a complex sequence of tasks, ýihich would need further breakdown, 
the grid should still serve as a guide to some major functions required 
of the framework, namely: 
(i) Showing the relationship, and sequence, of various 
blocks of activities which were contingent in the 
planning and implementation process; 
(ii) Showing activities which were to be examined con- 
jointly (i. e. from the viewpoints of communication 
planning, development planning and decision-making); 
(iii) Clarifying the combined relationship of (i) and (ii) 
above, in a systemic planning process. 
In other words, item (i) above would be a reflection of the horizontal 
or lateral axis of the grid; (ii) a reflection of the vertical; and (iii) 
would inter-relate both axes. 
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In practice, this seemed to imply two specific approaches. The 
first was to prepare for planning by structured research into develop- 
ment policy and programmes, existing communication policies (both implicit 
and explicit), and surveys of communication support in a variety of 
sectors. The second was to work through a process of consensus, based 
on the preparation and reconciliation of a series of alternatives: in 
other words by preparing draft strategies and plans (rather than gener- 
alised statements of policy), which could be discussed and modified by all 
those involved. 
Commenting on the Fra. ework 
. 
When these guidelines were related to the matrix of Figure 11, the 
following basic model was produced (Figure 12). Figure 12 was still 
crude: it sought only to summarise the main activities which should be 
undertaken, and the main relationships involved, in the policy-planning 
segment of a traditional systems planning design. The expansion of the 
blocks of Figure 12 into a detailed set of relationships, entering into 
dialogue between the various interested agencies, was something which 
could only be adapted to a particular, local situation, at the level of 
a planning scenario. However, each of the main activities isolated in 
Figure 12 could still be amplified in some detail, before the process of 
adaptation was attempted. 
This amplification is attempted below, in relation to the three 
main blocks of policy formulation, strategic and operational planning. 
Its intention is to specify, in broad terms, the nature of the activities 
included and of the kinds of dialogue which they imply. All the activities 
in the blocks demand a series of interactions between the various 
agencies concerned: these are indicated (in Figure 12 )f 
by bi-directional arrows. In the evolution 
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of the scenario which follows in Chapter VII , this interaction will be 
examined more precisely; here, it is simply assumed that the objective 
which prefaces the discussion of each block can only be achieved through 
extended consultation. 
It must be emphasised that this formulation is hypothetical, based 
more on logic than on precedent. Particularly in the area of communi- 
cation policy, there is little in the way of prior example to fall back. 
on: whatever statements exist (in particular the monographs produced by 
UNESCO in its series on communication policy) are basically descriptions 
of existing institutions, regulatory provisions and philosophical and 
political positions, which do not attempt to reconcile disagreements or 
integrate sectoral variations. Later eleriments, such as operational plannin and 
implementation, pose a lesser problem; they are founded on well-established 
procedures, both in the context of communication and in other fields. In 
each case, an overall objective for the block is stated, followed by a 
descriptive commentary, suggesting ways in which to proceed. 
Pre-Policy Research 
The activities of Figure 12 are preceded by what was earlier des- 
cribed as a 'gestation' period, during which the pressur. 2 to formulate 
communication policies and plans builds up, appropriate planning structures 
are created, and sonic basic data are collected. This gestation period is 
likely to be different in each communication planning environment, and it 
is therefore excluded from the basic model. 
Block one: policy formulation 
Overall objective: To evolve a statement of communication policy in 
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which general goals and targets for the overall communication system are 
specified to the best possible satisfaction of all interested agencies, 
institutions, and bodies. 
The first stage in formulating communication policy is one of 
structured data collection and synthesis: an activity which should 
be completed before the process of consensus seeking is begun. Such 
an exercise is likely to reveal inconsistencies which should be the 
basis of intersectoral discussion. 
It is not assumed, at this early stage, that a position on communi- 
cation policy can be fully agreed w4ich will reflect total agreement 
among sectors. In a field such as communication, where there is no 
tradition of centralised planning, the mbst that can be hoped is the 
elaboration, in fairly specific terms, of the main positions to be agreed, 
so that decisions of principle can be taken, and in particular priorities 
assigned. 
The kinds of data which need collection are reflected in Table 5. 
The data base has been deliberately set wide, as it is information 
that will be required perennially for communication planning, and a good 
deal of attention should be paid to its storage and coding, in such a 
way that access is simple and cross-referencing possible. The next step, 
therefore, is to categorise data in such a way that it relates more 
obviously to the main areas of concern for communication. This relation- 
ship is shown in Figure 13. 
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MARKET AND COMMERCIAL 
STRUCTURES 
EXAMPLES OF DATA REQUIREMENTS 
1. SOCIAL RESEARCH 
2. 
3. INFORMATION STORAGE AND 
DISTRIBUTION 
TABLE 5 
Social structures; media effects; 
community organisation; media con- 
sumption patterns. 
Production and distribution; invest- 
ment patterns; entrepreneurial habits; 
advertising, promotion and sales. 
. 
Library storage and retrieval; computer 
storage and capacity; information han- 
dling capacity; links with international 
networks; copyright. 
4. MEDIA STRUCTURES 
5. 
Organisation, management, ownership, 
financing, marketing, production, 
transmission and distribution patterns 
for radio, television, film, audio-visual 
media, press, publishing, news agencies; 
international flow and exchange patterns. 
EDUCATION PLANS AND Organisation, management and financing 
STRUCTURES 
of education; curriculum objectives and 
priorities; data on enrolment, wastage, 
class size, access, literacy. 
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TABLE 5 (contd. ) 
6. 
7. 
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
PLANS 
POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURES 
Development plans, priorities, goals 
and targets; input/output data; 
employment and manpower data; invest- 
ment patterns and constraints; 
technical assistance forms and inter- 
national relations; economic planning 
constructs and mechanisms. 
Patterns of Government; legislative 
procedures; social policy; geo-political 
data; administrative patterns; decision- 
making structures and processes; attitudes 
to international regulation; censorship 
and control assumptions. 
8. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
PLANS AND STRUCTURES 
9. TELECOMS AND TRANSPORT 
Technological infrastructures; indus- 
trialisation and technological depen- 
dence; electrification; science poli- 
cies and objectives. 
Telecommunications infrastructures; 
telecomiiiunication plans; local and in- 
ternational regulations, norms and 
standards; organisation, management, 
financing capacity and marketing patterns 
of telecoms; transport plans and structures; 
organisation, management, financing, 
capacity and investment patterns of 
transport industries. 
- 265 - 
TABLE 5 (contd. 
10. URBAN AND RURAL Urban and rural development policies; 
DEVELOPMENT 
regional policies; agricultural pat- 
terns and practices; extension work 
and structures; community development 
plans and structures. 
11. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA Population size, growth, attitudes to 
control; birth and death rates; statis- 
tical breakdowns by sex, age, occupation 
and social stratification. 
0 
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The result of this initial ordering of data should be to provide 
the following: 
-a statement of explicit policies now in force (that is 
a description of infrastructures and summary of con- 
stitutional or regulatory provisions). 
-a review of implicit policies (for example, those apparent 
from social research or embedded in societal and develop- 
mental goals). 
-a summary of sectoral policies that impinge upon communi- 
cation (for example, education, rural development, tele- 
communications, and the relevant orientations of the conm- 
mercial sector). 
The analysis should also highlight a number of inconsistencies 
and conflicts. These should also be described in the policy statement, 
with annotations (for example, how they have arisen, how they may be 
resolved, how immutable they appear to be), but without prescriptive 
recommendations. The outcome should be a clear, relatively short, but 
statistically supported statement of current conditions and mores. 
The fact that this analysis has been pitched at a national level 
does not materially affect the character of analysis at other levels, 
only its complexity. At the national level more data are needed; more 
co-ordination is required; more feedback is needed between institutions. 
At other levels (for example, sectoral), many of the information sources 
illustrated will not be relevant if policy is problem-oriented. Yet 
even in this analysis links with national policy formulation have to be 
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forged, even if this national policy has to be inferred because it 
has never been properly articulated. 
All of the above implies continuing dialogue between communication 
and development planners. But it also includes the first phase of 
decision-making: an examination of the preliminary statement of policy 
and its interpretation, including the reduction of inconsistency. Even 
at this stage, there is already room for decisions against particular 
aspects of policy, once these are recognized to be contradictory. What- 
ever policy organ is available, it will inevitably have to include means 
for negotiation and arbitration. Where contradictions occur, their 
eradication will not benefit all parties uniformly. Subsequently; a 
revised statement, not yet an agreed strategy but one at least free of 
ambivalence, may be returned to the planning agency for revision (that is, 
for improved wording and amplification). This new statement requires 
analysis of a somewhat different order than before. The six separate 
categories indicated in the lower column of Figure 13 now require cross- 
referencing, comparison, and where possible testing, to see what kind 
of common picture emerges. 
Figure 14 illustrates this process. What it amounts to is a 
gradual reconciliation of separate political statements, and their equa- 
tion with capacities (the ability of the infrastructure to support the 
goals) and with constraints (social attitudes and regulatory conditions). 
It should end with a clear statement of goals and targets. 
In most cases, there will be in existence a coherent statement 
of overall development objectives, relatively well amplified and quanti- 
fied. Similar sectoral statements (for example, for each ministry 
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or industry) will exist, but these will rarely have been compared and 
negotiated. This process of negotiation is illustrated in block A 
of Figure 14. The bargaining that it involves (since there are bound 
to be contradictions between the various positions) is in the hands 
of decision-makers, but the willingness to bargain rests upon the ability 
of planners and researchers to point out fundamental inconsistencies. 
Block A in the diagram therefore conforms to an agreed position after 
negotiation. 
This is modified by other evidence. Social research, or articu- 
lated social pressures, may show popular resistance to some assump- 
tions; and the degree to which this is, or can be accommodated will 
depend upon the political system of the society concerned and upon its 
degree of maturity. The new synthesis, is in block B. 
Regulatory provisions (legislation, subscription to international or 
regional codes) may produce a new version, block C. While contrad- 
ictions may have existed for some time (for example, in copyright), 
once they are pinpointed they have to be faced and then either accepted 
or rejected. 
The final set of modifications is pragmatic. A particular set of 
goals implies certain sustaining structures, technical and organizational 
(each of which, of course, also implies a financial base). 
If a technical capacity for electrification or for media production 
is inadequate, it either has to be improved or the goals have to be 
correspondingly reduced. The same is true of organizational capacities. 
Thus two further versions, blocks D and E, are produced. Out of this 
process comes a final version, F, that at least has the virtue of con- 
- 271 - 
sistency. It will not be firm, but it should provide a reasonable base 
upon which other levels of planning can build. 
Every stage of this process necessitates regular interaction between 
and among the researchers (who derive the basic data), the planners (who 
organize it and perceive implications), and the decision-makers (who face 
up to these implications). The process is likely to be delicate and often 
long-winded. 
Block two: strategic planning 
Overall objective: To develop a strategic plan for the communication system 
This block of activities focuses first upon the setting of objectives 
as a guide to the articulation of strategy. The main character of objec- 
tives, if they are well framed, is that they assist not only planning but 
also implementation and evaluation. They lay down criteria which imply 
specific outcomes, courses of action, needs, methodologies. 
Objectives are derived from an analysis of needs and goals; they 
point the way toward system design. In many ways, the preparation of 
objectives is a habit of thinking that translates diffuse notions of 
"what ought to be done" into precise statements of "what has to be done". 
This translation is important in order to make clear the implications of 
ambiguous thinking: to point up in advance irrelevant outcomes and to 
hel-p frame alternative approaches that may be properly compared, as the 
basis of strategic planning. But it is also important as a means of 
introducing members of other disciplines into the planning and implemen- 
tation process, especially those from technical fields who find it dif- 
ficult to work without clearer specifications. 
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The preparation of objectives is therefore a critical stage, and 
it is not a one-time process. At each stage of planning and imple- 
mentation, the same precision is necessary; each set of objectives will 
subsequently be translated into sub-objectives. 
Once the basic catalogue of objectives is prepared, however, it 
is suggested that it should be reviewed at once by the decison-makers 
before it is exhaustively quantified. This procedure should avoid 
redundancy and provide a further opportunity for checking planners' 
proposals against other understandings, including the politician's grasp 
of possibility. 
0 
The transition from objectives to strategic planning is partly one 
of quantification (setting precise goals and targets), and partly one of 
organisation (consolidating objectives into coherent groups). It is a 
process which is amply described in the literature of curriculum design 
and educational technology, and is not considered at length here. However, 
it is suggested that, once objectives have been validated, a series of 
alternative strategies should be devised to ease the transition. The best 
way to allow decison-making groups to discover their real positions is to 
provide them with some choice and to let this focus down their thinking 
and judgement. They will not, in all probability, prefer a particular 
alternative but will wish to synthesize permutations of each. 
Block three: Operational Planning 
Overall objective: To develop an overall operational plan, and individual 
plans at the sectoral level. 
Figure 15 depicts both the preparation of strategic plans through the 
examination of alternatives, and the gradation to operational planning. 
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Essentially, this is a process of concretisation: the translation of a 
strategy first into a macro-framework, which designates agencies 
and mechanisms for implementation, and subsequently its expansion into 
operational plans for each sector or agency involved. 
Operational plans are, by definition, precise and their characteris- 
tic components are listed in Table 6. However, this does not mean that 
they are immutable. They may be amenable, in the first place, to exten- 
sive testing by researchers either in the form of simulations (not nec- 
essarily computer models) or through pilot experiments. Simulations can 
cover all aspects of planning, from the conceptual to the strictly material 
(for example, from the projection of a particular curriculum approach to 
the verification of budgets for construction work). Piloting normally 
involves the implementation of a limited component of a plan, in a con- 
trolled situation, which allows it to be extensively evaluated before the 
whole of the plan is put into effect. 
A particular need in operational planning, therefore, is to com- 
bine precision with flexibility, in the knowledge that circumstances may 
well change at the time of implementation, and modifications made to 
planning designs, which must be introduced in such a way that the integrity 
of the system is not overly disturbed. 
A great deal of this flexibility depends upon the adequacy of what- 
ever evaluation system has been designed, so that difficulties and prob- 
lems are identified early, and on the arrangements made for co-ordination 
between operational agencies during the implementation process. 
In the past, evaluation has been traditionally summative: implying 
that it gives up its data too late to be of practical use. The recent 
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TABLE 6 
COMPONENTS OF OPERATIONAL PLANS 
1. OBJECTIVES (Long-range and short-term objectives, categorised 
into main and subsidiary groups, with quantiIN cation, phasing 
and time scales attached). 
2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION (An overall review and summary of the 
project and of its anticipated outcomes). 
3. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION (A rationale for the project and its means 
of policy determination, including quantifiable and statistical 
determinants, and cost comparison, benefit and efficiency analyses). 
4. ORGANISATION (Organisational infrastructures, existing and 
projected, and institutional framework for implementation). 
5. TECII1NICAL COMPONENTS (including designs at macro level): 
6. CONSTRUCTION COMPONENTS (including designs at macro level). 
7. STAFFING AND PERSONNEL COMPONENTS (including selection and training 
needs). 
8. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING (including budgetary cycles, loan 
arrangements, material costs and salary structures). 
9. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND NETWORKS (on both time and systemic frames, 
using programming and networking techniques). 
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TABLE 6 (contd. ) 
10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CO-ORDINATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PROJECTS 
(using networked as well as descriptive formats). 
11. ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVALUATION (formative, process and summative) 
12. STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND SUMMARIES (including (i) basic data upon 
which the plan is based; (ii) statistical and comparative projections 
of outcomes; (iii) illustrative data - e. g. salary scales, sample 
construction costs; (iv) relevant data on regulatory needs (e. g. 
telecommunications); and (v) agencies and institutions involved 
in plan formulation. 
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stress upon formative evaluation suggests that as many checks as possible 
should be run in advance upon system performance. 
A critical task at this stage, therefore, is not only to evaluate 
prototype versions of the communication system plan, but also to devise 
an evaluation framework to run parallel to, and feed into, system imple- 
mentation. Evaluation processes throw up judg-? m-nts that may cause 
decision-makers to alter their consensus in many different ways, seen in 
terms of programmes (from policy down to administration), of institutional 
relationships (at the vertical level), or of co-ordination arrangements 
(at the horizontal level). Some of these changes may take a long time to 
effect: major policy changes, for example, may require substantial redef- 
initions of role and have to await a complete reappraisal of communication 
policy. Other items may be trivial enough to be included without causing 
any system disturbance (for example, a change in co-ordination patterns). 
Nevertheless, it is important both that change should be accommodated in 
system design as early as possible, and that planning frameworks should 
be flexible enough to incorporate shifts of emphasis. 
A diagrammatic illustration is given in Figure 16. Here, evaluation 
is represented somewhat externally from the triad of policy-making, planning 
and implementation, in order to illustrate its impact on policy and planning 
at all levels. 
Figure 17 refers to the issue of coordination. At the policy 
making level, this can usually only be achieved through personal 
involvement; at the stage of implementation, large numbers of agencies 
and institutions are concerned, and the more separate these levels of 
activity become, the more critical is the need for horizontal connections. 
It is only too easy for activities, once disconnected and having some 
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FIGURE N° 16 
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independent life, to move out of phase, dissociated from the whole. So, 
monitoring arrangements and warning signals are important, not just to 
continue the evaluation process, but also to keep track of the system's 
diverging parts and to assess the significance of component failure. 
Figure 17 also makes a distinction between coordination and what is 
termed 'integration'. In the sense of avoiding duplication and redundancy, 
and ensuring the coherence of the overall strategic plan, it is at the 
stage of implementation that coordination needs in the traditional sense 
are greatest. But the idea of integration is more conceptual; it suggests 
that there has to be a unity of perception of the needs and goals of the 
communcation system, which can only come from interdisciplinary thinking 
and working. While the same formal needs exist for regular meetings, 
exchange of correspondence and so on, the level and quality of represen- 
tation of those involved needs to be higher, and the mechanistic aspects 
of the process are much less significant. The issue is explored further 
in Chapter VII, in the Afghanistan field test, and again in Chapters VIII 
and IX which review the model and its implications for the future. 
The Implementation Process 
The final arrow leading out of Figure 12 is directed towards imple- 
mentation, which has been left out of the basic framework as being out- 
side the immediate planning environment. Nevertheless, much of the 
discussion of operational planning has to be in anticipation of the 
implementation process. Successful implementation depends upon adequate 
pre-planning, and the link between the framework and its realisation 
should be close and direct. 
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Expansion of the Basic Framework 
It would have been possible, even at this preliminary stage, to have 
expanded upon the basic model of Figure 12, reflecting the preceding 
commentary and adapting it to network form. 
However, it has been emphasised that these are hypothetical, not pre- 
scriptive comments, and it was thought best to leave the framework as 
it stood, in a relatively simple form, while awaiting a field test to 
expand it into a more direct and detailed scenario. 
0 
Limitations of the Framework 
It is difficult in accounts of this kind, edited retrospectively, to 
avoid reorganising the research process and, with the benefit of hindsight, 
rectifying flaws in conceptualisation and methodology which were only 
gradually perceived. A number of features of the planning framework, as 
originally devised, were inadequate, and were found to be so through the 
experience of Afghanistan. These are fully recorded in Chapter VII, and 
reflected, as far as possible, in the reconsideration of the planning model 
which is attempted in Chapter VIII. 
-At the same time, certain limitations were recognised in advance, 
though it seemed impossible to incorporate them in the planning framework 
with any degree of adequacy, for two reasons. These related, in the main, 
to the dimensions of need and user involvement in the framework: encompas- 
sed by the broad concept of public participation. 
In the first place, the development of the framework coincided with 
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an opportunity, in Afghanistan, to test a systematic planning model. 
Unfortunately, as will be explained later, this opportunity occurred 
with little warning; the time constraints were extreme. Secondly, 
the opportunity in Afghanistan was in relation to a planning request 
which had been, to a considerable extent, structured in advance, with 
a heavy emphasis on media resource planning and little consideration 
of public participation. Thirdly, the political structures of Afghanistan, 
at the time dictatorially governed, were such that, however the planning 
design were framed, there would be little possiblity of introducing more 
than nominal elements of participation. 
Moreover, the whole issue of participation in planning was at that 
time (as it still is) in a process of flux, with a good deal of theoret- 
ical discussion of needs and rights, but. very little of operational 
opportunities. In consequence, much of this argument was put aside for 
subsequent consideration, in the full knowledge that it would, in the 
final analysis, radically affect the refinement, and transferability, of 
the planning framework. 
Nevertheless, it is important, even at this stage, to indicate the 
reservations which were felt about the planning model as it was being 
developed. It was realised that, first of all, the framework was essen- 
tially two dimensional: it correlated activities and roles over a period 
of time, but ignored other dimentions of co-ordination, integration, and 
structure. It did not differentiate readily between and among the many 
levels of analysis and decision-making that must be pursued in a complex 
planning network, especially one pitched at a national level where many 
agencies and institutions are involved, often hierarchically. 
Figure 18 therefore provides a simple three-dimensional analogy, 
. __ 2ý - 
ri 
0 
C) 7) 
O 
7t 
a z d 
C) 
O 
O 
1 
z 
H M 
O ti 
n 
O 
Or 
ým 
-< 
Zm r >O 
O 
Z 
- 284 - 
although as a model it is only illustrative and not intended to be com- 
plete. Its purpose is to make clear that the kind of network envisaged 
in Figure 12 also penetrates downwards and sideways through the institu- 
tional and decision-making structures of a society. We can best approach 
this idea by assuming that the network of Figure 12 is overlaid across 
the top surface of Figure 18 (as marked), but that, like a motif, it 
imprints through other levels. 
Quite clearly, all the activities isolated in Figure 12 have rami- 
fications at many different levels of organization. The setting of 
objectives, for example, is a function of a large number of separate 
agencies, each of which is required to evolve its own planning mechan- 
isms and to construct its programme in accordance with overall goals. 
Such levels of decision-making are illustrated in the vertical axis 
of Figure 18. The pyramidical and hierarchical nature of most national 
structures also calls for a lateral planning framework devoted to the 
co-ordination of various subsystems, and this is expressed in the 
horizontal axis of Figure 18. Both dimensions have to be acknowledged 
and reconciled within the planning process for it to be successful. But 
in fact the constraints go still deeper. 
There is also the impact of evaluation and feedback. If there is 
continuous monitoring and assessment of the planning and implementation 
process, this permits constant modification and sensitivity to changed 
circumstances and demands: consequently, the time-based continum of the 
planning process is false. It does not have a beginning and an end as 
shown in Figures 12 and 18, but is basically cyclic and repetitive. More- 
over, the analogy of imprinting, used to clarify Figure 18, is itself 
incomplete because, while a version of the'planning network will be found 
in each institution or agency at each organizational level, in fact the 
specifics of the network will be different in each case. Figures 12 and 18 
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map an overall process, to which connected agencies will relate in dif- 
ferent ways. Not every agency will be involved to the same extent in 
policy formulation; or rather, different policy demands will be made 
at different levels. One aspect of this situation is somewhat roughly 
illustrated in Figure 19 which emphasizes that the most significant 
items of policy formulation (in rational comprehensive planning at least) 
occur at upper organizational strata; it is not until we come to imple- 
mentation that lower levels are fully engaged. 
This argument may immediately be queried by those who resist hierar- 
chical planning. It will certainly have been noted that the models of 
Figures 18 and 19 assume a pyramidical structure which is now, of course, 
being vigorously challenged in many societies, irrespective of ideology. 
The problem of participant or open planning is to make of the vertical 
structure a genuine two-way or multi-way flow, moving policy formulation 
and planning processes upward as well as downward (indeed, originating 
with an upward movement). To whatever extent open planning is successful, 
the penetration of Figure 12 through Figures 18 and 19 will become propor- 
tionately more complex. 
Finally, therefore, it may be helpful to introduce a categori- 
sation of different dimensions of planning, which will be much more 
fully explored in Chapter IX. 
These are: 
1. Vertical - answering organizational and structural needs, to 
correlate planning activities at various levels from the 
national down; 
0 
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2. Horizontal - developing mechanisms for co-ordination and integra- 
tion, as between different agencies and organizational forms. 
3. Cyclic and Iterative - exploring the feedback principle in 
planning, and reducing linearity; 
4. Open and Participatory - exploring principles of open planning, 
decentralization, and periphery-centre movements. 
Of these dimensions, the main emphasis, at this early stage, has been 
given to the vertical and the horizontal, though the planning framework 
also pays some attention to cyclic and iterative forms of planning, 
particularly in the context of evaluation (and the problem of iteration, 
as will be seen, became critical in the context of the Afghanistan 
survey). 
But open and participatory forms, at this stage have been relatively 
little considered. In accounting for this omission, a number of different 
constraints are important: the overall lack of public representation, 
public literacy in decision-making, social mores. There are however 
two overriding practical constraints. In the first place, planning and 
decision-making can only operate with a relatively restricted cast; the 
number of participants has to be limited, and often only symbolic user 
groups can be involved in a consultation process. Secondly, public parti- 
cipation cannot be expected to extend practically into all stages of 
negotiation: characteristically it occurs at the beginning of a policy- 
setting process, and in discussing relatively advanced drafts of policy 
documents. Each society has its own way of dealing with these constraints 
(community representative bodies, commissions of enquiry, etc), and the 
situation is in most societies in a state of continual flux. Characteristic 
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mechanisms (and the principles underlying their creation) are dealt with 
in Chapter IX, but the constraints which exist in developing countries, 
where not only are infrastructures for public consultation fewer, but the 
prevailing political ideology may itself be inhibiting, were immediately 
apparent, even before the Afghanistan field test. 
The purpose of introducing this discussion at this particular stage 
is not to set up a framework in order to annihilate it, but rather to 
make clear some of the limitations that must be placed upon it. It was 
not always possible to retain at every point perspectives of planning which 
went beyond the time and activity frame of the basic network. Obviously, 
more will have to be said on categor. ies of activity that must be 
differently interpreted at specific organizational levels, and 
on probl. ems*of co-ordination, as well as, methodological constraints. 
More. must certainly be said about participant planning. But the biggest 
constraints of all stem from the complexity of the structures with which 
planning has to deal, and their shifting dynamics as circumstances and 
social options change. These constraints cannot always be programmed 
in advance: they are mentioned here to ensure that they are recognized 
and that the necessary reservations are made in putting the framework to 
use. 
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CHAPTERVII 
SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION: 
THE AFGHANISTAN FIELD TEST 
The first major application of the framework was in Afghanistan in 
1977, when it was adapted to scenario form, as the basis of a project 
executed by UNESCO (in association with ITU), financed under a Funds-in- 
Trust Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The objective of this project was (in the formula of the original 
project document)'to assess the overall needs of the Republic of Afghanistan, 
in the production, distribution and utilization of communication media 
(including radio, film, press, publishing, television and other audio- 
visual resources, etc. ), and taking account of associated services and 
infrastructures (e. g. telecommunications, printing facilities, field and 
extension services, manpower and training requirements)'. As a result of 
this assessment a report was to be' produced, 'recomnmending a phased and 
integrated development programme for communications over a medium-term 
period, and specific proposals were to be made for project financing. In 
particular'attention was to be paid to problems of policy formulation and 
coordination between different sectors with communication interests'. 
The actual time-span to be covered by the survey led to a good deal 
of debate. Immediately before the project, discussions between the team 
leader and the UNESCO Secretariat, followed by conversations in Kabul with 
the Ministry of Information, resulted in a , proposal to extend the planning 
period from five to twelve years (i. e. to attempt to evolve a longer- 
range plan). In practice, lack of data and difficulty in assessing 
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variables of both technological and political change made this proposal 
impossible to sustain, and finally, in producing the report, an eight- 
year period was chosen. 
The report of the survey mission was produced by UNESCO, Paris, in 
March 1978: it reviewed communication development in both the media 
sectors and the user secotors, in relation to the country's overall 
economic development priorities and programmes, under the title of 
"Communication Planning for Afghanistan: an eight-year projection of 
communication development" (UNESCO, Paris 1978). It was divided into 
three volumes, comprising an initial summary and list of projects suitable 
for both internal and external financing; the main document, consisting 
of sectoral and inter-sectoral reports; and a final volume of annexes. 
Individual sections within the report discussed (among the user agencies) 
agriculture, rural development, public health, education, women's programmes 
and arts and culture, and (among the media agencies) graphic production, 
the press and news agencies, publishing, telecommunications and broad- 
casting (radio and television), film, audio-visual facilities and adver- 
tising, as well as common problems of training, management and coordination. 
At the time of writing (early 1980), the report had not been widely 
distributed or acted upon, largely because of political events in Afghanistan. 
However, the discussion within this chapter and the chapter which follows 
is essentially of the planning of the survey, and of difficulties exper- 
ienced in scenario application: it does not reproduce elements of the 
actual plan and is not primarily concerned with content. 
Background to the Project 
The Afghanistan communication system survey had a relatively long run-ul 
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period and was not originally designed as a test of any specific planning 
methodology: this was a later adaptation. Discussions first began in 
Kabul, between UNESCO and the local office of the United Nations Devel- 
opment Programme, as early as October 1974; it was then anticipated that 
the survey would be conducted with UNDP financing, but this proposal was 
abandoned in December 1975, at the time of UNDP's liquidity crisis. At 
that stage, postponement until 1976-1977 was envisaged. In 1976, however, 
the project was submitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, for funding under a Funds-in-Trust arrangement (still for UNESCO 
execution), and in December, the Afghan authorities made a formal request 
for'the proposal to be considered. After some administrative delays, a 
formal agreement was signed on 25 April 1977, and the survey was scheduled 
to begin on 13 June 1977. 
However, as with the Thai survey described in Chapter V, there was 
a hidden, unreported aspect of these negotiations, and personal interests 
and interactions had far more to do with the development of the project 
than is apparent from the prosaic account. The pressure for the survey 
did not come, initially, from the Afghan Government, not even from UNDP 
(although UNDP, once involved, proved an enthusiastic supporter). The 
first approach to Afghanistan was made by a UNESCO functionary, Lloyd 
Sommerlad, who was embarking on a programme of communication policies and 
planning and was anxious to find a field location for experimental work. 
It was Sommerlad, too, who later turned to the German Government for 
financing, through established UNESCO channels, once UNDP's liquidity 
crisis made UN financial involvement impossible. 
At that time, the theory of communication planning was embryonic, 
not to say crude, and it was seen by Sommerlad in rather simplistic terms 
of resource allocation. This caused some difficulties, in that the original 
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proposal put forward to Afghanistan (developed by Sommerlad and his staff) 
dealt with communication system planning exclusively in media terms, and 
included among the planning team only media specialists, apart from a 
team leader and economic adviser. No thought was given to the involve- 
ment of the user sectors, to questions of utilisation or evaluation, 
and very little consideration was given to Afghan participation in the 
planning process: in particular little attempt was made to formulate the 
project in an idiom which reflected the peculiar Afghan situation. 
This created considerable problems at the time of preparing the 
scenario, as the budget for the project had been settled on the basis of 
the earlier proposal, and these negotiations had left both the Afghan 
authorities and UNDP with a very restricted idea of what was involved 
(i. e. they saw it as a purely technical exercise in resource planning 
and distribution). 
A further difficulty arose in relationships with the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). Integrated communication planning 
inevitably includes discussion of telecommunications, as the main dis- 
tribution channel for a number of mass media, but within the UN system 
the mandate for telecommunications rests exclusively with the ITU. On 
hearing of the Afghanistan project, the ITU protested vigorously that 
its mandate was being eroded, and eventually the Union was admitted 
into the project as an associate executing agency. Unfortunately, the 
ITU did not become actively involved in the conceptual development of 
the survey, preferring to sub-contract its interest to an American con- 
sultancy firm, and as a result, the element of telecommunications planning 
in the project was handled almost independently, requiring considerable 
sleight of hand when it came to synthesising the final report. 
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The Scenario 
By a fortunate coincidence the Afghan survey coincided with the 
need to mount a field study of the planning framework and for this 
purpose a special scenario was produced in the UNESCO Secretariat (by 
myself). 
Basically, this scenario laid out an operational design for the 
survey and consisted of a timetabled sequence of 33 activities to be 
completed in the 25 weeks allocated to field planning activities. 
The process of adaptation was begun by considering the basic set 
of principles, especially those grouped under the heading of scenario 
construction. These reflected two principal themes, one concerned with 
the identification and coordination of planning and decision-making 
agencies, the second with phasing. 
Each of these affected the expansion of the basic framework into 
scenario form. The first emphasised that, within the broad main 
categories of communication planning, development planning, and consul- 
tation and decision making, special attention must be paid to the inclusion 
of a sufficient number of agencies, the isolation of agencies in key 
positions, and the orchestration of contacts among them. Even at the 
level of a scenario, this could not :: e attempted too precisely, but it was 
assumed that a framework for coordination could at least be set. 
Primarily this affected the participant axis in the planning framework. 
The dimension of phasing related to the second axis, which was time 
and activity-based. It urged realism in determining the intervals between 
activities, to allow decision making processes and their outcomes adequate, 
time for assimilation. 
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Format 
The solution found in terms of format was to retain the basic matrix 
of Figure 12 but to expand it in the form of a network. This network 
(Figure 20 ) broke the blocks of activities in Figure 12 down further: 
principally, to point up the main relationships between planners and 
agencies, and their sequencing. Subsequently, the main activities were 
also summarised in tabular form, in Table 7. 
Both of these diagrams were still kept as simple as possible, as they 
were intended for generalists and decision-makers as well as planners, 
and must be readily understood. 
Scenario Commentary 
The scenario was originally produced in July 1976, at a time when it 
was anticipated that the Afghan project would begin before the end of the 
year. Because of urgent deadlines, it had to be produced without the 
benefit of advance field studies in Afghanistan and with only restricted 
background documentation; it was, however, quite specific about its 
functions: 
"The purpose of this scenario is two-fold. Firstly, it is 
intended as a guide for the planning team, providing a breakdown 
and phasing for essential activities of the study. Secondly, it 
is conceived as a reference frame, and a norm for evaluation in 
order that the survey may be monitored throughout. Previous 
studies of communication planning have had to depend largely upon 
secondary data, as the progress and conduct of planning surveys 
have rarely been monitored in situ. 
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The scenario is based upon two main principles. It seeks, 
in the first place, to secure a compromise between careful 
pre-planning and scheduling, and flexibility: to profit from 
detailed creativity, leaving the planning team with genuine 
responsibility and decision-making capacity. At the same 
time, it tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and 
decision-making within its planning strategies, taking 
account of pragmatic as well as theoretical constraints. " 
(Hancock, 1976 p. 1) 
The scenario dealt independently with both the construction of a 
planning design and the process of its application. 
Scenario Design 
On system design, it had the following to say: 
"The key to the approach is seen in Figure (20) and Tdu1e (7) 
(to which the scenario is essentially a commentary). 
Figure (20) is a simplified network of the planning process, 
set within a two-dimensional matrix. In this matrix, the 
vertical axis is one of time, covering a pre-planning period 
(basically of data collection and synthesis before the survey), 
and three main phases beyond. Phase One is a policy-making 
period, during which communication policies are set and artic- 
ulated, goals and targets evolved and objectives specified. 
Phase Two covers the strategic planning phase, during which 
alternative strategies are developed, preferred alternatives 
chosen, and an overall framework devised. Phase Three is the 
- 296 - 
FIGURE 20 
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FIGURE 20 cont'd 
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The Scenario: TABLE 7 
Week Activity Description of Activity Team Membership 
(Summary) 
1 5-6 Discuss draft policy statement 
with counterparts 
Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
7 Discuss with Planning and Policy 
Body and Modify 
3 8-9 Expand to include goals and 
Team Leader 
targets 
) Deputy Leader (Economist 
Discuss and modify with Planning 
Body 
S t t l ys ems Ana ys 
4 10 Derive and State Objectives 
5 11 Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
6 12-13 Quantify Objectives 
Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
7 14 Formulate alternative strategic 
8 14 approaches 
9 15 Review alternatives with full 
team 
10 16 Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
11 17-18 Prepare Format for Decision- 
Makers 
Team Leader 
Discuss with Policy Body and 
Select Preference Deputy Leader - Economist 
12 19-20 Evolve macro framework Rural Com. Expert 
Discuss with Planning Body Telecom. Expert 
and Modify Radio-TV Progr. Expert 
13 21 Evolve phased strategic plan Print & News Ag. Expert 
14 22 Discuss with Planning Body and. Film & A-V Expert 
Modify 
Evaluation Expert 
15 23- Research for Operational Plan 
16 25 Evolve evaluation framework Systems Analyst 
Prepare Plan for decision-makers 
1ý' 
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TABLE 7 (cont'd) 
Week Activity Description of Activity 
(Summary) 
17 26 Review strategic plan with 
policy body and modify 
18 
19 
27 
27 
Prepare detailed 
Operational Plan 
20 28 Discuss with Planning Body 
and Modify 
21 29 Synthesise Report 
22 30 Review Report with Planning 
Body and Modify 
23 31 Prepare Report Format for 
Decision Makers 
24 32 Review with Policy Body 
25+ 33 Finalise and Submit Report 
Team Membership 
Team Leader 
Deputy Leader - Economist 
Rural Com. Expert 
Telecom. Expert 
Evaluation Expert 
Team Leader 
Deputy Leader - Economist 
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final period of preparing phased operational plans. The 
horizontal axis represents the environment of planning. 
It comprises firstly the communication planning setting 
(i. e. the planning team and counterparts): secondly, the 
development planning context (e. g. economic and central 
government planning); and thirdly, the policy-making and 
decision-making environment (i. e. government itself). 
Figure 20 therefore, traces the course of the survey 
through its separate planning phases, in relation to 
both planning and decision-making forums. " (Ibid pp 1-2) 
Process 0 
On process, the scenario was far less specific, largely because of 
the paucity of available information on Afghanistan. It began with a 
discussion of constraints. 
"Certain constraints have either been recognised or directly 
introduced into the survey. It has had to be accepted that the 
time available is short, and the numbers of specialists small, 
for a study of this magnitude. 
A more deliberate restriction derives from the nature of 
decision-making and decision-making agencies. It has been 
accepted that the time of senior politicians and members of 
government is'limited, and that the possibility of consul- 
ting activity with policy-making bodies (and involving these 
in decisions, at various critical points of the survey) is 
correspondingly restricted. Consequently, the number of 
such. consultations has been reduced to what is considered 
a practical minimum, less than which cooperative 
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decision-making would have been more nominal 
than real. (On the other hand, far more dialogue has been 
assumed with central and sectoral development planning 
agencies, to whom access is easier. It has also been 
assumed that in communication planning itself, full- 
time counterpart specialists to the external team will 
be available throughout the survey - and this is con- 
sidered a vital factor for the project's success. )" 
(Ibid, p. 2) 
The scenario was nevertheless specific on the character of the plan- 
ning and decision-making which it assumed would be adopted, and the kinds 
of policy-making machinery which might be created. 
"The purpose of the network shown in Figure 20 is to pin- 
point key activities and decision points, as these occur within 
a phased planning process. It is not intended to be exhaustive, 
nor does it (nor can it) contain all the casual interactions bet- 
ween sectors upon which the sensitivity of the survey must depend. 
Similarly, it does not include other components of briefings, 
visits, etc., which will be necessary for external specialists. 
However, even within those activities highlighted in the network 
of Figure 20 several kinds of consultations are envisaged. The 
discussions of the communication planning team, for example, are 
seen as regular, daily dialogues (and group, preferable open-plan, 
working is recommended for the team and its counterparts). Dis- 
cussions with the development planning agencies are of a different 
order. In Figure 20 the term "planning body" is used as a con- 
venient shorthand to include consultants with a number of planning 
agencies (some of which may be specifically created or convened to 
assist with the survey). Firstly 
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it is urged that a representative of the Ministry of Planning 
should be appointed as a permanent link with the team, and if 
possible made available full-time to work as a regular team 
member. At a more formal level meetings with the Ministry of 
Planning will be needed to consider particular sets of proposals 
and to modify these before they attain a wider circulation. It 
is also recommended that, for the most critical planning meetings, 
a Co-ordinating Committee should be formed, including representa- 
tives of the various ministries concerned (e. g. Information and 
Culture, Education, Agriculture, Communication, etc. ), as well 
as the Planning Ministry, to ensure that sectoral opinion is 
adequately voiced. The particular level of debate for each 
activity is indicated in the commentary which follows. 
The term "policy body" is used in a similarly generic fashion, 
to denote a high level of political consultation, appropriate to 
the options being discussed. Only four occasions are proposed in 
this scenario at which such a high level of policy discussion is 
considered essential (as opposed to nine occasions for more formal 
meetings of the "planning body"). It is hoped that, if the 
importance of these policy meetings is adequately stressed from 
the outset, satisfactory arrangements can be made for them to be 
maintained. In all probability, no single existing body will be 
suitable for such discussions, and a special Cabinet-level com- 
mittee may have to be created, ad hoc, to consider the alternatives 
being proposed and decide orientations. Again, it is the level 
of representation which is primarily being urged here. 
In summary, what is being proposed is as follows: 
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(1) Communication Planning: 
A team made up of external specialists and full time 
counterparts, drawn (at a middle professional level) from 
the various Ministries concerned with communication issues. 
(2) Development Planning: 
(i) A permanent officer placed with the communication 
planning team; 
(ii) A small ad hoc committee formed within the Planning 
Ministry, to review particular drafts produced by 
the team, and to relate these to central planning 
issues; 
(iii) A Co-ordinating Committee, formed (at a senior prof- 
essional level) from the various ministries (and 
private agencies, if appropriate), concerned with 
communication issues. This committee, convened by 
the Planning Ministry, but with nominees from each 
participating Ministry, would meet on about nine 
occasions (cf. the scenario and Figure 20 to review 
critical drafts produced by the communication planning 
team, after informal negotiations and discussions were 
complete. 
Policy and Decision-Making 
A high-level body convened to discuss major policy issues 
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arising during, or as a result of, the survey. This committee 
would meet on only four occasions; its composition would be 
subject to advice received from the Afghan Government, through 
the intermediary agency of the Planning Ministry. " 
(Ibid pp. 3-4) 
The remainder of the scenario broke down, in further detail, the 
activities envisaged by Figure 20 and Table 7 in a commentary form 
related to individual tasks or groups of tasks. It is reproduced in 
full in Annex 2. 
Scenario Application 
The application of the scenario took place between June - December 
1977, as part of the Afghanistan Communication System Planning Survey. 
Administrative responsibility for the project lay with the newly formed 
Section of Communication Planning and Studies in UNESCO's Division of 
Development of Communication Systems (in the sector of Culture and 
Communication). Twelve consultants participated in the survey over a 
six-month time-span; they came from the USA (5), the United Kingdom (3), 
Turkey (1), Indian (1), the Philippines (1) and Liberia (1). Additionally, 
as UNESCO project officer I made a total of four individual visits to 
Kabul during the course of the survey. Not all consultants participated 
for the whole length of the study: only the team leader and his deputy 
(an economist)were present throughout. Actual dispositions are shown 
in Table 8 (which also shows the source of local counterparts). 
The scenario was discussed in advance with the team leader (Dr Leslie 
Sargent (USA) and guided the team's work in Afghanistan. In these dis- 
cussions it was emphasised that the scenario was not intended as a rigid 
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TABLE 8 
Recruitment of Foreign Specialists 
and Counterparts (AFGHANISTAN) 
COUNTERPARTS (S) BY 
ARRIVAL DEPARTURE FOREIGN SPECIALIST DEPARTMENT 
(1977, (1977) 
June December Team Leader 
June December Deputy team leader/ 
economist 
June October Systems analyst 
August October Broadcasting Radio Afghanistan - production Educational broadcasting 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rural development (2) 
August October Film and Audio-Visual Afghan Films 
Department of Culture 
-------------------------------------------------------=-------------------------------- 
August November Telecommunications Ministry of Communications 
Radio Afghanistan-transmission 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
October November News Agency and Press Bakhtar News Agency 
Newspaper representatives 
Rural development (2) 
Public health (2) 
August November Rural development Agriculture 
Women's organisations 
Adult education 
------------- ---------------------------- -------------------------------------------- ---- 
Educational broadcasting 
Adult education August November Education and evaluation Radio Afghanistan-audience 
research 
Agriculture 
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design to be followed meticulously, but more as a guideline for project 
planning, to be modified as circumstances dictated. 
Intrinsic to the study at this stage was a comprehensive independent 
evaluation. It was considered imperative, if the framework were to be 
properly field tested and later extended to other planning situations, 
that all departures from the original scenario should be monitored and 
explained, and the effectiveness of the approach thoroughly assessed. In 
practice, two separate kinds of evaluation were incorporated. The first, 
conducted by Kiran Karnik (a systems planner from the Satellite Applica- 
tions Centre, Ahmedabad, India) was of a more formal kind: Mr Karnik's 
function was principally to record, . in network form, departures from the 
planned scenario and the reasons cited for these departures. The second 
evaluation was more intimately concerned with process and team working and 
was conducted by Dr. A. Bates, Institute of Educational Technology, The 
Open University, UK. Dr Bates' report was more concerned with how the 
theoretical framework stood up in the field than with an evaluation of 
the whole process of planning for communications development in Afghanistan, 
even though the two were evidently closely linked. It is worth noting that, 
although Karnik and Bates overlapped in Kabul for a considerable period of 
time, and naturally discussed the project in the course of their normal 
assignments, their final reports were independently completed. Both are 
reproduced in full in Annexes 3 and 4. 
Although the evaluations were conducted separately, however, there 
was inevitably some overlap between the concerns of both researchers. The 
operational activities of the framework could not always be discretely 
separated from the process of application, nor was either evaluator required 
to limit his observations to a single focus'. 
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The System Evaluation (Karnik) 
Karnik began by describing his task in the following terms: 
"One of the implicit aims of the project was, therefore, 
to study the applicability and usefulness of the scenario: 
specifically, to use this project as a field trial of the 
suggested planning framework, as a learning experience 
regarding how best to use such planning techniques, what 
modifications are required and what elements are missing, etc. 
This necessitates a comparison of the plan with what was 
actually done and an analysis of the reasons for deviations. 
It is important to know whether the deviations from the original 
plan were due to conceptual reasons, or factors in the local 
situation, or pragmatic operational constraints. " 
(Karnik, 1978 p. 21) 
Karnik began by describing the sequence by which the planning survey 
was carried out. He did so with reference to three specially constructed 
networks reproduced below (Figures 21-23). 
"Since the draft policy document was not ready when the 
project started, the original plan contained in the scenario 
had obviously to be modified. A new PERT/CPM chart was there- 
fore prepared by the team. As work progressed, changes had 
to be made even in this modified network. A simplified version 
of the network representing the actual planning process is 
shown in Figure 21 and this best summarizes the actual exper- 
ience in the execution of this project. (This simplified 
network does not show the meetings and discussions held with 
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various levels of the government at a number of times during 
the project. ) 
The first few weeks were taken up by the process of trying 
to determine the overall communication policy of the country. 
Since no clearly defined and articulated communication policy 
seemed to exist, this task had to begin with data collection. 
Based on various policy documents of the government and inter- 
views with important officials, a draft paper on communication 
policy was prepared. This raised certain specific policy questions 
and the intention was to get answers to these from a Minister- 
level policy body. In the absence of such a body for this 
project, and delays in meeting individual Ministers, definite 
answers could not be got immediately. In view of the time 
constraints, the team decided to go ahead on other fronts with- 
out awaiting high-level policy guidance. This mode of working 
simultaneously on different tasks had to be followed through- 
out the project. 
Since the tasks of getting the overall communication policy 
and objectives seemed to be rather difficult and time-consuming, 
it was decided to try and determine these on a sectoral basis. 
This decision was also based on information that, by and large, 
different sectors were free to make their own communication 
policies and objectives within the broad general framework of 
overall government policy. Accordingly, efforts were initiated 
to determine the communication policies and objectives of each 
relevant sector. Based on these sectoral inputs, an attempt 
was made to put together an overall picture in terms of communi- 
cation policy. However, it became clear that a sectoral - as 
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opposed to global - approach would have to be used. Accord- 
ingly, goals and target audiences were determined on a sec- 
toral basis. None of these existed: they had to be 'treated'. 
Existing sectoral strategies too had to be determined, and 
goals and targets revised in the light of these. This was an 
iterative process involving policies, objectives, goals and 
targets. Based on these, preliminary future sectoral strategies 
and operational plans were formulated. 
Some areas of overlap and duplication between sectors were 
noticed and this issue (with possible options) was referred to 
the policy level. In the absence of immediate decisions on all 
these issues, the team went ahead by assuming the choice of a 
particular option. 
After choosing from the various possibilities a preferred 
strategy for each sector in consultation with representatives 
of that sector, detailed sectoral operational plans were pre- 
pared along with a preliminary macro-framework. The finaliza- 
tion of an evaluation framework preceded these tasks. Sectoral 
plans were then integrated into a final overall macro-framework. 
In some cases this required some modification of the sectoral 
plans and thus this was basically an iterative exercise. Sim- 
ultaneously, a preliminary overall phased plan was evolved and 
the main recommendations were discussed with the government. 
Based on these, a preliminary report and final overall phased 
plan were prepared. After this, the writing of the final 
report was taken up. " (Ibid, pp. 11-13) 
The remainder of Karnik's evaluation was largely taken up by a com- 
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mentary on the deviations perceived. He divided these into conceptual 
situational and operational components, and summarized his observations 
in tabular form (Table 9 ). Figure 22 also showed , in network form, 
deviations from the original scenario, while Figure 23 compared planned 
and actual major activities. 
The Process Evaluation (Bates) 
As Bates was more concerned with the dynamics of team planning, his 
approach was markedly different from that of Karnik. He summarized the 
methodology of his study as follows: 
0 
"Basically, the method used has been a form of participa- 
tive observation, as controlled and systematic as possible, 
supported by semi-structured interviews of project personnel, 
and the careful collection and filing of records. 
The evaluation was carried out by myself, as one of 
the specialists recruited by UNESCO to work on the planning 
survey team ... As a full member of the team, I had direct and 
easy access, on an informal and friendly basis, both to other 
foreign specialists on the team and in other agencies, and to 
Afghan nationals in the education sector with whom I was 
working. In this way, it was possible to obtain at least 
indirectly reactions of various people concerned to the way 
in which the planning survey was being carried out, and also 
to obtain a good knowledge of the way decision-making was carried 
out in the. Afghan government sector. 
As well as this informal observation, formal semi- 
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TABLE 9 
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SCENARIO AND REALITY 
IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS OF SCENARIO REALITY 
Conceptual 
1. It is possible to draw up a 
long-term (10-15 years) 
communication plan. 
The possiblity has been proven; 
there is, however, the problem 
of getting bogged down in the 
present. 
2. Communication planning is a 
systematic process that can 
be carried out in a "linear- 
sequential" mode. 
3. No mutual interaction exists 
between the main elements 
(policy, objectives, strategy): 
a one-way only relationship is 
assumed. 
4. International experts coming 
in only for brief periods and 
with no prior knowledge of the 
local situation can prepare a 
relevant long-term communica- 
tion plan. 
5. Decision-making is based on 
rational, logical analysis: 
on cost-benefit studies, for 
example. 
Communication planning can be 
done in a systematic, planned 
manner, but the steps are often 
iterative and not sequential. 
There is interaction between 
these, especially when an explicit, 
coherent communication policy 
does not already exist. 
A plan has been prepared and hence 
the feasibility of this is proven. 
Its quality and relevance cannot 
be assessed at this stage. 
Decisions on important and basic 
matters are made on arbitrary or 
political considerations. 
Situational 
6. A coherent communication policy 
exists, and can be culled from 
official documents. 
An explicitly, coherent communi- 
cation policy did not seem to 
exist: the task of trying to cull it directly from documents was an impossible one. 
7. The host country has a high 
level of interest in the 
communication planning 
exercise, and attaches 
importance to it. 
This, unfortunately, did not 
seem to be the case. 
continued ...... 
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TABLE 9 (cont'd) 
8. The host country has a desire 
to participate actively in the 
decision-making and alternative- 
choosing processes involved in 
communication planning. 
9. Full-time counterparts will be 
available, and the whole plan- 
ning process will be carried out 
by a joint national-international 
team. 
10. A high-level policy group can 
be convened to meet a few 
times (3-4 times) during the 
project to provide guidance 
and make decisions. 
Operational 
11. A6 months-long study can 
produce a good, long-term 
communication plan for the 
country. 
12. The media experts are 
required for a shorter 
time and can leave before 
the "user" sector experts. 
13. It is possible and desirable 
to have all "sector experts" 
(i. e. excluding the genera- 
lists) arrive at the same 
time. 
0 
This was not evident - possibly 
because this was not considered 
an especially important project. 
No full-time counterparts were 
available, and much of the basic 
planning was done by the inter- 
national consultants. 
This was found to be impossible. 
The only Minister-level group 
that was convened met days before 
the end of the project. 
While 6 months is a very short 
period for producing such a 
plan and more time is certainly 
desirable, the project has 
shown that it is possible to 
prepare a plan in 6 months. 
In retrospect it would have 
been better for the "user" 
sector experts to come before 
the media experts and finis 
most of their work (in terms 
of finally assessing media 
needs) before the media experts 
arrive - or at least before 
they leave. 
It is not possible, nor desirable 
(see 12 above). 
- 316 - 
structured interviews were held with six of the seven foreign 
specialists on the team whose field-work extended for more 
than two weeks, at the end of their mission, before leaving 
Afghanistan. The team leader was interviewed in England after 
all the field-work had been completed and the final report had 
been drafted. 
The team leader kept a daily diary. Although the diary 
was personal and its confidentiality was maintained, the team 
leader was able to draw on this to verify points of detail and 
to support some of the more general conclusions he made during 
his interview. 
Records of all carmittee meetings, including minutes, notes 
of meetings with Ministers and senior government officials, 
briefing or "action" papers prepared by members of the project 
team, notes of the project team's staff meetings, and other 
papers relevant to the planning survey, were carefully main- 
tained and made available for the evaluation. 
Mid-way through the project, when six members of the 
team had spent at least one month each on the project, a. staff 
meeting was held specifically to discuss the evaluation of 
the planning survey so far. 
Members of the team were told at the beginning of their 
mission that there would be an attempt made to evaluate the 
planning process as it happened, but it was also made clear 
that the evaluation was not concerned with the individual 
performance of members of the team, but with the structuring 
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of the plannning exercise. The foreign specialists 
approved of the idea of such an evaluation, although some 
were rather sceptical about whether it was possible to 
do, or whether it would make much difference to future 
projects. Members of the team had been sent the scenario in 
advance of their mission, but, with the exception of the 
team leader, they were not given the planning framework 
in full, partly because of bulk, and partly because it was 
not thought necessary for the foreign specialists to be 
aware of the theoretical basis of the framework. Indeed, 
it was thought that a more independent evaluation of 
the planning process would be achieved if they were unaware 
of some of the assumptions behind the framework. " 
(Bates, 1978 pp. 8-11) 
Bates then proceeded to describe the process by which decisions on 
policy and strategy were taken, and the difficulties which they encount- 
ered. 
"There were three levels at which it was attempted to 
create structures for deciding on planning strategies and 
policies: Ministerial, Departmental (i. e. presidents), and 
operational. 
The project was formally attached to the Ministry of 
Information (of which Radio Afghanistan was then a department). 
However, there were only two formal meetings arranged between 
the team leader and the Minister. The first was held in 
September, and was attended by five. presidents from the 
Ministry, two UNDP officials, and the team leader and deputy 
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team leader. The main purpose of the visit was to obtain advice 
on government communication policy (a set of questions having been 
sent to the Minister by the team in advance of the meeting). At 
this meeting, the team requested the minister to arrange an inter- 
ministerial meeting of Ministers in November to discuss the team's 
major proposals. 
The second meeting was held in November. This was short, and 
lasted just 20 minutes, before a cabinet meeting. In the end, the 
inter-ministerial meeting never occurred, at least during the period 
of the project. 
0 
One meeting was also held with the Deputy Minister of Planning, 
and several meetings were held with Ministers in the Ministry 
of Education. Apart from these, it was not possible for any 
other meetings to be arranged at a Ministerial level with 
members of the planning team. 
At the President of Departmental level, a President's 
Communication Council was established, to assist with the 
project. Presidents from 14 different departments, plus three 
representatives from three other departments, were members. 
It was hoped that the Council would meet once a month, but 
in fact it met three times during the project. Table 10 
sets out attendance at the meetings. 
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ý4 
TABLE 10 MEETINGS OF PRESIDENTS' COMMUNICATION COUNCIL 
NO. OF MEMBERS 
ATTENDING 
Pres- Others Total idents 
Full Afghan membership 14 3 17 
DATE AGENDA ITEMS - 
August Ist Discussion of sec- 84 12 
tor objectives 
and communication 
policies 
Sept. 26th Likely demand for 65 11 
media from each 
sector 
Oct. 24th Five inter- 369 
sectoral proposals 
from team 
The stated aim of the Presidents' Communication Council 
was to confirm the accuracy and authenticity of the informa- 
tion collected through the Communication Coordination Council, 
and to guide the direction of the study. In practice, though, 
the team came to expect the Presidents' Communication Council 
to resolve or agree to communication policies identified or 
proposed by the team. Unfortunately, however, this did not 
in general occur. 
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At the first meeting, each of the sectors gave useful 
additional information about policies and clarified possible 
points on which the team were not sure. The meeting also 
provided an opportunity for sectoral presidents to find 
out about the policies of their departments or sectors, if 
they did not know these already. It was also used by the 
team to request further information about counterparts and 
strategic planning. 
At the second meeting, the Presidents were asked to 
specify their likely demand for different media. However, 
although a form setting out the 'information required had 
been circulated prior to the meeting, it was received by 
most presidents only a day or two before the meeting. 
Nevertheless, a number of sectors were able to respond in 
general terms. However., it was clear that for most sectors, 
it was going to be difficult to provide this information, 
because a number of broader policy issues, involving several 
sectors, needed to be resolved first. For instance, ed- 
ucational radio broadcasts would depend to a large extent 
on the availability of sets being increased. 
At the third meeting, the Presidents' Communication 
Council was asked to consider five major proposals for- 
mulated by the planning team, that cut across or re- 
quired agreement from a number of sectors. This was a 
particularly important meeting for the planning team, 
since these proposals were seen by the team as essential 
foundations for the development of an integrated communi- 
cations planning strategy for Afghanistan. The five 
proposals were as follows: 
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- the issue and shared use of community radio sets 
- the establishment of a permanent Communication 
Co-ordinating Council 
- the establishment of a communication and audience 
research service 
- the establishment of an inter-agency system of 
training centres for village level workers 
- the establishment of a "wall newspaper" containing 
development information from all agencies 
It was clear from the discussion which took place after 
the brief introduction of each' proposal that in Afghanistan it 
was going to be very difficult to get different Ministries or 
agencies to share facilities, if it': meant loss of autonomy. 
However, the proposals were discussed, and the planning team 
did get an accurate reflection of how the proposals were likely 
to be received, even if the likely reactions were not to the 
liking of the planning team. 
However, the team leader was worried about the outcome 
of the third meeting in particular. It can be seen from Table 10 
that although overall attendance had dropped only slightly 
from the first meeting (from 12 to 9), the level of represen- 
tation had declined considerably, only three presidents 
attending the October meeting (and one of these left after 
half an hour). Given the difficulty being felt at that stage 
of getting contacts at a Ministerial level, it was considered 
all the more disappointing that clear-cut decisions, especially 
regarding co-operation between sectors, could not be reached 
through the Presidents' Communication Council. 
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However, if attendance of presidents at the Council 
meetings was disappointing, generally presidents were 
accessible to individual members of the planning team who 
wished to see them. On several occasions, in fact, 
presidents themselves requested meetings with individual 
members of the team, either to keep themselves personally 
informed, or to seek advice or assistance on particular 
issues. 
Finally, the last structure devised to obtain wide 
involvement of nationals in the project was the establishment 
of a Communication Planning Council. In all, 15 different 
agencies were represented on this Council. Members of this 
Council were used as information sources for development of 
a communication policy and objectives statement. Members 
were operational personnel at the "director" level - persons 
involved in the daily execution of communication activities 
for their respective ministries. The Council met six times 
between June and September (roughly every two to three weeks). 
Table 11 summarizes attendance at meetings, and Table 12 indicates 
the extent of involvement of various departments and individuals. 
It can be seen from Table 11 that although there was a 
slight drop (from 19 attending the first meeting, which was 
slightly unusual, being the first, and therefore attracting 
several presidents as well, to 13 for the last), the numbers 
of individuals attending held up well. The number of depart- 
ments represented decreased from 11 for the first meeting, to 
8 for the last. However, some which were not represented at 
the first meeting were represented at later meetings, and 
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vice-versa, 15 departments in all being represented in at least 
one meeting. 
However, more than just token participation was required. 
As one of the Afghan members pointed out in the second meeting, 
"irregular attendance by a section could cripple the project's 
effectiveness", and it was agreed by the Communication Planning 
Council members that the Chairman (a President from Radio 
Afghanistan) should get in touch with any missing members, and 
that UNESCO team members should also try and ensure that 
sectors were represented. Table 12 indicates the extent to which 
continuity of Afghan membership'of the Communication Planning 
Council was achieved. 
TABLE 11 : MEETINGS OF COMMUNICATION PLANNING COUNCIL 
DATE TOPIC 
June 21 Introduction to project-request for information 
on current communication policy 
July 11 Links between CPC and Presidents explained - 
request for specific sectoral objectives 
July 25 Depts. reported on their general objectives, 
target audiences, main obstacles to commun- 
ication 
August 13 Request for sectional budget data-2 groups discussed overlap between sectors and 
problem of facilities 
August 22 Continuation of earlier discussion, around 
specific questions 
Sept. 19 Four problem areas raised for discussion 
ATTENDANCE 
Individuals Depts. 
19 11 
15 11 
16 11 
15 10 
14 10 
13 8 
(Attendance refers to Afghan nationals only - UNESCO team members 
were also present at each meeting). 
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TABLE 12 CONTINUITY OF ATTENDANCE AT CPC MEETINGS 
NO. OF 
TIMES 
DEPARTMENT/MINISTRY REPRESENTED 
Radio Afghanistan 6 
Bakhtar News Agency' 6 
Educational Broadcasting 6 
Afghan Women's Association 5 
Min. of Communications 5 
Min. of Agriculture 5 
Adult Education 4 
Rural Development 4 
Afghan Film 4 
Dept. of Journalism, Kabul 
University 3 
Min of Health 3 
Central Statistics Office 3 
Min. of Information - 
Publications 3 
Min. of Planning 3 
Arts and Culture 1 
NO. OF INDIVIDUALS ATTENDING 
6543 times 
2 2 
1 1 
1 
1 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
In all, 35 different individuals from Afghan government 
agencies attended CPC meetings. Of these, 15, from 10 differ- 
ent agencies, attended at least half the CPC meetings. Virtually 
all the relevant Ministries and Departments-were represented at 
half the meetings, and ten were represented at two-thirds of 
the meetings. Although the team leader was disappointed that 
attendance was not greater, it does seem that attendance was at 
least as good as could be expected, given the day-to-day pressures 
on the operational people who were members of CPC. Certainly, 
the CPC did ensure that at least someone in each sector was aware 
of what the UNESCO team were proposing and thinking, and had the 
opportunity to put forward their own sector's views and information, 
if they wished. 
It is more difficult to judge the more qualitative aspect 
of the extent to which CPC led to avoidance of overlap, and co- 
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operation between different departments. It was a constant 
frustration for the UNESCO team, or at least the team leader- 
ship, that during both the CPC and the Presidents' Communi- 
cation Council meetings, there was so little apparent willing- 
ness to co-operate between the different sectors ... On the 
other hand, frank and sometimes heated discussions on the 
need for and possibility of co-operation and the use of 
shared facilities did occur, sector objectives, and obstacles 
to the effective use of communications in each sector, were 
discussed, and it would be surprising if those 15 members 
who regularly attended went away without a much better under- 
standing of the communication planning process, the possible 
roles of communication in development, and the likely advan- 
tages and disadvantages of co-operation and shared use of 
facilities. " (Ibid pp. 20-39) 
Both evaluations were completed shortly after the end of the survey 
and submitted to UNESCO, both as a guide to the future development of 
the Afghan project and to assist with methodological studies. Although 
based primarily on records kept during the period of the survey, the 
authors consulted with team members, mainly by correspondence, as a 
further check on factual accuracy. The evaluations were also circu- 
lated to the team by the UNESCO Secretariat, asking for verification 
of points of detail, as well as for reactions to the conclusions reached. 
The replies to this request were taken into account in the subsequent 
analysis. 
Analysis of the Field Test 
The starting point for an analysis of the Afghanistan field test 
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was, therefore, the substance of the two evaluations produced. The main 
conclusions of each evaluation were, first of all, summarised, before 
being compared according to the original parameters of design and 
application. In each category, positive and negative factors and 
reactions were noted. 
Scenario Design 
Positive Factors 
Both authors concluded that the scenario gave the survey a focus and 
sense of direction at a time when its objectives and methodology were still 
unclear (this being the first exercise of its kind). Bates observed: 
"The overall approach of the proposed framework was 
clearly right, within the context of an external, tech- 
nical aid project. The emphasis on precision in policies, 
qualification of objectives, participation in planning, 
validation of proposals by the government, and practical 
operational plans, proved invaluable as goals to which the 
team should strive. It made clear, particularly to the 
team leader, what the team should try and do ... ... The 
framework - or rather the scenario - was very useful to 
the team leader for setting out steps that could be taken to 
force the team to push for the identification of clear 
sectoral objectives, consultation with Ministries, counter- 
part involvement. Although the team was strong enough to 
ignore the scenario when it did not fit the circumstances, 
it did provide clear goals to aim for. It cannot be 
assumed that foreign specialists are clear in what is 
required in the development of a communication planning 
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survey, and such guidance is necessary. " (Op cit pp. 63-5) 
Karnik went further, to stress the utility of the scenario as 
a basis fron which deviation might be patterned, and as a necessary 
instrument for breaking down activities, or differentiating between 
and sequencing tasks. 
"Firstly, it provided a clear plan and direction at the 
inception of the project itself: a critical time when various 
pressures and the effects of "culture shock" can lead to fren- 
zied but chaotic working, in the absence of a definite plan. 
0 
Secondly, it provided a base to deviate from. For the 
essence of successful planning lies 'not in having a fixed, 
immutable plan, but in having a basic plan from which one 
deviates in a conscious and intentional manner as dictated 
by circumstances. In this case, for instance, a new plan and 
network was drawn up within the first few weeks of the project 
itself, but this new plan was based on the original scenario. 
Thirdly, it provided a detailed "work break-down structure" 
in the form of the tasks required to be carried out. Even as 
the original plan underwent various modifications and changes, 
this listing of tasks proved invaluable - both as inputs for 
new plans and as a check-list of work to be performed. 
Finally, except for the policy - objectives stage, the 
planning framework could be applied - by and large - almost as 
designed. " (Op cit pp. 28-29) 
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Negative Factors 
The evaluators were also unanimous about certain deficiencies in 
the framework. In the first place, they found it too linear, and 
therefore inhibiting to a planning process which should have an iter- 
ative character. Bates observed: 
"Indeed, the most serious weakness of the framework is 
the sequencing and nature of the network. Although it was 
accompanied by qualifying statements about it being only 
a guide, and the need for it to be used flexibly, it did 
turn out to be much too linear and too simplified in prac- 
tice in its assumptions about the planning process. It 
i 
is not moreover a logical deduction from the main prin- 
ciples set out in the framework. It certainly does not 
reflect a cyclical approach to planning. One must ques- 
tion seriously the "normal sequence of planning by ob- 
jectives, moving from policy to goal statement, strategic 
and operational planning, prototyping and implementation. " 
This is an ideal, a post-hoc rationalization of a much 
more involved and complex process which, if charted out in 
detail in advance, will almost certainly be impossible 
to follow, if an acceptable project document is to be 
achieved. Of course, it is valuable for a team to have 
a model of what they should be aiming for, but this 
particular network did not reflect the reality of planning". 
- (Op cit p. 57) 
Karnik developed this point in more detail, referring to problems 
of formulating policy. It was a key principle of the scenario that the 
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survey should begin with a communication policy statement already in 
existence: prepared and endorsed in advance by the Afghan authorities. 
Although a certain amount of advance data collection was undertaken 
by the UNESCO Secretariat, no specific policy statement was finally 
compiled, and the team leader and his deputy were faced, upon arrival 
in Kabul, with the need to organize this in situ, thereby either delaying 
other activities in the planned network, or forcing tasks to run con- 
currently. Karnik argued: 
"The figures highlight the step-by-step, linear-sequential 
mode of the original plan, in contrast to the approach of tasks- 
in -parallel adopted in reality, It also shows the considerable 
time which had to be devoted to the task of determining communica- 
tion policies. In terms of both time and effort, this was a 
major deviation from the scenario, which had assumed that a draft 
policy statement would be ready even before the project started, 
so that it would only need to be discussed, modified and formally 
ratified. The project team did draft a policy document in the 
first few weeks, but unfortunately this could not be discussed 
at the policy level for a long time. It was this delay that 
necessitated the strategy of working simultaneously on several 
fronts rather than on a task-by-task basis. 
However, while the initial reason for working simultaneously 
on policy, objectives, goals and targets was merely the result 
of operational exigencies (the time constraint), later it was 
found to be a conceptual necessity. This was because a def- 
inite "communication policy" did not exist when the project 
started: it had to be created. 
- 330 - 
The same was true of objectives and goals. In this process, 
the team found that the relationship between these was not a 
unidirectional, linear-sequential one of the type shown below 
and assumed in the scenario. 
POLICY ) GOALS & TARGETS --- > OBJECTIVES 
Rather, it was a complex interacting relationship, and each 
of the factors could be arrived at only on an iterative basis. 
Thus, the relationship can be symbolised as below: 
POLIO 
GOALS & TARGETS -)E-- OBJECTIVES 
It is debatable as to whether policy should (or even can) 
be influenced by objectives or by goals and targets; however, the 
fact is that in a real-world situation, "policy" is necessarily 
an amalgam of the desirable and possible, of philosophy and 
pragmatism, of achievable targets and populist goals. In such a 
situation, the interplay between the three (as shown above), is 
not only inevitable, but even necessary. In fact, the three can 
be considered as part of a single package and not as easily 
separable, distinct units. This was the approach the team was 
finally forced to adopt. 
In situations where a pre-defined, clearly articulated communi- 
cation policy does exist, the linear, uni-directional flow model 
may be valid. However, one should note that there are few 
countries in the world fulfilling this pre-requisite. In all 
other situations, varying amounts of iterations with other factors 
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will be necessary before "policy" can be "created". 
Both Bates and Karnik emphasized that not only must policy be the 
result of an iterative process, carried out over a sustained period of 
time, but that much of this process must be devoted to the establishment 
of sectoral policies which in turn need to be reconciled within a com- 
prehensive communication policy. Karnik observed: 
"The scenario was based primarily on an "up-to-down" 
planning process. This "planning from above" was implicit 
in the logical flow from communication policies (overall) 
to objectives, goals, targets and alternative strategies. 
Though not explicitly stated, these seem to be at the 
global or total - system (as opposed to sectoral) level. 
In actual practice, the team was forced to follow a con- 
trary course and resort to "bottom-up" planning: policies 
and objectives had to be determined at sectoral levels, 
since no overall communication policy existed. Having 
begun in this mode, it was carried further and even 
strategies were worked out only at the sectoral level. 
It was only after a preferred sectoral strategy had been 
selected, and operational plans prepared for each sector, 
that an overall macro-framework was put together. Thus, 
though the process was not strictly a "bottom-up" one, 
it did involve a sectoral-to-global approach and not vice- 
versa". (Op cit p. 19) 
Bates came to asimilar conclusion, in the context of his dis- 
cussion of process. 
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"The problem was that most departments did not have a 
communications policy. Some had limited communications 
facilities but these had been provided to meet short-term 
requirements for specific projects, and nearly all facilities 
had been bought from funds from overseas aid for such projects. 
What the sectors did have (though even then often only in the 
most general terms) was a sectoral policy, or set of priorities, 
for development tasks and target audiences. The media sectors 
also, of course, had general policies, but these were related 
primarily to their own survival or expansion, and not to 
development goals, except in the vaguest of terms. 
The first task therefore of the team's development specialists 
was to derive a set of sectoral communication policies - in 
other words, to suggest how the use of communications media 
could assist in the achievement of the development priorities 
of the different departments. The media specialists on the 
other hand concentrated on technical and management aspects". 
(Op cit p. 47) 
Indeed, Bates was somewhat sceptical of the concept of communication 
policy at all, certainly as an a priori consideration in designing a 
communication planning strategy. 
"First of all, it was clear that communications policies did not 
exist, either implicitly or explicitly, in Afghanistan when the project 
began. Indeed, the main result of the exercise, and perhaps its most 
important outcome, was that it forced through consideration of communi- 
cations policies in various sectors, and related these to development 
goals. Indeed, in most of the development sectors, people were unaware 
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of the role that communication media could play in achieving 
their development goals. It was unrealistic then to assume 
that communication policies were there already, to be handed 
down and given to the team when it arrived. One of the major 
functions of the team was to assist the various sectors in the 
development of communication policies. 
Indeed, on reflection, it should appear self-evident that 
such a project would not have had such a strong justification 
if Afghanistan did have clear communications policies. Knowing 
what you want to do is always much harder than doing it. This 
of course does not mean that there were no communication 
policies at all. Radio Afghanistan and Bakhtar News Agencies 
had their own policies, but these had not been related to 
specific development goals and objectives, except for increasing 
national cohension and identity. Until communication policies 
are related to specific development goals of the various devel- 
opment departments, there will obviously be difficulties in 
getting such development departments as agriculture, health, 
education, etc., to take a communication planning exercise 
seriously. " (Op cit pp. 54-58) 
This situation prompted both evaluators to come up with specific sug- 
gestions for change in the sequencing and phasing of consultants. 
"Certainly, it would be better to reduce the phase 1 
period, just bringing in the team leader four to six weeks 
in advance to make practical arrangements and find and brief 
appropriate counterparts. The development sector specialist 
should then arrive, followed two to four weeks later by the 
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media sector specialists. As well as aiming to suggest specific 
projects and goals for communications media, the team should aim 
at suggesting structures to improve the planning and utilization 
of communications media for development". (Bates Op cit p. 59) 
"A better use of the consultants would have been possible 
if the user sector consultants had come before the media con- 
sultants, done some work on media requirements - on their own, 
and in consultation with the media experts when they came - and 
then provided these as inputs to the media experts for their 
planning. Some iteration in such cases - between the desirable 
and the possible - is obviously-essential, and this, can be done 
only if the user sector requirements of media support are fed 
into the media experts' planning. " : (Karnik Op cit p. 32) 
In much of this discussion there was an apparent unease with the 
assumed 'rationality' of the planning framework. While a declared objec- 
tive of the framework was to extend the systems approach as far as was 
compatible with pragmatic recognition of the realities of decision- 
making, there was some evidence in both evaluations that this may not 
have been taken far enough. Karnik commented: 
"The scenario implicitly assumed that decision-making 
is a logical, rational process which takes account of costs 
and benefits. However, as almost everywhere in the world, 
important decisions were based not on economic analyses, but 
on political or arbitrary factors ... ... A larger problem 
that arises for a long-term planning project is the degree 
of immutability of policies and objectives. In the rapidly 
changing world environment, with exponential rates of change 
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in technologies, can fixed policies and objectives be laid 
down at all? Especially in developing countries, the rate 
of change is extremely rapid, both in the technological and 
socio-economic spheres. Change can be even more rapid and 
drastic in the field of politics. In such cases, what is 
the temporal validity of a policy or of objectives? " 
(Op cit p. 23) 
Bates had a similar attitude: 
"The network does not allow sufficiently for planning 
being an on-going process. Obviously, in a project limited 
to a specific period of time, specific projects and proposals 
for the use of communications media must be put forward, and 
decisions are required from government officials during the 
lifetime of the project to enable such proposals to be made 
within the overall context of existing government policy. 
However, government is an on-going process, with an ever- 
shifting frame of policy, priorities, and political philosophy. 
The network relied too much on quick, one might say hasty, 
"one-off" decisions from government about a range of policies 
which needed careful consideration and discussion, particularly 
since they were usually put forward in a foreign language. 
The network emphasized too much products, in the way of 
projects, ending with a single "preferred" communication 
strategy, and not enough process, i. e. establishing perman- 
ent structures within government which would facilitate the 
planning process to accommodate changes in policy (although 
it must be said that the team did end up by proposing a num- 
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ber of such structures). " (Op cit pp. 58-59) 
Scenario Application 
Positive Factors 
Bates identified successful outcomes in applying the framework, 
mainly its ability to involve its executors fully, especially team mem- 
bers. He saw a particular advantage in this planning approach for N 
personnel at an operational level. 
"The project did involve pbople at an operational level, 
and a number of people at the president level (i. e. heads of 
government departments). Influence on this level of govern- 
ment, in a country as politically unstable as Afghanistan was 
at the time, is important. While Ministers may come and go, 
the operational people are more permanent, and may themselves 
become heads of departments later". (Op cit p. 64) 
Essentially, therefore, he regarded the survey as an educative 
process. 
"The project proved to be an invaluable educative process 
- it made Afghans at all levels of government think more clearly 
about what they wanted, needed and expected from communications 
in assisting development. 
... Although there was less involvement of Ministers than 
was necessary, the framework is clearly right to push for their 
involvement. Without it, no communication plan would stand 
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a chance of being implemented". (Op Cit p. 64) 
Bates also considered that the management of the planning team in 
the field had been efficiently conceived and carried out. 
"To some extent, of course, this depends on the qualities 
of the team leader, but there were several steps taken which 
greatly enhanced the coherence of the team of foreign special- 
ists, and facilitated the development of proposals which cut 
across sectoral interests. First of all, office accommodation 
was secured at Radio Afghanistan which provided desk space for 
all the consultants in two rooms, close to each other. There- 
fore most specialists were able to meet each other on a daily, 
working basis. Secondly, during Phase 2 and 3, when there 
were usually at least six foreign consultants working on the 
project at any one time, regular weekly staff meetings were 
held, usually with an agenda and an opportunity for each special- 
ist to report to the others on his or her progress, problems 
and discoveries. These meetings were held by most of the 
specialists to be extremely valuable. It enabled frustra- 
tions to be talked through and shared, but most of all it 
allowed for an interchange of experiences of how Afghan culture 
worked, and of the development of a common approach and under- 
standing of communication planning. " (Op cit pp. 39-40) 
Negative Factors 
Inevitably, both Bates and Karnik had more to say about problem areas: 
it was in the application of the generalized planning model that the 
Afghan scene had to be most carefully studied. 
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The most serious deficiencies noted by both evaluators related to 
the status ascribed to the survey, at a senior and political level. 
Bates commented; 
"This is a much more intractable problem than the sequen- 
cing and steps in the network. 
... Several of the 
foreign specialists believed that the 
reason for the difficulty in getting in to see Ministers was 
because the project was not offering tangible resources, in 
the sence of immediate development projects. It had no carrots 
to offer. 
... (But) Whatever the reasons, this particular project 
did not have political support or status; there was no senior 
Minister rooting for it. " (Op cit pp. 60-61) 
This general statement was related more specifically by Karnik to 
questions of the institutional base for the project, and to patterns of 
decision-making. 
"The plan was drawn up on the basis of the Planning 
Ministry being the focal point of the project; it was also 
assumed that the counterpart Coordinator would be from the 
Ministry of Planning. As it turned out, the Ministry of 
Information and Culture - and Radio Afghanistan (RA) in 
particular - was the focal point. To what extent this 
change affected the project is not immediately clear; 
however, it does seem clear that the Planning Ministry 
may have been a more preferable base because of its inter- 
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Ministerial and coordinating role. It may have also added to 
the prestige and importance of the project, since the Planning 
Ministry is responsible for deciding on fund allocations for 
all developmental activities". (Op cit p. 24) 
However, Bates, while agreeing with Karnik's point in general, was 
not all that optimistic about the impact of a change of base. 
"Even if the project had started with the full support of 
the Ministry of Planning, there would have been problems in 
getting high-level involvement. One reason why it was difficult 
to get Ministers together, it was suggested by one member of 
the team, was due to the tense political situation in Afghanistan. 
This feeling was not altogether exaggerated, as six months after 
the project, there was a revolution in which the President and 
at least one other Minister were killed. 
Nevertheless, there are serious practical problems in 
getting high-level involvement. Long-term planning exercises 
do not have the urgency of day-to-day problems that Ministers 
have to tackle, nor do they offer immediate prospects of grand- 
iose schemes which bring political rewards. How much time can 
such a project really expect of Ministers? It was suggested 
that Ministerial involvement is needed only twice: at the 
beginning and at the end, the first time to give the project 
a political push, the last time for endorsement of or clari- 
fication of policy. It would seem though that where there is 
little devolution of responsibility for decision-making, a mid- 
term meeting of Ministers would also be needed. Whatever 
detailed proposals though that are made for Ministerial involve- 
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ment, this should be written into the official project agreement 
between UNESCO and the national government". 
(Op cit pp. 61-63) 
This leads on to the second, major problem which was described by 
Bates concerning the nature of decision-making in Afghanistan, espec- 
ially means of securing consensus on policy. The problem was graphically 
illustrated in the case of two documents: first, the statement of overall 
communication policy which was meant to be fundamental to the survey; 
and second', the draft proposals for action (both sectoral and inter- 
sectoral) which were circulated, in order to prepare a macro planning 
framework. 
Bates first summarised the lengthy procedure which led to the 
elaboration (unsuccessfuly, *. in the event) of an agreed policy document. 
"Arising from the first meeting between the UNESCO team 
and department heads on June 21st, a questionnaire was sent to 
each sector requesting a listing of-sectoral communication policies. 
The response was very poor; even the few questionnaires that 
were returned had little information of use or relevance. 
After several attempts, the team leader managed to get a 
meeting with one of the Presidents from the Ministry of 
Planning on July 13th. Although he was unable to give any 
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specific policy guidance, he did clarify that, basically, 
each Department was free to make its own policies, so 
long as they were within the broad policies enunciated in 
the Constitution, etc. 
Fortunately, two days earlier, at the first "business" 
meeting of the Communication Planning Council, the team had 
already decided that because of the time constraints, each 
department should be asked clearly to state its specific 
sectoral (as distinct from communication objectives)and 
target audiences. Thus, without waiting for finalisation 
of the communication policy statement, the team had decided 
to move on to the "objectives" phase. 
In this way, derived from the information provided by 
each sector and discussions with Afghan officials, on August 
10th the team produced a draft paper on Communication Policies 
and Objectives. However, it indicated a number of areas of 
duplication and overlap, and a number of overall policy 
issues were clearly still to be resolved. Since, at this 
time a high-level policy body had not been established (nor, 
in fact, at any time during the project), on the advice of 
the PCC, it was decided to approach the Minister of Infor- 
mation. To force through decisions more quickly, the team 
prepared a document assuming certain policy decisions, unless 
informed otherwise. A meeting eventually took place with 
the Minister on September 3rd. Two of the policy issues were 
resolved on the spot. The third, concerning the duplication 
of effort at the village level, could only be resolved 
through a meeting of several ministers, which the Minister 
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promised to arrange. This however did not take place during the 
life of the project. However, a Communications Policies and 
Objectives in Afghanistan statement, in a revised form as a 
result of this meeting, was drawn up and included in the annex 
to the team's report. This statement was however never formally 
endorsed by the Afghan government (except by default). Further- 
more, being couched in very general terms, and being finalised 
as late as it was, it proved to be of little use to the sectoral 
specialits who arrived in August. "(Op. Cit. pp. 44-41) 
The next problem was to get the proposals discussed and 
options chosen. The proposals were circulated to Presidents 
of the various departments at the end of September. It was in 
practice difficult to get a detailed discussion of the various 
proposals with individual presidents, although this did vary 
from department to department. Reactions varied from complete 
acceptance without any discussion to total avoidance of any dis- 
cussion or even consideration of the proposals. Language was 
obviously a problem. Some of the proposals were lengthy and 
detailed. Foreign specialists had to rely largely on inter- 
preting or guessing the real reaction to proposals. 
It was however possible, as a result of the stages worked 
through so far, to begin to draw out from the discussions and 
various sectoral proposals a number of general, strategic 
proposals, which cut across sectors. Thus, at the Presidents' 
Council Meeting of October 24th, it was possible to put forward 
for discussion five major inter-departmental proposals. These 
were not mutually exclusive, and could stand or fall on their 
own merits. They would however, in most cases (such as the 
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establishment of regional training centres for village-level 
workers) facilitate many of the individual sectoral prop- 
osals. As already mentioned, reactions of both the CPC and 
the PCC to the sharing of resources and the development of 
co-operative inter-departmental projects were not encouraging. " 
(Op Cit, pp. 48-50) 
Subsequently, Bates provided an analysis of these difficulties. It 
was impossible, through subjective commentaries upon a local bureaucratic 
structure, to determine what was, or was not, unique to Afghanistan and 
what was more generalisable. He made the reasonable assumption, however, 
that conditions experienced by the team could not be attributed solely to 
Afghan conditions, and that they therefore needed to be incorporated more 
adequately into future versions of the planning models. 
"The hierarchical nature of decision-making in the 
government had several consequences. Firstly, decisions 
were always referred upwards. Secondly, below Ministerial 
level, there were likely in any one Ministry to be up to 
15 or 20 presidents, all attempting to get the Minister's 
attention or decisions. Inevitably, then, it took time to 
get even meetings arranged. Thirdly, there was a reluctance 
to make decisions which created precedents or suggested 
initiative. While this may be true of most governments, it 
was exceptionally pronounced in Afghanistan. The team leader 
was moved to write in the report: 
1 ... members of the team improved in their ability 
to understand the seeming reluctance of the indivi- 
duals to provide information or to comment on prop- 
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osed plans. This self-protectiveness in a society 
coping with many difficult problems is understand- 
able. The individual's fear of reprisal appears 
to be stronger motivation than hope that he will 
be rewarded by a system which can afford few 
monetary inducements. A salary scale which pays 
a department president the equivalent of perhaps 
$80 a month does not leave much scope between this 
and a bare subsistence level to offer incentives 
for enterprise. Job security is more important 
than innovation. ' (UNESCO, 1978 Vol II, p. 6) 
0 
Fourthly, sectoral autonomy was particularly strong, making 
arrangements or plans requiring co-operationi or the sharing of 
facilities between departments particularly difficult. Again, 
the team leader commented: 
'The sectoral. 'chief' exacts almost feudal loyalty 
from his people and, in the bureaucratic sense at least, 
he is likely to punish undue consorting with other sectors 
or sharing with them proprietary information or facilities 
... It would appear that the 'committee' structure so 
beloved by Western politicians and educators is not a 
viable. decision-making machine in Afghanistan. In the 
first place, the member of the conference is speaking not 
for himself but as a representative of his agency. He is 
thus reluctant to express any view unless specially so 
commissioned by his superior. For a subordinate to -attempt 
to guess what such a decision may be is not considered a 
wholesome exercise ... And this 
is not the way to make 
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plans anyway (say the social mores): plans are made 
by the leader and carried out by his subordinates; 
strong leaders do not parley - they act. ' (UNESCO, 
1978, Vol II, p. 5) 
This has been spelled out at some length because the 
framework does depend very largely on co-operation between 
sectors, on people having the authority to make - and being 
willing to make - decisions, on the willingness of individ- 
uals to subordinate narrower sectoral interests to a broader, 
common good. It is dangerous to assume that Afghanistan is 
massively an exception amongst 
developing countries. While it 
may be more extreme, some of the tendencies can be found in 
many organisations, both in developed and developing countries". 
(Op Cit pp. 50-52) 
A final set of observations by both evaluators was specific to the 
kind of survey undertaken in Afghanistan, involving groups of foreign con- 
sultants, ostensibly working with local counterparts (i. e. the traditional 
technical assistance project). In practice, none of the Afghan counter- 
parts was made available full-time,. and in some critical cases (e. g. the 
planning ministry) there was finally no counterpart. The evaluators 
concluded that the counterpart formula (which was crucial to the scenario) 
was unsuccessfuly applied, though Bates was most detailed in his analysis. 
"Counterparts are seen as the means by which planning dis- 
cussions, knowledge of planning procedures, and most important 
of all, national involvement in the planning exercise, are per- 
meated through the system at all levels. The counterparts will 
remain after the foreign experts have gone, and therefore 
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should be able both to understand the background to the 
planning issues, and also to carry through the operation- 
alization of the plans for communications development. 
Unfortunately, however, this aspect ... did not work 
out as planned ... 
First of all, the counterparts could not work full- 
time with specialists. They all had their own work to 
do, often in departments with a heavy load of work which 
could, for various reasons, only be done by the counter- 
part ... 
0 
Perhaps more importantly, the counterparts were not 
at the right level ... As the team leader pointed out, the 
ideal level for the counterpart would have been the sec- 
toral president. However, this was clearly impossible. 
Presidents of sectors already had impossible work-loads, and 
a regular day-to-day involvement with foreign specialists 
was clearly out of the question. 
Another unfortunate consequence of this situation was 
that in general, the counterparts did not adequately liaise 
between the team of foreign specialists and their presidents. 
Often, they were unaware themselves of policy within their 
own department, and if they were able to get in to see their 
president, their own operational difficulties and requirements 
were likely to take precedence over reporting on the team's 
work. 
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Partly as a consequence of the hierarchical nature of 
decision-making, and partly because the information did not 
usually exist, counterparts were often unable to carry out 
one of the main functions laid down for them in the framework, 
which was to provide data for the foreign specialists on 
facilities and policies, particularly if the information 
required went outside the narrow sector for which they them- 
selves were responsible. 
Lastly, with few exceptions, most counterparts were not 
fully involved with or committed to the planning exercise. 
Particularly since most counterparts were working at the oper- 
ational level, immediate problems naturally took precedence 
over long-term planning". (Op Cit pp. 24-27) 
Implications for the Planning Model 
The two evaluations were focused on the scenario, but in assessing 
its strengths and weaknesses, they inevitably commented far more broadly 
on the planning process. In discussing the implications of their work for 
revising the planning framework, therefore, initially at least the broad 
categories of design and application will be retained. Subsequently, 
this discussion will be related to the list of principles consolidated 
at the end of Chapter V, and then, in Chapter VIII which follows, used in 
revising the planning models employed, to the extent that they still appear 
to be useful. 
Implications for Planning Design 
A particular problem in assessing these implications was to decide 
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which issues were peculiar to Afghanistan, and which were more general- 
isable to other countexts. In approaching this problem, the networks 
produced by Karnik, showing deviations from the original planning sequence, 
were the most useful starting point. Both networks occupy the same time- 
scale: the main objective of the survey was met, in that a detailed report 
was produced within the time-span allocated. In broad outline, this 
followed the initial sequence of activities proposed, moving from the 
setting of objectives to the evolution of a strategic plan (a macro 
framework), and so to a group of individual projects for submission to 
donors. The means by which it did so, however, were in many ways radi- 
cally different from the strategy proposed in the planning scenario. 
9 
The most significant departure concerned the establishment of communi- 
cation policy. In the original version a policy document was to be agreed 
prior to the team's arrival in Afghanistan; in practice, such a document 
was never really agreed at all. The planning team nucleus, arriving in 
the country to find that no such statement existed, set about preparing 
one, using its own resources, but this draft was never confirmed at a 
senior policy level. Indeed, while the original scenario scheduled four 
ministerial-level policy meetings (already reduced to a minimal level, 
after the experience of Thailand), in the event this also proved to be 
over-optimistic, and only two such occasions were actually provided. (Even 
these were at a level below the Cabinet-type discussion originally foreseen 
- essentially these were short ad hoc meetings with the Minister of 
Information). Thus, for the scenario to be made workable at all, it was 
necessary to abandon the assumption that communication planning must 
reflect a consensus, across Ministries, on communication policy. 
This potentially disastrous position was circumvented in two ways. 
In the first place, the team was forced to assume, after leaving a 
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decent interval for reactions which were not forthcoming, that its prop- 
osals on a number of policy issues were, in principle, acceptable, since 
nothing negative had been heard about them. 
But it also tried not to place too much reliance on such an assump- 
tion, which might well (using the analogy of the 'agreement' reached in 
Thailand to establish a radio network independent of the Public Relations 
Department - an agreement which did not stand up once it was put to the 
test) be revoked if ever publicly affirmed. 
It did so by working, as far as possible, through the establishment 
of sectoral objectives, a process somewhat underplayed in the original 
scenario. At this level, it was possible to work in a more operational 
way, as some indication, at least, of intersectoral reactions to the team's 
proposals was possible through the meetings of the Communication Planning 
Council. 
In practice, what did this mean for the scenario? Firstly, its 
linear, step-by-step precision broke down very rapidly. It was replaced 
by a series of more circular, iterative processes, which mirrored much 
more accurately the reality of decision-making. (In fact, both framework 
and scenario had recognised that, within each block of activities, iterative 
processes were at work. However, it was felt that they were too complex 
and too informal to reproduce in network form, and the fact that there was 
iteration and repetition between major blocks, as well as within them, was 
not fully acknowledged). 
Secondly, the existence of parallel activities, with only tenuous 
connections between them (at a conceptual' rather than operational level), 
was emphasised. Sometimes this was a pragmatic response to a difficult 
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situation, such as the communication policy 
methodological problem, which might well go 
Afghanistan. The establishment of sectoral 
proceed through a logical process of gradual 
worked in parallel, and consensus came very 
far less structured than planned. 
issue, but it also reflected a 
beyond the context of 
policies, for example, did not 
consensus: rather, each sector 
much at the end of this process, 
Third, the process of bargaining and consensus seeking, on which the 
participant axis of the framework was based, did not in practice figure 
substantially in Afghanistan, except to a very limited extent in the work 
of the Communication Planning Council. The only real attempt at inter- 
disciplinarity occurred within the planning team itself, which was, on 
the whole, a tightly-knit group. " 
How much of this was peculiar to Afghanistan? Probably, the country 
was somewhat unusual in its total lack of a platform for intersectoral 
action; at the policy-making level, decisions were taken only by Cabinet, 
and usually only at the Presidential level. It was this which was largely 
responsible for the subsequent coup. Decisions tended to be made either 
pragmatically (emphasising short-term advantages and priorities), or 
dictatorially, and so were quite unsuited to the strategy of the planning 
framework, which was trying to move, if not towards overt participatory 
planning, then at least towards consensus planning. 
Afghanistan was also unusual, to some extent, in the extreme laissez- 
faire attitude adopted by the planning ministry towards sectoral autonomy: 
a tradition of allowing each sector independence, unless this caused a 
flagrant breach with other units (or offended the President). The planning 
ministry was, unlike many developing countries, neither strong nor force- 
ful in imposing coordination; it was mostly concerned with the generation 
of foreign assistance. This could, however, have been perceived earlier, 
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probably even before the study began, as it is a pattern particularly 
associated with the least-developed countries (it is also found, for 
example, in Nepal in the same region). Partly it arises from a shortage 
of trained planning personnel in the development and economic Ministries; 
it also stems from an unusually high dependence upon foreign aid. 
However, the ways in which the team leader bypassed this difficulty 
not only revealed basic flaws in the planning design, but also suggested 
some new concepts. The most important of these was the realisation that 
no single link in a planning chain can be made so critical that, if it 
is not completed, nothing else can follow. In the case of Afghanistan, 
this link was the production of a communication policy statement, and 
without the tactical qualities of the team leader the whole survey could 
have foundered at this stage. 
This was also a problem which might have been foreseen. There are 
few, if any, cases in the world where communication policy documents 
have been prepared and agreed, beyond the level of descriptive state- 
ments which generally ignore dissension and duplication. The emphasis 
placed upon it in the planning model was unfortunate, but a succession of 
UNESCO conferences and publications had emphasised the importance of 
communication policy, and this element was therefore exaggerated in the 
scenario (as an ostensible trial, and eventual vindication, of an official 
position, without really taking account of the realities of Afghanistan). 
To some extent, this was inevitable in a UNESCO-executed project; the 
original negotiations for the survey (conducted by Lloyd Sommerlad) had 
the same emphasis, and there were many internal pressures for the survey 
to be forced into such a model. It should, nevertheless, have been 
resisted earlier and more strongly. 
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The second lesson was the importance attached by the survey to proces- 
ses of iteration, and especially to the introduction of parallel activities, 
with fewer explicit and structured connections between them. This flex- 
ibility was, in fact, written into the planning framework, but it was 
assumed that, at the level of a scenario, the planning design would have 
become sufficiently localised to allow for the sequencing of activities in 
more precise terms. In practice, it appeared that, even at the scenario 
level, the planning instrument would have to be more of a guide to planners, 
less of a linear and programmed device. 
The third lesson was the need to enlarge upon the establishment of 
sectoral objectives, as a prelude to articulating communication policy (and 
in some cases, as an alternative). Although this need was particularly 
forced in Afghanistan, it seems to have implications for most other con- 
texts. It also exists at two levels: at a relatively technical level, 
implying that the process needs more attention and specific treatment in 
scenario design; but also at a theoretical level, suggesting that the 
establishment of policy is not a precursor of strategic planning, but actually 
part of the planning process. It is, in many ways, a practical reflection 
of the participant axis in the planning framework, a means by which the 
needs of consultation, consensus seeking and interdisciplinary working 
are formalised and expressed in operational terms. 
Implications for Planning Application 
The Afghanistan survey was far more successful in organising its own 
planning processes than in coping with local political and decision-making 
traditions. The survey arose almost accidentally, coinciding with a need 
to test the planning framework, and very little prior analysis was carried 
out of social and political organisation in the country. This was recog- 
nised from the outset, but it was unfortunately only possible to collect 
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background data in Paris, so that the volume of local data available 
to the team leader was largely unvalidated. An attempt was made to 
collect more informal material, by contracting a UNESCO associate ex- 
pert (working on an educational radio project) to put together an addi- 
tional dossier, but he did not fully understand the purposes of the 
exercise and his work was not finally very useful. I tried myself to 
arrange for a visit to Kabul before the survey began, to supplement 
this data, but constraints of time made this impossible. Moreover, the 
survey was very much underbudgeted, in such areas as data collection and 
evaluation, because of its original emphasis on media resource planning. 
In many ways, therefore, the survey began at a disadvantage, certainly 
in comparison with the earlier Thai survey. It had fewer resources to 
carry out what was finally a much larger task, and the country was rel- 
atively unknown to the planning team. (I had paid a few earlier visits 
to Kabul myself, but always in connection with a specific project and 
never for more than a few days). Moreover, there was no one on the ground 
with a particular interest in the survey (unl-ike the Thai situation, where 
the deputy team leader had been resident in the country for many years), 
apart from UNDP personnel whose interest was broad and political. 
In Afghanistan, therefore, the team had to learn about decision-making 
structures and patterns in situ, as the survey proceeded. Often, what 
was learned came too late to affect the planning dynamic; it certainly 
came too late to be reflected adequately in scenario design. 
Perhaps most important of all, the team leader had no direct entree 
to senior political circles. He was constantly compromised by this dif- 
ficulty; even at the sectoral level, access to the Minister of Information 
was not easy, and contact was never made with the President. Therefore, 
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although plans had been made for promotional and educational programmes 
for decision makers, these could never be put to the test. The level 
of representation at planning meetings was rarely appropriate (at first, 
there was not even a reliable means of deciding how inappropriate, as 
the sectoral cadres were unknown). Obviously, as the survey proceeded, 
more was learned, but usually too late to be acted upon. And even when 
it was known, the project did not have sufficient support or status for 
the issue of representation to be pressed. 
What was pre-plannable, however, was the organisation of team working, 
and'here the experience of Afghanistan was much more positive. Curiously, 
in spite of the severe practical constraints on working, the level of team 
interaction was better than in Thailand. Some of the same personality 
problems recurred (one consultant left without properly fulfilling his 
role; another was poorly chosen, being a practitioner rather than a planner; 
in some cases consultants arrived too late, or were resident for too short 
a period. ) The needs of the user Ministries were seriously under-estimated 
in the original plan, and the single consultant in the area of rural devel- 
opment was overwhelmed by the massiveness of her task, devoting most of her 
time to disentangling existing organisations and structures. But in gen- 
eral, the group was cohesive, committed to the survey, and very much in 
tune with its conceptual base. Much of this cohesion could be traced to 
the difficulty of living in Kabul, attempting to penetrate a complex, 
unusually alien system, in an atmosphere where, it was evident, political 
support for the survey did not really exist. The position vis a vis 
counterparts was much as in Thailand, but in one or two cases - especially 
the counterpart to the team leader, the engineering head of Radio 
Afghanistan - there was genuine interest and commitment, which was trans- 
lated into active, almost full-time support. 
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The earlier difficulty experienced in Thailand of relationships with 
donor agencies was not repeated. The German Government, which financed the 
study, had long-term interests (at that time) in radio expansion, and 
welcomed the insights which the study might provide; it did not involve 
itself to any great extent with the survey, but was interested throughout 
to hear about progress. Other international agencies were also inter- 
ested in the eventual plan, as a means of establishing lines of project 
finance, and in certain cases (e. g. the World Bank and UNICEF) actually 
delayed country programming until the plan was complete. 
1 The most serious difficulty in terms of external relationships lay 
in the respective roles of the two executing agencies for the survey: 
UNESCO and the ITU. As reported above, the International Telecommunica- 
tion Union insisted upon a technical involvement with the study, to 
protect its mandate in the telecommunications sphere (always a point of 
contention with UNESCO, which, in the ITU view, often crosses the bound- 
ary line between the two). But the Union did not follow up this involve- 
ment in operational terms. The consultant employed by the ITU did not 
work closely with the team (in fact a succession of short-term con- 
sultants arrived, each with a different view of the project and its 
priorities), and there was little contact, apart from financial negotia- 
tions, at the Secretariat level. 
Finally, an even more difficult situation arose, which could have 
had a disastrous impact on the survey. The ITU consultant was especially 
interested in satellite potential, and produced a plan which recommended 
satellite distribution; this cut across an existing ITU regional initia- 
tive based upon terrestrial microwave (a Pan-Asian project, coordinated 
from the ITU regional office in Bangkok). In consequence, the ITU refused 
categorically to allow any sections of the consultant's report to be used 
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in the final plan, and UNESCO was compelled to employ, from its own fin- 
ancial resources, an independent consultant to prepare an alternative 
version. The project therefore illustrated yet again the very real 
need to build into planning strategy the claims and priorities of 
external groups with special interests. 
Comparison with Original Principles 
In the chapter which follows, the lessons learned from Afghanistan 
will be applied directly to the planning model and a number of revisions 
and reformulations proposed. 
0 
Before this is done, however, it should be useful to return to the 
consolidated set of planning principles proposed at the end of Chapter V, 
to see how these were borne out in Afghanistan and in particular to isolate 
any new principles. 
In the context of framework construction, certainly no principle 
was denied: circumstances in Afghanistan made a flexible, untheoretical 
approach particularly important, and the need to establish clear communi- 
cation objectives was considerably reinforced. The first UNESCO design 
over-emphasised media technologies, and it appeared that the revisions 
carried out to this original plan were not sufficient to redress the 
balance. However, the survey illustrated very well the importance of 
moving away from purely media and technical considerations, and taking 
full note of the Afghan social structure. A media analysis alone would 
have done little more than reproduce the technical features of a number 
of existing Western communication systems, and the analysis of existing 
structures carried out by the team revealed, in many instances, projects 
originally financed under bilateral or international agreements which 
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were flawed in this way. Afghan Films, for example, was initially a 
USAID project, with a small output, equipment inappropriate to the 
country (with very little in the way of field equipment , for a country 
with a difficult terrain and a scattered, often migrant population), 
and poor utilisation. The new television system which was under way 
as the survey proceeded, planned and constructed by the Japanese, was 
again a prestige, technical assistance project, focussed on the urban 
elite of Kabul, with a reasonably planned technical infrastructure 
(highly derivative from Japanese models), but with little consideration 
of programming apart from what might be available from foreign sources. 
Not surprisingly, there was very little. consideration of user involve- 
ment, even at the client level. Development planning was not decentral- 
ised to regional levels; 'urban planners rarely went outside Kabul. Even 
the survey was not a reflection of local need, as the result of an 
accommodation between international agencies (notably UNESCO and UNDP, 
with the German interest coming later). 
The planning team did what it could, from its own perspective, to 
base planning on at least a theoretical perception of the needs of de- 
prived, especially rural audiences, but it was unable to consult with 
the ultimate users of the system, or to establish any mechanisms for 
needs assessment. 
The principles associated with scenario construction were all re- 
inforced: indeed, the deficiences of the survey were in many cases the 
result of these not being adequately reflected in scenario design. 
Sometimes they were simply not implementable. For example, this was 
true of the need for an adequate data base, first confirmed in Thailand; 
in Afghanistan, not only was it impossible to secure such a base in time, 
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but the existence of many of the data required, especially quantitative, 
was in any case doubtful. Basic demographic data, even accurate maps, 
could not be assumed to exist, or relied upon when they were produced. 
In such cases, the planning process has to adapt to data scarcity, and 
improvise as best it can. 
The need for pragmatism in scenario application was confirmed in 
other ways. The plan to educate decision makers, built upon the Thai 
experience, collapsed in practice, as reported above, and attempts to 
reflect the interests of external groups, again modelled on the Thai 
example, proved inadequate to deal with the entrenched-political interests 
of the ITU . As in Thailand, a conscious attempt to involve local personnel 
at appropriate levels was compromised by existing patterns of organisation. 
In this situation, the principle of interdisciplinarity in team organ- 
isation proved especially important, as the only means by which an adequate 
report could finally be produced, in the face of numerous constraints. 
Much had been learned, however, from the Thai experience in the matter 
of report production, and this was well applied. Although the report had 
finally to be produced in Paris, the result was much better than in 
Thailand; it was shorter, contained a simpler summary volume, and was 
focused directly on the needs of donor agencies (it was organised, in 
fact, in the form of a series of projects, but without compromising the 
integrity of the communication system proposed). The survey was thoroughly 
and usefully monitored, and the final report also described the planning 
process in detail, for the benefit of those who might have to go over the 
same ground in the future. 
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The Thai survey, although produced in 1975, did not lead to agree- 
ment on a project until 1978-9. The Afghan survey, completed in 1977-8, 
was overtaken by political events and will at best lie dormant for a 
number of years, until a stable Government decides to review its con- 
tents. (The attitude of recent Government has been that any document 
produced under earlier regimes cannot even be considered, let alone 
adapted or implemented). 
In the circumstances, it is obviously important for planning studies 
to describe, in some detail, the processes by which decisions are reached: 
otherwise, changes in personnel and decision making cadres will make the 
sequence of decision-making obscure, 'when plans are finally acted upon. 
Expansion and Extension of Principles 
Much of the above suggested an expansion of the basic principles, 
showing some re-ordering of emphasis. Modification was obviously neces- 
sary in the discussion of objectives (originally Principle 5 in Table 4 
and in the discussion of flexibility, (Principle 1). 
However, three lessons from the survey, relating to scenario con- 
struction, were sufficiently important to incorporate in new principles. 
These concerned the need for parallel planning processes; the avoidance 
of over-dependence on particular activities or blocks of activities in 
scenario construction (e. g. the issue of communication policy), and 
finally a new concept arising from the discussion of pragmatism. 
This last point concerned the need to build redundancy into scenario 
construction; an embodiment, in scenario design, of the concept of realism 
and pragmatism already discussed in the context of scenario application. 
The concept had been interpreted earlier more as an attitude of mind, a 
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need to retain balance and perspective in applying planning models, but 
it seemed, on the basis of Afghanistan, that it might be more directly 
incorporated, into both the planning design itself and into the insti- 
tutional mix which is the result of planning. Caiden and Wildavsky, in 
fact, discuss this point in a consideration of the concept of redundancy, 
and isolate various functions which it may perform: as a reserve (the 
ability to deal with unforeseen contingencies), as an alternative (to 
ensure variety and competition), as security, as a duplicator (to ensure 
ready availability of data), and as a facilitator of change (to hedge 
against uncertainty). 
They conclude: 
"The presence of overlap is normally regarded as a sign 
of inefficiency; the existence of competing mechanisms for 
performing the same tasks may suggest that they could be per- 
formed at low cost. But reliability, the probability that a 
given function will be performed, depends upon a certain amount 
of redundancy. Otherwise, if there is only one existing mech- 
anism, the first breakdown will result in failure to finish 
the job ... " 
"Redundancy in rich societies is found everywhere, though 
it is not usually thought of in these terms. It may be seen in 
over-capacity, in variety and competition which provide alter- 
native ways of getting things done, and in the overlap and flexi- 
bility connected with a high level of supporting sources. " 
(Caiden & Wildavsky, 1974 pp. 49-50) 
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While the argument is focused on the results of planning and on 
implementation, it seems equally applicable to the planning process: 
in the case of Afghanistan, without redundancy and the possibility of 
conducting planning processes in parallel, there would have been no 
plan. 
A revised list of twenty principles, taking account of the above, 
is therefore provided in Table 13, in readiness for the reconsideration 
of the planning framework in Chapter VIII. 
TABLE. 13 
FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
1. Planning design should not be over-theoretical; it should be flexible, 
avoiding the uncritical use of external models. 
2. Planning should focus on the whole communication system under review, 
and not confine itself to particular projects, sectors, media or 
technologies. 
3. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through avail- 
able needs assessment mechanisms. 
4. Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, involv- 
ing as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis on system 
users. 
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TABLE 13(contd) 
5. Planning should proceed from the establishment of clear and precise 
objectives. In this process, the establishment of clearly defined 
sectoral objectives is the first requirement. 
SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
6. In scenario construction, no single activity or group of activities 
should be made critical. It is important to avoid creating a 
situation in which, if one activity is not completed, nothing else 
can follow, so that the overall product - the plan - cannot be 
attained. 0 
7. Scenario design should avoid linearity, making allowances for iterative 
and repetitive planning processes, and planning activities which run 
in parallel. 
B. In scenario construction, elements of redundancy must be included, 
and reflected in the final plan. 
9. Scenario construction should seek to maximise the use of existing 
resources and infrastructures 
10. Scenario construction should pay particular attention to timing and 
phasing. 
11. Adequate arrangements should be made in scenario design for the 
cooperative and coordinated working of all agencies involved. 
12. The special interests and preconditions of all interested agencies 
and donor agencies should be reflected in scenario design. 
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TABLE 13 (contd) 
13. Scenario design should include means of securing an adequate 
data base. 
14. Promotional activities, including the education of decision-makers, 
should be included in scenario design. 
SCENARIO APPLICATION 
15. In planning, people are more important than techniques. 
16. To be successful the planning process must have the interest of, 
as well as access to, influential people in key positions of 
decision making. 
17. In planning, the limits of decision-makers, planners, planning 
processes, and institutions should be realistically recognised. 
This implies the careful analysis of decision making patterns, 
the involvement of a broad spread of local personnel, and their 
continuous representation at appropriate levels in planning processes. 
18. In the organisation of planning teams, an approach which emphasises 
interdisciplinarity is important. For this to be effective, it is 
important for team members to be assigned specific and stated roles 
and responsibilities. 
PLANNING REPORTS 
19. Plans should be organised in such a way that they facilitate imple- 
mentation. This implies the inclusion of detailed proposals for 
financing, project development, training and the eventual achieve- 
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TABLE 13(contd) 
ment of self-support, organised in such a way that both donors 
and recipients are provided with the categories of information 
which they require, presented in the format most suited to their 
needs. 
20. Plans should include mechanisms for evaluation, to allow for 
subsequent revision of the proposals being put forward. As part 
of this design the planning process should itself be evaluated. 
v 
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CHARTER VIII 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, two basic questions are considered. First, and 
more specific, what has been learned in the course of research about 
the planning design upon which the field test was based (including both 
the development of the planning framework, and its adaptation into scenario 
form? ). Second, and more fundamental, what is the utility, and validity, 
of planning designs of this kind in the particular context of communication 
planning for national development in"the third world? Is it possible, for 
the future, to contemplate the gradual extension of the strategy employed, 
or an alternative version? Or are the difficulties encountered too great 
for the methodology to be pursued? 
The chapter begins with an examination of the first question, partly 
because it arises directly out of the evaluations analysed in Chapter VII, 
but also because it is within this assessment that an answer to the second, 
more fundamental query is likely to be found. 
In the course of the Afghanistan evaluation (encapsulated by the 
revised list of planning principles at the end of Chapter VIII), a number 
of basic problems were revealed about the planning framework, especially 
its operational scenario form. In relation to the two axes originally 
devised for the framework (of participants and of activity) two major 
points emerged. For the participant axis, it-was clear that the original 
triad of development planners, communication planners, and decision- 
makers, was inadequate: it needed both further breakdown and expansion 
(this had been sensed as early as Chapter VI, but was rejected at that time, 
as being too premature to be acted upon). 
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Conversely, for the activity axis, it appeared that the original 
categories of policy, strategy and operations should be left at this 
broad and general level, to allow for the accommodation, in each 
category, of a range of cyclic and iterative functions. 
Both points affected the interaction between the two axes, which 
was not only critical to the development of a planning scenario, but also the 
area of greatest difficulty. The scenario, while recognising that many 
of its component activities would be cyclic, was nevertheless expressed 
in predominantly linear and sequential terms. This had two effects on 
the Afghanistan survey. In the first place, it implied that some actions 
which were fundamentally iterative were in fact linear. And secondly, it 
did not allow sufficiently for activities to be conducted in parallel. 
In consequence, it inferred that there was, in the planning process, an 
ordered sequence of activities, so that failure to complete certain 
actions would render the rest of the sequence inoperable (in other words, 
that there was a critical path). 
These three observations clearly had fundamental implications for 
the development of the framework. But they were also linked to other, 
more deep-rooted issues. 
One concerned the idea of communication policy. While the difficül- 
ties experienced in defining communication policy in Afghanistan were 
mostly related to the critical path issue described above, they raised 
a more profound question: was the idea of communication policies 
really only a political device, possibly useful in categorising a societal 
position, but not as an operational instrument? 
Other problems stemmed from the concepts of access and participation, 
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in particular the tensions between planning and control, and freedom of 
expression. A cardinal assumption of the framework was that it should be 
capable of adaptation to a variety of social and political structures; 
in practice, as a tool, was it only fully appropriate to a centrally 
planned system, with little admission of public participation? 
Even in the first steps towards model construction (in Chapter VI) 
some of the constraints on the framework had been noted: that it was a 
two-dimensional model, which had to be imprinted into other dimensions of 
society, if decentralisation was to occur. It was also noted, in the 
review of project case studies, that the concepts of reflection of need 
and devolution were the most inadequately illustrated. The problem here 
was, therefore, whether any version of a framework and scenario could 
cope with the addition of decentralised planning, or with an increased 
participation base. These latter issues are extremely complex, and it 
was thought best to begin in this chapter with the more technical issues 
relating to model building and application, pointing up deficiencies and 
constraints in the framework, and seeing to what extent it might be 
reworked (and hence to what extent it would continue to be useful). The 
other, more conceptual issues relate, in most cases, to versions of social 
development which go well beyond the status quo, and hence beyond oper- 
ational models which deal, by definition, with existing patterns of 
social organisation. These certainly need to be discussed, but outside 
the context of model building. they are therefore mainly left to Chapter 
IX which follows. 
Communication Policies 
However, one issue which should be discussed at this stage, before 
the framework is reconsidered, is that of communication policy. Problems 
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arising from the concept of communication policies have been raised on a 
number of occasions in this thesis, and it is important, for the sake of 
the argument which follows, to make a distinction between policy and 
communication policies. The first is an essential element in the planning 
process: the formulation of objectives needs to be preceded by some artic- 
ulation of policy, providing broad directions and orientations, otherwise 
there is a very real risk that objectives, while internally consistent and 
precise, may not reflect political and social will. 
Communication policy, however, is different in character; at best 
it is more of a theory, or model, of communication structure than a plan- 
ning instrument. While deriving from the orthodox systems understanding 
of policy (i. e. that coherence of perspective and unity of view are 
important in proceeding towards specific action and quantification), it 
has been transmuted into a political formula. Attached to the concept by 
this time are definitions of the nature and function of communication 
which are prescriptive, part of the mythology of international organisa- 
tions. (notably UNESCO) in their treatement of communication issues, and 
also part of a set of polemic arguments conducted at the international 
level, in particular between the United States and the third world bloc 
(especially the group of Non Aligned Countries). While these understandings 
go well beyond any mechanistic version of policy-planning processes, 
doubts cast upon the idea of a mandatory stage of formulating 'communication 
policies' do not mean (nor can they within the systems argument) the 
automatic rejection of the idea of policy per se, as a part of planning 
strategy. 
This being said, quite apart from its significance as a potential 
stumbling block within the networking process, the issue of communication 
policy needs some additional consideration. Much of what has been written 
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about it is prescriptive rather than operational; while it has been defined 
in such a way that it may be made applicable to both socialist and pluralist 
societies (by stressing the fact that it covers implicit as well as expli- 
cit policies and norms, and is supposedly only descriptive of communi- 
cation institutions and processes, even when these are laissez faire in 
character), in practice the formula is most easily applicable to socialist 
countries, or to mixed economies where (as in much of the developing world), 
there is a strong tradition of centralist development planning. 
In the case of Hungary, for example, a UNESCO monograph found little 
difficulty in equating overall political norms and structures with communi- 
cation processes. 0 
"Mass communication is taking a more and more central 
place in the life of Hungarian society, because of the on- 
going process of democratization, the increasing political 
activity of citizens, the differentiation of their cultural 
demands, the rising standard of living and the extension of 
leisure time as well as the integration of certain elements 
of the scientific-technical revolution into everyday life. 
The rapid development of mass communication has resul- 
ted in a transformation of the structure of the Hungarian 
communication system, the electronic media gaining ground 
to the detriment of the classic types of media, mass communi- 
cation in general gaining ground at the expense of a more 
traditional type of transfer of information and culture. 
None the less the communication system has remained an 
integrated whole, incorporating new and traditional channels 
alike, and both communication policies and communication 
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plans relate to the whole of this complex. system. 
Communication policies reflecting the value and norm 
system of socialist society are formulated at various insti- 
tutional levels, regulating communication processes'by prov- 
isions of law, the adoption and application of certain prin- 
ciples and by economic and administrative measures. These 
policies constitute a more and more coherent system of reg- 
ulations and they rely, to a growing extent, on complex social 
planning. 
In the process of elaborating and implementing communi- 
cation policies socialist society uses experimental methods 
to meet challenges without historical precedents in the domain 
of information and culture. Development of the communication 
system is an integral part of the cultural revolution which is 
in turn part of the political-social revolution. To quote 
Marx: 'The revolution of the people is total: every sphere makes 
its revolution in its own way; why should the press as such 
not do the same? " (Szecsko and Fodor, 1974) 
But in other cases, the tension between planning (identified with 
control) and pluralism (identified with freedom of expression) is more 
difficult to resolve, and communication policy statements only highlight 
this tension. Thus, in the case of Ireland: 
"The prospect of more elaborate 'communication planning' in 
the public sector is greatly dependent on the level of social and 
political understanding such a policy would be likely to command. 
While planning now commands a wide degree of acceptance in Irish 
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society, public approval of its extension to the sensitive 
area of mass communication policy might pose major problems. 
Nevertheless, the Devlin report expressed the view that 
... the role of government 
in a modern society becomes more 
and more concerned with the economic, social and cultural 
development of the people' ... This view was the 
basis of the 
recommendation that a Department of National Culture be 
established with responsibility for the Irish language and 
its associated culture, the national heritage, recreation, 
and the arts and cultural media', including RTE. 
0 
An acceptance of this proposal would radically alter the 
entire context of public policy formation in respect of mass 
communication media, which must now be accepted as a primary 
influence on the cultural evolution of modern societies; and, 
in the case of the publicly owned broadcasting services 
particularly, the environment within which the media institu- 
tions define their own policy. " (Stapleton, 1974). 
In democratic socialist countries such as Sweden, the argument is 
taken further, because the State has felt obliged to try to reconcile 
the two positions, and in doing so has encountered serious economic 
obstacles. 
"It is a cardinal precept of democratic idealogy to have 
the mass media, in interaction with their public, provide 
many-sided information and mould opinion independently of the 
goverment. 
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At the same time it is obvious that the opportunities of 
so doing are becoming more and more restricted. ' 
The financial concentration of newspapers constitutes a 
patent threat to diversity of opinion. In addition, the re- 
maining monopoly papers are known from experience and avail- 
able research findings to adapt to their monopoly by glossing 
over the editorial profile, by turning into 'community papers', 
to borrow an American term. 
The growing parliamentary pressure put on the broadcasting 
media has had a similar effect » The Swedish experiment of 
`stimulating rivalry' between two television channels has 
not provided any solution. 
The only counteracting factor is the growing interest in 
specialized publications. However, these can do no more than 
exert an indirect influence on mass communication itself (with 
the mass media editorial staffs acting as middlemen). Further- 
more these publications reach only the already enlightened or 
convinced. 
So far the solution tried has involved various attempts to 
keep newspaper competition alive, but if the Swedish experience 
is any guide, such efforts cannot amount to anything more than 
a rearguard action. The sums required to maintain the status quo 
are already considerable; given the dynamism inherent in com- 
petition, the amounts must be constantly increased, and soon the 
limit will have been reached to what the national economy can 
bear. " (Furhoff, Jonsson and Wilsson, 1974) 
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In the end, the attempt to define communication policy in a pluralist 
society can become extremely diffuse and theoretical, leading to bland 
statements of apparently irreconcilable objectives. This statement from 
two German writers (in a UNESCO monograph describing communication policies 
in the Federal Republic of Germany) might well be accused of 'double-think'. 
"The more complex society becomes, and the less a communi- 
cations system functions in a self-evident and self-regulating 
manner, the more essential an intentional and systematic communi- 
cation policy becomes in the sense of ordering structural policy. 
However, such structural policy may not restrict social communi- 
cations freedom in any way. It, should, instead, make the condi- 
tions available for its best possible development. Different 
social groups, organizations and institutions, not primarily the 
State, can be representative agents of communication policy. 
But, even a democratic State will increasingly see the neces- 
sity of aiding the claim of each individual to an equal chance 
at participating in the process of social communication. " 
(Mahle and Richter, 1974) 
In essence, the more pluralist the society, the more difficulty it 
will have in reconciling the two poles of communication policy: the idea 
of coherence and conservation, on the'one hand, and of free expression and 
variety, on the other. Thus, while the concept of communication policy 
may be considered an operational concept in a communist society, because 
its rational base is synonymous with societal attitudes towards planning, 
in a pluralist society it becomes more of a descriptor, even a figure 
of speech, because the planning needs of such societies are at a different 
level, more pragmatic and more discrete. Consequently, if the search - 
as in this thesis - is for a model of planning which has some pretensions 
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to generality, the concept of communication policies cannot be made 
integral to that model, and a more restricted definition of policy 
has to be adopted. 
The argument has been conducted at some length, because it was felt 
to be critical in the definition of planning strategies. How acceptable, 
or applicable empirically, the UNESCO-inspired concept of communication 
policies will become in the future is a matter for speculation, but in 
this chapter, the articulation of policy is a technical understanding, 
denoting a preliminary stage in setting objectives. 
With this definition in view, then, it is possible to turn directly 
to the planning framework. 
The Planning Matrix 
Reconsideration of the planning design began at the same point as 
Chapter VI, in order to redefine, and modify, each component of the 
design process in turn. There, the original starting point was a two- 
dimensional matrix, which took as its axes planning participants, and a 
time-activity sequence. 
The Participant Axis 
Initially, it had been decided to restrict this matrix to three kinds 
of participant communication planners, development planners, and decision- 
makers. In view of the time constraints and tentative nature of the 
Afghanistan field test, this limitation was probably justified, but in 
the light of the Afghanistan evaluation, it was evident that the original 
tried should be expanded. On the one hand, an expansion of communication 
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planners was necessary, to take account of the importance of sectoral 
debate and negotiation revealed in Afghanistan. On the other hand, 
a more refined account of decision making cadres was required (partic- 
ularly some consideration of the dimension of the client and user, which 
was originally reflected only in the term 'consultation'. ) 
In Figure 24, a revised matrix is proposed, in which the partici- 
pant axis is enlarged to include, first of all, policy makers, develop- 
ment planners and communication planners at the sectoral level. 
At the same time, the dimension. of the user is expanded to differen- 
tiate between sectoral and general users. Essentially this refers to 
the discussion of 'clients' and 'publics' found in Chapter IV, when 
project case studies were analysed and planning principles examined; 
the sectoral user is primarily the 'client' of this earlier analysis, 
while the term'general user'synthesises a variety of publics. Thus, 
the client user is one directly involved in a communication project or 
system, because of his association as sponsor or institutional partner. 
The general user, on the other hand, is involved, not through a specil- 
ised interest or through sponsorship, but through his membership of 
the communication audience. 
The interaction of these participants is, naturally, likely to be 
different at each stage of the planning sequence. For this reason, it 
cannot be generalised; not only do some activities involve different 
permutations of participants, but their interrelationship is also dif- 
ferent in each context. 
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Time Activity Axis 
In Figure 24, however, the time activity axis of the matrix is left 
broad, principally because of the emphasis, in the Afghanistan evaluations, 
on the parallel and iterative nature of planning processes. At this stage, 
the broader the categorisation, the more capable it is likely to be of 
accommodating parallel and cyclic processes. 
0 
At a later stage, a further breakdown is clearly necessary, but 
if carried out within these three retaining divisions, it is less 
likely to force linearity where it-is inappropriate. 
A Revised Framework 
The next stage of the review was to attempt to expand the matrix 
of Figure 24 into a revised framework, much as the original matrix 
of Figure 11 was adapted (in Chapter VI) into Figure 12. 
However, the original framework of Figure 12 was no more than a 
set of summary descriptions of general activities, set in the three 
blocks of policy, strategy and operations, and interrrelated at a 
crude level. It was followed by a prose commentary which advanced, 
hypothetically, a number of directions and assumptions for the scenario. 
The revised framework, if a useful model was to be possible at all, 
should presumably go somewhat further. Since Figure 12 was first con- 
structed, much had been learned through the Afghanistan 
experience; some assumptions were at less hypothetical a level, and 
some of the interactions were better known,. (as evidenced by the expansion f 
of the participant axis of Figure 24). 
- 378 - 
At the same time, more was known about the utility, and limitations, 
of the format chosen, mainly as a result of the Afghanistan Scenario 
(Figure 20). It had been established, for example, that this format, 
with its breakdown into highly specific activity blocks, imposed too 
much linearity upon the process, particularly when activities were 
numbered sequentially. In the scenario, parallel processes were dif- 
ficult to accommodate. The format did not allow for interrelationships 
or levels of planning to be expressed. 
However, even at the time of formulating Figure 12 many of these 
limitations had been recognised, and it was then found necessary to 
use the diagrammatic model asa starting point, which would emphasise 
systemic unity, while using a prose commentary, supplemented at times 
by individual diagrams describing individual, internal processes, to 
explain the nuances of particular elements of strategy, or to expand 
upon questions of relationship. 
To some extent, therefore, the same double-headed approach could be 
used to support a revised framework:. The problem was: how far could 
this be pushed, to take account of the additional experience gained in 
Afghanistan, while skirting round those limitations already discussed 
of linearity, parallel planning and the avoidance of critical paths? 
Not surprisingly this problem - and the actual revision of the 
framework - caused considerable difficulty. But it was thought impor- 
tant enough to be pursued, for several reasons. 
The basic justification was that, in presenting and analysing the 
results of the research, questions of detail, specific instances and 
accounts of processes were probably as important as a validation, or 
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rejection, of any set of assumptions or hypotheses. It was important 
to determine whether planning approaches of the kind being applied were 
useful in the developing world, but equally important to know in what 
way, with what constraints; since the research was action-based and 
problem-oriented, its utility would lie in the pointers which it gave 
towards future problem-solving. Therefore, it seemed adviseable to 
press the framework as far as possible, regardless of the difficulties 
involved, because the very act of doing so would be informative about 
these constraints. 
Moreover, the framework could not reasonably be detached from the 
overall design process adopted in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan evalua- 
tors confirmed the usefulness of the scenario in planning, but the scenario 
was evolved as a result of work carried out on the framework; if other 
scenarios were to be . prepared,. 
they would need to be based on equally 
solid foundations. It was not simply a framework which was being con- 
sidered, or a scenario, but a planning strategy based on a comprehensive 
design process. 
In the end, therefore, a second-stage model of the framework was 
produced, still in a tentative and experimental form, and this is re- 
produced in Figure 25. 
Major Blocks 
Figure 25 retains the three main blocks of Figure 12, 
distinguishing between the critical processes of policy formulation, 
strategic and operational planning. In general, these can be consider- 
ed linear and sequential, in the sense that, within the formula of 
rational, systems planning, each of these stages represents a crystal- 
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lisation of thought, allowing the next stage to proceed more efficiently. 
At the same time, none of these processes is self-contained; they are 
conducted in parallel, and in so doing spill across into each other. 
More important still, none is a one-time process; they continue in a 
cyclic form, and each is therefore subject to repeated redefinition and 
reformulation. The linearity in such cases is, in fact, more conceptual 
than temporal; the argument is illustrated in Figure 26. 
Figure 26 characterises the process by incorporating the function 
of evaluation. The diagonal line in the figure shows the traditional 
systems sequence, from policy through to strategy and hence to operational 
planning (leading on to implementation). But each of these stages is 
also depicted (by lines which continue vertically downward) as continuous; 
at critical points each process is temporarily suspended, in order to be 
embodied in a policy statement, a strategic formulation, or an operational 
plan, but the processes continue beyond, subject to continual refinement. 
The means of monitoring this ongoing process, and of acting upon 
its conclusions in the form of revisions to the original statement, for- 
mulation or plan, are provided by evaluation. At each critical stage, 
some form of evaluation (of process or of product, formative or summative) 
is conducted, feeding its results back, after processing and summation, 
to various levels of the system. (The final set of arrows leading out 
of the base of the diagram indicates that this is also a continuing 
process, repeated over time. ) 
This does not imply, of course, that evaluation is the only influence 
which will affect the policy making and planning processes. Policy is 
likely to be modified by changes in social perceptions and trends; strategic 
planning by new methodologies (like forecasting techniques) or new tech- 
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FIGURE 6. LINEAR AND ITERATIVE PROCESSES 
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nologies (which change the potential mix for the communication system); 
operational planning and implementation by new processes and tech- 
niques (which allow plans to be prepared and realised more quickly and 
more efficiently). But it is evaluation which formalises and disci- 
plines the process of review; if policy making is continuous, its con- 
clusions have still to be summarised from time to time, or they will 
never impact upon the system with which they are concerned. 
Component Activities 
These three major blocks are, however, further subdivided in Figure 
25 into a series of nine activity limes, for each of which a prose com- 
mentary is provided. The criterion for isolating these activities was 
one of significance and relevance in the process of scenario construc- 
tion. 
The activities are not sequential, nor is there any presumption that 
they are contingent (i. e. the commencement of each line does not neces- 
sarily assume the completion of its predecessor, nor is it assumed that 
failure to complete one line invalidates the remainder of the sequence). 
Each line is also related to the second, participant axis of Figure 
25, to indicate the main groupings of participants at each stage. However, 
the interrelationship and interaction of participants is not illustrated 
(it cannot be in a simple two-dimensional format, whose main function is 
to demonstrate the coherence of the overall design), and this interrela- 
tionship will be pursued in the commentary which follows. 
In Figure 25, therefore, the number assigned to each group of com- 
ponent activities is for reference purposes, not to indicate sequence. 
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In each line, in fact, several activities may be taking place simul- 
taneously (e. g. the preparation of sectoral and overall objectives), 
and each may continue for different periods of time (the blocks are 
formal, not time-specific). Moreover, activities involving some groups 
of participants, for example at the sectoral level, may be continued 
out of phase with the central level, if there are delays in the parallel 
process. The main directional line through the diagram is shown as 
emanating from the central communication planning agency, as this has 
been defined as - the main coordinating, motivating and initiating 
force, but a dotted line connecting sectoral planning activities proceeds 
independently along its own path. 
0 
Commentary on Figure 25 
The commentary below refers directly to each activity line, but as a 
general guide, Line 1 relates to the establishment of a data base and to 
needs assessment; Line 2 comprises policy formulation, both sectoral 
and central; and line 3 the setting of objectives. In Line 4, a synthesis 
is proposed of sectoral and overall objectives, before planning moves on 
to the framing, and reconsideration, of alternative strategies in Line 5. 
A further synthesis is proposed in Line 6, culminating in Line 7, in the 
broad statement of strategy which has been termed a macro-framework. 
Finally, Line 8 defines the overall or macro plan, and subsequently 
Line 9 leads on to operational planning (and so to implementation, which 
is outside the matrix. ) No attempt is made to isolate such functions as 
evaluation, which have already been characterised as continuous, and 
applicable in some form or other within each block. 
It should be emphasised that both this framework and the commentary 
which follows are still experimental and tentative. They are less hypo- 
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thetical than their predecessors in Chapter VI, since they represent 
an attempt to overcome deficiencies revealed by field testing, but even 
so, much of their substance is still at the level of empirically based 
recommendations. This is inevitable in research of this kind, which 
seeks, over time, to improve operational tools through repeated field- 
testing and evaluation. The framework is, therefore, supportive and 
not prescriptive. 
BLOCK ONE - POLICY FORMULATION 
Line 1- Data Base 
The formulation of policy should begin, as confirmed in both Thailand 
and Afghanistan, with the establishment of an adequate a data base as 
possible. In figure 25, the communication planning agent is shown as 
the initiator and prime mover of this process, but drawing upon all other 
participants in the system to broaden its resource base. (Throughout 
Figure 25, in fact, the communication planning agent is shown as the 
central thread, creating and sustaining the momentum of planning. This 
agent may be a single individual or a group, based in the economic devel- 
opment planning unit or in an information agency; it may be a consul- 
tant team, a research institute, an intersectoral task force or committee. 
But in any planning exercise, some agency has to take prime responsibility 
for setting planning in motion, and pressing for it to meet its deadlines). 
The difficulty of obtaining adequate data sources was also well illu- 
strated by both the Thai and the Afghan surveys, but in the discussion of 
data needs in Chapter VI, the main emphasis was on data gathering and 
processing. While this aspect is important, it places a premium on 
statistical and quantifiable data, and less on the needs of system users. 
It is for this reason that Line 1 shows interconnections between the 
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communication planning agent and all other system participants, to stress 
not only data collection but also needs assessment research. 
Such research may, of course, amount to little more than soliciting 
evidence from representative public groups, and this is a perfectly 
valid source, but special difficulties occur in fields like communication 
notably in the development world. In the first place, it is difficult 
to ask the public to specify what it wants, or needs, in the form of a 
communication system, particularly if this means distinguishing between 
a variety of alternative forms, each with different cost and benefit 
implications, and in some cases based upon unfamiliar technologies. The 
task (much as was the case when devising programme formats in India, for 
the SITE experiment, when many members of the audience had never been 
exposed to a television programme, often not even to a film programme) 
is to find out ways of asking questions which illuminate, in an objec- 
tive fashion, what audiences need, without being prescriptive or patern- 
alistic about what is good for them. 
Bella Mody, introducing a needs assessment study which she conducted 
for the Rajasthan cluster of villages (her study was produced in 
December 1974 as part of the preparatory work for SITE) had this to say: 
"In this study, more than 75 district and block officials 
were interviewed on the most pressing needs of villagers whose 
satisfaction came within the purview of their department, on- 
going schemes they were responsible for, how well/badly these 
schemes were functioning, reasons for this, major bottlenecks 
in implementation, the role and functioning of panchayats and 
co-operatives, and the kinds of tasks they thought TV would 
do for them. Data on caste and communal compositions and 
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barriers, and opinions on villagers' responses to new schemes 
and government officials was also sought. The interview 
schedule, an adapted version of a previous schedule used for 
the same purpose in the Kheda district of Gujarat, was open- 
ended and took approximately an hour to administer. However, 
our interviewers reported that officials continued to talk 
about related aspects of their work for much longer. Insights 
gathered from the total contact and published material have 
been taken into consideration in reporting the findings per 
cluster. " (Mody, 1974 p. 3) 
The problem is not one of questionnaire design, or of technique. It 
is rather a problem of assessing the capability of audiences and publics 
to respond to questions put to them, of designing appropriate vehicles for 
meaningful responses, and of finding ways around the dilemmas of unfam- 
iliarity, reticence and passivity. 
The picture, or synthesis, which emerges from needs assessment and 
data collection will not, of course, be complete: it will require sup- 
plementing as planning proceeds. But it should provide a reference 
bank of basic data which will help in planning the detailed scenario 
and act as a reservoir for planners as they begin their work. It should 
also be extremely useful in identifying the agencies which can best be 
involved in planning (since the data gathering process will both reveal 
critical agencies and those representatives who are most interested in the 
subsequent task). 
All this is summarised, diagrammatically, in Figure 27, which shows 
the merging of different kinds of data source (subjective and objective) 
in a synthesised form. 
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Line 2- Policy 
Line 3- Objectives 
The formulation of policy, and the articulation of objectives, have 
been considered extensively in the course of this thesis, and the argu- 
ments will not be repeated here. As a result of this discussion, in 
Line 2 the consideration of sectoral and overall policy -is kept separate, 
though with obvious important connections, and the base of consultation 
and participation is left as broad as possible. Within the simple boxes 
of Line 2, a complex set of interactions has inevitably to take place, 
which will need to be programmed specifically in each environment, and 
even with careful preparation, as was seen in Afghanistan, there can be 
no guarantee that more than a nominal consensus on priorities will be 
reached at this stage. 
Many delicate and long-winded relationships are involved: between 
the communication planning agency and overall policy makers, for example, 
and between policy makers and the public. Bearing in mind the earlier 
discussion of communication policy,, while some kind of limited consensus 
on priorities and emphasis may be reached over a relatively short period 
of time (and must be, for serious planning and implementation to proceed), 
the discussion of communication policies in their wider, socio-political 
sense has no such limitation: it implies an extended dialogue over a 
lengthy period, constrained by cultural habits. 
Even in the more restricted sense of confirming priorities, the 
Afghanistan project showed how difficult it can be to obtain serious 
consideration by decison-makers, and to achieve consensus. Proposals 
for motivation, for the education of politicians, have been emphasised, 
but they will not necessarily be taken up or lead to concrete results. 
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If necessary, as in Afghanistan, an interim assumption may have to be 
made that agreement has been reached on certain policy positions, and 
failsafe procedures written into the planning design, to allow for 
modifications at a later stage, if this apparent consensus is denied. 
The setting of objectives has also been considered at length 
and it will be noted that in Line 3, while the sectoral participation 
base has been left broad (because the sectoral user has been identified 
with clients and institutional users), in the setting of overall objec- 
tives, public involvement has been excluded. This is a precise and 
frequently technical process, and it was noted in several of the project 
case studies (e. g. in the discussidn of the Children's Television Workshop) 
that too broad a base of participation at this stage is likely to con- 
fuse the clarity and utility of the result. 
Line 4- Policy Synthesis 
In most situations (clearly evidenced in Afghanistan), after a 
complex exercise has been completed which involves a number of partici- 
pants, some form of synthesis is needed, partly to group and categorise 
the points made and decisions taken, but also to ensure that the same 
understanding of consensus is. shared by all concerned. As the goal 
of Lines 2 and 3 was to secure a marriage between sectoral and central/ 
intersectoral policies and objectives, responsibility for this synthesis 
is assigned to the central communication planning and development 
planning agents, as these have the best overall perspective and the least 
partisan stake. 
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BLOCK TWO - STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Line 5- Strategic Alternatives 
Line 6- Synthesis of Strategy 
Line 5 moves towards a more concrete stage of planning, as activities 
focus down on system possibilities. Its principal concern is to formulate 
strategic options, and to proceed from these to an overall strategy 
which reconsiders conflicting demands. The process was described in 
Chapter VI (Figure 15); it is based on preparation and analysis of con- 
crete options, which makes negotiation and synthesis easier, because it 
is focused on practical issues. 
0 
In the Thai survey, the approach worked relatively well, apart from 
time constraints which meant that the bargaining process had to be rushed. 
It was the approach through concretisation which proved most useful in 
Thailand, as it brought the pattern of decision-making closer to decision 
making styles which were familiar in other contexts. It is a dilemma 
of communication planning that it often seems over-complex to the poli- 
tician, because it involves technical considerations and system designs 
which are out of his normal reference frame. However, Thailand was essen- 
tially a sectoral study, and it was in Afghanistan that the complexity of 
achieving intersectoral consensus was fully revealed. In the first place, 
each sector moves at its own pace, and sectoral planning cannot be made 
contingent on the habits of other sectors, or of central agencies. 
Secondly, achieving consensus across sectors, each with a different set 
of priorities and a different understanding of communication potential, 
is far more difficult than reconciling the demands of separate agencies 
within a single sector, where at least a general milieu is shared. In 
Afghanistan, it is doubtful whether this process of consensus ever really 
began in earnest. Additionally, planning across sectors implies that 
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some intersectoral mechanisms will also be needed: to provide for 
coordination, for joint action in areas which cut across the interests 
of several agencies, for general evaluation and review. 
Line 5, therefore, subsumes a number of parallel activities within 
each sector, and a good deal of dialogue between them and the central 
planning and development agencies. 
The process is not likely to be a simple matter of formulating 
alternatives in a single round, and then reconciling the set of all 
sectors; it will probably involve a number of false starts, parallel 
discussions, revisions and gradual modifications. Essentially, in 
this process the communication planning agent is both catalyst and 
synthesiser. It is only at a central level that some coherence of view 
can be maintained, seeing each sectoral initiative in the context of 
an emerging communication system. But it is also important for the 
communication planning agent to act as adviser, explaining something 
of the potential of communication channels and forms in relation to 
sectoral problems, offering advice on technical needs, and helping 
analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each draft of the strategic 
alternatives as they evolve. The initial dialogue is likely to 
be between the communication planning agency and each sector in turn, 
a dialogue which will continue for some time, before the demands of 
a number of sectors are considered together, and the process of 
negotiation begun. It is at this later stage that other central plan- 
ning and decision making agencies are brought into the picture; if they 
are involved too early, before the sectors have properly crystallised 
their own positions, undergone their own consensus-seeking process and 
defined their priorities, the result will be confusion. 
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The synthesis of decisons on strategy which is again proposed (for 
the same reasons as in Block One) is assigned, on this occasion, to 
the communication planning agents at both central and sectoral levels; 
at this point, the planning exercise has narrowed down much more directly 
to consider communication possibilities and structures. 
Line 7 
Macro-Framework 
In this activity line a crucial stage of harmonisation is reached. 
Demands have been fed in from a variety of sources, and the overall 
synthesis will inevitably be one of adaptation and compromise, as no 
system can give total satisfaction to all its users. 
The line therefore reflects a more than usually elaborate process 
of discussion, drafting and modification, in a search for an agreeable 
formula. The macro-framework represents the last stage of political 
validation; as a generalised description of the communication system 
proposed, it is drafted at the planning level, but offered up to 
decision makers and users for their commentaries and agreement, before 
being transcribed into technical form. 
BLOCK THREE - OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
Line 8- Macro Plan 
Line 9- Operational Plans 
This final block moves into more familiar territory. From the broad 
outline of the macro-framework, modified by consultation with decision- 
makers and users, a master plan is produced (by the two communication 
planning agencies together), before operational plans are prepared at 
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both sectoral and intersectoral levels. The macro-plan is, therefore, 
a critical document. It translates into specific and technical terms 
the orientations of the macro-framework, and sets out to provide a 
coherent description, to which operational planners can refer, of the 
entire system to which their institutions are attached. It also includes 
provisions for intersectoral mechanisms (which are certainly, on the 
evidence of Afghanistan, likely to be recommended in the course of 
intersectoral planning); the detailed operational plans for these 
umbrella institutions will probably rest with the central communication 
planning agency. By the time the stage of operational planning has been 
reached, it is likely that this agency, however tentative and limited 
it may have been in its formative stages, will have increased in size 
and responsibility, and be able to take a lead role in such areas as 
training, evaluation, research and forward planning, where intersectoral 
arrangements are likely to be both more efficient and more effective. 
Conclusion 
It will have been noticed that, as the commentary on Figure 25 pro- 
ceeded, it became more and more general in character. This is not 
unexpected, as with the move from policy and strategy to operational 
planning, locality and specificity become progressively more important. 
In any case, it would seem that this is as far as Figure 25 can be 
pressed, without falling into some of the conceptual and logical traps 
already described. It is, therefore, an appropriate time at which to 
address the second of the two basic questions raised earlier: on the 
utility of such a model for communication planning in the third world. 
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This research began, not with an hypothesis, but with a set of 
questions, concerning the possibility of fusing planning techniques with 
a sensitive response to external pressures, especially those of decision 
makers and decision making processes. In Chapter II, I stated: 
"If there had been a formally stated hypothesis, this 
would have proposed that it is possible to evolve a communi- 
cation planning instrument which embodies both technical 
supports and elements of policy formulation and decision 
making". 
0 
.. The methodology adopted 
to investigate this problem was to work from 
the general to the particular: to begin by evolving a general planning 
framework, supposedly capable of being applied to a variety of social and 
political contexts. This was then to be adapted, for each planning problem 
as it arose, into a unique, time-based scenario, created to match a partic- 
ular set of circumstances, not+transferable to other environments. 
The assumption of this approach was that the generalised framework, 
at least, might be found to be widely useful, in that it might provide 
a format within which an individual scenario could be organised. It would 
therefore be valid at the level of guideline and technical support. In 
the event, the Afghanistan evaluation did show that the scenario had been 
useful in organising the planning team's activities. In Karnik's words: 
"It provided a clear plan and direction at the inception of 
the project itself; a critical time when various pressures and 
the effects of culture shock can lead to frenzied working, in 
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the absence of a definite plan ... It provided a base to 
deviate from". (Op cit, p. 28) 
In a broad sense, then, the quasi-hypothesis could be held to have 
been supported in the field test. But in this kind of research, I 
have argued, it is the manner of support which is ultimately of the great- 
est interest. For it was not, finally, the generalised framework which 
was of the most use, but the localised scenario. And in order to under- 
stand that phenomenon, a good deal of qualification is needed: any attempt 
to detach the framework (or, for that matter, the scenario) from its 
context could lead to erroneous conclusions. 
0 
It may, for example, be argued that if it was the scenario which was 
practically useful, then the generalised framework was no more than a 
bridge, a resting point en route to scenario construction. In a sense, 
this is true: the framework on its own existed only to facilitate the 
construction of an operational, scenario form. This was not fully under- 
stood in the original set of assumptions made when the research began, but 
it was adequately confirmed by the Afghan experience. 
Yet conversely, the scenario could not have been created in a vacuum. 
It depended upon the earlier project analysis, the articulation of planning 
principles, the development of a planning matrix. And the same is likely 
to be true of later adaptations; in order to become specific, to take full 
account of both local conditions and general constraints. upon planning, 
they need to be rooted in a solid conceptual base. It is finally the 
overall planning strategy, and the full planning design, which are critical. 
If anything can be said as a result of the Afghanistan experience, it is 
that this particular model of planning proved to be useful, in spite of 
its primitiveness, its constraints, and its mistakes. It can be inferred, 
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It seems therefore that Figure 25 is as far as one can go in illustrating 
this procss. It should be left in an inomplete form, not expanded into 
a pore outplex network ; as a simple matrix, part diagrammatic and part 
descriptive (taken together with its acocmpanying eanmentary), it represents 
an interiat but critical stage in a process leading towards scenario con- 
struction. On its own, like other ocmponents, it is weak, inocri, lete, 
auLivale t. Laut the sun of all carponents, co-existing in an evolutionary 
cosign, should be helpful in creating specific planning strategies. 
In Chapter 1, it was stated that the objective of this research was to evolve 
a planning strategy or instrument which would catalyse the contribution of 
oom-auLication resources to the development process, while recognising the 
variety of contraints, particularly those of political action and decision 
makU g, which exist in real world situations. The test of the adequacy of 
such an instrument is that it should be capable of application in 
the developing world, by planners and planning teems, working with the 
supjort of the planning tool alone (i. e. without interpretation or 
guidance from its creators), and that its use in this way should be considered 
helpful anu viable by these same planners. 
In the case of Afghanistan. a planning strategy 
(the scenario) was devised by the researcher and harried over to the Afghanistan 
planning survey team for them to use independently. In the opinion of the 
survey's evaluators, the scenario enabled the team to operate more effectively 
in a strange envirorm nt and to produce a plan which, in their opinion, had 
potential for itrc)lenentation. To this extent, therefore, the objective of 
the research was net. 
To what extent may it also be considered useful and applicable in other 
situations? I would conclude that, following the refinenents intt+oduoed as 
a result of the Afghanistan evaluations, the instrument has a higher chance of 
successful use and replicabýility than in its original setting. Within this 
tYesis, a set of instruments is contained which can be used as the basis 
of further planning designs, covering a variety of situations in the developing 
world, provided the instruments are seen as facilitating, rather than blueprint 
saalels. 
In the first place, there is the develczental ncäel of Figure 25, and its 
associated c vientary (in Chapter VIII), which provide a broad framework for 
the collection and processing of information at various stages of the planning 
process. -Secondly, to facilitate the expansion of this figure into a country 
car pr ble r-specific scenario, there is a set of guiding criteria, which are 
embodies in th e revised list of principles sunnarised in Table 13. These 
are guides, nct only to the process of scenario construction, but also to tge 
management of oatiu iication planning teams and processes in the field. 
Finally, in the account given of the Afghanistan planning survey (and 
especially in its two, evaluations), there is an example of scenario con- 
struction and application which illustrates, in a concrete manner which cannot 
be assureu by Figure 25 and Table 13 alone, the process of adaptation. 
If these three elements are taken together, I would conclude that, at the 
very least, they will provide a focus and a framework for action by independent 
planning tews, ana that they are also likely to lead to the production of a 
coherent plan, with potential for implementation. On this final issue, 
however, a specific nieasure of utility and validity has still to be established 
by further field tests, as the Afghanistan plan has not yet been followed through. 
At this point, then... (ILTUR ZO ORIGINAL TEXT) 
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reasonably, that later adaptations of the model may also be useful, if 
they adopt the same general strategy, while at the same time attempting 
to avoid the flaws of their predecessor. But this model is not a two- 
dimensional format: it is essentially the complete process which has 
been recorded in this thesis, not any one of its component parts. 
In fact, while the model set out to create a generalised framework, 
it concluded by extending the concept of an 'operational framework' into 
a more dynamic form, an operational design process rather than a specific 
format. This is not, of course, to say that other planning models are 
innappropriate; but the research has little directly to say about them, 
either in conformation or in. opposition. 
It''skems therefore that Figure 25 is as far as one can go in illus- 
trating this It should be left in an incomplete form, not 
expanded into a mor complex network; as a simple matrix, part diagram- 
matic and part descriptiv it represents an interim stage in a process 
leading towards scenario tonst tion. On its own (like other components) 
it is weak, incomplete, ambivalent. existing in an evolutionary design, the 
sum of all components was demonstrably he ul (in the opinion of the Afghan 
evaluators), and valid in the sense that the des' n led to the construc- 
tion of a communication plan (this being the main-objstive of the Afghan- 
istan survey ). Its validity in other contexts remains to be oven (and 
whether or not it actually leads to successful implementation als remains 
to be seen, as the Afghanistan survey has not yet been followed throug 
At this point, then, it is appropriate to turn to the other limita- 
tions of the framework: limitations which were recognised in advance, 
and which the design did not, in Afghanistan, attempt to overcome. They 
are discussed, as independent conceptual problems, in Chapter IX, but 
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before this discussion is begun, it may be asked whether or not, in the 
future, the model of the planning framework could possibly accommodate 
some of these needs? 
It has been stressed that the framework design, as it stands, does not 
extend beyond two dimensions; it does not easily reflect moves towards 
decentralisation, and it is not easily adaptable to processes of social 
transformation which adopt radical and participatory planning forms. Yet, 
if planning is to be opened up further, and communication users more fully 
involved, it has to reflect activities conducted at many different levels 
of society. The problem in relation to the matrix of this research is 
illustrated by Figure 28, where a three-dimensional framework is shown. 
Collaboration, coordination, participation would all have to take place 
within this setting, impying an elaborate; routing of activities throughout 
the model. 
Even though Figure 25 did not attempt to go so far, could it in 
theory - if a different set of assumptions were made - do more to accom- 
modate such processes? Probably it could, with the aid of computer models, 
be made much more complex, capable certainly of accommodating more than 
two dimensions and a far larger spread of local variables. But in doing 
so, it would refine itself to a point where it might well defeat one of 
its main objectives: to provide an instrument for planners and decision 
makers in the developing world, where the ability to use refined tools 
is limited, and where the data upon which these tools depend for their 
success are scarce. The basis of the planning approach adopted in this 
research has been rational-comprehensive in character, relying heavily 
on systems planning approaches, but the scepticism of the incrementalists 
has also been noted, and responded to wherever possible, primarily by 
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keeping the planning design simple. The design has been based upon 
a status quo which reflected, it was thought, the reality of planning 
traditions in the developing world. 
However, even if a decision were made to refine the model to 
accommodate greater local variety in existing planning situations, it 
is doubtful whether it could also accommodate variables of potential 
social change, responding to structural changes in participation as 
these gradually emerge in the developing world. It is important to 
recognise these changes, and to consider their ideological base: that 
is the function of Chapter IX. I would conclude, however, that a plan- 
ning design, at the present time, will be more useful if it is kept 
simple enough to be operated by developing world planners and decision- 
makers, without raising their dislike, scepticism, or non-comprehension. 
Even in the industrialised world, where data bases are larger, con- 
siderable difficulty has been experienced in using computer models to 
accommodate complex social processes. For planning to be realistic, 
and practically useful, it cannot prove too far or too deeply into potential 
or hypothetical forms of social organisation; it has to be ready to 
respond to such changes when they take place, but at the macro level, 
at least, and in pluralist societies, it should be a reflection of balance 
and of a status quo, neither too reactionary nor too liberal. 
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CHAPTER IX 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
This final chapter is speculative: it attempts to highlight those 
features of communication planning for development which go beyond the 
practical limits of the framework, because they are only latent or impli- 
cit in current forms of political and social organisation, and so are not 
reflected in planning structures. They are discussed more as parameters 
for the construction and evaluation of future planning designs, and as 
indicators for research and field testing, than as specific and tangible 
guidelines. 
Dimensions of Planning 
In Chapter VI, a distinction was made between four dimensions of 
planning, which were characterised as follows: 
(1) Vertical - answering organizational and structural needs, 
to correlate planning activities at various levels from 
the national down; 
(2) Horizontal - developing mechanisms for co-ordination and 
integration, as between different agencies and organizational 
forms. 
(3) Cyclic and Iterative - exploring the feedback principle in 
planning, and reducing linearity; 
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(4) Open and Participatory - exploring principles of open 
planning, decentralization, and periphery-centre move- 
ments. 
The evolution of the framework design mostly assumed a two- 
dimensional, pyramidic structure, based upon a centre-periphery relation- 
ship which is the general planning norm. In consequence, the discussion 
has been mainly of vertical and horizontal planning styles, and to a 
certain extent (in the revised version of the planning framework presented 
in Chapter VIII) of cyclic and iterative planning. Following a develop- 
ment tradition which is still rooted in centralist planning, it has 
proved impossible to evolve a framework which has deep-seated and integral 
elements of participatory planning; the framework was conceived with a 
deliberate emphasis on current planning modes, on the patterns of technical 
cooperation, and on the reality of decision-making. 
However, this centralist planning norm is now being challenged in 
many societies, irrespective of ideology, even though the challenge is 
still theoretical rather than operational. 
The overall problem to be resolved is how to create within the 
pyramid structure a genuine two-way or rather multi-way flow, moving 
policy formulation processes upwards as well as downwards (indeed origin- 
ating with an upward movement). 
This is not only a theoretical problem: it has important practical 
implications. Arguably, if it is not met, many of the principles which 
have been explored will have little real chance of being practised: goal 
sharing and the common perception of problems demand participation from 
the earliest stages of policy formation. 
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However, the problem does separate out into two relatively discrete 
stands: one more concerned with strategy and structure, the other with 
the tension between theory and implementation within the constraints of 
a social system. Of the four dimensions cited above, while all should 
benefit from the opening out of planning processes and the achievement of 
greater representation and participation, the first three are particularly 
concerned with mechanisms for co-ordination, integration, and the mon- 
itoring and evaluation of planning, while the fourth has more complex 
social and ideological ramifications. 
This final chapter begins, therefore, by reviewing the more tradi- 
tional problem areas of co-ordination and integration, in relation to the 
first three categories of vertical, horizontal and cyclic planning 
Horizontal, Vertical, and Cyclic Planning 
Co-ordination difficulties arise from two causes: a lack of 
identification and value sharing among those involved, regarding the 
significance or priority of the overall task; and a lack of information 
and communication exchanged between them. 
Both of these difficulties can recur throughout the entire system, 
extending from policy formulation through to implementation; both make 
different demands. Identification demands a common goal structure, a 
shared perception of priorities in the communication planning task. It 
can only come from a thorough and sustained interaction between parties. 
This need is at its most critical in the policy formulation stage, but 
if an analogue of the same understanding is not found at other levels of 
action, in turn the implementation stage will not succeed, because it 
will reflect the work of separate agencies, each working to differentiated 
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patterns and most probably in mutual competition. 
Information and communication needs are less value-oriented; they 
demand a sufficient sharing of information to allow parts of the overall 
system to function both independently and in unison. This activity is 
more in keeping with older, traditional concepts of co-ordination, whereas 
identification needs are of a different order. If in communication plan- 
ning for development we are envisaging a coherent system in which there 
is an organic and functional relationship between component parts, not a 
loose association, then we are in many cases talking of integration 
rather than co-ordination. Admittedly there is a fine line separating 
the two, and the term 'integration' tan have an inhibiting effect upon 
institutions which are willing enough to connect their work through a 
common programme, but nonetheless prize their individual autonomy and 
identity. These provisos apart, the term 'integration' is still used 
here to distinguish those forms of co-ordination which demand subordina- 
tion to common tasks, rather than a simple dialogue. Co-ordination, 
therefore, refers more to horizontal planning, and integration to verti- 
cal, since the former demands collaborative planning between agencies, 
while the latter implies a unity of theme and policy across a whole 
structure. 
An evaluation by John Middleton on the Agency for Instructional 
Television (Middleton, 1979) suggested several principles underlying 
successful co-ordination, which amounted in summary to the following: 
(i) that co-ordination is most successful when common 
goals, criteria, philosophies, patterns of needs 
determination, problem perceptions and corporately 
evaluated patterns of experience exist among the 
agencies involved; 
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(ii) that when it comes to the specifics of production, 
centralized control will lead to better products. 
(iii) Ergo, that overall, a sensitive balance between 
participation and control in planning has to be 
struck. 
The implication is that there are certain activities (e. g. production) 
which demand centralization of control, and that the acceptance of such 
centralized arrangements will be readier if other determinant processes 
(of policy formulation prior to production; or of evaluation, post-production) 
have been based upon fully participant formulae. 
Although these principles were derived from a context of media 
production, they seem to have some relevance to overall communication 
planning for development (which is also a task and product-oriented 
process, even though its tasks and products are far more numerous and 
the agencies involved much more diffuse). Integration is most needed 
at the fundamental stages of policy and planning, while implementation 
depends upon co-ordinated arrangements between separate production 
agencies. In other words, the planning stages demand a pooling and 
synthesis of ideas, designed to lead to a coherent understanding of 
what the communication system is to achieve; implementation necessarily 
breaks down into separate but related groupings. 
The resolution of both of these needs requires management and ad- 
ministrative frameworks, but of somewhat different kinds. The more 
traditional function of 'co-ordination' is normally served by committee 
and data exchange networks, though in practice even these do not always 
operate as regularly or effectively as might be wished. The deeper 
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sense of 'integration' assumes sustained, task-force structures, where 
goal sharing comes about through regular contact and shared experience; 
it assumes the kind of profile which should emerge from a communication 
planning team comprised of many different disciplines, or from a commis- 
sion or working party at an inter-agency or inter-ministerial level. 
This structure is actually easier to visualize at senior policy levels, 
where agencies are fewer and appropriate membership simpler to identify. 
At lower levels (e. g. among supporting institutions) added difficulties 
may be caused by distance, an inability to perceive common loci of 
interest and pressures of operational work. 
There is one derivative need which also has to be met and this we 
may term cohesion. The cohesive need is to forge links between the two 
concepts of integration and co-ordination. Put more directly, it means 
impressing the sense of an overall policy (and an overall plan) upon all 
parts of the system, so bringing together what might otherwise be seen 
as discrete exercises, particularly when the phase of implementation is 
reached. Communication planning, it has been argued, is a matter of 
reconciling the whole of a communication system with, on the one hand, its 
component (and individually active) parts and, on the other hand, the 
social system which it serves. It may also be argued that at the time 
of policy formulation this functional relationship will be naturally 
exposed. But it certainly cannot be assumed that this systemic percep- 
tion will automatically be maintained throughout implementation, with its 
inevitable (and necessary) decentralization of energies. 
It does seem, therefore, that throughout the communication planning 
process there should be some common strand of planning and executive 
responsibility which can penetrate the entire framework and devote itself 
to drawing together loose ends, as well as to promoting a consciousness 
of the overall design. This is a further reason why, in the earlier 
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discussion of structures, a professional communication planning unit was 
recommended,. preferably set within a central economic planning agency. 
The same concept may also be extended to regional levels. At all levels, 
such a unit would patently be directly involved with the planning process 
itself, but it would have other responsibilities further down the line. 
It would act as a channel for feedback (of information and of opinion), 
from regional and local to upper levels and vice-versa. It would serve 
as a means of dissemination and promotion - of overall plans and priorities 
as these emerge, and of the rationale upon which they are based. It would 
seek to bring together catalytically institutions and agencies with rele- 
vant roles in the planning and implementation process. It would try 
to identify opposite numbers in these agencies (if they were not specifi- 
cally assigned to co-ordination functions) and to build its work upon a 
personal net. 
It is this kind of permanent presence which ensures cyclic planning. 
Within its own limits, the framework has already suggested that there is 
more to planning than the simple elimination of disorder: in proposing, 
for example, the means of reaching concrete objectives, or establishing 
a range of alternative choices to assist in the process of decision making. 
But the complexity goes much further. In a sense, all decision- 
making is concerned with the management of uncertainty - uncertainty as 
to the planning environment, policy decisions, planning boundaries. 
Uncertainty is normally reduced by obtaining more information (through 
surveys, research etc. ), through formulating objectives and policy guide- 
lines, and through attempting to pinpoint and guide contingent and related 
areas of decision-making. 
Such processes are not, unfortunately, tidy. Elements for strategic J 
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choice are collected unpredictably, and within the framework which has 
been advanced, there are many cyclic processes at work: numerous 
exchanges within each of the activities identified, as new information 
is collected or assimilated or new alternatives, possibilities or 
combinations are raised. These exchanges are too informal, too ad hoc, 
to be 'planned' for in any meaningful way. 
The essence of the cyclic planning process, therefore, is character- 
ised by the concept of evaluation, already discussed extensively. While 
evaluation is necessary for every step of decision-making, it has been 
argued that there is a parallel need for evaluation of the planning frame- 
work as a whole, which will allow it to assess its performance and so modify 
its general orientation. It is only by such means that one can both plan 
for flexibility, and respond to flexible planning. 
Consensus 
A key concept in this rather abstract discussion is that a principal 
goal of planning should be the achievement of consensus among the various 
planning participants. 
The distinctions between horizontal, vertical and cyclic planning 
forms were made to reduce misunderstanding and ambivalence. But they 
are finally part of a total planning system, which seeks, through inter- 
action, monitoring and debate, to produce both plans which reflect the 
maximum degree of common agreement among planning participants and the 
widest possible acceptance of the resulting compromise. It is therefore 
important to define the planning base as broadly as possible, on the 
grounds that all those who are the subject of planning should also be 
involved in the planning process, and to establish mechanisms whereby 
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the results of planning can be constantly reviewed, to allow for revision 
and change. 
As a goal this is admirable, though the means of achieving it are 
more complex, demanding a sensitive balance between agencies, involving 
the right planning participants at the right time in the right places. 
In this process, too much involvement of too many people acting in 
unfamiliar or inexpert roles can be as unproductive as too little. 
Open and Participatory Planning 
The area of debate can, in a simplified form, be represented 
diagrammatically, as in Figure 29. This diagram shows the levels at 
which planning decisions may be made, in contexts ranging from the 
international to the local. The vertical dimension is one of organi- 
sational connections; the horizontal axis is one of coordination and 
consultation. In both of these dimensions, principles of feedback, 
evaluation and of multi-way flow are to be stressed, with varying 
possibilities for participation in each context (these being indicated 
by the device of circularity). Not surprisingly, it is the discussion 
of circularity that moves on to the most precarious ground. 
In the earlier analysis of communication projects and surveys (Chapters 
IV and V) the diffuculty of realising goals of participation and user 
involvement has already been amply illustrated. Among the basic principles 
proposed as a guide to framework construction, two were particularly 
deficient in practice; they are reproduced below in Figure 30. 
These two principles are clearly counterpointed: the establishment 
of need as a starting point for planning design can only be accomplished 
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FIGURE 29. 
PARAMETERS OF PLANTING DECISIONS 
VERTICAL PARAMETERS 
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through a proper consultation with, and involvement of, system users, 
and conversely, the involvement of users is not self-justifying, but 
seeks to evolve communication systems and structures which are genuinely 
reflective and supportive of individual needs. 
This assumes a perception and a definition of communication planning 
which is far less directly associated with the deployment of economic or 
social resources, far more concentrated upon individual and group satis- 
faction. The two are not necessarily incompatible, but their correlation 
is difficult in that it demands an accommodation of individual and societal 
priorities and aspirations. This kind of perspective is currently defined 
in terms of participatory or 'open' planning, of which a definition has 
been attempted as follows: 
"Open planning, in contrast to other forms of planning, 
is a process of decision-making on the rational and demo- 
cratic allocation of a society's limited resources to reach 
certain objectives by establishing targets and plans, designed 
through the active consultation, participation and inter-action 
of the key actors in the planning process, i. e. the planning 
experts, the public at large, the people's representatives, 
and those critical sectors of the population directly affected 
by the plans. As such, open planning should be considered 
constantly open in at least three different senses: 
a) open to the participation of the key actors or citizen- 
clients; 
b) open to feedback from results, both material and ideolo- 
gical; 
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c) open to evaluation and revision. 
If this definition is accepted, open planning would then 
be considered as a heuristic process for the achievement of 
consensus on society's goals, objectives, plans, programmes 
and projects within given time and resource constraints. It 
can be achieved within a variety of social and economic systems 
and through different communication means and channels, but its 
rational and democratic essence cannot be ignored. In studying 
the unity and variety of the open planning experiments taking 
place in different historical contexts, we may therefore focus 
on the interaction of the environment and processes of planning 
as well as on the level to which capacity, access and partici- 
pation in communication have been reached in planning decisions. " 
(Tehranian, 1980 pp. 4-5) 
The definition may appear somewhat cumbersome, but it separates out 
into two component parts: a general definition, and a series of quali- 
fications, intended to help evaluation and the establishment of criteria. 
The definition has much in common with recent definitions of the 
development process overall, which also lay stress on individual as well 
as national development. The emphasis is clearly expressed by Juan Diaz 
Bordenave, in the following passage: 
"Development is the deliberate social process of trans- 
forming the production mode of society and its resulting 
institutions, through the conscious participation of the whole 
population in the effort of building a just, solidaristic and 
autonomous social structure in which conditions exist for all 
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its members to achieve their full realization as human 
persons. " (Bordenave, 1978 p. 7) 
The pressure to consider 'another development' is mounting; the 
1981 General Assembly of the United Nations is committed to consider 
'alternatives' to the development process, and an International Founda- 
tion for Development Alternatives has been established, headquartered 
in Switzerland. The search for a New World Economic Order has there- 
fore moved towards the consideration of practical, not simply rhetor- 
ical platforms, and with recent debates in UNESCO (including the work 
of the MacBride Commission, and especially the proposal to create, 
wit n the framework of UNESCO, an International Programme for the 
Development of Communication) the debate upon the New International 
Information and Communication Order has entered a similar phase. But 
the position relative to communication is complicated, because of the 
considerable interpenetration of communication systems with technology, 
and the traditions of technology transfer. In the words of Denis Goulet: 
"Is the technological universe ... blindly condemned to 
grow in present modes, or can technological maturity be reached 
within patterns of steady state? The question is whether quali- 
tative improvement can replace quantitative growth as the driving 
force of the evolutionary dynamism of technology? " 
(Goulet, 1977 p. 3) 
In the context of communication, this situation raises problems at 
two separate levels. Reverting to Figure 30, this can be subdivided 
further into two hemisphers, as shown in Figure 31 : one touching upon 
questions of philosophy and ideology, and the second those infrastructures 
and mechanisms which can help incorporate ideology. 
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The problem of considering such questions in the context of open 
planning is, of course, considerable. On the one hand, a perspective 
of communication need is being adopted which is no more than latent in 
the majority of, it not all, societies. The emphasis upon individual 
participation and gratification also leads to a potential conflict with 
national interest which is not easily resolved. Further, such tensions 
must be resolved in a different way in each society, depending upon a 
host of environmental, political and temporal factors. In the circum- 
stances, therefore, there is little opportunity to do more than lay down 
parameters for the consideration of open planning in each particular 
environment. 
f" 
A Taxonomy of Open Planning 
At the same time, given the plurality of forms which may be con- 
sidered under the general rubric of participation, the different ideolo- 
gical positions, political and social systems which give rise to these 
forms, and the various infrastructures which could be devised to assist 
in their realisation, it may be as well, at this point, to attempt a 
simple, taxonomy. And in order to relate this taxonomy to the earlier 
argument, and to emphasise the primacy of relationships between its 
components, rather than a linear categorisation, it may also be useful 
to express it diagrammatically, by working from the same base as before 
(Figure 31), but by superimposing upon this figure a number of defining, 
qualifying, or expanding factors. This is begun in Figure 32. 
Ideology and Political System 
Initially, the parameter of ideology and socio-political philosophy 
is broken down into three components of economic organisation, political 
organisation and social development. The first two of these define 
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dominant patterns of economic behaviour and of political structure; the 
third refers more to the level of social development (i. e. the move- 
ment from a traditional to a 'developed' society). The success of 
open planning as an organized activity depends on a number of environ- 
mental parameters which include the role of government vis-a-vis the 
market, the level of consciousness and organization of voluntary associa- 
tions such as trade unions, political parties, professional groups, and 
the degree of community-wide participation on the discussion and resolution 
of issues of common interest. 
Economic and political organisation can be discussed together, as 
they are closely associated, particularly in the role of government vis- 
a-vis the market in planning. The following simple distinction between 
market-oriented, government-oriented and mixed market and government 
orientation, is an attempt to distinguish between three different environ- 
ments of planning prevalent in the world. 
The market-oriented structures of planning are clearly more common 
in the so-called capitalist world. Here, a further distinction can be 
made between fully competitive markets (typical of the earlier stages of 
capitalism), oligopolistic markets and monopolistic markets. Each 
different structure clearly imposes its own constraints on open planning 
processes, but it is reasonable to generalize that such constraints 
increase as one moves from fully competative to oligopolistic and mono- 
polistic market situations. 
By contrast, government-oriented structures of planning are more 
typical of, but not exclusive to, the socialist countries. Here, again, 
a further distinction can be made between styles of government planning 
by identifying three major types: comprehensive, indicative and interactive. 
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Comprehensive government planning encompasses all areas of social and 
economic life; indicative planning confines itself to setting the most 
important social and economic targets, but demands that autonomous 
public or private bodies observe them; interactive planning, by contrast, 
assigns a leading but not exclusive role to government in determining 
goals and targets. Generally speaking, it seems that prospects for 
open planning improve in the transition from comprehensive to indicative 
and interactive environments of planning. 
The third category of planning environments, which are termed market 
and government-oriented, is typical of the less developed countries (LDCs). 
The traditional/modern dichotomy in the social and economic life of most 
LDCs clearly imposes severe limits upon the degree of market or government 
reach and'penetration. Although most governments in LDCs use the rhetoric 
of planning, the fact remains that the defects of the market and the 
shortcomings of government bureaucracy make it virtually impossible to 
design or implement their social and economic plans effectively. Realisti- 
cally speaking, therefore, planning activities in the LDCs may have to be 
considered in the context of their dualistic social and economic structures. 
The degree of dualism varies enormously from country to country, but the 
constraints and possibilities for open planning are profoundly related to 
differences in the traditional and modern sectors of social and economic 
life. Paradoxically, there are perhaps greater opportunities for open 
planning in the traditional sectors, where community ties are still viable 
and strong. The typical situation, however, reveals an imperfectly com- 
petitive market and ad hoc government interventions, often legitimized by 
planning and democratic rhetoric. 
In turning to the third factor, of social development, a rather 
different focus emerges, as this is concerned first and foremost with 
the degree of social readiness for participation. In this respect, at 
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least three different states of readiness can be identified: pre- 
mobilized, mobilized and post-mobilized. The pre-mobilized populations, 
most often situated in the rural areas of traditional societies, are 
generally characterized by a conservative reluctance to participate. 
The strategy of open planning in such contexts would therefore have 
to concentrate primarily on consciousness raising. By contrast, mobilized 
populations often show an enthusiasm for participation which may lead to 
frustration. An appropriate strategy for open planning in such contexts 
might be to focus on constraints and the reconciliation of conflicting 
pressure group demands. The post-mobilized populations are typically 
those which have in broad terms attained their immediate social goals 
and are therefore reluctant participants in planning activities that 
might seem either too remote or too threatening to their current privileges. 
The identification of these different social environments for plan- 
ning admittedly depends more on intuitive judgement than on empirical 
analysis. However, it should not be too difficult to recognize three 
distinct socio-historical situations, which correspond roughly to the 
circumstances of pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies. 
This being said, in a given context the same categories may apply 
far more to certain sectors of the population than to others. In other 
words, in any country, we may find sectors of population that are pre- 
mobilized, living side by side with those that are mobilized or post- 
mobilized. In the United States, for instance, the rural blacks in the 
South were largely pre-mobilized during the thirties, while the Northern 
industrial cities reflected a high level of mobilization. Since no 
society is fully integrated, the level of mobilization may vary enormously 
from social class to social class, or among ethnic or racial groups. 
Possibilities for mobilization also vary from issue to issue; some issues 
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are participation-prone, some tend to be national and some local or 
parochial in scope. 
Infrastructure 
Turning now to the bottom category (in Figure 32) of infrastructure, 
Figure 33 expands this category into three components which define differ- 
ent kinds of intervention: they have been labelled the level of interven- 
tion, the point of intervention, and the means of intervention, and they 
relate in particular to the earlier discussion of dimensions of planning. 
The level of intervention is a parameter which has been explored on 
several occasions during this thesis; it refers to a range of institu- 
tional or social organisations which exist from local to national levels. 
These were expressed diagrammatically in Figures 18,19 and 28. 
The point of intervention has also been considered. The character- 
istic systems planning model includes five critical stages: need or 
problem identification; policy formulation; programme and project develop- 
ment; implementation; evaluation and revision. Participation can occur 
at any stage, in some form or other. However, openness at one level does 
not necessarily mean openness at others. Participation of certain actors 
may be more critical at certain levels than at others. For example, need 
or problem identification is, properly speaking, a community-wide concern. 
But policy formulation may concern only those directly affected by the 
decisions taken. Programme and project development should be achieved as 
a result of the interaction of planning experts and their citizen clients. 
Implementation is primarily the domain of the executive agencies. By 
contrast, evaluation and revision are both a community-wide activity and 
the duty of specially charged independent evaluators. 
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Finally, the means of intervention is mostly a technical factor, 
although one which is heavily dependent upon the contextual constraints 
of economy, polity and social readiness. Intervention may be on a scale 
which begins with face-to-face community dialogue, passes through simple 
mediated forms (low cost technologies, small format media) and ends with 
newer, often still embryonic forms of technological participation, (e. g. 
combinations of computerised and cabled systems, which have the potential 
for individual response and interaction on a massive scale. In the main 
this technology exists, but its practical development is still at an 
experimental level. Nevertheless such systems as the cable system in 
Columbus, Ohio (QUBE, which gives some limited possibility for local 
opinion sampling)or the planned cable network for the Boston area (which 
would also include an interactive component) illustrate the possibility 
of technological solutions to the problem of soliciting individual opinion 
on a metropolitan scale. 
Type and Objectives of Participation 
This then is the framework in which participation may be broadly 
considered. But the taxonomy is still short of two critical parameters 
which define the core issues of user involvement and needs identifi- 
cation. In relation to the ideological apparatus, these are they type 
of participation which the user is being called upon (or desires) to 
provide, and the purposes and objectives of this participation. Both 
are included in Figure 34. 
Such parameters are clearly at a different level from thosecon- 
sidered above; they do not simply define a context in which participation 
takes place, or delimit supporting structures, but focus upon the rationale 
and character of participatory action. 
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Type of Participation 
The first criterion in this final group, type of participation, 
defines the involvement of the user, and so conditions, to a consider- 
able degree, the kind of strategy and infrastructure foreseen. 
Here, three basic types of participation may be identified: 
cognitive, affective and operational. Cognitive participation, (i. e. 
the general awareness of issues and possible alternatives), does not 
automatically lead to (though it is a pre-condition for ) effective 
participation. For reasons of their own, many aware people may decide 
not to participate in certain decision-making processes. By contrast, 
affective participation is often tied to strong community feelings and 
implies trust and confidence in group decision-making processes. It is, 
however, in operational participation that cognitive and affective types 
interact, hopefully leading to effective roles in the processes of 
identifying and resolving problems. 
Different structures of decision-making often set different processes 
in motion. A market-oriented system is likely to be associated with 
management-centered decision making processes that emphasize corporate 
rationality and planning. A government-oriented system is often associ- 
ated with the domination of a technocratic elite that focuses on 'social' 
efficiency and 'public' rationality at the cost of democratic participation. 
A mixed system, in so far as it is often open and vulnerable to political 
pressures, tends to rely primarily on the solidarity of a particular poli- 
tical elite. 
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Objectives of Participation 
The most important grouping of the taxonomy has been left until last: 
the purposes and objectives of participation. These may be considered 
initially as threefold: 
(1) To expand the physical and institutional capacity of 
a communication system; 
(2) To integrate the competing interests and objectives of 
the community through participation, communication and 
consensus formation. " 
(3) To mobilize communication resources for the goals and 
objectives of development plans; 
To Expand Communications Capacity 
On the premise that communication planning is concerned principally 
with those aspects of social communication which are technologically 
mediated or institutionally arranged, any expansion in their capacity 
may be considered amenable to open planning efforts. However, it should 
be noted that certain technologies and institutional arrangements lend 
themselves better to these purposes than others. For example, the expan- 
sion of uni-directional technologies and bureaucracies of mass communi- 
cation (broadcasting in particular) at the expense of interactive 
communication systems (telephone, local press, publishing, voluntary 
associations etc) may in fact limit rather than expand open planning 
possibilities. 
In this context, therefore, it might be useful to make a further 
distinction between macro, micro and meso media. While the macro media 
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(satellites, large information processing systems, broadcasting, the 
national press) tend to address large and undifferentiated audiences, 
the micro media (voice and videotape cassettes, telephone, small copying 
and printing facilities, Citizen Bands, etc. ) are most prone to private 
use. By contrast it is the meso media (community radio, community multi- 
media centers, rural or local press, wall posters and newspapers, and 
most traditional media of communication) that lend themselves best to 
forms of interactive communication. In the LDCs, community power is 
often overshadowed by the development of centralized state power and 
the private pursuits of citizens. As a result, community or meso media 
remain least developed. But the success of open planning efforts depends 
vitally on the creation of these missing linkages between national objec- 
tives and private pursuits. 
To Integrate Competing Interests and Objectives 
Since communication provides a major channel for the reconciliation 
of competing interests and objectives in the processes of development, a 
second function of the media in open planning is to recognize and integrate 
conflicting social forces. How far and effectively are existing technolo- 
gical and institutional capacities utilized in the processes of decision 
making on a society's goals, objectives, development strategy and programme 
selection? What, in other words, are those consultative and decision 
making organs that facilitate information exchange and communication in 
the planning process? These certainly include policy and planning organs 
in a number of spheres of decision making: the international or multi- 
national sphere, the public sector, the private sector and community 
organizations, as well as connections between them. Legislative, 
executive and judiciary organs in the government sphere, all organized 
enterprises in the private sector, and a variety of voluntary associations 
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and pressure groups (such as political parties, trade unions, media 
groups, university centres) are also worthy of note. ' 
To Mobilize Communication Development Resources 
Once discussion has run its course and decisions have been reached 
on development planning objectives, it is the role of communications to 
mobilize human and material resources to implement the plan. This 
obviously includes the mobilization of information and communication 
resources, but such resources are different in character from most 
others. While scarce, they can expand through active utilization. 
While subject to imbalance, they are, widely distributed throughout 
society. in informal channels and social networks. While quickly obsol- 
escent, they. can be regenerated and recycled through constant use. 
A rational mobilization strategy might therefore be expected to 
focus on unity of purpose through plurality of expression, although the 
actual course of historical development does not always reflect this 
strategy. 
Some Tentative Examples 
It is not possible here to explore each of these factors, or 
permutations of factors, in relation to a whole canvas of social organi- 
sation: that is a major task for the future. However, in a sense the 
very exercise of developing a crude set of classifications has begun 
that task, because the identification of its component parts has normally 
to be achieved by relating each to a characteristic milieu. It is clear, 
for example, that in the main, in industrial, capitalistic societies where 
there is a broad base of ideological acceptance, the pressure to increase 
participation is mostly expansionist or integrative: the type of participation 
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sought is both cognitive and operational. In socialist societies, parti- 
cipation is commonly assumed to be intrinsic to the social fabric; its 
purposes are therefore considered expansionist, and the mode cognitive. 
In developing countries, on the other hand, the objective of participation 
is primarily seen as mobilising, and the main thrust of involvement is 
affective. 
The critical element in the taxonomy is, however, that of establishing 
objectives: while the first level of Figure 34 establishes the economic, 
political and social character of the social unit under review, and the 
bottom level designates appropriate infrastructures and points of inter- 
vention, it is the purpose of participatory communication which is finally 
of the greatest interest, and which defines the function of open planning. 
It is on this issue that the next section of this chapter concentrates, 
by considering characteristic examples of participation, and distinguishing 
between expansionist, integrative, and mobilising forms. 
Expansion of Communication Systems 
The most common examples of the expansionist objective are associated 
with the development of telecommunications, and among these the best known 
example comes from Australia. 
The Australian Telecommunications Commission published in 1975 a 
report entitled TELECOM 2000, which was subtitled 'an exploration of the 
long-term development of telecommunications in Australia'. A tentative, 
long-range plan, put forward for discussion, it explored in some depth 
participatory formulae. 
Various models have been proposed for open planning by a public 
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utility, since without community participation, the utility interacts 
with the community solely at a public relations level. This character- 
izes the way in which public utilities have traditionally operated, 
but in a changing social climate this stance is becoming less tenable. 
The Australian report put forward concrete alternatives. 
"The first level of participation requires that the 
utility communicates interactively with the public, dissemin- 
ating information about its activities, presenting alterna- 
tive solutions to current problems, offering choice about 
future directions and actively seeking responses. This 
approach would include structured discussions with community 
groups having a special interest in communications, sampling 
of community opinion through interviews and surveys, some- 
times extended by the appointment of consumer advisory com- 
mittees or nominating consumer or union representatives on 
the board of directors of the utility. Although decision- 
making remains with the utility, it is at least enhanced by 
a greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, external perspec- 
tives and needs. The process can be represented by the model 
in Figure 35. 
The next level of participation could be the establishment 
of an (ideally) independent decision-making body, knowledgeable 
in the public utility field, which would weigh arguments from 
both the utility and the public, balancing the financial and 
other interests of the utility against the social and environ- 
mental values of the community. In the absence of such a body, 
and where there is intense conflict, the courts are sometimes 
called on to adjudicate, or a commission may be created by 
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a government to hear evidence and rule or recommend on a 
specific issue. 
In some countries, permanent telecommunication tribunals 
or commissions have been established. Experience shows that 
safeguards are needed to prevent such bodies becoming bureau- 
cratic, extending their power base, or being unduly conserva- 
tive. Also, permanent tribunals have traditionally been 
primarily concerned with government regulation, adjudicating 
on the competing interests of big power blocs, rather than 
with the direct interests of the community or users. It is 
interesting that recent court-mandated changes in the US 
Federal Communications Commissions' procedures actively 
encourage citizen participation in communication issues, and 
may be ushering in a new role for that Commission. 
The independent decision-maker model is represented 
in Figure 36. 
Whilst this arrangement ostensibly gives the community 
equality of advocacy, in practice the community usually lacks 
the technical, organizational and financial resources to 
mount an equally powerful case. Another criticism is that 
the creation of a third-party adjudicator immediately casts 
the utilist and the community into conflict roles, rather 
than establishing conditions where each seeks the other as 
mutually supportive and both try to work towards an acceptable 
solution. 
Many variants are possible in seeking to improve on this 
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model. In one variant, initiatives or recommendations are 
made by the community group itself. This puts pressure on 
the utility to interact strongly with the community in the 
development and evaluation of alternatives since the utility 
may not submit recommendations to the decision-maker, only 
technical information. This arrangement is represented in 
Figure 37. 
Both models (Figures 36 and 37) imply that there are 
issues that cannot be resolved mutually. However, many 
decisions could be made through the creation of ad hoc 
local groups having representation from both the utility 
and the local or regional community, with recourse to the 
independent tribunal only as a last resort. The initiative 
to set up local machinery for co-operative decision-making 
rests largely with the utility, since public action is 
usually only mobilized in opposition to a decision already 
taken. 
The ability to anticipate issues of public sensitivity 
and concern requires a heightened social awareness on the 
part of the utility, whilst the need to examine what might 
be seen as purely technical issues from an entirely different 
standpoint, requires the generation of a multi-disciplinary 
approach within the utility planning organization. Working 
within a mixed team of engineers, economists and social 
scientists is a challenging and frequently difficult assign- 
ment, but rewarding for all members in opening up new 
perspectives on common problems. Fostering of this approach 
would seem to be a fundamental pre-requisite to successful 
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mutualist planning with community groups. 
For telecommunication issues of national significance, and 
particularly where the utility is government-owned - and, there- 
fore, may also be an instrument for implementing national econ- 
omic and social policy - it would not be appropriate for an 
independent tribunal to be the final decision-maker. Involve- 
ment of government in this way would only be necessary for 
major issues requiring new or changed legislation or, if 
within the ambit of existing legislation, where the subject 
would nevertheless be considered of sufficient importance to 
justify parliamentary debate. . 
In principle, government should be society's ideal rep- 
resentative body for resolving national issues. But govern- 
ment needs to be properly informed before embarking on courses 
of action with potentially far-reaching social and economic 
consequences (and that could only be reversed at substantial 
national cost). Here the independent tribunal could perform 
an intermediary role where submissions from all interested 
sectors could be studied, a thorough examination of alterna- 
tives made and recommendations framed for government approval. 
This arrangement is indicated in Figure 38. 
(Australia Telecommunications Commission, 1975, pp. 150-152) 
The models put forward by TELECOM 2000 were not advanced purely 
theoretically: practical constraints and problems were also acknowledged. 
One of these is the difficulty of defining a 'community' in the context 
of open planning; telecommunications systems cut across communities and 
boundary problems arise. Some aspects of telecommunications systems 
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planning can be taken out of centralised control (e. g. local cable 
television and distribution systems): others (e. g. telephone services) 
can only be partially devolved, being dependent on national networks 
for their support. 
There are also problems of local decision-making: achieving con- 
sensus across the varied opinions of minority groups. Here the local 
political machinery has probably to be involved, rather than a separate 
mechanism for decision-making on telecommunications matters. There 
are conflicts when options are chosen which are not 'least cost'; who 
is to pay the difference in price: the utility, or the local community? 
And not least, there are problems to be faced by the utility itself. 
Open planning is bound to be expensive in resources, but has no 
immediate economic spin-off; even more difficult is the adjustment which 
the utility has to make to the culture of open planning, which is a 
considerable challenge to traditional patterns of management. 
However, after the publication of the original TELECOM 2000 report, 
the National Telecommunications Planning Branch of the Australian Tele- 
communications Commission solicited comments from many sectors of 
Australian society, and published a digest of reactions in July 1978. 
They found widespread support for the concept of open planning among all 
segments of the community, including businessmen, government, academics, 
the media and people within the utility, although some opposition also 
came from entrenched groups of managers and technologists. Their summary 
of reactions was categorised under five headings: community consensus; 
social effects; open planning as part of the planning process; the relation- 
ship between open planning and specific problems affecting telecommunications; 
and the capacity of the utility to absorb open planning. They concluded: 
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"COMMUNITY CONSENSUS. The notion that all control over 
decision making should be given to the community presupposes 
the possiblity of developing a single community view. This 
would be an uncommon event, and, if it did happen, an authority 
like Telecom Australia could only ignore the community view 
at its peril. In most planning problems competing and con- 
flicting interests are at stake -a compromise may be possible 
but consensus is usually not. A programme of public partici- 
pation that is designed without taking into account the wide 
differences among interest groups will surely fail - through 
attempting to obtain agreement where none is possible. 
e 
The responses we have received reveal important groups 
affected by Telecom's policies with quite different inter- 
ests, value perspectives and views of the future. Should 
Telecom and the economy be predicated on economic growth? 
Competition or monopoly? Rapid technological development 
or cautious social evaluation of new technologies? These 
are just a few of the issues on which people are seriously 
divided. Telecom cannot act purely on the community con- 
sensus because there is not one. On the other hand it 
should not act independently of community viewpoints either. 
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS. Only rela- 
tively recently has there been widespread concern at the 
social effect of telecommunications. The concern has arisen 
in parallel with mounting questioning of technological devel- 
opment in other areas and in response to a perceived dramatic 
development in telecommunications known in the popular jargon 
as the 'wired city'. The wired city embraces visions of 
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videophones, interactive cable television, and push-button 
information services in the home. In this climate, increased 
social responsiveness in a hitherto principally technolo- 
gical area was seen as essential. Open planning was viewed 
as one way of understanding the needs of those affected by 
Telecom's policies. Our support for the principle of open 
planning remains unabated by our increased understanding 
of the pitfalls of open planning. 
OPEN PLANNING AS PART OF THE PLANNING PROCESS. It will 
be clear by now that we see open planning as part of the 
planning process rather than a sibstitute for it. Open plan- 
ning is seen as providing a framework for understanding the 
diverse needs of the Australian society - in some cases 
helping to resolve conflict. For people affected by Telecom's 
policies it promises greater access to information and an 
acknowledged receptivity to the needs of consumer groups. In 
many cases great effort will be required of Telecom to consult 
those affected - not only through reports like TELECOM 2000 
aimed at opinion leaders, but through more active research 
methods and group meetings. 
PARTICIPATION DEPENDS ON THE PROBLEM. As we discussed in 
TELECOM 2000 the type of open planning programme depends vitally 
on the problem being examined. People's capacity to partici- 
pate and their interest in telecommunications planning is res- 
olved to a great extent by the type of problem being examined. 
For example, the siting of exchange facilities, public telephones 
or television masts is of interest principally to those within 
close proximity. Their interest will tend to lie not in the 
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technical aspects of each possibility but in the effect on 
their life, e. g. aesthetic or altered TV reception. The 
choice of who should participate is not difficult in theory 
at least: anyone with a demonstrated stake in the planning 
problem or its outcome. The difficulty lies in deciding 
whose interests should prevail. 
TELECOM'S CAPACITY FOR OPEN PLANNING -A USERS COUNCIL? 
Many respondents doubted Telecom's capacity to implement open 
planning in view of its bureaucratic structure and technolo- 
gical emphasis. We voiced similar fears in TELECOM 2000. 
Some steps have been taken in establishing district manage- 
ment units and in increasing the marketing emphasis of the 
Customer Services Section of Telecom: both steps being aimed 
at improving responsiveness to consumer needs. Open planning 
has received support from the Commission, but the details of 
implementation have still to be worked out. The cynicism 
that people expressed about NTP's motives for proposing open 
planning, though understandable, was misplaced. However, 
many of the problems in implementing open planning remain 
and require priority and experience in participation to 
solve. 
Discussion on the need for a users' council was incon- 
clusive. There was considerable doubt by academics, businesses 
and government about the effectiveness of a users' council; 
though there was some support for the concept among academics. 
We feel that the creation of a tame users' council remote from 
the technical aspects of decisions would be undesirable. On 
the other hand we believe that social factors currently receive 
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lower emphasis than technical ones, and a strong users' 
council might be one effective way of bolstering expertise 
in that area". (Australian Telecommunications Commission, 
1978 pp. 36-44) 
Integration of Policies and Objectives 
Since the above comments were published, the Australian Commissioners 
have approved most of the recommendations of TELECOM 2000, including those 
on open planning, though implementation will take a long time - one res- 
pondent suggested 15 years as being realistic, in view of the fact that 
changes of attitude as well as process are involved. Nevertheless, a 
start has been made, and the Australian experience can be considered at 
least partially successful in arousing public interest in the communication 
sector. 
However, it was still dealing with relatively uncontroversial aspects 
of participatory planning: the expansion of technical services. While 
the report recognised many potential areas of conflict between different 
sections of the population (in particular, conflict between local and 
national users), it was still looking for consensus at a relatively 
parochial level. There is little fundamental conflict between differ- 
ent audiences as to the desirability of some kind of infrastructural 
expansion, only as to its form. The objective of integration is more 
complex, because it is seeking consultation, and ultimately consensus, 
among potential users of a wider range of communication infrastructures 
and services, in a framework which includes ideological attitudes towards 
the use of communication channels as well as technical means. The end 
product, which the consultation process is meant to illuminate, is less 
well defined, and the emphasis is more on appropriate mechanisms for 
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consultation and social regulation. Thus the approach frequently 
encountered is at a relatively traditional level: it simply con- 
templates extending the nucleus of policy formulation in the communi- 
cation sector to include a variety of user groups in a quasi-committee 
structure. It is in essence an extension of the earlier discussion on 
co-ordination problems, and it has been expressed most concretely in 
the idea of Communication Policy Councils. The theme is explored in a 
recent UNESCO publication: 
"What needs to be regarded as essential, then, is the 
building of policy formulation structures and mechanisms 
which are interconnected, interrelated and work in such a 
fashion that the policies as a whole allow for specific 
parts of the communication system to operate freely, res- 
ponsibly and effectively without either coming in conflict 
with other parts or with the overall philosophy or ideology. 
In fact, safeguards may have to be built at various levels - 
individual, community, institutional (especially media), 
national, regional and international. For these and other 
reasons, it is suggested that every country should aim at 
setting up a national communication policy council.... 
It is important to remember that the exact nature and 
composition of any such communication policy council, and 
even the nomenclature for such a co-ordinating body, would 
differ in detail from country to country, depending upon 
the specific set of circumstances in which a country's 
communication system finds itself, including the aims and 
goals which that country's own philosophies and policies 
may dictate. There would perhaps be general agreement, 
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however, that the wider the representation of the various 
components of the communication system, the greater the 
chances are of the conclusions and plans of such a co- 
ordinating body, or bodies, being accepted and acted upon. 
It is for this reason that, beside organizations directly 
involved with professional communication and information 
activities, there should be also representatives of 
political and social organizations, financial institutions, 
legal and civil groups, media receivers, general public, 
etc. " (UNESCO, 1979a pp. 27-8) 
One of the few specific experiences quoted in the same study was 
in Finland, where in 1972 an exploratory Committee for Communication 
Policy was established. Seventeen members were appointed by the Govern- 
ment (on a part-time basis), comprising communication research and 
journalism interests, mass media industries, telecommunications and 
technology concerns and the law. The committee was active between 
1972-74 and produced five separate reports, mainly covering the structure 
and economy of the Finnish media. Kaarle NORDENSTRENG, writing on the 
experiment in the same UNESCO monograph, concluded: 
"The experience of the Finnish Committee suggests that 
the main role and function of such a body probably lies in 
its potential to feed the decision-makers and the general 
public with factual and solid information about relevant 
aspects of communication policies. In other words, it 
might be understood as a body for research and documentation 
rather than for making final policy proposals. The latter 
depend essentially on more general socio-economico-political 
developments, such as the "energy crisis" and difficulties in 
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State economy experiences after the setting-up of the Committee. 
It seems to be ill-founded to count on a coherent and logical 
promotion of communication policies regardless of the rest of 
the social arena. 
The early 1970s were evidently in Finnish society an 
exceptionally favourable period for the communication field 
to gather political "momentum", but it would be both naive 
and frustrating to believe that this situation will continue 
unchanged. Even if it would seem advisable from an expert's 
point of view to develop and implement a 'grand design' for 
national communication policies, it certainly is a more 
realistic approach to let the political balance of forces 
determine when and what kind of policies should be imple- 
mented. 
Whenever there is potential for a significant political 
move, it might be advisable to set up on an ad hoc basis 
another Committee composed of politicians to concentrate on 
the political clearance of the policy measures in question. 
But in any cases it is beneficial to have the basic facts 
and alternatives mapped out either by a specialized body like 
the Finnish Committee or by some other arrangement producing 
the necessary studies and documentation, e. g. through academic 
and other research institutions. " (Ibid, p. 24) 
Nordenstreng's conclusions are of interest, because they lay stress 
on the development of infrastructures for consultation, which can interpret, 
in an ad hoc way, situations as they arise and advise political and decision- 
making bodies on reaction rather than evolve overall policy designs. This) 
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approach is at the same time similar to, and distinct from, the assump- 
tions and conclusions of the planning framework which was evolved to 
fit developing country contexts. The framework's emphasis on flexibility, 
on sensitive mechanisms for consultations and coordination and on the 
need to respond pragmatically to changing situations is identical: so 
is the emphasis which it places upon interweaving planning and decision- 
making bodies and platforms. But in the developing world, it has been 
argued that the idea of general and comprehensive communication planning 
is more conceivable. Both the examples considered so far have been drawn 
from industrialised countries and this is hardly surprising; a drive 
towards expansion of services is most likely to be encountered in societies 
where there is already a considerable infrastructure for communication. 
Similarly pressures for enlarged public consultation are also most likely 
to be vocalised in advanced, industrial Societies. 
Mobilisation 
In the developing world, the overt pressure is more likely to be 
towards mobilisation, interpreted generally as increased commitment by 
a population towards development goals. These may be said to have evolved 
as part of a process of social consultation, but they are much more likely 
to reflect consensus among sectoral planners, led by development economists. 
Their intention, in involving communication channels, is primarily to 
enlist these in support of the development programme. 
There are many examples extant of plans to harness communication 
media and channels in this way, (e. g. `plans drawn up in Guyana, Indonesia, 
India, Malaysia, Iran, Papua and New Guinea, in many cases by UNDP - 
supported agencies, under the general rubric of 'development support 
communication' .) They range from fairly simple, generalised statements, 
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to rather sophisticated coordination programmes. There are fewer examples 
of evaluated programmes ( and indeed evaluation is difficult, as communi- 
cation variables cannot easily be separated from other developmental 
factors). Perhaps the greatest range of examples lies in the field of 
population communication, reflecting an international financing bias. 
As an illustration, however, a plan conceived at a local level may 
be most informative, because it dealt with the problem of 'bottom-up' 
or participatory planning in the sense of popular motivation. 
A study prepared for UNESCO, based on a Philippines municipality 
(Rosario-Braid and Mariano, 1979), set out to suggest a detailed process 
whereby planners' perceptions of problems and needs could be matched with 
popular demand. A case study of the role of communication in the develop- 
ment of an integrated five-year development plan, it set municipal planning 
in the context of the National Development Plan. 
The study was based on Tuguegarao, a municipality at the south 
central tip of Cagayan Province, largely devoted to agriculture. With 
a population of just over 65,000, most of them unskilled farm workers, 
it was made up of 34 barangays (the smallest political unit in the 
Philippines). Initially, the authors reviewed the general development 
planning process. 
"Tuguegarao's Development Plan was the result of the 
joint efforts of various government agencies. The Municipal 
Development Staff (MDS) under the Office of the Mayor col- 
lected the primary data on land use and secondary socio- 
economic data which served as the socio-economic profile 
(SEP) of the municipality. These were obtained from the 
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various local offices such as the National Census and Stati- 
stics Office (NCSO), the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
(BAECON) and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). 
Space requirements were made on the basis of Planning 
Standards provided by the Human Settlements Commission (HSC). 
The SEP and the plan were divided into major sectors. 
Sectoral plans, programmes, and projects were identified, 
prioritized, and incorporated with financial requirements. 
The data gathered were collaged with the help of the 
Municipal Engineer's Office. The MDS prepared the entire 
plan by sectors after which it. was submitted to the Mayor. 
Based on guidelines issued by the National Co-ordinating 
Committee (NCC), the Mayor and the Municipal Planning and 
Development Board (MPDB) members commented on the plan and 
forwarded it to the National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA) Regional Office for further comments. The 
latter convened the Regional Technical Review Committee 
composed of all the regional directors to comment on the 
plan. The plan was subsequently revised and returned to 
the MDS after which the Mayor convened the MPDB to a 
meeting prior to its submission to a public hearing and 
eventual approval by the Community Council, the Sangguniang 
Bayan (SB) .... 
The public hearing conducted at the session hall of 
the municipal building was held for a day with represen- 
tatives from various government agencies, the media, 
barangay captains, employees and the local residents in 
attendance. Members of the MDS, the MPDB and the SB 
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took turns in presenting the sectoral plans. In motivating 
the people to participate in the public hearings, letters 
of invitation were sent to the different sectoral representa- 
tives and announcements were made through the local radio 
stations. It is during this stage when the people were provi- 
ded the opportunity to react to the plan or to suggest alterna- 
tive plans. After the public hearing, the SB members incorpor- 
ated all the suggestions made and returned the plan to the MDS 
which submitted it to the NEDA Central Office for examination 
and approval. This whole process is summarized in the follow- 
ing diagram (Figure 39 ). " (Rosario-Braid and Mariano, 1979 
pp. 6-12) 0 
This account is of a relatively traditional approach to integrated develop- 
ment planning, but the study was specifically interested in communication 
processes. Communication needs, in this context, were seen to be of three 
kinds. Firstly, there was a basic need for information and data collection 
and transmission. Secondly, there was internal, inter-agency and inter- 
institutional communication, on which organizational capacity is based. 
Thirdly, there was communication support, embracing mass as well as inter- 
personal media. 
In Tuguegarao, the range of communication facilities was generally 
good: it had been chosen as a regional growth centre partly because these 
facilities were more developed than in other municipalities. It had an 
active regional public information office, a news centre, two local news- 
papers, three local radio stations, and a lively community life. 
Given this pattern of planning and the available range of communi- 
cation media and channels, the study came up with a plan, half analytical, 
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half prescriptive, for communication support to the development planning 
process, again with some use of flow charts. 
"Communication should support the various phases of 
integrated development planning. We have identified at 
least five major planning phases with their respective 
specific activities and the communication support needs 
through a flowchart (Figure 40 ). The two activities on 
the left margin of the flowchart are called "pre-planning" 
because they refer to preliminary activities which have 
to be done prior to the actual planning. 
0 
The planning process assumes that the MDS coordinates 
all the activities and that sectoral chairmen and working 
committees teams have been organized to oversee and develop 
each sectoral plan. As will be noted, the communication 
supports to each of the major activities mentioned are also 
indicated ..... 
Bottom-Up Planning 
The analysis of the planning process shows the need 
for barrio-level interactive mechanisms. This would ensure 
that interaction among the people, local leaders, and 
extension workers is encouraged. One such mechanism is 
by making available such physical settings like the baran- 
gay halls or ACDO offices and enlisting the help of local 
facilitators who would catalyse the articulation of people's 
needs and aspirations. Barangay captains and the ACDOs 
may serve the function of crystallizing people's opinions, 
so that these are communicated to higher level planners 
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and concerned authorities. 
The following flowchart (Figure 41) describes how 
planning at the barangay level could take place with the 
active participation of the people and the help of baran- 
gay, SN officials, and the ACDOs. We have emphasized the 
need to mobilize the ACDOs and SN officials in helping 
the people to articulate their needs which could be done 
through regular meetings. Likewise, for small-time pro- 
jects which automatically get implemented, the people 
are immediately informed through radio, the print media, 
barangay and SN officials and the ACDOs, so that they 
would know that their problems/needs are being attended 
to ..... 
Finally, communication should be able to motivate the 
people so that their priority needs may be reflected in 
projects which are submitted to the planning body. Here, 
public officials and the mass media could play a signifi- 
cant role". (Ibid, pp. 35-37) 
In this example, one of the pitfalls of discussions of participation 
is evident: differences in the understanding of the concepts as between the 
industrialised and the developing world. There is some danger in the use 
of such terms as 'participation', 'access' and 'democratisation', without 
setting them in a societal context. 'Participation' in the developing 
world may imply the involvement of local people in support of an agreed 
development programme, but include only nominally the right to dissent 
from its premises and priorities. This does not square with the usual 
Western understanding, but it cannot be rejected out of hand, simply 
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because it reflects a different set of cultural and social values. 
Ideological Challenge and Political Change 
However, it may be argued with some justification that the taxonomy, 
and the examples which have been put forward, largely ignore what is often 
regarded as a cornerstone of participatory or open planning: its function 
within processes which challenge political ideologies, forms of political 
organisation and social mores and norms. In the context of communication, 
this may imply two kinds of challenge: of the organisation and conduct of 
communication systems, and of society as a whole. 
9 
Figure 34 included, at the top of the diagram, an item labelled 
'ideology and philosophy', but in distinguishing between different forms 
of participation in planning, this concept needs to be explored much more 
fully. The earlier discussion considered aspects of change over time, 
but mostly in the context of interaction between users and planners/producers/ 
policy makers etc, working through a complex set of mechanisms for con- 
sultation, which would allow for both a more adequate definition of need 
and for the resolution of different kinds of need - in particular indivi- 
dual as compared with institutional or societal. It tended to assume 
that the overall form and character of this ideology are broadly accepted 
by the members of a society, and that objectives are principally focused 
on improving the base and manner of participation. In fact, many, if not 
the majority, of the experimental forms of communication access and partici- 
pation have derived from a challenge to the status quo. 
Not surprisingly, this is also a distinguishing feature of much 
communication research. The original approaches to communication and 
development also took as their starting point a conservative platform 
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on the relationship between the media and social change, as evidenced in 
the work of Lerner (1958), Schramm (1964) and Rogers (1962). For example, 
in Schramm's terms: 
"Free and adequate information is not only a goal, it 
is also a meansof bringing about social change. Without 
adequate and effective communication, economic and social 
development will inevitably be retarded, and may be counter- 
productive". (Schramm, 1964 p. ix) 
Implicit in this kind of statement was an acceptance of the goals 
and value systems of Western, especi. ally American society, and a con- 
viction (also implicit) that the final goals of developing societies 
would inevitably correspond. This 'dominant paradigm' was somewhat 
modified over the years, as some of its components were challenged and 
discarded - for example, as the essentially one-way flow model of communi- 
cation was rejected. The intricacy of diffusion processes was stressed 
by Rogers, (1971) and the idea of reciprocal communication was embodied 
in 'convergence' models of communication, which stressed feedback and 
dialogue. But still the assumption was of technology as an exogenous 
factor. Golding concluded of such models: 
"(They are) both ahistorical and ethnocentric, they 
extrapolate findings about the media in advanced societies 
to circumstances elsewhere which they perceive as mere 
embryonic microcosms of western capitalism". (Golding, 
1974a p. 63) 
Partly this was attributable to the early stage of development of 
communication research. Marxist traditions of criticism were, for 
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example, equally crude and reductionist. 
"Whatever else the immense output of the mass media is 
intended to achieve, it is also intended to help prevent the 
development of class consciousness in the working class ... 
the fact remains that 'the class which has the means of 
material production at its disposal' does have control at 
the same time of the means of mental production; and that it 
does seek to use them for the weakening of opposition to 
the established order. " (Milliband, 1977 p. 50) 
But gradually, in all research. traditions, the importance of context, 
especially the social and economic environment of communication industries, 
was increasingly emphasised. Halloran, for example, argued that an adequate 
sociological analysis of the structures and operations of mass communications 
involved placing them in a 'total social context', by tracing their connec- 
tions with social institutions at all levels, from family to economy (Halloran 
1974). Raymond Williams described the field as the study of interactions 
between the spheres of culture, polity and economy (Williams 1974). Stuart 
Hall treated media products as messages in code, symbolising and expres- 
sing relationships between media organisations and political and social 
institutions and processes, consequently making statements about the 
nature of society (Hall 1973a). Dallas Smythe underlined the relationship 
of media products to the objectives of monopoly capitalism, regarding 
them as a kind of inducement to recruit and maintain the attention of 
loyal members of the audience (Smythe, 1977). The position was summarised 
by Golding and Murdock when they argued for a consolidated approach to 
communication research which took full account of social context, ideolo- 
gical position and economic organisation and dynamic. 
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"Our central argument ... is that sociologists inter- 
ested in contemporary mass communications need to pay care- 
ful and detailed attention to the ways in which the economic 
organisation and dynamics of mass media production determine 
the range and nature of the resulting output. In proposing 
this we are not arguing that economic forces are the only 
factors shaping cultural production, or that they are always 
and everywhere the most significant. We do not deny the 
importance of the controls and constraints imposed by the 
state and the political sphere, or the significance of the 
inertia exerted by dominant cultural codes and traditions. 
Nor do we deny the 'relative autonomy' of production personnel 
and the pertinent effects of professional ideologies and 
practices. Nevertheless for us the crucial term in this 
couplet is 'relative'. In our view any sociological analysis 
of the ways in which the mass media operate as ideological 
agencies which fails to pay serious attention to the economic 
determinants framing production is bound to be partial. " 
(Golding and Murdock, l979 p. 198) 
In all of these later research positions (although they are con- 
siderably differentiated in matters of emphasis) there is a critical 
common thread. While some of the researchers have been personally 
committed to a particular ideology, usually socialist, all of them 
believe that communication research must be located within, and 
interpreted through, an adequate and questioning analysis of the 
social and economic conditions in which communication messages and 
products are framed. 
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Access and Participation 
In the following section, therefore, of the three objectives of 
expansion, integration and mobilisation, only the latter two will be 
considered, and these from a rather different perspective: that of the 
debate on access and participation to communications media. The inspiring 
principle of this debate is the concept of 'democratisation', whose 
origins are perhaps best expressed in the model of 'conscientisation' 
of the people, as articulated by Paolo Freire (1972). 
A special difficulty arises from the rather paradoxical nature of the 
access debate. As Frances Berrigan put it, in a book written for UNESCO 
a few years ago: 
"Its advocates share a common mood and tone, at once 
romantic, radical and missionary. They see the individual 
as trapped within social forms and the media as a passport 
to freedom. They express themselves characteristically in 
image and metaphor. Yet in reality, access is a matter of 
operation as well as ideology. It involves practitioners, 
technicians, entrepreneurs, as well as thinkers and social 
reformers. 
This is not to say that the romance and radicalism are 
unimportant; they are not only the one common link between 
many different experimenters and experimental forms, but 
also a motive force behind what is being done. Consequently 
(research) which goes beyond the philosophy of access into 
practical detail and analysis has both to understand and 
resolve this paradox, if it is to be more than yet another 
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contribution to a debate between interested parties. " 
(Berrigan, 1977 p. 15) 
This tension between thinker and practitioner has had a marked 
impact on the development of participatory media. While the thinker 
articulated ideals and aspirations, the practitioner looked for opera- 
tional forms. And because he was unable to penetrate traditional mass 
media channels, he sought alternative formats in low-cost, small-format 
technologies: community video, local radio, local cable television systems 
and so on. Since the inspiration for participatory media was one of 
social reform, not surprisingly they were first developed in the industrial- 
ised world. The manner of their development substantially affected their 
adaptation to developing countries, so much so that it will be as well to 
begin by briefly reviewing their historical development. 
The Growth of Community Media 
In the west, the forms of community media now extend from local to 
quasi-national levels, and include both radio and television. National 
systems have moved well beyond the simple 'phone-in' programme, to experi- 
ments such as that in Denmark, where the national radio organisation set 
up a "Radio Workshop" with its own production and editing facilities, 
designed for access to the public (both in using the technical facilities, 
and in air time on the second network). The BBC offers air time on tele- 
vision to minority groups and the assistance of technical staff and producers 
who are there only to give technical assistance in realising the groups' 
objectives, not as editors or censors. Another television series in 
Finland presents the opinion of minority groups in the form of a debate 
in the presence of the host community. But'the trend has gone furthest 
at the local community level, in the proliferation of video groups, usually 
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expressing political or social convictions. Sometimes these groups replay 
their programmes through a local cable network; sometimes they use them 
as resource material in public meetings or community events, or as the 
nucleus of a local library. 
However, some of the experiences of the West also laid the founda- 
tions for an adaptation of the same principles to the developing world. 
The Canadian "Challenge for Change" programme undertook what is probably 
its best known work in Fogo Island, off the coast of Newfoundland, 
husbanded by the Extension Department of the Memorial University. Its 
main thrust was to use the media to reflect communities to themselves, 
as a kind of public introspection out of which new insights and community 
building forces might emerge, and in the course of this work far more 
became known of the role of the group 'animator', as neutral observer 
and stimulus rather than active participant. The first period of Fogo 
was conducted on film, but after 1971, the advantage of videotape prod- 
uction (cheaper, and with instant replay was proven, and film was reserved 
only for items which were to be preserved as records, or shown to wider 
audiences. The techniques evolved in this long experience have since 
been spread, not only through North America, but to programmes in Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Validation in the Developing World 
The problems involved in this transfer were considerable, because of 
basic differences between conditions in the industrialised countries and 
18S developed countries. In most Western industrialised countries, 
community development projects concentrate on those sections of the commu- 
nity which are out of step' with the rate or level of development which 
the majority have achieved. But in most developing countries deprivation 
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is on a much larger scale. It is often rooted in traditions which have 
yet to be challenged, and the implications of redistribution of the 
benefits of development are that there is likely to be a reduction in 
economic and social position for those currently in power in favour of 
the disadvantaged majority. 
Partly because of this implication, the position of developing world 
Governments towards practical examples of participatory projects in the 
communication field has been more marked in public statements than in 
tangible experiments. 
There is no doubt that by now, -the doctrines of access and partici- 
pation are part of the litany of development, in such forms as UNESCO. 
The 'official' position is well summed up by the International Commission 
for the Study of Communication Problems, which was set up by UNESCO, 
presided over by Sean MacBride and completed its report in 1980. The 
final recommendations of the Commission include the following passage: 
"Implementation of national policies should be carried 
out through three complementary communication patterns: first, 
from decision-makers towards different social sectors to 
transmit information about what they regard as necessary changes 
in development actions, alternative strategies and the varying 
consequences of the different alternatives; second, among and 
between diverse social sectors in a horizontal information 
network to express and exchange views on their different demands, 
aspirations, objective needs and subjective motivations; third, 
between decision-makers and all social groups through permanent 
participatory mechanisms for two-way information flows to 
elaborate development goals and priorities and make decisions 
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on utilisation of resources. Each one of these patterns 
requires the design of specific information programmes, 
using different communications means. " (UNESCO, 1979 pp. 448-9) 
But in practice, in spite of international conferences on communi- 
cation access such as a UNESCO meeting in Belgrade in 1977, most of the 
projects and experiments which have been undertaken so far have been on 
a very limited scale. To some observers, there is something of the con- 
trived in this situation: for example, Juan Diaz Bordenave writes: 
"Thus we see readily available international financing 
for projects related to Intermediate Technology, Appropriate 
Technology, Participatory Communication Systems, etc. But 
one can also easily observe that most of these new technologies 
and projects are not used to facilitate the conscientization 
of the people on their oppressive structural situation and on 
their potential for political struggle for liberation. To 
achieve pragmatic goals of better agriculture, better health 
and better formal and non-formal education, yes. Conscienti- 
zation, Politization, Political Action, No. On the contrary, 
those reformist projects in general occur at the same time 
that police repression increases, as in the case of El Salvador 
at this precise moment. " (Bordenave, 1980 p. 18) 
What Bordenave is suggesting is a kind of 'pseudo participation': 
the adoption of formats originally devised to allow for community 
expression and challenge, and their deliberate harnessing to the propa- 
gation of a single development message. The attempt is therefore to 
engage public participation in a predetermined formula, rather than to 
encourage original and vigorous debate. Not all developing country 
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experiments have been of this kind (there have been notable exceptions 
in Tanzania, especially in the short-lived 'Year 16' video programme), 
but it is true of many. 
So, to commentators like Bordenave, the major problem is now one of 
translating what started out as 'alternative' forms of communication to 
a more comprehensive level, including the forms of mass communication. 
Bordenave himself put the point explicitly in the Latin American context: 
"We realized that it is impossible to really demo- 
cratize the media and put them at the service of the people, 
within the capitalist system. " . (Ibid, p 12) 
An American researcher, Robert Hornik, voiced the same doubts in a 
more expansive way: 
"I share the implicit doubts about the equation of the 
use of locally controlled/appropriate/low cost technology 
with outcomes of autonomous development and self-reliance. 
The assumption that the organization of the use of communi- 
cation in projects (as opposed to the social, economic and 
political influences which provide the context in which they 
work) is primarily responsible for their success or failure 
to generate self-reliant development relies on no evidence 
that I know, nor is it particularly persuasive. The place 
to look is at the purposes of technology-based programs and 
the political commitments to those purposes as reflected in 
available resources. A given technology system can be made 
to serve a wide variety of purposes; the technological deter- 
minism which suggests that a mass medium cannot be used in a 
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way which permits individualization, two-way address, and 
flexibility in local implementation as well as useful develop- 
ment outcomes at least equal to most alternatives, is mis- 
leading. I suspect the problem of converting a mass media- 
based system to the purposes of self development are rather 
less than the problems of expanding previous locally-based 
projects so that they reach the mass of a population. And 
both sets of problems pale before the obstacles to achieving 
the political and economic commitments crucial to success 
with either. " (Hornik, 1980 p. 2) 
Implications for Planning 
What is contemplated here is not primarily a reform of communication 
processes, but a comprehensive reform of social planning. Ultimately 
this implies the remodelling of communications, but only along with many 
other components of the social system. If the same discussion is related 
to the objectives of mobilisation and integration, what is being urged is 
a transition between the two: the development of sufficient self-confidence 
in a developing society to allow the single-minded concerns of mobilization 
to diversify. 
This discussion was recently related to development policy and 
planning needs in a paper written by Majid Tehranian. In it, he sought 
to make his account more concrete by taking a set of development goals 
as characteristically perceived by politicians and central planners, and 
expressing these same goals in terms which might be employed if they were 
viewed from the bottom instead of from the top of the social pyramid. 
(Table 14 ) 
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TABLE 14 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN PERSPECTIVE 
Development Goals Viewed from the Development Goals Viewed from the 
Top 
National power and security 
Social mobilization 
National identity, integration 
and unity 
Economic growth (rise in 
national income) 
Political socialization 
Property and business rights 
Educational and professional 
advance 
Information control 
Majority rule (where electoral 
democracy has moved in) 
Central control and direction 
Cultural and artistic direction 
(sometimes censorship) 
Ideological and cultural control 
Bottom 
Individual choice and freedom 
Social mobility 
Sub-national (ethnic or group interest) 
identity and solidarity 
Income distribution and social justice 
0 
Political participation 
Public and consumer rights 
Educational and professional 
opportunities 
Information access 
Minority rights 
Regional and local autonomy 
Cultural and artistic creativity 
(sometimes subversion) 
Intellectual and artistic freedom 
Teheranian commented on this table: 
"It is by no means exhaustive, nor does it represent any 
hierachy. The list is sufficient, however, to show the kinds of tension 
that the developmental process generates between the Government, which 
sets the communication policies, and the public, which is expected to 
observe those policies but may have its own views. These sets of object- 
ives are not, of course, irreconcilable. For the process of reconcili- 
ation to be effective, however, a missing link of communication should 
be provided. 
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Planning may be said to be of three kinds: reactive, 
inactive and proactive. In reactive planning, the planners 
are often reacting to a set of past events as perceived at 
present. Inactive planning, typical of the situation in 
many developing countries, consists in going through the 
formal motions of designing a plan only to put it aside and 
go on doing what you were doing before. Proactive planning 
is obviously future oriented; it involves not only correcting 
the past but also anticipating the future. It is this kind 
of planning that is critically dependent upon information 
and communication". " (Tehranian, 1978 p. 28) 
0 
The transition towards this kind of planning is clearly extremely 
difficult, but it may be that, if a basic self-confidence can be secured, 
the developing world may be in a better position than its industrialised 
counterpart to put it into practice. 
In the industrialized world the tendency has been to stress partici- 
pation in political activity and to leave planning somewhat aside as the 
technical prerogative of professional cadres. The inference has been 
that greater political participation will necessarily lead to planning 
based upon different, more liberal parameters. The same is true of 
industrial organization, where worker participation has been construed 
more in terms of access to decision-making bodies, which act upon the 
technical advice of planners, than as. direct involvement in the planning 
process. In this assumption there seems to be at least some danger of 
control through mystification by planners. 
#A 
The position (in the industrialized wörld) with respect to private 
mass communication enterprises is even worse. Traditionally, consumer 
interests have been reflected only in the demand analyses of market 
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research, and the pressures of organized consumer groups have been mostly 
concentrated upon messages (e. g. advertising or environmental issues) or 
the activities of large business concerns (e. g. the multi-national corpor- 
ations). Apart from the concerns of minority groups, such as those 
involved in public broadcasting campaigns, there has been little impetus 
towards a comprehensive overview of communication planning, as a pre- 
requisite to other specific kinds of reform. 
In the developing world, the position has been rather different, 
though the same traditions of verticality have been maintained, sometimes 
with more rigidity than in the West. Where notions of participation 
exist, they mostly do so in the sense of feedback, attached to extension 
work and delivery-centred development programmes. Every rural development 
or family planning communication model has its feedback component (by 
which is meant the return of opinion and reaction from the village to 
the production centre, so that programme success can be evaluated and 
elements of phasing, pace, motivation, face-to-face working and so on 
can be continuously adjusted). The model is itself direct and persuasive; 
the feedback occurs within that persuasive context. Often, the feedback 
system is very complex, involving a careful co-ordination of the activities 
of field workers with the generation of communication messages. 
Nevertheless, in the third world, the kinds of structures which have 
been created, often sectorally, for extension work do appear to carry 
within them a basic potential for greater participation in communication 
(and development) planning, if these are finally consistent with the 
aspirations of their societies. There are, in many cases, local mechanisms 
- for discussion, for administration, for social organization, for decision- 
making - which could be expanded to include both the upward movement of 
ideas and representative participation in planning activities. 
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In the multi-step, reciprocal process envisaged here, some principles 
of construction would be important. There would have to be, first of all, 
a good deal of latitude and flexibility in arrangements; at local and 
regional levels, theoretical models of organization are unlikely to work, 
as they must deal with residual factors of local culture, social organi- 
zation, special interests, status and the local innovation threshold. 
Moreover, a highly decentralized structure would be necessary, giving 
identity to each level of the chain, including the ability to be account- 
able for its own affairs. Participation will only be valued if it con- 
tains responsibilities as well as rights. 
Consequently, to whatever exteht is organizationally feasible, some 
elements of decision-making must be implanted at the local level, and the 
tendency towards centralization which is implicit in current planning 
resisted. This is in most cases a long-term proposition, but one which 
might ultimately produce a model more as symbolized in Figure 42. Here, 
the policy planning sequence is seen far more rotationally, implying a 
full dialogue at national, regional and local levels before subsequent 
stages of planning and implementation proceed. The model is, of course, 
again crude; it begs questions of which matters can be planned at local 
levels and which cannot, of the degree to which regional variations from 
a national norm are technically and economically possible, or of where the 
mechanisms for arbitration may lie. But it is an indicator of overall 
direction. And while such a model cannot be anticipated in developing 
country contexts in the immediate future, there are at least two precondi- 
tions for its eventual emergence: namely a care and a desire to avoid 
over-specificity in the early planning stages, and a positive attempt 
to build into a communication system viable local institutions with 
broad areas of responsibility. 
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Implications of Technology 
A final word may also be said on technological opportunity. It is 
evident by now that the micro forms of community media are insufficient 
to ensure participation; they tend in some ways to create a ghetto. It 
is also evident that for participation to be introduced adequately into 
mass media, change in overall social organisation is necessary: pressure 
within the communication system alone will not suffice. 
Nevertheless, in this process, new developments in technology 
may themselves help, and a good deal of research attention has been 
focused in the past few years on widening the popular base of access. 
Some forms of communication technology which seemed, at the time of 
their introduction, the prerogative of the industrialised world have 
now been adapted to suit smaller audiences and developing world 
communities. 
The first of these is the satellite. The satellite programmes 
of PEACESAT in the Pacific (using a satellite for audio connections 
between remote Pacific territories, linking university campuses), the 
experiments in two-way radio communication for medical purposes in Alaska, 
the various experiments surrounding the NASA satellite ATS-6 (especially 
the Indian satellite experiment), the emergence of low cost and mobile 
satellite ground stations and the new satellite demonstration projects 
of the US Agency for International Development - all of these have eroded 
the original image of the satellite as a rich country's tool. 
A particular need for the creation of opportunities for the local 
community itself to move out into the broader world. Improved telecommuni- 
- 470 - 
cations may provide part of the answer, and 
in some countries, steps are 
now being taken to strengthen these systems. In Alaska there is now a 
network of 120 satellite ground stations which provide open channel 
communications to every permanent community of twenty-five or more. In 
India there are plans to install public telephones in villages of over 
2,500 people, and in district and sub-district headquarters, with priority 
in under-privileged areas. In Kenya and Tanzania there are plans to 
extend postal and telephone services to all villages and in several Latin 
American countries (Columbia, Ecuador and Costa Rica) development plans 
include the installation of public telephones in rural areas and additional 
exchange systems. 
The relationship between group media and broader transmission systems, 
especially the telephone and radio, is not peripheral. At the simplest 
level, a community group which has defined its goals can use the telephone 
to make contact with decision-makers. By linking group media activities 
with local radio, there can be a platform for wider discussion and the 
stimulation of other people to participate in on-going activities, even 
if these have not been touched directly by group media projects. Program- 
ming from local radio and television can find an entry into regional 
broadcasting channels, when issues have reached a certain point of develop- 
ment, and because of the way in which societies are organised, this level 
of communication is more likely to make an impact on authority. 
Perhaps of equal significance for the future are the technological 
developments which have led to miniature forms of communication equipment, 
more portable camera and video recorders, and the spread of optical fibre 
transmission systems. The emergence of digital technologies, the growing 
application of the silicone chip, have helped create smaller production 
systems, more sophisticated distribution systems, and greater storage and 
access capacity. Combinations of the computer with other production, trans- 
mission and distribution systems are also significant. While these develop- 
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ments are as yet only partially applicable 
in the developing world, they 
promise a great deal for the future. Once the investment price 
has 
lowered, developing countries are in a better position than their industrial- 
ised counterparts to create new communication systems, because they have 
less commitment and interest in older forms and infrastructures. The 
process of adaptation has, in any case, begun. A recent programme of 
UNESCO has brought together a consortium of developing world engineers to 
design a genuinely low cost camera and recorder system. In India, the 
Space Applications Centre has a flourishing programme in communication 
technology adaptation, looking for cheaper and simpler, but above all 
indigenous ways of producing communication tools. It was in Indonesia 
that the electronic blackboard was fjrst developed (a device which allows 
for the transmission of simple visual information via telephone or radio 
links). 
It may be argued that the growing emphasis upon self reliance and 
endogenous growth in the developing world, in the technological as well 
as in other spheres, is founded as much upon political and expedient 
grounds as was much of the earlier dialogue on access and participation. 
At the same time, moves towards self-reliance do substantially increase 
the possiblity of introducing a genuine element of participation into 
developing countries, if only because they delimit the area of decision 
making (taking away some of the constraints of traditional patterns of 
technology transfer), and emphasise the creation of local technologies 
and communication systems, which demand concrete forms of planning and 
implementation. Any trend which emphasises the need to formulate precise 
objectives is likely to improve planning and expand its base of partici- 
pation. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis a continuum of planning approaches has been consi- 
dered, ranging from traditional models of operational and project plan- 
ning, through an experimental framework for overall system planning, to 
the far more tentative arena of open and participatory planning. The needs 
for research and application are different in each context. 
Operational and project planning have a long history and are well 
researched in a number of fields. The main requirement for the communi- 
cation sector is one of application, rather than of methodological develop- 
ment: methods and techniques evolved in other fields need more specific 
adaptation, through both simulation and field trial, to communication 
problems, accompanied by evaluations which seriously analyse the special 
conditions of the communication environment. 
Interest in overall system design, although much more recent, has 
also increased considerably in recent years. As a field of action it has 
also been absorbed into the official programmes of the international 
agencies (notably UNESCO), and accepted as a platform by the developing 
countries, in particular the Group of Non-Aligned Countries. It was dis- 
cussed by the 1980 Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activi- 
ties, Needs and Programmes for Communication Development, and endorsed as 
a mainstream activity by the Conference's Final Recommendation (which was 
adopted by consensus, though with considerable reserve from a number of 
countries, especially donor countries). Communication planning is there- 
fore likely to be fully embodied in the work of the upcoming International 
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Programme for the Development of Communication, which was proposed by 
that same Conference, and it is already included as a substantive 
operational item in the draft of the 1981-83 communication programme of 
UNESCO. 
It is gratifying that an activity which figured barely, if at all, 
in international programmes six years ago has now been endorsed so widely 
as a legitimate field. Nevertheless, this euphoria, which has a largely 
political base, should be treated with some caution. Communication plan- 
ning is not a universal prescription for all countries or for all situa- 
tions. The UNESCO programme proposes assistance for national communication 
planning in a number of developing countries over the next three years, 
but the execution of this programme may well be subject to the same kinds 
of practical constraint as has been the case with programmes on access 
and participation. Key concepts and issues which have a demonstrably 
democratic ring are less easily accepted in reality, when they require not 
only the commitment of nation - states, but also an agreement to let citi- 
zen participation challenge governmental orthodoxy. Among recent UNESCO 
programmes, it is those projects in the participatory field which have 
been the most under-implemented; requests simply do not arrive, or if 
they come from non-governmental agencies they fail to secure the approval 
of the host government (UNESCO being a consortium of governments, and its 
programme therefore subject to government approval). 
The same position may very well be true of communication system 
planning, if it is executed in the manner suggested by this thesis, pre- 
faced by (and derived from) an objective analysis and synthesis of communi- 
cation policies. Indeed, the only country which has so far undertaken 
such a comprehensive policy and planning review is Afghanistan, and the 
resulting plan has, for self-evident reasons, not been implemented. 
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Similar surveys have been discussed (for example with Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Jamaica, Malaysia), but in the event each proposal has been reduced to a 
project or sectoral exercise, which has in no case embarked upon an analy- 
sis of policy fundamentals, as a prelude to revitalising a communication 
system. 
It has been emphasised throughout this research that the framework 
which it considers is specifically concerned with developing countries, 
where the commitment to radical structural and societal change at least 
exists in theory, and where the forces of inertia are apparently fewer. 
But at the developing country level, too, there are many practical reser- 
vations, and it is a matter for speculation as to how far these reserva- 
tions can be honestly overcome. 
Whatever new attempts are made to plan comprehensively, it is 
important that these should be monitored and evaluated throughout, to 
enlarge the dimensions of what is still a tentative and primitively 
expressed framework. Unfortunately, the up coming UNESCO programme, 
with a heavy emphasis on practical action, significaly reduces the volume 
of research proposed for this area, apparently confident that enough has 
already been done for planning and research. 
The position in the field of open planning is even more difficult. 
At present UNESCO is engaged upon a global review of open planning 
approaches and is attempting to compile case studies of experiments, 
broadly following the taxonomy advanced in Chapter IX. There is, of 
course, a considerable literature available on the field of access and 
participation, but it is heavily concentrated upon local experiments, 
especially on alternative technologies, and has little to say about plan- 
ning processes. In this field, for a number of years to come, the focus 
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of research will probably have to be upon the collection, analysis and 
synthesis of case studies (usually a difficult task, as the examples are 
fugitive, mostly at local community levels, often the work of practitioners 
without involving planners or researchers, rarely described or monitored 
in detail, and often short-lived). Critical in all of this is a more 
general acceptance of the need for evaluation and research into project 
design and implementation. This is not an easy habit to encourage: few 
technical assistance agencies even contemplate, let alone insist upon, 
such an association, but prefer to continue with projects which are based 
upon broad, unquestioning and simplistic assumptions about the nature of 
communication, which mostly reflect obsolete models of diffusion. 
In consequence, an associated need is for training, not so much to 
produce communication planners, but rather a variety of specialists with 
an adequate and sympathetic knowledge of parallel and related fields to 
their own, who can work comfortably in multi -disciplinary teams. A limited 
number of research institutions have begun to create such programmes, 
usually at a post-graduate or post-experience level, and there are plans 
for an international programme to begin in 1982, following a series of 
regional workshops which is nearing completion, under UNESCO auspices. 
Similarly, there is a need for a broader, more sensitive and more 
detailed pattern of information exchange. The present pattern of institu- 
tional exchange is inadequate: far more is done through personal networks 
of interested scholars and planners. But the legacy of separate research 
traditions - especially the contrasted North American and European posi- 
tions - which has for so long inhibited the development of communication 
research, persists. Possibly the fora of the international agencies are 
still the best means of overcoming this disability, if they can be enticed 
to go beyond a superficial level of confrontation, and divert at least part 
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of their efforts to a more objective academic exploration, and a non- 
ideological exchange of personnel. 
Finally, it can be said that the field lacks, at present, a sense of 
coherence, of systemic unity - in short a philosophy. Mention was made 
earlier of a continuum of planning, but the interrelationship of the parts 
of this continuum is rarely discussed. The more we analyse planning methods 
and compile case studies of specific projects and processes, the more com- 
plex it will become to relate these organically, even with the assistance 
of computer models. Nevertheless, the main need is to relate the various 
initiatives and motivations of planning more thoughtfully, to underpin 
common interests and foci. In order. to avoid some of the earlier traps 
of unquestioning ideological acceptance, and a sterile concern with purely 
technical issues, we need an imaginative and comprehensive view of the 
whole planning environment, reflecting all those shifts of emphasis and 
perspective that were broadly outlined in Chapter IX. 
ANNEX 1 
SUMMARY PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS 
1. SINGAPORE EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION SERVICE 
In 1956/7, an audio-visual department was set up for the first time 
in the Singapore Teachers Training College. At that time, a limited 
educational radio service already existed in Singapore, under the control 
of the Ministry of Culture, but it was generally acknowledged that this 
was not effective in the schools, and its programmes were finally discon- 
tinued. The new Audio-Visual Unit was asked to investigate the introduc- 
tion of educational television into the Republic, and its first proposal 
was put forward in 1963. This submission was considered over a period 
of years until, in 1966, approval for the Service was given by Cabinet. 
It was established at this time that the new ETV Service would be opera- 
ted by the Ministry of Education, but that programme distribution would 
utilise the country's main broadcasting network. In a small country of 
some 225 square miles, distribution was not in any case considered a 
major problem. 
The Cabinet decision also intimated that the Service would come into 
operation in 1967 (i. e. after a lapse of only eight months, if it were to 
correspond with the beginning of the academic year). An adviser was quickly 
recruited from the United Kingdom's Centre for Educational Television 
Overseas (at that time an independent body, with a portion of its over- 
seas programme financed from Ford Foundation funds). The adviser (Alan 
Hancock) worked from April 1966 with the deputed Head of the ETV Service, 
Lian Fook Shin, and members of the Audio-Visual Unit, to develop the basic 
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proposal in greater detail and to begin a highly compressed programme of 
operational and budgetary planning, building and equipment, training and 
programme development. The Service was to be housed in a new block, then 
in the course of erection in the Teachers Training College; a first 
essential was to ensure that architectural plans (already completed in 
outline) could be adapted to educational television usage. Budgetary 
lines had also to be established rapidly, and equipment tendered and 
ordered. A training programme was initiated for production staff, which 
recruited a large number of interested teachers to a series of part-time 
courses; from the experience of this training programme, the final selec- 
tion of producers was made. However, programme development occupied the 
bulk of the time available. The Service was seen as an aid to qualitative 
educational reform and to the introduction of new curricula; there was no 
teacher shortage as such in the Republic, but there were serious weaknesses 
in certain areas, particularly science and mathematics. Programming was 
therefore curriculum supportive, but not in the form of direct teaching; it 
was to be accompanied by a range of printed support materials. A strong 
emphasis was upon the fostering of national cohesion (Singapore being a 
new State, having relatively recently seceded from Malaysia). Programmes 
were initially to be directed towards the first two Secondary levels, and 
all teachers at these levels were brought into the TTC campus, towards the 
end of the year, for brief orientation courses in the use of educational 
media. A quarterly magazine was also started, under the title of 'ETV 
Singapura'. 
General policy for the Service was evolved by an Advisory Committee, 
meeting at a senior policy level at least once a year. Specific series 
planning was in the hands of Programme Committees, meeting far more 
regularly; these included curriculum specialists, members of the school 
Inspectorate, school principals, content specialists and the series' 
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producers. Producers were ultimately responsible for programme presen- 
tation, though on matters of curriculum orientation, they were subject 
to the direction of the Programme Committee and its Chairman. 
Although impeded by what appeared to be impracticable deadlines 
and budgetary delays, the Service began transmissions in January 1967, 
broadcasting ten series a week to Secondary 1 and 2 classes over TV 
Singapura's Channel 8. The majority of programmes were repeated at 
least three times to ease timetabling difficulties, and programmes were 
devised in several languages (not dubbed, but produced in a different 
language according to each subject's requirements). English, Chinese 
and Malay all figured within this framework. Government and aided 
schools were issued with television receivers, and a basic evaluation 
system was set up, in which a rotating sample of schools reported weekly 
on all series, following a structured questionnaire. The results of these 
evaluations were later summarized in the Service's magazine; from 1967 
onwards they were computerized and their format extended. They gave a 
general picture of reactions to programmes, but did not attempt to meaure 
learning gains: primarily they operated as a check on programme quality 
and teacher/pupil reaction, which was followed carefully in the prepara- 
tion of new series. 
The Service was somewhat influenced, in its early days, by the 
fact that its principal adviser had come from a BBC educational broad- 
casting tradition, and programme presentation reflected this influence. 
However, partly because training was conducted locally and was problem- 
oriented, within a short space of time the Service developed its own style, 
responding to the demands of the Singapore'curriculum. Utilisation training, 
rushed in the formative stages, was improved in 1967; a series of special- 
ist seminars was held, as well as the first of many courses in ETV script- 
writing for teachers. (The tradition of the Service was that scripts, 
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and presentations, of programmes were in the hands of teachers working 
part-time; producers - though also teachers by background - had broad 
responsibilities, covering as many as three series per week, and help 
from specialists was necessary if programme quality was not to suffer). 
In August 1967, four inspectors from the Ministry of Education also spent 
a month surveying utilisation practices in the schools, reporting back to 
the Service to help determine future programme planning. 
Plans were made in 1967 for the expansion of the Service down to the 
Primary level and these were agreed in principle. Unfortunately, the 
withdrawal of UK military aid put unforeseen pressures on Government, and 
the expansion phase was postponed (in the event for many years). A report 
on the Service produced in 1968 by a consultant for the Ford Foundation 
(Meade 1968) commented favourably on progress, but stressed that producers 
were working beyond capacity, dependent on inadequate equipment and facili- 
ties. Producers were highly motivated (they were helped by winning two 
special prizes in 1967 and 1968 in the annual Japan Prize competition), 
but they could not sustain the same pace indefinitely. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these drawbacks, programming was extended, 
in 1971, to the primary levels and to the Pre-University level, not so 
much by expanding programme hours or budget, as by utilising time and 
resources made available through repeating previous series. All series had 
been extensively remade after the first year of transmissions, and again, 
to a lesser extent, after the second year. But by 1969-70 the majority 
were sufficiently acceptable to schools to be retransmitted with little 
more than updating. The primary programmes were produced in small units, 
stressing activity and group learning, and they proved very popular. A 
further development also came in 1970, when an Instructional Materials 
Library was opened at the Service: this was seen as the first phase in 
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developing a comprehensive multi-media facility. 
The report of a joint Singapore/UNESCO feasibility study in 1971 
specifically proposed the expansion of the Service into a Singapore 
Educational Media Service (SEMS), but it was not until 1973 that this 
step was finally taken. While small financial increments allowed the 
Service to extend its materials library, move experimentally into new 
programming areas, and acquire extra videotaping. and telecine facilities, 
the planned major expansion of effort into an integrated multi-media 
facility was continually delayed. Apparently, the Service did not figure 
sufficiently high in the country's list of priorities. 
In 1973, a new project was launched, which promised to change this 
state of affairs: CEPTA-TV (Centre for Production and Training in Adult 
Education for Television). A joint venture between the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation of Germany and the Singapore Government, this project had been 
in the planning stages since 1969, though originally as a combined venture 
between the Foundation and the Ministry of Culture (i. e. the broadcasting 
Ministry). In 1972, the Singapore interest was transferred to the Ministry 
of Education, and for the first time a link-up between CEPTA-TV and SEMS 
became a possiblity. CEPTA-TV was in part a regional association for 
South-East Asia, designed to offer programmes for use on regional tele- 
vision screens in the adult and non-formal education sectors, but the 
combination of SEMS and CEPTA-TV, especially from the point of view of 
physical facilities, was attractive. On the Singapore side, the Head of 
the Singapore Educational Media Service was appointed as Director of 
CEPTA-TV, and plans were made to develop a joint facility, which envisaged, 
among other things, the eventual integration of educational broadcasting 
in Singapore into a lifelong education process, operating on an independent 
education channel. 
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The development of CEPTA-TV was to prove onerous (in particular, 
progress on its regional front), and further integration did not come 
quickly. Under the terms of the basic Agreement, the Singapore Govern- 
ment was to provide the site and buildings for a new production complex, 
but delays on this facility were lengthy. Finally, in 1°76, approval 
for the necessary finance was given. 
After its original momentum, therefore, the ETV Service was forced 
to sustain itself over a long period of time at a more restrained level, 
concentrating on improvements in programming, limited expansions into 
new territory, a better range and integration of media. Some bureaucratic 
revisions were made which were to prove helpful (the integration, for 
example, of Ministry of Education audio-visual services, including the 
audio-visual inspectorate). But a major boost was lacking, and there 
were still many frustrations. 
The proposed integration between CEPTA-TV did not take place; when 
the regional association moved to new premises, the Singapore Educational 
Media Service moved to CEPTA-TV's old studio complex, which at least 
helped to resolve some of its production problems. In the meantime, 
changes in video technology, especially the development of videocassettes, 
substantially affected future planning for the Service, in a small country 
where physical distribution of audio-visual materials presented less of a 
problem than in most developing country environments. 
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2. SATELLITE INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION DE', 'ý1ONSTRATION (SITE 
India's interest in practical applications of space technology dates 
from the early sixties, when the first active space research programme 
began, through the initiative of the late Drs. Vikram Sarabhai and Homi 
Bhaba. The first earth station was built at Ahmedebad in 1967, with 
UNDP assistance. At that time, most materials and technical expertise 
were imported, but the experience gained was such that the first commer- 
cial station at Arvi was constructed largely with indigenous equipment. 
Television in India was confined for many years to the city of Delhi, 
where a school programme began in the mid-sixties. In 1967 a pilot 
agricultural TV project (Krishi Darshan) also began in the Delhi area, 
with 80 community sets distributed around the countryside, as a first 
follow-up, in TV, of the earlier farm forums on radio. But it was not 
until the mid-seventies that television extended to the Bombay, Amritsar 
and Srinagar areas, and later to Calcutta, Lucknow and Madras. While the 
radio network in India is comprehensive, the build-up of terrestrial TV 
transmissions has been relatively slow. 
In 1966, a UNESCO expert panel proposed a pilot project for educa- 
tional and development purposes using a space satellite. This panel had 
countries like India specifically in mind, because of their size and 
diffuseness; an annexure to the final report made particular mention of 
Indian potential. Subsequently, in 1967, a UNESCO mission visited India, 
and in cooperation with an Indian team produced a report recommending 
considerable television expansion and an accelerated training programme. 
In the same year, a study team sponsored by the Indian Department of 
Atomic Energy visited the USA and France, for an on-the-spot study of 
satellite developments, and concluded that it was technically feasible 
to launch an educational TV experiment with a suitable satellite (such as 
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ATS -F or G, then under development with NASA). The attraction cf this 
satellite, which was experimental, was that it was a direct broadcasting 
satellite (i. e. it was to make provision for relaying TV signals directly 
to the ground, to individual community receivers, rather than to a terres- 
trial transmitter which would then rebroadcast in the traditional way). 
Thus, a genuinely rural experiment might be mounted, independent of the 
expansion of the Indian terrestrial TV network, which not unnaturally was 
extending primarily through the major cities and only afterwards to country 
areas. 
In 1968, an Inter-Ministerial Committee was set up, entitled NASCOM 
(National Satellite Communications Group). The group included representaý 
tives of potential user Ministries, of the Indian Space Research Organisa- 
tion (ISRO), of the communications authorities and of All India Radio (AIR). 
It subdivided its activities into a number of smaller working groups and 
reported favourably, after six months, on the viability of the satellite 
experiment, having completed a good deal of preliminary work on such problems 
as village selection, maintenance, programme production needs and training. 
It recommended that an agreement should be concluded with NASA (the US Space 
agency), and this was signed on September 19th 1969. According to the 
memorandum of understanding, the general objectives of the experiment were 
perceived as: 
(i) gaining experience in the developing, testing and manage- 
ment of a satellite based instructional TV system, especi- 
ally in rural areas; 
(ii) demonstrating the potential value of satellite technology 
in the developing world; 
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demonstrating the potential value of satellite broad- 
cast TV for instructional purposes; 
(iv) stimulating Indian national development in managem: m. it, 
technological, economic and social areas. 
(Cowlan et alia 1973, p 35) 
The original timetable proposed called for satellite availability 
in late 1972 or early 1973, which would have forced an accelerated pace 
of development. However, for technical and budgetary reasons, the 
project was delayed until 1974, which allowed for a longer run-up time. 
In the event, this delay led to temporary inertia in India, particularly 
in software aspects of the experiment, and in the years before 1974, 
when a massive effort was begun, repeated doubts were expressed by a 
variety of external agencies on the slowness of production and evaluation 
preparations. One major factor was disagreement on production responsi- 
bility. Under the Rules of Business of AIR, broadcasting production 
rested exclusively with the national broadcasting organisation, and it 
was not until 1973/4 that this principle was partially eroded, leaving 
AIR in supervisory authority, but with some production being delegated 
to the Indian Space Research Organisation itself (and subsequently, some 
other production responsibilities to other agencies, including the 
Ministry of Education). 
The Agreement made available to India four hours of programming 
daily, for a period of one year from August 1975 to July 1976. (The 
satellite was actually launched in 1974, but was used over an initial 
year for experiments in the United States, after which its orbital 
position was changed). ISRO was responsible for all developments of a 
technical nature on the ground and set up two earth stations (transmit- 
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receive) in Ahmedebad and Delhi to transmit programmes to the satellite. 
2,400 sets were installed in villages in six States, to receive community 
programmes, news and current affairs, school and teacher education series, 
agriculture, health education, family planning and various socio-cultural 
themes. For four hours per day the satellite provided one video and two 
audio channels, allowing for some language differentiation, and programmes 
were produced in three base production centres created by AIR (supple- 
mented by two small studios operated by ISRO). 
The ISRO organisation was characterised from the outset by its homo- 
geneity and innovativeness, especially in the technical field. A standard 
3-metre antenna for community-reception was designed very early, and at a 
later stage, more sophisticated technologies viere developed, including the 
local fabrication of larger antennae. But programming and evaluation strands 
were much slower to emerge, partly because of coordination difficulties 
among the many agencies involved in the experiment. Although a sizeable 
evaluation programme was finally undertaken during the project, this did 
not really get under way until late 1973, after ISRO had set up its own 
evaluation cell. Similarly, in programming, stockpiling began in earnest 
only in 1974, after a senior AIR executive was specially designated to 
take over production responsibility, and it was in the same year that 
utilisation training programmes also began under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Education and the Centre for Educational Technology of its 
National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT). Many of 
the ambitious original plans for formative evaluation to take place during 
programme construction did not materialize; there was a good deal of work 
on needs assessment and some pre-testing of materials, but production 
demands were such that programmes could not be remade after piloting, only 
later programmes in the series modified. 
Nonetheless, the experiment began on schedule in 1975 and continued 
to the end of the allocated year. A considerable amount was learned of 
the difficulties of operating such a large-scale system, and of imple- 
menting a phased developmental programme calling for considerable inter- 
agency cooperation. Research components included technical evaluation, 
needs assessment and input research (e. g. carrying out audience profile 
surveys as a preliminary to programme planning), an extensive feedback 
study, based on a daily interview schedule covering a panel of 100 villages, 
an impact study on children (mostly affecting the morning instructional 
programmes), a programme content study using message system analysis 
techniques, and a series of smaller in-depth studies on communication 
processes and effects (the latter confined to particular clusters). 
The results of the evaluation were not complete by the end of 1976 
(the cut-off point of the present analysis), but even in mid-stream it 
was reported that satellite TV continued to attract large audiences, 
usually between 100-200 and on some occasions up to 500-1,000. In child- 
ren's programmes, despite the need to produce an 'all-purpose' programme 
covering children between 5+ and 12 years, the attraction of the medium 
and its novelty were such that audiences of 95 continued to be reported, 
even after 8-9 months of exposure. The satellite was used, linked via 
an improvised terrestrial hook-up, to broadcast the Prime Minister's 
address to the nation for the first time on television in August 1975. 
A programme of teacher-training, carried out in conjunction with the 
satellite experiment by the Centre for Educational Technology of NCERT, 
reached 22,106 teachers (against a target of 24,000) in over 2,000 centres. 
On occasions when floods made maintenance work on defective receivers 
difficult or impossible to carry out, villagers carried them on stretchers, 
or ferried them by boat, to reach maintenance teams. 
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The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment was not seen by 
its creators as an ideal experiment. Very little in the way of learning 
gains could be expected, for example, after such a short-term exposure. 
The main advantage of the experiment was the experience which it provided 
of management and development problems. 
Originally SITE was meant to be followed almost immediately by the 
launch of India's own domestic satellite. This proved to be financially 
and logistically impossible, and the problem of continuity was only parti- 
ally resolved through the priority extension of terrestrial transmitters 
to at least some of the rural clusters which received SITE programmes. 
This was particularly marked in the Kheda region, near Ahmedebad, where 
the original developmental group attached to the Space Applications Centre 
continued to provide a daily one-hour programme, half of which was produced 
from its own studios. 
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3. INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION IN EL SALVADOR 
The possibility of introducing instructional television (ITV) into 
El Salvador was discussed in the Salvador national press as early as 1960, 
but it was not until 1962 that some definite steps were taken. At that 
tiiýme, Walter Beneke, Salvadorean Ambassador to Japan, had become interes- 
ted in the educational television work of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corpora- 
tion), and he was able to arrange for a team of Japanese engineers to visit 
El Salvador. This team recommended the establishment of a national ITV 
system, and in 1963 President Julio Rivera set up an Educational Television 
Commission, ostensibly to prepare a national plan for ITV by 1964. The 
work of the Commission dragged; some Salvadoreans were sent to Japan for 
training, but were without positions on their return, and although a 
Department of Educational Television was created in 1974 within the Mini- 
stry of Education, for two years it had neither leader nor budget. Matters 
progressed only when Beneke returned from Japan, and was himself appointed 
Chairman of the Commission. 
In 1966, a decision was made that ITV should be introduced initially 
into the Third Cycle of Education, Grades 7-9, on the grounds that the 
country was mostly in need of a middle-level and technical work force, 
to promote its industrialization programme. The Commission also recom- 
mended that ITV should'be administered by an autonomous institution 
reporting directly to the President, so as to sidestep the apparent 
inertia of the Ministry of Education. By 1967, some experimental programme 
production had begun, using rented commercial studios. However, in April 
1967, the (then) President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez participated in a meet- 
ing of Government leaders of the Americas, and heard Lyndon Johnson speak 
of the possibility of financing a pilot ITV project somewhere in Latin 
America. He suggested El Salvador, and this was later corroborated by 
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an AID survey team, recruited through the National Association of Educa- 
tional Broadcasters (NAEB, 1967). This team also came out in favour 
of a primary, rather than a secondary, target audience, but after a 
lengthy debate the Salvadoreans won their case in this respect. Mean- 
while, Walter Beneke was appointed (linister of Education, and at this 
point arguments against Ministry of Education control evaporated on 
both sides. 
The agreement for the project was signed in 1968. Under its terms, 
USAID agreed to contribute 653,000 dollars to the start-up costs of ITV, 
mostly for equipment. A back-up loan of 1.9 million dollars was also 
negotiated for the construction of facilities, and various kinds of 
technical assistance expertise were agreed (the latter not confined to 
US assistance). 
ITV was not, however, a project in its own right, but part of an 
extensive programme of curriculum reform, which included the preparation 
of new curricula, teacher training, educational administrative reform, 
the diversification of technical education, and various forms of materials 
production. Nevertheless, ITV was to play a highly significant part in 
this process because, under the pressure of technical and programming 
deadlines., it was able to push other, more inert parts of the system for- 
ward, and hasten delivery (especially of curricula). One. of the first 
acts of Minister Beneke was to close most of the normal schools for teacher 
training, which had been over-producing primary school teachers, and 
establish a new centralised normal school in a single campus. Here, first 
short-term, and subsequently one-year, courses for secondary teachers were 
initiated, including curriculum and pedagogic training, principles of 
education, methodology, and ITV utilisation. 
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In September 196E a temporary TV studio was equiipped, and the fiirsi 
20 members of the ITV staff began on-the-job training, under the super- 
vision of the first batch of advisers. A tentative revision of the seventh- 
grade curriculum was completed in November, and the ITV production teams 
began work, with three months in which to complete programmes and class- 
room support materials for pilot ITV transmissions. ITV was introduced 
into 32 seventh-grade classes when school reopened in February 1969, 
utilised by 100 teachers who had undergone the crash utilisation training 
programme. Simultaneously, a more extensive nine-month retraining pro- 
gramme began for a further 250 teachers, ready for the next academic year. 
Progress in 1969 was hampered by the war between El Salvador and 
Honduras, as this caused a blockage of aid funds which was only lifted 
in 1970 (so creating a year's delay in completing the second TV studio). 
Still, in February 1970 the reform curriculum was extended throughout 
the seveth-grade, with ITV in 216 out of 400 classrooms, and the original 
pilot classes began a revised eighth-grade, also with ITV support. In 
October of this year, the Salvadorean National Assembly gave the final 
authorisation for the AID loan to finance new studio and transmission 
facilities, and the next stage of the project was able to move forward, 
albeit belatedly. The following year brought a major reorganisation of 
the Ministry of Education and a new system of oriented promotion for 
students, with some modernisation of test methods and evaluation. The 
extension of curriculum and of ITV continued, with re-training for 
primary school teachers now beginning (using television) and re-orientation 
for school directors. However, in July of this same year, a teachers' 
strike began, in pursuit of higher pay and reduced workloads. There was 
considerable disorganisation throughout the system, and ninth grade 
programmes went off the air for much of the year. It was not until 
Spetember 1971 that the strike was finally settled, and even afterwards 
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many schools remained disorganised. 
At this time, Beneke resigned as Minister of Education and trans- 
ferred to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Nonetheless, his main task had 
been completed, and the extension of both ITV and the new curriculum 
continued generally according to plan. In 1972, a new Five Year Plan 
was prepared for the country, which included the extension of ITV to 
the Second Cycle, and also its expansion into adult education. By this 
time the new production complex had opened and there was more time for 
retraining studio personnel, thus helping to improve production standards 
(which had never had time to stabilise). The original impetus had been 
reduced by this time, with a much slower expansion into new levels, espe- 
cially non-formal levels, though there was a definite need for a period 
of consolidation, as the system was taken over in entirety by the Salva- 
doreans. 
The success of El Salvador was confirmed, in both management and 
learning contexts, by a lengthy series of evaluations carried out, as 
the system developed, by the Institute of Communication Research, 
Stanford University (Mayo et alia, 1976). In a period of four years (up 
to 1972) some 10,000 students had completed grades 7-9 with television. 
As a result of the overall Reform, considerable improvements were regi- 
stered throughout the school system, and ITV was a strong egalitarian 
influence in this process, as it was one of the few resources distribu- 
ted equally across the country, being available to 70% of all Third Cycle 
students. The most impressive gains in learning were on general ability 
tests, where ITV students gained between 15-25% more than did their non- 
ITV peers in the Third Cycle. Learning was influenced by student back- 
ground factors such as family wealth and parental level of education, but 
ITV, introduced always in the context of the overall reform, was judged 
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more important than any other community or classroom variable in pre- 
dicting student learning. There were gains on both individual subject 
tests, and on tests of numerical, verbal and nonverbal reasoning abili- 
ties, though there was no apparent improvement in reading skills. (Some 
of this was attributed to variable programme quality by the project's 
evaluators, and specific recommendations were made for improved training 
programmes and better salaries for production personnel. ) 
The evaluators attributed success in this project to a number of 
factors. Paramount among these were the commitment of Walter Beneke, 
the emphasis upon utilisation, the association of ITV with a total educa- 
tional reform programme, and the phased introduction of all reforms. On 
the whole, too, although doubts were cast upon the individual efficacy of 
foreign advisers, their contribution to the programme was felt to be 
important. There had, however, been some doubt cast on the exclusive 
concentration of ITV upon the Third Cycle in its early stages, rather 
than on primary or non-formal levels. Although this concentration was 
justified on manpower planning and economic grounds, in fact economic 
expansion did not match the increased school enrollments. 
Much of the reform programme was, however, justified on broader 
philosophical grounds: on the right of the Salvadorean child to nine years 
of basic education; it was not confined to cost reduction, manpower plan- 
ning or even curriculum considerations. 
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4. ASIA-PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR BROADCASTING DEVELOPMENT 
In 1966, a UNESCO meeting held in Bangkok, entitled 'Radio and 
Television in the Service of Development in Asia', put fori-Iard the idea 
of a regional institute for advanced broadcasting training to be based 
on a national training institution which would first of all meet the 
specific needs of an Asian country. It set regional training within a 
hierarchy of training needs, formulated as follows: 
"National training is the fundamental requirement ... 
Regional training should preferably be built upon a national 
foundation ... 
(but) given this national basis, regional 
training has the advantage of financial saving through the 
centralisation of resources, justification for a better and 
larger staff, a stronger appeal to international aid sources, 
and the opportunity to develop regional exchanges of experi- 
ences and programmes". (UNESCO, 1967 p 26) 
In this statement, the origins of the Asia-Pacific Institute for 
Broadcasting Development were implicit. In 1967, a UNESCO-sponsored 
survey of training needs in the Asian region revealed that, out of a 
total of 35,000 broadcasting personnel, 20,000 would be in need of 
training or re-training over a five-year period. Of these, 10o were 
estimated as potential recruits for a regional training programme. 
Subsequently, a meeting of training experts held in Malaysia agreed 
upon Kuala Lumpur as the location for an eventual Institute (after hearing 
the rival claims of both Malaysia and Iran). An initial development 
programme was entrusted to UNESCO and financed by UNDP, and in 1970 a 
UNESCO Regional Broadcasting Planning Adviser (Alan Hancock) took up 
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post in Kuala Lumpur. His task was twofold: to assist in the develop-. 
ment of the National Broadcasting Training Centre of flalaysia; and to 
make plans for the creation and financing of the regional institute. 
A national centre was established in temporary premises in 1972, 
and four experts were seconded to a UNESCO project, again financed by 
UNDP, with equipment provided by the UK under its bilateral aid programme. 
Simultaneously, survey tours of Asian countries were made to examine the 
regional problem, and a questionnaire survey was mounted. In 1971 a 
lengthy report was published; 'Asian Broadcasting Training Institute' 
(Hancock 1971). This was discussed at the annual meeting of the Asian 
Broadcasting Union (from the outset an active supporter of the proposal), 
and a formal submission was made to UNDP for financing. However, this 
main submission was turned down as not having a sufficiently high develop- 
ment priority, and only an interim programme was financed, which covered 
a limited number of annual regional courses and the continued services 
of the Regional Broadcasting Planning Adviser, reinforced by an additional 
expert to be responsible for mounting basic, in-country courses. In 1972, 
a supplementary report was issued (Hancock 1972) and again discussed at 
the ABU; this report proposed a system of self-maintenance for the Institute 
through annual contributions from mixed sources, including the broadcasting 
organisations themselves. It was discussed at the ABU General Assembly, 
and a special Study Group was formed to look more closely at its recom- 
mendations. However, the cost-sharing formula was not accepted at this 
time. 
In 1972, the national training programme began in Malaysia, and later 
in the same year a limited regional programme was started. This was oper- 
ated very much on an ad hoc basis; individual courses were financed by 
separate sponsors and specialist consultants were secured for each train- 
ing programme. The facilities of the National Broadcasting Training Centre 
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were made available to the regional programme by the Malaysian Govern- 
ment (which had remained loyal to the concept, in spite of financial 
and political setbacks), and the overall programme was coordinated by 
UNESCO. 
In the meantime, plans were going ahead for the construction of 
a new training complex, on the site of the main radio and television 
facility of Malaysia, following designs prepared in 1971 with UNESCO 
assistance. A more permanent policy-making body was established, in 
1973, as the Asian Broadcasting Training Group (later renamed Committee), 
which included representatives of the ABU, of the host institution, of 
UNESCO, and of other sponsors. This group was responsible for the pre- 
paration of an annual programme, though financing was still largely 
coordinated by UNESCO. 
The two years from 1973-4 were a period both of consolidation and 
of attempts to put the project on a more secure, long-term footing. The 
importance of the project was underlined by a resolution passed at an 
Asian Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies convened by UNESCO 
in Jakarta; further endorsement came from the ABU and from the 1974 
General Conference of Unesco. But UNDP rejected requests for further 
sponsorship, at least for the time being, and in 1974, the in-country 
programme had to be suspended for lack of funds. From 1973 onwards, the 
burden of coordination fell primarily upon UNESCO, which maintained its 
Regional Communication Adviser in Malaysia, financing his services from 
the Organisation's own regular programme. 
Nevertheless, training opportunities continued, and the search for 
sponsors was reasonably successful. By 1975,640 broadcasters had been 
trained at an advanced or intermediate level 
in Kuala Lumpur; 579 had 
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received basic training on in-country courses. The range of sponsors 
included multilateral, bilateral and private organisations - over ten 
agencies were involved at different times 
The philosophy of the project also changed considerably. In 1975, 
the Institute was renamed 'Asian Institute for Broadcasting Development', 
to symbolise the extension of its role beyond a simple training function: 
research, planning and development also figured theoretically in its 
repertoire. In the context of training, priorities shifted; whereas the 
original demand had been for basic skills (e. g. engineering and production), 
a survey conducted in 1975 showed a shift of interest towards training in 
more specialised areas, including an emphasis on management and instructional 
topics, in particular the training of trainers. The first materials were 
produced by the Institute, including a broadcasting glossary, and links 
were set up with other national and regional organisations, such as the 
communication faculty of the Universiti Sains Malaysia, CEPTA TV, and the 
Asian Mass Communication Information and Research Centre in Singapore. 
At the same time, the original emphasis on television training was also 
reduced, as more interest was shown within the region in a revival of 
radio. 
In 1975, under pressure from the Malaysian Government, UNDP agreed 
to finance a further survey of the project, and subsequently a completely 
revised project document was prepared for circulation (hopefully to be 
financed, from 1976 onwards, by UNDP's Intercountry Programme for Asia and 
the Pacific). Unfortunately, the timing of this submission coincided 
with a massive liquidity problem for the agency, and all new projects were 
temporarily suspended. However, a Project Manager was appointed for 
further preparatory work (R. Balakrishnan, the earlier Director of the 
National Broadcasting Training Centre), including in particular the 
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convening of an inter-governmental meeting in 1977. With whatever 
resources could be mustered, the regional programme continued as before. 
At this time, UNESCO was still continuing its direct assistance through 
the Regional Communication Adviser, and a regional training coordinator 
was also financed by the New Zealand Government. 
In 1976, the long-awaited training complex opened, now renamed the 
Tun Abdul Razak Broadcasting Training Institute (in honour of the recently 
deceased Prime Minister of Malaysia). A reduced project submission was 
made to UNDP, in the light of their changed financial circumstances, and 
while the search for additional sponsors continued (successful approaches 
were made, for example, to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation), 
a main effort was directed towards turning the Institute (soon to be renamed 
the Asio-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development) into a bona fide 
intergovernmental organisation. This move, which had been resisted for 
many years by the Asian Broadcasting Union, seeing it as a threat to the 
independence of broadcasters and to mixed public and private broadcasting 
systems, was now agreed to be necessary if long-term financial and material 
support were to be secured throughout the region. 
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5. GROW (GROUP RESOURCES OF WOMEN) - TOBAGO 
The first outline of the GROW project appeared in the Regular 
Programme of UNESCO for 1973-4, as approved by UNESCO's 1972 General 
Conference. Entitled 'Communication and the Functional Education of 
Women', it embodied a programme proposal in the area of communications 
media and lifelong education; strong connections viere foreseen with 
International Women's Year. Conceptually, the project was also part 
of a major initiative of UNESCO's Communication Sector in the Caribbean, 
which was most directly expressed through a regional project (financed 
by UNDP) on the use of communication in development. 
The island of Tobago was chosen, in 1973, as an appropriate loca- 
tion for a pilot experiment: the island was compact and homogeneous, and 
relatively underdeveloped as compared with its sister island Trinidad. 
It had (in 1970) a population of 41,000, of whom half were women and 
under the age of 21. One of its major problems was migration (to Trinidad), 
and employment opportunities were limited. 
The project was therefore planned mainly as an experiment in com- 
munity development, with media acting as catalyst; the communication 
emphasis was to be on low-cost forms, including the community press, 
radio and simple video formats. However, in tracing its development, 
several influences have to be accounted for, as these were not always 
compatible and seriously affected the success of the programme. The 
first influence was the strong emphasis upon educational programmes for 
women, accentuated by the imminence of International Women's Year. There 
was, secondly, a growing interest by UNESCO in multi-media materials for 
education, and in particular low-cost and innovative technologies. 
Finally, there was the emergence of a new strand of activity concerned 
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with community media - media based upon community identity and gr, owwrth, 
to be created and managed by the community itself, stressing principles 
of access and participation. Another part of the UNESCO Communication 
Sector's programme was, at the same time, concerned with community media 
in North America and Europe, where models of development in industrial- 
ised settings were being surveyed. The Tobago project was intended to 
furnish preliminary experience on the application of such principles in 
the developing world, as a prelude to a more structured exploration of 
this field at a later stage. For this reason, there was a particular 
stress upon allowing the Tobago experiment to evolve of its own accord, 
without pressure, so as not to prejudge its problems. 
Initial discussions in Trinidad and Tobago, handled through the 
UNESCO National Commission for that country, seemed to indicate interest 
in the project, and subsequently a consultant, Kay Kinane (of the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission) visited Tobago for a few weeks in mid- 
1973. Her visit was welcomed by the Trinidad National Commission, whose 
Secretary General (Sheilah Solomon) considered Miss Kinane's personality 
and experience exactly what was needed (in fact, it was hoped that she 
might later act as a more permanent expert, though in the event she could 
not be released from her Australian functions). The report which she 
completed (Kinane 1973) laid particular stress upon community and self- 
help actions, including employment and tourist possibilities; however, it 
had little specific to say about communication's role. After much cor- 
respondence, a version of the project was put forward for consideration 
in Trinidad, which included both Miss Kinane's material and other material 
prepared by the UNESCO Secretariat: it was received in the country in 
October, and formed the basis of a Cabinet paper submitted in December. 
The project as revised was not actually accepted until April 1974; 
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ill the final framework the UNESCO commitment a;, ºounted to 67,840 dollars, 
and included the services of a senior media adviser and a variety of 
equipment. Because of UNESCO's budgetary procedures, much of this equip- 
ment had to be ordered in 1973: a constraint which led to difficulties 
at a"later stage. In spite of the non-approval of the main document, a 
senior media adviser (a Canadian, Ernest Mutimer) was appointed in January 
1974, for a period of two years. Mutimer's expertise was mostly in mass 
media (in radio, television and film); he had been working previously as 
part of a residential team in the Caribbean (attached to the UNDP/UNESCO 
regional communication project) and had actually been located in Trinidad. 
It was felt that his previous experience of the region should help him 
acclimatise quickly to the new project's demands, even though he was 
unfamiliar with community animation and development work. 
On Mutimer's appointment, a local coordinator was also found, but 
she resigned almost immediately. Subsequently, a young sociologist, 
Joy Henry, was recruited in her place, though only after a seven-month 
interval. Two other local staff were also found, one of whom, Olive 
Sawyer, was a social worker and educationist of many years' experience, 
now in retirement. 
Much of 1974 was taken up with receiving equipment, pressing for 
building works for the GROW centre (which were substantially delayed, 
though they were part of the Government commitment), and negotiating 
acceptance of the project document. Very little time, according to 
subsequent evaluations, was spent in devising infrastructures for the 
project's organisation, consolidating local development contacts, 
training personnel, or producing an operational work programme. In 
October 1974, the project was visited for one month by a Canadian con- 
sultant appointed by UNESCO, who had a strong background in community 
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video programmes; he reportedly brought to the project some fresh impetus, 
and gave some instruction in video production. 
By 1975, there was still apparently no real work programme, and 
what had been achieved had been random. For example, a small group, 
encouraged by Olive Sawyer, had been making greeting cards out of banana 
leaves; some videotapes had been produced to demonstrate local handi- 
crafts. A survey had been conducted on readership habits, to help prepare 
for the community newspaper, but the results of this survey were left 
unprocessed for a considerable period. 
In April, 1975, a member of the UNESCO Secretariat (Alan Hancock) 
visited the project, together with Hugh Cholmondeley (the Caribbean 
regional adviser), and at this time helped draw up, together with Sheilah 
Solomon, the Secretary General of the Trinidad National Commission and 
the prime mover of the project, a more specific framework for project 
development. The Senior Media Adviser produced a work plan, which inclu- 
ded newspaper work, radio programming and a series of travelling exhibi- 
tions. The newspaper actually began production in June 1975, assisted 
by an associate expert (Bernard Legrelle, who had arrived on the project 
in early 1975, sponsored by the Belgian Government), but the radio input 
was of very short duration, and the exhibitions did not finally take place. 
The local coordinator, Joy Henry, had to leave the project for medical 
reasons, and relationships between other local staff and experts deteri- 
orated. Later in 1975, two further evaluations were made: one by Everold 
Hosein, a visiting lecturer from the University of the West Indies, and 
the second by Sheilah Solomon herself. Hosein attributed the failure of 
the project to take off the ground to two factors: conflicting objectives 
and incompatible views of its functions; and unsuitable expert personnel. 
Sheilah Solomon developed both of these themes in some detail, arguing 
that the failure of the project to assume a tangible shape lay in the fact 
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that, in its original conception, comi, un icati on ',. Jas seen as a 'neutral 
facility', attached to development objectives which were not clarified 
in the project plan, but left to emerge as a result of community involve- 
ment. 
The Senior Media Adviser left Tobago in December 1975, though the 
associate expert stayed on for a further year. The community newspaper 
was the only real survivor of the many communication initiatives, although 
even this was criticised at first as basically a tourist promotion, with 
few roots in the local community. Subsequent development of the project 
was expected to lie in affiliating it more strongly with regional initi- 
atives, and at the same time trying to involve it more strongly with local 
development programmes. During 1976, the UNESCO assistance was gradually 
phased out, much of it concerned with specialist assistance (e. g. for 
the newspaper, as the most viable point of operations) and with evalu- 
ation. The regional connections which had been hoped for did not finally 
materialise (as the UNDP regional communication project was discontinued 
at the end of 1976). 
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6. THE OPEN UNIVERSITY 
Although references to a 'University of the Air' can be traced as 
far back as the 1920s, the first official proposal for the present 
institution was made by Harold Wilson, in a speech in Glasgow, Scotland, 
in 1963. Preliminary steps towards planning were take by the Minis- 
terial Committee on Broadcasting, in 1965, after the Labour Party had 
come to power (mention of the Open University was made in its 1964 
manifesto). Miss Jennie Lee, then Minister of State for the Arts, was 
asked to create an advisory group to study the educational functions and 
content of a 'University of the Air', and her group reported in 1965 (a 
White Paper was produced in 1966). Subsequently, an Official Committee 
was asked to consider further aspects of organisation and finance; its 
estimates were again checked, at the invitation of the Prime Minister, 
by Lord Goodman. In the event, though both estimates were close to each 
other, the institution proved to be much larger and more costly than had 
been envisaged. 
Jennie Lee originally argued that the University of the Air could 
only be serviced by allocating a fourth television channel to educa- 
tional broadcasting. However, this argument was not accepted, and a 
partnership arrangement with the BBC, using existing channel space, 
became the basis of media operations. 
In 1967, the appointment of a Planning Committee, as proposed by 
the White Paper of the year before, was announced. By this time, the 
'University of the Air' had become the 'Open University', and the task 
of the Planning Committee, under the Chairmanship of Sir Peter Venables, 
was to work out a comprehensive plan for the University's creation, and 
a draft Charter and Statutes. The resulting Charter, the work of a sub- 
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group, was similar in character to those of traditional universities, 
and it has since been criticised as over-restrictive. 
The first report from the Planning Committee came in the form of a 
press release in March 1968, though its full report was not published 
until 1969. However, pressures of time were then considerable, if the 
University were to begin its first courses in 1970. In 1968, Walter 
Perry was appointed Vice-Chancellor, and Anastasios Christodoulou, Secrc- 
tary; temporary offices were found in Betgrave Square, London. 
The overall design of the University was clear by the time the 
Planning Committee had finished its deliberations, as a mix of corres- 
pondence courses, textual support, radio and television programming, 
residential schools, and local study centres. It was proposed that the 
University should operate at three levels: the undergraduate, the post- 
experience, and the post-graduate; it was also proposed that it should 
operate a 'credit' system, along similar lines to US universities, and 
that its academic year should run from January to December (both of these 
innovative proposals for a British university). What was not clear was 
the process by which this design would be implemented, and the period 
1969-70 therefore represented a crisis period for planning, with 1970 
as the first, compressed year of Foundation Course preparation. Academic 
and administrative staff were mostly recruited during 1969, and a site was 
chosen for the University in the new city of Milton Keynes, where building 
work began at an accelerated pace, ready for the arrival-of incoming staff 
in September 1969. 
The basic courses were evolved through a 'course team' approach, 
which was to reflect the corporate work, for each course, of a body of 
academics, educational technologists, and media producers. Production of 
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these courses had to be phased to begin in early 1970, for delivery 
to students by January 1971. The emphasis was upon an integrated deli- 
very system, and the earlier stress upon mass media was soon played down. 
Problems associated with course production, however, had not been fully 
appreciated at the outset, except for the broadcasting component (where 
the BBC had a substantial reservoir of experience upon which to draw), 
and during 1909/70 the University had to create sustaining infrastruc- 
tures as it went along, including an extensive publishing and distri- 
bution operation. 
The Government of the University was in the hands of a Council and 
of a Senate (all academic staff and ß6C senior producers being members of 
the latter), with specific development entrusted to a network of inter- 
locking committees. In practice, however, the government structure evolved 
in a far more complex way than was originally envisaged, partly because of 
the magnitude of the institution (e. g. with more than 500 members of 
Senate in 1976), partly because of the attempt to introduce more democratic 
elements into its management, and partly because of its evolution along 
lines not originally foreseen by the Planning Committee. One component 
of the system which received little attention initially was the University's 
regional infrastructure, and the Regional Directors appointed in 1969 had 
to begin virtually from nothing. Apart from overcoming initial hostilities 
from local Government and traditional adult education movements, they had 
to set up a mechanism for establishing some 284 study centres in twelve 
regions, and shortly afterwards the residential summer schools (covering 
twenty-seven academic lines). 
It had been envisaged that, from 1972/3, post-experience courses 
would be inaugurated, but a further complication arose through a series 
of confrontations with the new Conservative Government. As early as 1969, 
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Edward Heath had warned the University that there was no guarantee of its 
continuance with a new Government in poww, wer, although in the event this 
threat was not followed through, apart from a budgetary cut amounting to 
£1 million over three years. But a great deal of pressure was exerted 
upon the University to accept eighteen-year-old students among its numbers, 
a principle which the University resisted as being against the spirit of 
the University (as an institution for mature students seeking a 'second 
chance'); it was however an attractive political formula for those wishing 
to see an extension of higher educational opportunities at low cost. In 
the end, the University agreed to mount a pilot experiment involving 500 
young people, and this began in 1974. 
Another problem had been resistance from the academic community. This 
came in particular from the traditional adult education movement, which was 
sensitive to the fact that the University had been established by drawing 
on funds to which they might have some claim; the movement also resented 
the academic level at which the experiment had been pitched, feeling that 
a lower level of qualification would have been more appropriate. This 
feeling was gradually eroded following a long public relations campaign, 
and might be said to have been formally removed when, in 1973, Walter Perry 
was invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals of the UK. 
The first years of the University were extremely hectic: there was 
little time to apply formative principles in the construction of courses, 
or in the development of University infrastructures. The institution was 
forced to learn through experience, and proved both sensitive and resi- 
lient in adapting to pressure. An early introduction was the creation of 
an Institute of Educational Technology, partly to monitor student perfor- 
mance and measure instructional efficiency, but also concerned, once 
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courses were better established, with elements of formative research. 
Fortunately, the University soon proved itself capable and became 
well known throughout the world as a major innovative force in education. 
The Open University Consultancy Service (later to become the Centre for 
International Co-operation and Services) was established to advise on 
similar distance-Tearing projects overseas, and courses were marketed 
through an independent marketing service. The drop-out rate from courses 
proved much lower than anticipated, and in 1975, the cumulative percentage 
of graduating students had reached 42.4%, a figure which was much better 
than any other correspondence-based programme in the UK, and comparable 
with many US universities with a sizeable off-campus population. Having 
always been sensitive to the problem of academic equivalence, the Univer- 
sity was scrupulous in its recruitment of academic staff, and the per- 
centage of doctoral-level staff, for example, was above the national 
average for British universities. 
-It also lived up to earlier promises of cost-effectiveness, even 
though the limitations deliberately placed upon its student members restri- 
cted cost benefit. Although difficult to establish how much cheaper it was 
than conventional University education, one calculation in 1972 put the 
average annual recurrent cost per undergraduate at £251 for an OU student, 
compared with 1940 for a conventional university undergraduate. 
One problem which still remained unresolved was that of 'openness'. 
The University was created according to a principle of egalitarian 
opportunity, and in theory at least, the structure of its student-body was 
expected to bear a marked resemblance to the overall structure of the UK 
adult population. An early bias in enrollment against women was soon 
rectified, and once enrolled, women proved to be quite as capable as their 
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male peers. But working-class students, and those with a limited 
education, were still under-represented; moreover, their chances of 
surviving the degree programme were lower than those of other student 
groups. 
Over the course of its early history, the Open University learned 
to place the mass media in perspective, using them for specific illustra- 
tive and motivational tasks. However it was beginning (by 1975) to face 
great difficulties in respect of access to air time, being already com- 
pelled to make use of early morning and late-night hours. In its pres- 
entations to the Annan Committee on Broadcasting (GPO 1977), the University 
argued for a continuation of its partnership arrangement with the BBC, 
which it considered to have been valuable, but insisted that further 
progress would depend upon the allocation of a fourth television channel 
to educational broadcasting in the UK (a proposal which was not ultimately 
accepted). In the meantime, it conducted some local experiments with 
alternative forms of distribution (originally with film cassettes, sub- 
sequently with video-cassettes), and undertook theoretical studies on 
the relative cost and feasibility of physical distribution of media net- 
works in certain course areas, as compared with broadcast transmission. 
By the end of 1976, it was still, as an institution, evolutionary, 
with little consensus on the future of media use, but very conscious that 
this area was subject to technological and institutional developments in 
the field of broadcasting as a whole. At the same time, the University 
was vulnerable to economic pressues affecting all of higher education. 
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7. AGENCY FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION 
In 1962, the US Office of Education funded three demonstration 
projects in instructional television. Each of these was conceived 
of primarily as a library of instructional television program; mnes; two 
were regional (the Northeastern Regional Instructional Library and the 
Great Plains Regional Instructional Library), but the third - the National 
Instructional Television Library - had a wider mandate. NITL was physi- 
cally located in New York and was affiliated with National Educational 
Television (NET). The broad goal of all three projects was the exchange 
of educational programmes. 
In 1965, when the original NITL grant ended, the organisation moved 
from New York to Bloomington, Indiana, where, under the auspices of the 
Indiana University Foundation, it became the National Center for School 
and College Television (NCSCT). At that point, financial continuance until 
1967 was guaranteed, and at the same time the IUF agreed to provide credit 
even beyond 1967, as a bridge from subsidy to a new financial formula. 
After a series of internal assessments', in 1967 yet another agency 
was created, after the end of federal funding, when NCSCT became NIT 
(National Instructional Television Centre). The Centre was to operate 
on income from the sale and rental of telecourses, and on money borrowed 
from the Indiana University Foundation. In this way, interim financing 
was secured, but the long-range programme still remained uncertain. 
The answer to this problem had to lie in some kind of programme 
development formula, but an early unilateral experiment by NIT (a physical 
education series called 'Ready Steady Go') was not a financial success. 
Gradually the Consortium idea evolved; the idea was promoted that state 
education agencies might be persuaded to invest in a project in return 
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for extensive user rights and the opportunity to participate in project 
design. A first consortium experiment, 'Ripples' (on early childhood 
education), was produced in 1969/70 and had encouraging results; a 
second series, 'Images and Things' (in the field of art education), was 
produced in 1970/71, for a consortium consisting of seventeen State 
agencies and six local and regional agencies within States. As th"e size 
of the consortium grew, the proportion of funding provided by NIT dimini- 
shed, and the viability of the approach seemed to be demonstrable. Sub- 
sequently, a third project, 'Inside Out' (a health education series at 
the primary level), was produced with some finance from the Exxon Corpora- 
tion but without NIT funds, and it was followed, in 1972, by a career 
development series entitled 'Bread and Butterflies'. By this time the 
consortium had grown to 32 State agencies and two local organisations. 
The approach, however, still needed regularisation and a sharper political 
edge. This was provided, in 1972, by a formal association of the project 
with the Council of Chief State School Officers (the professional associa- 
tion representing State-level educational administrators), largely through 
the assistance of C. Taylor Whittier, a member of the NIT Advisory Board 
and also a CCSSO member (in his capacity as Commissioner of Education for 
the State of Kansas). In July 1972, six Chiefs were invited to Bloomington 
to discuss NIT and the idea of interstate cooperation. Subsequently, a 
major meeting was held in Atlanta, in late October, which was attended 
by 105 educational and communication administrators, representing 54 States, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and four Canadian provinces. This 
meeting generally endorsed the consortium approach, and specifically the 
formation of a national organisation for the development of school tele- 
vision programming. Immediately after Atlanta, the same proposition was 
put before the CCSSO and was again supported, with a seventeen-member 
working committee (under the Chairmanship of Whittier) being mandated to 
pursue the matter. This committee reported in February 1973 and produced 
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a draft proposal for the creation of the Agency for Instructional Television 
(AIT). After this point, the work snowballed, and the AIT was actually 
incorporated in April 1973. It was headed by Ed Cohen, who had served 
as Executive Director of NIT (and indeed of the earlier projects). 
One difficulty which remained was administrative: how to phase out 
NIT, without placing undue burdens on the new organisation. Finally, it 
was agreed that AIT would purchase NIT from the Indiana University Founda- 
tion for the amount of its outstanding indebtedness to the Foundation plus 
a reasonable interest return. This would, however, be achieved only grad- 
ually, terminating at some point between 1977 and 1980, after which time 
the two organisations could merge fiscally. By a piece of administrative 
sleight of hand, and through goodwill, what might have posed a consider- 
able financial problem was averted. The AIT Agreement took effect in July, 
assisted also by a long-term loan from the Ford Foundation and from the 
Exxon Corporation. The mechanism for long-range financing continued to 
work, and by 1976, debt repayment was on schedule and the financial situa- 
tion appeared promising. 
At the time of the emergence of AIT in 1973, consortium production 
methods and priorities were also formalised through a series of regional 
meetings. The approach of the AIT project was to stress extensive consul- 
tation between members of the consortium and the pre-testing and formative 
evaluation of materials at all stages. First of all, priority areas were 
fixed through a needs determination process; ideas were crystallised at 
meetings and through conferences, and then circulated to prospective 
consortium members for comment. In order to produce a particular series, 
a consensus was required as to the series' importance - not necessarily 
total agreement, but at least a substantial majority. Planning teams were 
formed under the chairmanship of a chief consultant, and a preliminary 
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report produced, which was shared with education and broadcasting agencies 
for comment. Some four to eight months later, a prospectus was issued, 
as the end product of the conceptualisation process, and this became: the 
formal commitment document for a new series. 
Production was contracted out to selected educational production 
agencies, and materials were extensively pre-tested. The emphasis in 
the AIT is not so much upon the formulation of highly specific and detailed 
objectives (which are already shared by its members), as upon the valida- 
tion of production at every stage through formative research. Summative 
evaluation has been generally slight; the product has to be right at the 
initial stage if the consortium is to succeed. The AIT staff itself is 
small, acting as a secretariat, with motivating and coordinating functions 
(although considerable expertise is still demanded of them in all produc- 
tion and utilisation areas). The agency is run on informal lines, with 
few staff meetings: yet all decisions are based upon consensus, however 
informally secured. The nature of the Agency is such that it has to be 
extremely sensitive to group feelings and preferences. It is governed by 
a sixteen-member Board of Directors, but the Board's main function is to 
set priorities for the overall programme, not to interfere with the prod- 
uction cycle once established. 
The programmes of AIT have been widely used: 'Inside Out, for example 
has been broadcast by almost 85% of all public television stations, and 
at the time of developmental work on 'Self Inc. ' all but five US States 
and Canadian provinces had participated in at least one collaborative 
project. In the absence of comprehensive survey data, however, it is 
impossible to estimate the numbers of children reached by the programmes. 
The concentration of the AIT is upon reaching the educational teacher/ 
user, and its formula for priority setting and financing depends heavily 
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upon the involvement of educational administrators, a group vThiCh it 
considers a valid reflector of what is needed in the schools. This 
view has demonstrably brought about financial and organisational 
security, however much it might be challenged on other grounds. 
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8. CHILDRENS TELEVISION WORKSHOP f 
The idea for the Children's Television Workshop reputedly stei-il. ned 
from a dinner party in New York, given in 1966 by Joan Cooney (then a 
TV producer) and her husband, at which one of the guests was Lloyd 
Morrissett, a vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation. This anecdotal 
account of the project's origins is significant, in that the whole project 
subsequently hinged upon the activities of a small, elite and influential 
group of people, among whom Cooney and Norrisett were particularly impor- 
tant. At this dinner party the subject of children's television program- 
ming was raised, and as a result of what was argued on the topic, Joan 
Cooney was later commissioned by Carnegie to prepare a feasibility study 
on the possibility of mounting a new TV series at the pre-school level, 
which was ostensibly both to educate and entertain children. 
The feasibility study was submitted in October and was favourably 
received; in May 1967, Joan Cooney joined Carnegie as a television. con- 
sultant. She had originally conceived of the series as a project for WNDT 
(a New York Public Television Channel for which she was working), but it 
soon appeared to have much wider implications. Morrisett decided to try 
to interest other agencies, such as the US Office of Education, in the 
idea; he perceived it, from the very early stages, as a project in need 
of financing from a consortium of sponsors. Thus, in June 1967, a meeting 
took place in Washington, attended by Harold Howe and Louis Hausmann of 
the US Office of Education, Morrisett and Barbara Findberg from Carnegie, 
and Joan Cooney. At this meeting a consensus was reached on the viability 
of the proposal; it was then up to its sponsors to find the necessary finan- 
cing. 
Two further meetings also took place at Carnegie in 1967: one in 
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September, to discuss production and budgetary issues, and the. second 
October, to review plans for research and evaluation. A number of out- 
side experts were brought into these meetings (and at the second, 
Edward Meade, Jr., of the Ford Foundation, also attended - important in 
view of Ford's later assistance to the project). 
A final proposal was completed by the end of the year, synthesising 
the conclusions of all these meetings, and this was formally submitted to 
the Carnegie authorities in Feburary 1968 (although a commitment to the 
project was made on the basis of an earlier, December 1967, draft). A 
tentative budget of eight million dollars was agreed for the Workshop, 
with the primary sponsors being Carnegie, the US Office of Education, and 
the Ford Foundation. (Ford's original commitment was 250,000 dollars, 
but this was seen only as a preliminary undertaking). Joan Cooney was 
appointed Executive Director, and Gerald Lesser (of Harvard) as Chairman 
of the Advisory Committee; both of these had been instrumental in steering 
the project through its first phases. 
1968 was a year of intensive preparatory work for the Workshop and 
for its first production 'Sesame Street', which was scheduled to begin 
transmissions in 1969. It had been agreed by all concerned that the 
programme would have some eighteen months of unhurried preparation, inclu- 
ding extensive developmental testing of materials, and this grace period 
was actually secured without undue pressure. Indeed, after a Press Con- 
ference announcing the project in March, 1968, publicity was allowed to 
drop until much closer to the transmission date, so that those involved 
could work without interference. Two major matters dominated 1968: one 
administrative, one creative. In March an Agreement was signed between 
the Workshop and National Educational Television, which spelled out in 
precise terms the relationship between the two. CTW was to make use of 
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the legal and administrative support facilities of NET, but the UorL- 
shop's Executive Director was to report directly to the President of NIET, 
so avoiding some of the problems experienced in earlier projects (notably 
the Public Broadcasting Laboratory). It was recognised that the t-! orLshop 
would make extensive use of the NET distribution network, covering the 
nation's public television stations, but that at the same time production 
independence must be guaranteed. The fact that this arrangement was 
reached without major incident showed a great sensitivity by all involved 
to the difficulties which might be faced, and a considerable commitment 
to the project's goals. 
The second strand was more academic, but quite fundamental. In 
June, July and August, a series of five seminars were held in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and in New York, during which the goals of the programme 
were carefully evolved. By this time senior production staff and research 
staff for the Workshop had been appointed (David Connell, from commercial 
broadcasting, as executive producer, and Edward Palmer as research director), 
and the seminars were therefore able to involve all of these in a dialogue 
. with expert workers 
in the various child-centred fields. The seminars 
were directed by Gerald Lesser and came to grips, successively, with the 
series' goals in the areas of social, moral and affective development; 
language and reading; mathematical and numerical skills; reasoning and 
problem solving; and perception. Participants were asked to consider 
creative production proposals as well as goal statements, and out of these 
exchanges came a statement of the series' intentions which was synthesised 
as a producers' and researchers' manual. All those concerned considered 
them to be instrumental in the project's success. 
In September 1969, the Workshop staff was enlarged, and the production 
process began in earnest, with transmissions staring in November 1969, 
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following an intensive period of pre-publicity (directed both to tele- 
vision stations in the public bro dcasting netoork, and to parents and 
teachers). The production process itself was based upon principles oi 
formative evaluation: programme concepts were developed through exchanges 
between producers and researchers, who were initially hired, not solely 
for their qualifications, but for their breadth of interest and apparent 
willingness to work together in team settings. Programmes and pilot 
programmes were developmentally tested, and revisions constantly made, 
as the series continued. But summative evaluations were also made by the 
Educational Testing Service of Princeton University, which published its 
first results in October 1970, after pre- and post-test investigations. 
This evaluation showed the impact of the series to be significant in most 
spheres: children who viewed the programme achieved many of the goals in 
letters, numbers and forms, and gained appreciably in skill in sorting 
and classifying. The cognitive skills of poor children were increased, 
in some cases, by as-much as 62%, and the popularity of the series was 
such that it reached almost 7 million children, five days a week. The 
gains*of frequent viewers surpassed those of less-frequent viewers (the 
frequency variable cutting across social class boundaries); teachers also 
welcomed the series, though not all considered it to be a useful classroom 
innovation. 
The success of Sesame Street was greater than the Workshop had 
expected, and it promised well for the next venture, a basic reading 
series for 7-10 year olds, entitled 'The Electric Company'. The con- 
struction of this second series followed comparable principles to Sesame 
Street, and the first daily series began in October 1971. Again, results 
were highly encouraging, In a second survey, conducted by indpendent 
evaluators in 1972,85% of teachers had very favourable overall opinions 
of the series, and similar enthusiasm was reported from students. Specific 
-43_ 
gains in reading skills ýcere also reported by more than 80`, -% of teachers. 
The success of the Children's Television Workshop has been attributed 
to a combination of factors: good, flexible planning; the energetic inter- 
est of an influential controlling group; the marriage of production and 
research talents; a rational attitude to financing. However, it was not 
without its problems. The first anxiety was for how long the formula 
could be perpetuated: a later production of the Workshop, in the area of 
health education, was far less successful than its predecessors. The sec- 
ond problem was that of transferability: following its initial success, 
'Sesame Street' was sometimes adopted wholesale on many of the world's 
television screens, and a more cautious approach was urged (making a more 
judicious cultural adaptation for other countries, as in the version 
entitled 'Plaza Sesamo'). The third and most intransigent problem was 
that of finance. The Workshop could not be financed indefinitely from 
public and private funds, and the Ford Foundation, in 1972, made a terminal 
grant of 6 million dollars, while in 1974 Federal financing was reduced by 
some 50%. Additional funds were raised by establishing a products group 
(franchising articles, based on characters from the series), and some 
staff cuts were also made. The future of the Workshop was also substanti- 
ally affected by trends in the public broadcasting system, which was moving 
away from national programme production towards local initiatives, though 
at the same time, new approaches to the distribution of public broadcasting 
were being considered, including satellite interconnection. It was in this 
context that long-range financing strategies had to be devised, if the 
Workshop was to continue in the same vein, and with the same security, as 
during earlier years. 
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UNITED NATIONS 
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANISATION 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM PLANNING SURVEY FOR 
AFGHANISTAN -A SCENARIO 
- Alan l lancock 
Introduction 
The purpose of this scenario is two-fold. Firstly, it is intended 
as a guide for the planning team, providing a breakdown and phasing for 
essential activities of the study. Secondly, it is conceived as a refer- 
ence frame and norm for evaluation in order that the survey may be moni- 
tored throughout. Previous studies of communication planning have had 
to depend largely upon secondary data, as the progress and conduct of 
planning surveys have rarely been monitored in situ. 
The scenario is based upon two main principles. It seeks, in the 
first place, to secure a compromise between careful pre-planning and 
scheduling, and flexibility: to profit from detailed creativity, leaving 
the planning team with genuine responsibility and decision-making capacity. 
At the same time, it tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision- 
making within its planning strategies, taking account of pragmatic as well 
as theoretical constraints. 
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Basic Figures 
The key to this approach is seen in Figure I and Table A (to which tI)o 
scenario is essentially a commientary). 
Figure I is a simplified network of the planning process, set within 
a two-dimensional matrix. In this matrix, the vertical axis is one of 
time, covering a pre-planning period (basically of data collection and 
synthesis before the survey), and three main phases beyond. Phase One is 
a policy making period, during which communication policies are set and 
articulated, goals and targets evolved and objectives specified. Phase 
Two covers the strategic planning phase, during which alternative strategies 
are developed, preferred alternatives chosen, and an overall framework 
devised. Phase Three is the final period of preparing phased operational 
plans. The horizontal axis represents the environment of planning. It 
comprises firstly the communication planning setting (i. e. the planning 
team and counterparts): secondly, the development planning context (e. g. 
economic and central government planning); and thirdly, the policy-making 
and decision-making environment (i. e. government itself). Figure I, there- 
fore, traces the course of the survey through its separate planning phases, 
in relation to both planning and decision-making forums. 
Table A relates these activities more specifically to the phased 
introduction of planning consultants, and to the chronology of the study. 
Constraints 
Certain constraints have either been recognised or directly intro- 
duced into the survey. It has had to be accepted that the time available 
is short, and the numbers of specialists small, for a study of this magni- 
tude. 
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The-Scenario: TABLE A 
Week Activity Description of Activity 
(Summary) 
1 5-6 Discuss draft policy statement 
with counterparts 
Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
2 7 Discuss with Planning and Policy 
Body and Modify 
3 8-9 Expand to include goals and 
targets 
Discuss and modify with Planning 
Body 
4 10 Derive and State Objectives 
5 11 Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
6 12-13 Quantify Objectives 
Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
7 14 Formulate alternative strategic 
8 14 approaches 
9 15. Review alternatives with full 
team 
10 16 Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
11 17-18 Prepare Format for Decision- 
Makers 
Discuss with Policy Body and 
Select Preference 
12 19-20 Evolve macro framework 
Discuss with Planning Body 
and Modify 
13 21 Evolve phased strategic plan 
14 22 Discuss with Planning Body and_ 
Modify 
15 23- Research for Operational Plan 
16 25 Evolve evaluation framework 
Prepare Plan for decision-makers 
Team Membership 
Team Leader 
Deputy Leader (Economist) 
Systems Analyst 
Team Leader 
Deputy Leader - Economist 
Rural Com. Expert 
Telecom. Expert 
Radio-TV Progr. Expert 
Print & News Ag. Expert 
Film & A-V Expert 
Evaluation Expert 
Systems Analyst 
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TABLE A (cot, t'd) 
Week Activity Description of Activity Team Y embe. rship 
(Summary) 
17 26 Review strategic plan with Team Leader 
policy body and modify Deputy Leader - Economist 
R ural Corn. Expert 
18 27 Prepare detailed Telecom. Expert 
19 27 Operational Plan Evaluation Expert 
20 28 Discuss with Planning Body 
and Modify 
21 29 Synthesise Report 
22 30 Review Report with Planning 
Team Leader 
Body and Modify 
23 31 Prepare Report Format for 
Deputy Leader - Economist 
Decision-Makers 
24 32 Review with Policy Body 
25+ 33 Finalise and Submit Report 
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A more deliberate restriction derives from the nature of decision- 
making and decision-making organs. It has been accepted that the time 
of senior politicians and members of government is limited, and that the 
possibility of consulting actively with policy-making bodies (and involv- 
ing these in decisions at various critical points of the survey) is 
correspondingly restricted. Consequently, the number of such consulta- 
tions has been reduced to what is considered a practical minimum, less 
than which co-operative decision-making would have been more nominal than 
real. (On the other hand, far more dialogue has been assumed with central 
and sectoral development planning agencies, to whom access is easier. It 
has also been assumed that in communication planning itself, full-time 
counterpart specialists to the external team will be available through- 
out the survey - and this is considered a vital factor for the project's 
success). 
Planning and Decision-Making 
Something should also be said about the character and context of 
planning and decision-making. The purpose of the network shown in 
Figure I is to pinpoint key activities and decision points, as these 
occur within a phased planning process. It is not intended to be exhaust- 
ive, nor does it (nor can it) contain all the casual interactions between 
sectors upon which the sensitivity of the survey must depend. Similarly, 
it does not include other components of briefings, visits, etc. which 
will be necessary for external specialists (though these are included in 
the detailed commentary upon Figure I and Table A which follows). However, 
even within those activities highlighted in the network of Figure I, 
several kinds of consultation are envisaged. The discussions of the 
communication planning team, for example, are seen as regular, daily 
dialogues (and group, preferably open-plan, working is recommended for 
_g_ 
the team and its counterparts). Discussions with the developucnl. plan- 
ning agencies are of a different ordei. In Figure I, the term "planning 
body" is used as a convenient shorthand to include consultations with 
a number of planning agencies (some of which may be specially created or 
convened to assist with the survey). Firstly, it is urged that a repre- 
sentative of the Ministry of Planning should be appointed as a permanent 
link with the team, and if possible made available full-time to work as 
a regular team member. At a more formal level, meetings with the Ministry 
of Planning will be needed to consider particular sets of proposals and 
to modify these before they attain a wider circulation. It is also recom- 
mended that, for the most critical planning meetings, a Co-ordinating 
Committee should be formed, including representatives of the various mini- 
stries concerned (e. g. Information and Culture, Education, Agriculture, 
Communication etc. ) as well as the Planning Ministry, to ensure that 
sectoral opinion is adequately voiced. The particular level of debate for 
each activity is indicated in the commentary which follows. 
The term "policy body' is used in a similarly generic fashion, to 
denote. a high level of political consultation, appropriate to the options 
being discussed. Only four occasions are proposed in this scenario at 
which such a high level of policy discussion is considered essential (as 
opposed to nine occasions for more formal meetings of the "planning body"). 
it is hoped that, if the importance of these policy meetings is adequately 
stressed from the outset, satisfactory arrangements can be made for them 
to be maintained. In all probability, no single existing body will be 
suitable for such discussions, and a special Cabinet-level committee may 
have to be created ad hoc under the Office of the Presidency, to consider 
the alternatives being proposed and decide orientations. Again, it is 
the level of representations which is primarily being urged here. 
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In summary, what is being proposed is as follows: 
(1) Communication Planning: 
A team made up of external specialists and full time counterparts, 
drawn (at a middle professional level) from the various Ministries con- 
cerned with communication issues. 
(2) Development Planning: 
(i) A permanent officer placed with the communication planning 
team; 
(ii) A small ad hoc committee formed within the Planning Ministry, 
to review particular drafts produced by the team, and to 
relate these to central planning issues; 
(iii) A Co-ordinating Committee, formed (at a senior professional 
level) from the various ministries (and private agencies, 
if appropriate), concerned with communication issues. This 
committee, convened by the Planning Ministry, but with 
nominees from each participating Ministry, would meet on 
about nine occasions (cf. the scenario and Figure 1) to 
review critical drafts produced by the communication plan- 
ning team, after informal negotiations and discussions were 
complete. 
Policy and Decision-Making 
A high-level body, under the Office of the Presidency, should be 
convened to discuss major policy issues arising during, or as a result, 
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of the survey. This committee would meet on only four-occasions; its 
composition would be subject to advice received from the Afghan Govern- 
ment, through the intermediary agency of the Planning Ministry. 
In this proposal, there are evident departures from the Project 
Document produced for the study. In the project document there was: 
- no specific insistence upon full time professional counter- 
parts for the external team; 
- no distinction was made between planning and policy-making 
bodies, especially in the discussion of a Co-ordinating 
Committee. 
Rather it was proposed that liaison officers from the various Ministries 
would be appointed, who would constitute a Working Group to assist the 
team during its time in Afghanistan, and who might subsequently form the 
nucleus of a permanent Co-ordinating Committee. What is suggested here 
is an amplification of the earlier proposal, which is not in contradic- 
tion, but which clearly separates out planning and co-ordination from 
policy-making functions, and which also provides for permanent counter- 
parts (at a lower level) for the external team. It is believed that these 
additions are necessary in order to ensure a genuine pattern of partici- 
patory decision-making and to equate the concerns of planning and policy 
more closely. 
The scenario which follows consists, therefore, of an expanded 
commentary upon Figure I and Table A, to which reference should be made 
in order to retain a perspective of the whole survey. The commentary 
is weekly based; general introductory remarks are followed by a con- 
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sideration of specific activities or tasks. 
PREPARATORY PERIOD 
The activities in this period (Tasks 1-4) are not specifically des- 
cribed here; they belong to a preparatory phase, prior to the commence- 
ment of the survey. For completeness, they are included in Figure I, but 
not in Table A; taken together, they cover the processes of data collec- 
tion, its sifting and analysis to formulate a draft statement of communi- 
cation policies, the collection of supplementary data, and the synthesis 
of the whole as: 
(i) a statement for initiating debate with the country's planning 
and decision-making authorities; 
(ii) a means of briefing specialists attached to the planning team; 
(iii) a basic reference source. 
The outcome of this preliminary work (involving both Secretariat and 
research assistant time) should be a general statement of communication 
policies, both explicit and implicit, as these are revealed in existing 
documentation on communication processes and institutions in Afghanistan. 
This statement should include and highlight apparent anomalies in practice, 
particularly as these occur between sectors. In discussion with both plan- 
ning and policy-making bodies, it is through the appraisal of contradi- 
ctions and the removal of gross anomalies that a more coherent statement 
of policies will be arrived at. This is needed as a basis for the survey 
work which follows. 
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THE MAIN SURVEY 
Phase One 
Week 1 
In this week, the Team Leader, the Economist and the Systems 
Analyst arrive, meet with counterparts, and begin a round of 
courtesy calls. (For an initial four-week period, these are 
the only external specialists present). During this orienta- 
tion, it is important that they should: 
(i) ascertain that all counterpart commitments are being, 
or will be, met; 
(ii) explain to counterparts the organisation of the survey, 
and its emphasis upon corporate decision-making; 
(iii) discuss the draft policy statement, and review the 
authenticity of the data base; 
(iv) set up major meeting dates for the future (in partic- 
ular, meetings to be arranged with the policy-body); 
(v) determine the exact form and context of planning and 
policy-making bodies; 
(vi) evaluate working arrangements and administrative support; 
(vii) identify contact points and key figures in the various 
sectors participating in the study. 
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Task 5: Discuss Draft Policy Statement with Counterpart Team 
The draft policy statement should have been distributed to counter- 
parts only, prior to the team's arrival. The first meeting with the 
counterpart team should, therefore, serve as orientation to the whole 
survey, introducing the draft, examining the anomalies which it contains 
(and which will have to be reconciled) and explaining its relationship 
to the survey's organisation. 
After the first meeting, an interval should be allowed (while briefing 
visits proceed), to allow counterparts to digest and validate information 
in the policy statement. Meetings later in the week will lead to some 
modification of the document. 
A preliminary meeting with the Planning Ministry should set in motion 
other consultative arrangements, especially for: 
(i) the appointment of a Planning Ministry counterpart; 
(ii) the form and composition of the planning Co-ordinating 
Committee; 
(iii) the creation of an appropriate policy making body. 
Tentative time scales and dates should also be discussed. 
Task 6: Discuss Policy Draft with Planning Body and Modify 
Towards the end of the same week, a second meeting should be arranged 
with the Planning Body to review the policy document, and consider possible 
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strategies for its modification. A suitable format for presentation to 
the policy-making body should also be reviewed. 
Week 2 
During this week, a routine of team/counterpart working and consulta- 
tion should be established, further briefing visits undertaken and a 
programme for other visits (including distant visits) evolved. (Some of 
these may best be reserved for the arrival of the main team, to reduce 
time and expense. However, it should be stressed that, for this particu- 
lar survey, the time constraints are such that extensive visits must be 
avoided, and reliance placed upon counterpart knowledge; a basic briefing 
for experts is needed, but detailed enquiries will be impossible. 
Task 7: Discuss Policy Statement further with Planning Body and with 
Policy Body and Modify 
Two significant meetings are scheduled for this second week: with 
formal planning and policy making bodies respectively. The first is a 
meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee (made up of senior representatives 
of various interested Ministries). It is at this meeting that, apart 
from a general airing of the study's scope and purpose, the matter of 
sectoral co-ordination will be initially raised; discussion will be based 
upon the draft policy document (revised partially after the discussions 
of Week I. and circulated in advance to participants). No consensus can 
be expected at this-time, and it should be emphasised that the issues 
are also being presented, in the same few days, to the policy body for 
review. 
The meeting with the policy body (constituted according to the 
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Planning Ministry's advice) should, therefore, come relatively late in 
this second week. The format agreed upon as a basis for discussion 
should again be circulated in advance of the meeting to allow time for 
review, and the meeting should begin with an orientation conducted by the 
team leader and counterpart officers, explaining the organisation of the 
study, and in particular the pattern of co-operative decision-making. The 
main function of the first policy meeting (apart from promotion) will be 
to establish ground-rules for the study, agree survey design, and in 
particular to approach issues of sectoral priority and disagreement. It 
is unlikely that these issues will be resolved in a single session; they 
will have to be pursued through correspondence and informal meetings. A 
means of arbitration may finally be required, and should be discussed in 
advance. 
Week 3 
In this week a more routine dialogue with the Planning Ministry needs 
to be established and a calendar of meetings over the six-month period 
should be fixed. Links should be set up with other projects touching upon 
the communication field (cf project document listing) and specialist con- 
sultants and advisers within the country identified (as reference points 
for later team members). Further informational and statistical searches 
are begun on matters arising out of the policy meeting. A revised policy 
statement is produced for circulation incorporating, tentatively, any 
changes proposed to restrict sectoral independence in the interests of 
cohesion. As argued above, this last activity will be time consuming and 
will run parallel to other tasks listed below, but it must be complete, 
and agreement reached generally (after arbitration if necessary), by Week 11 
at the latest. An earlier resolution would be preferable, but if necessary 
outstanding issues can be finally resolved at the time of (and in the con- 
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text of) alternative strategic approaches. 
Task 8: Expand Policy Statement to Include Goals and Targets 
This is part of a gradual programme of concretisation of policies, 
leading towards the formulation and quantification of objectives. The 
first step is the determination of goals (as a, preliminary expression of 
desired societal outcomes and of communication philosophy), and targets 
(preliminary versions of phasing and quantification). 
Task 9: Discuss and Modify with Planning Body 
Task 9 continues with the matching of communication goals and targets 
to overall development goals. Here (and in immediately subsequent tasks) 
the main dialogue is with the Planning Ministry, but at each stage there 
must also be informal involvement of other sectoral representatives. Finally 
(after negotiation) the formal approval of the Co-ordinating Committee is 
required. The pattern is, therefore, one of gradual refinement, followed 
(once issues are understood, and sectoral points of view exposed and accom- 
modated as far as possible) by a confirmatory session. As far as possible, 
conflict issues should be resolved in advance of the major Co-ordinating 
Committee meeting. 
Some flexibility in phasing must be accepted during these early stages 
of discussion, provided that the final deadline (of Week 11) is respected. 
Many of the activities leading up to this deadline may be run concurrently, 
given a clear distribution of functions as between members of the counter- 
part team, the team leader and the deputy team leader/economist. 
- 17 .- 
Week 4 
By this t-"-e initial briefings, visits etc. should be completed 
and the proces-: of formulating objectives continuously under way. 
Task 10: Derive and State Objectives 
The intention in this task is to make the articulation of objectives 
as clear, as full, as coherent and as detailed as possible (and wherever 
possible expre . ed in outcomes which can be measured and evaluated). This 
goal is not easy to fulfill and, initially at least, a more general presen- 
tation may have to be accepted, to be modified, expanded and strengthened 
as the study proceeds. It should be remembered that, in many cases, object- 
ives are implicit, only becoming apparent as concrete discussions of the 
planning design (and especially the selection between alternatives) con- 
tinue. At the macro level of a communication system, not all objectives 
can be expressed in behavioural terms, but clearly the more frequently 
that this is done, the better for the evaluator. 
Week 5 
Task 11: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify 
Here, as for most of the interactions represented in the network, 
more than one exchange is envisaged. The assumption is not that the 
communication planning group will agree, unilaterally, a draft statement, 
which can then be passed over to the Planning Ministry for comment; rather, 
a more regular, multi-way dialogue is envisaged. The symbolisation of 
this activity (and comparable activities) in Figure I as a single exchange 
is only a convenience in graphic coding. 
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Week 6 
Task 12: Quantify Objectives 
Task 13: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify 
The first draft of objectives, after discussion, is put to the test 
of quantification. The purpose of this activity is not primarily to 
specify definite numerical quantities, but more to assist in the precision 
of objectives in general, and to force a greater coincidence between com- 
munication objectives and those of general development planning (which are 
already, to a greater or lesser extent, quantified). A coincidence of 
phasing,, in particular, between these two planning sets is crucial. 
Weeks 7 and 8 
Task 14: Formulate alternative strategic approaches 
The following month is taken up with the preparation of alternative 
strategies which might be contemplated in meeting the objectives derived 
for the communication system. Their basic formulation is undertaken by 
the team leader, deputy team leader and counterpart team, prior to the 
arrival of the main team. Clearly, the precision with which these alter- 
native strategies are formulated will depend upon the clarity with which 
goals, targets and objectives have been framed earlier, but however precise 
these are, there will be more than one possible way of meeting them. 
The preparation of alternative plans has a number of benefits. In 
the first place, it provides planning and policy-making bodies with a con- 
crete set of options, and a range of choice which is not confined to the 
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theoretical. Those planners and decision-makers who are not completely 
familiar with communication methods and processes will be in a much 
better position, if they are able to base their selection upon practical 
options. Secondly, the preparation of alternative strategies will, in 
many cases, bring to light elements of communication policy which have 
previously been neglected, or simply not realised. Thirdly, while there 
will have been some attempt, in the articulation of objectives, to rank 
these in an order of priority, it is through their incorporation into 
specific proposals for a communication system that the real order of 
priorities becomes explicit. And fourthly, assuming that there are still 
areas of sectoral. dissent and competition, these can best be highlighted 
(and compromises evolved) within the context of coherent communication 
plans, which will then point up, in discussion, the consequences of uni- 
lateral sectoral action, or of attempting to divert scarce resources to 
a variety of incompatible ends. 
The basic formulation of strategies is probably best done (judging 
from experience in other planning contexts) by a relatively small number 
of people: in any case, the financial and manpower constraints attached 
to this study make it impossible for the process to be worked through 
with the contribution of a full external team. 
It is further proposed that, at this particular stage, the Planning 
Ministry should not be as regularly involved as heretofore (apart from 
their permanent representative for the study). The preparation of specific 
strategies is a technical exercise best undertaken by communication speci- 
alists. 
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Phase Two 
Week 9 
With Phase Two, other members of the external team arrive, and a 
proportion of the first two weeks must be devoted to briefing them on 
the current position, allowing for orientation visits, and providing 
time for documentation to be digested. It is assumed that all team 
members will have been given in advance of their arrival a full set of 
briefing documents, including the original draft policy statement, and 
its accompanying data bank. The new documentation should include the 
agreed formulation of policies, the statement of goals, targets and 
objectives, and what has so far been prepared in the way of alternative 
strategies. An early part of the briefing must be devoted to explan- 
ations and discussions, between the team leader, deputy team leader and 
all team members, of the organisation of the study, the results which 
have so far been achieved and (most particularly), the constraints which 
are placed upon the weeks which follow. 
It must be understood, and accepted by the team, that the time avail- 
able for the survey and the phasing of the team's composition does not 
allow for any radical changes of direction. The formulation of policies, 
and their translation into goals, targets and objectives, must be taken 
as a sine qua non. Equally, there will be little time for extensive briefing 
in situ for team members, or an elaborate programme of visits. It is the 
specialised knowledge of team members which is being solicited; local data 
will have to be accepted largely upon-the valuation of the counterpart team. 
This is not to say that additional briefings will not be possible, or neces- 
sary, but they must be made in pursuit of specific enquiries, directly 
associated with the consideration of alternative strategies, or with ensuing 
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strategic and operational plans. 
Task 15: Review Alternatives with Main Team 
During Week 9 and over the first days of the following week, the 
preparation of alternatives must be completed, finalised through regular 
team meetings, and the implications of particular strategies must be 
thoroughly thought through and committed to paper. This will place a 
burden upon specialists newly arrived in the country, but it seems inevi- 
table given time constraints. A departure from the critical path at this 
stage will have a disastrous effect upon later activities, and could, if 
allowed to continue unchecked, mean the wastage of specialist talents and 
knowledge (since it would defer the stage of strategic and operational 
planning to a point at which the specialists had departed). It is likely 
that, over this particular period, some abnormal strains will occur, and 
considerable delicacy and firmness will be required of the team leader 
and deputy team leader. 
Week 10 
Task 16: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify 
By the end of the week, the devising of alternative strategies should 
have reached a point where it can be presented to, and discussed with, the 
Planning Ministry. Preliminary informal discussions with the Planning 
Ministry and with sectoral representatives should be followed by a Co- 
ordinating Committee meeting. (The first informal meetings will help 
track down inconsistencies in the various strategies as compared with 
overall development plans; meetings with sectoral representatives will 
also highlight individual reactions, since each option is likely to prove 
advantageous, or disadvantageous, when seen from a sectoral viewpoint. 
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Some negotiations and modifications may, therefore, be necessary be-lore 
the full Co-ordinating Committee meeting is held. The formal Co-ordinating 
Committee meeting will inevitably air options and preferences, but it should 
be emphasised that it is not a decision-making occasion). 
Week 11 
From the decision-making viewpoint, this is also a critical week, as 
it is during this period that a preferred mix - as between various options 
proposed - will be chosen, and the outlines of the main strategic plan 
clarified. 
Task 17: Prepare Format for Decision-Makers 
The first part of the week should be devoted to the presentation of 
alternatives. A policy-making body cannot be expected to consider the 
detail of available options with the same degree of attention, or the 
same *specialist knowledge, as a planning body; therefore, main outlines 
must be-summarised, major implications made clear and pursued, and the 
format of the whole presented as attractively and intelligibly as possible. 
There will be little time available for this work, and some consideration 
of the tasks involved should have been given by the team leader and deputy 
in earlier weeks. Moreover, there will be a burden on secretarial and 
supporting facilities, which should also be anticipated in advance. 
Task 18: Discuss with Policy Making Body and Select Options 
It is unlikely that, from the range of options presented to the policy 
making body, any one particular option will be preferred: a mixture which 
accommodates political forces is far more likely. Documents should be made 
23- 
available to the policy making body at least a day in advance, and a full 
and formal meeting should be prefaced by an explanation, from the team 
leader and counterpart leader, of how the options were arrived at (i. e. in 
relation to the policy statement), the significance of each alternative and 
the implications which are foreseen. After this initial presentation, the 
team (if all are present - this is debatable and can be decided in situ) 
should play a subordinate role, advising and intervening only as required. 
Again, tact and delicacy are required, to advance discussions without any 
hint of dominance. At the end of the meeting, the team leader (directed by 
the meeting's chairman) should be prepared to summarise conclusions, in 
such a way that a mandate for continued work is given, without necessarily 
waiting for approved minutes. It is of course likely that second thoughts 
will occur, and after the conclusion of the meeting, some modifications 
will probably be necessary to the overall strategy proposed, as a result of 
further consultations and some lobbying. But broad outlines of agreement, 
at least, are needed. 
Week 12 
This week offers a breath pause, and a time for assimilation. A "macro 
framework" is proposed; what this amounts to is a clear statement of the 
choices made at the policy meeting, in a format which commands general 
acceptance and credibility. In technical rather than political matters, 
some further contributions from the Planning Ministry may be expected. 
Task 19: Evolve Macro Framework 
Task 20: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify 
The format of the macro framework, therefore, is a short descriptive 
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account, with illustrative diagrams, of the mix of strategies and options 
chosen, and its relationship with earlier statements of policy, goals, 
targets, objectives etc. This document can serve as an explicit record 
of discussions to date; after corroboration from the Planning Ministry 
it can be fairly widely circulated, and it will act as a blueprint for 
the team in their preparation of more specified plans (and of course for 
the final report). Some care is therefore needed in its presentation, 
and its format (for circulation) should have an authoritative character. 
With this document the period of focussing down, of trial and of selection, 
is concluded, and the remaining tasks of the team, though considerable, 
are at the same time more technical, more dependent upon specialised 
knowledge and enquiry, and less open to political speculation. It should 
be noted, too, that by this time, the halfway point of the study has been 
reached. 
Week 13 
In this and the following week, briefings have to be arranged for 
the newly arrived evaluation, film and audio-visual specialists (arranged 
ad hoc and scheduled between other team activities which must take prece- 
dence). 
The main events which follow over subsequent weeks follow a more 
traditional pattern for work of this kind - the preparation and in-fill 
of strategic plans, their translation into operational sequences, and the 
incorporation of an evaluation framework, leading to a final complete 
report. 
Task 21: Evolve Phased Strategic Plan 
From the overall framework, it will be the function of the team, 
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working as a whole (in group discussion) to develop the phased outline 
of a strategic plan for the system. This phased outline has two functions: 
to develop the first, skeletal framework of an operational plan; and to 
indicate the extent of the planning activities which have still to be 
undertaken, in such a way that some division of labour is possible bet- 
ween team personnel. One of the main disadvantages of the time constraints 
is that they limit the team members to an overall span of two months: their 
particular expertise will, therefore, not be available when the detailed 
operational plan is produced and the final report drafted. The only means 
of mitigating this position is to estimate in advance what individual, 
specialised inputs will be required (particularly in technical areas, 
costing and scheduling), so that the necessary research can be done early. 
The phased outline consequently differs from the macro framework mostly 
in the degree to which activities are pinpointed in time, over an appro- 
priate planning period, and their elemental strands networked. At the 
same time, the needs for quantification (in such matters as institution 
building, training, programming, materials production and distribution 
etc. ) should be foreseen and extrapolated for each specialist. Charts, 
networks, tables etc. are essential at this stage. 
Week 14 
Task 22: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify 
The strategic plan, in its tentative form, can be discussed immediately 
with the Planning Ministry; since it is similar in form to other develop- 
ment programmes, it will cause the professional planner little difficulty 
in assimilation, and his critique is likely to be directly relevant and 
useful. Furthermore, the more difficulties which can be eliminated at 
this relatively early stage-(and areas of potential disagreement), the 
less the more detailed stages of preparation are likely to suffer. 
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Weeks 15 and 16 
These weeks mark the final period during which the whole team is 
available; for optimisation of effort, therefore, a number of tasks are 
scheduled concurrently. The task of co-ordination and liaison will fall 
upon the team leader. Some group meetings will be necessary to ensure that 
a degree of cross-fertilisation -is taking place, but they should be kept 
to a minimum. It is at this particular period that individual work by 
specialists will pay off most (and for this reason, the dialogue with 
planning and policy-making bodies is interrupted, to capitalise upon 
individual effort). 
The tasks involved are as follows: 
Task 23: Research for Operational Plan 
Under the guidance of the team leader and deputy team leader, basic 
data (costs, technical detail, projects etc. ) for the construction of the 
operational plan are researched, and other enquiries progressed. This will 
in all likelihood involve correspondence with Headquarters, or with other 
external agencies, for which adequate time has to be provided. 
Task 24: Evolve Evaluation Framework 
One of the drawbacks of the team's composition and phasing is that an 
evaluation specialist'cannot be made available throughout the study. He has, 
however, been brought into the team at the best point available: early enough 
for him to consider evaluation strategies before planning detail has been 
finalised, but late enough for him to contribute to actual plan construction. 
His task will be to devise an evaluation strategy for the communication 
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system proposed and of its components, so that these can be incorporated 
into the plan as a whole. If this is not done, evaluation is likely to 
become an appendage to the system (and hence a dispensable component, 
vulnerable to financial astringencies). It should be emphasised that the 
greater needs are for formative and process evaluation. Summative forms 
can be added more easily later, and are in any case traditionally more 
acceptable. 
Task 25: Prepare Plan for Decision-Makers 
This is primarily a task for the leader and deputy team leader . 
It is important, before the main team disperses, that a coherent presenta- 
tion of the strategic plan (as far as it has been developed) should be 
made to decision-makers. This presentation will serve two purposes. In 
the first place, it will act as a final check with policy-makers that 
intentions have been properly construed, before an elaborate report is 
begun. Secondly, it will help promote the importance of the final plan, 
and orient those responsible for the policy towards practical implementa- 
tion, in a way that a report alone could never do. Again, some attention 
must be given to format and the presentation made as thorough, yet as 
clear and attractive, as possible. If time permits, some appropriate use 
of audio-visual resources can be made. 
Week 17 
Task 26: Review and Modify Strategic Plan 
In this final week before the departure of the majority of the 
specialists, the presentation planned in Task 25 above is made, and 
suggestions and reactions noted. The presentation should come early 
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enough in the week to allow for final additions from consultants, if 
these are found necessary. In some cases, further correspondence may 
be required during the report-writing stage. 
Phase Three 
Weeks 18 and 19 
Task 27: Prepare Detailed Operational Plan 
The two weeks which begin Phase Three are a time of intensive activity 
for those members of the external team who remain (the leader, the deputy 
team leader, the rural development specialist, and the evaluator) and for 
the counterpart team. Upon them falls the principal burden of expanding 
the strategic plan and synthesising the individual contributions of other 
specialists, into a detailed and phased operational plan. The shape of 
operational plans is well known; it includes components of technical design 
and specification, organisation and administration, finance, personnel 
(including training), materials design, production and distribution and 
co-ordination; all of these have also to be interrelated, phased and net- 
worked. 
Week 20 
Task 28: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify 
The consultations with the Planning Ministry at this stage are mainly 
upon presentation and technical detail; it is probably better for drafts 
of the plan to be circulated, and comments solicited, than to hold a full 
Co-ordinating Committee meeting. (If the latter is held, then it should 
come after sectoral reactions have been obtained -a formal meeting is not 
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the best forum for discussing a specific report). The work of the evalu- 
ator is of special importance at this time, as he will shortly be leaving 
the team; any critique of the strategy which he is proposing should be 
obtained early. 
Week 21 
Task 29: Synthesis Report 
For the remainder of the time available, the focus of attention is 
upon two tasks: the preparation of the final, consolidated report, and its 
presentation and submission to the decision-making body in such a way that 
real outcomes are likely. 
It must be accepted that time and logistics (including publication 
problems) will almost certainly prohibit the report from being issued in 
Afghanistan (hence the labelling of the final week as 25+). However, its 
overall shape must be clear enough for a terminal presentation to be made 
to the highest policy level (by the team leader, the counterpart leader 
and their deputies). In preparing for the report synthesis, both needs 
should be kept in mind: the collation and editing of materials; and the 
preparation of a summary version in advance, to facilitate the closing 
stages of the team's work. The actual form of the report should be kept 
flexible, sensitive to events as they occur. It should at one and the 
same time be a truthful record of the team's experiences and a coherent 
treatment of its conclusions. It should also be reasonably brief. 
In all probability the report will contain: 
1. A summary of findings and of the system proposed. 
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2. A summary of policies, goals, targets and objectives 
(and of the processes by which these were derived). 
3. The overall framework and strategic plan proposal. 
4. The detailed operational plan (with financial and 
quantitative projections). 
5. Annexes (giving technical and supporting information - 
including statistics), sources and references consulted, 
and other ancillary materials produced (e. g. the evalu- 
` ation framework proposed). 
Whatever the actual format adopted, it will be imperative for a 
summary volume to be available, which draws toycther basic information 
for decision-makers and review missions, since these are unlikely to 
master the fuller version. This should be presented in an attractive 
format with some graphic illustration. 
Week 22 
Task 30: Review Report with Planning Body and Modify 
At this stage, as argued above, it will be logistically impossible 
to review a full report - but an explanation of format and of context, and 
possibly a draft summary, can be undertaken with the Planning Ministry. 
This is not an occasion for a formal meeting, and there will be little 
advantage at this stage (and some disadvantage) in exposing the drafting 
to sectoral review. What is basically required is an informal dialogue 
with the Planning Minsitry, with particular emphasis laid upon the form 
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and procedures to be anticipated for the report's final submission. 
Week 23 
Task 31: Prepare Report Format for Decision-Makers 
The main focus of attention at this time is upon the concluding main 
presentation by the team to decision-makers; any audio-visual support should 
be solicited early. A time-table should also be agreed for report printing 
and publication, and for channels of communication. 
Week 24 
Task 32: Review with Policy Body 
The presentation should be prefaced by a full review of the study's 
history, the co-operative means by which decisions have been reached, and 
in particular, the ways and means by which follow-up can be achieved. The 
initial presentation will be the responsibility of the team leader and 
counterpart, but as before, following their detailed introduction, they 
should play a subordinate role in the discussion which follows. 
Week 25+ 
Task 33: Finalise and Submit Report 
It is assumed that the publication and submission of the report will 
be completed outside Afghanistan, and their form dictated by the resources 
available. However, this should be only a mechanistic process; the contents 
of the report should all be agreed before the remnants of the team leave 
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and the period of publication should not be used for major editorial 
revisions. However, editing for the sake of conciseness and brevity 
can profitably be undertaken at this time. 
Final Note 
Nothing in this scenario should be construed to mean that its time- 
scales and activities are inviolate, or that flexibility is eliminated. 
On the contrary, it will be most important for the team, when on the ground, 
to respond to unforeseen pressures and to add, delete or re-shape tasks in 
the light of new and specific knowledge. 
For the sake of evaluation, however, all departures from the original 
plan should be carefully noted, and a record kept by the team leader and 
his deputy of the reasons for divergence, and the consequences of all 
changes of plan. (At a later stage, a more precise evaluation framework 
for the survey itself will be prepared). Even more important, when alter- 
ations of plan are envisaged, their impact upon other activities which 
follow must be carefully judged, and both the scenario and Figure I re- 
phased to accommodate change; flexibility does not imply improvisation. 
In their present form, Figure I and Table A are still over-simplified and 
tentative, and may usefully be expanded immediately prior to the survey. 
ANNEX 3 
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION PLANNING 
A Review of the Communication System, Planning Survey in 
Afghanistan 
- Kiran Karnik 
SPACE APPLICATIONS CENTRE 
AHMEDEBAD 
INDIA 
INTRODUCTION 
The Project 
The Communication System Planning Survey (CSPS), carried out jointly 
by UNESCO and the Government of Afghanistan, aimed basically at preparing 
a long-term (10-12 years) plan for the communications sector of Afghanistan. 
The plan was to include broad outlines for specific courses of action in 
regard to the development of infrastructure, production, distribution, 
utilisation, manpower, training, research and evaluation, etc within the 
overall communication sector. This was to be based upon an assessment 
of the overall needs with respect to the utilisation and production of 
communication media and associated services (e. g., telecommunication infra- 
structure, printing facilities, field and extension services, manpower 
training, etc). 
The CSPS is unique in many ways: 
- it was the first ever exercise attempting to prepare a 
complete, long-term plan for all the communication media 
of 'a whole country. 
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- it was the first attempt at considering the communication 
sector as a total system and applying concepts of systems 
analysis to it. 
- for the first time systematic planning procedures were 
sought to be used on a communication planning exercise 
of this magnitude. 
The Process 
A detailed description of the survey, and the specific responsibili- 
ties of UNESCO and the Government of Afghanistan, have been spelt out 
in a Plan of Operation which forms the basis for the survey. This calls 
for a joint team, with UNESCO-hired consultants and national counterparts 
working together on the project. 
The planning procedure and tasks were documented in a Scenario, whose 
purpose was to serve as a guideline in the process of evolving a plan. 
This study 
One of the implicit aims of the project was, therefore, to study the 
applicability and usefulness of the Scenario. Specifically, to use this 
project as a field trial of the suggested planning framework, as a learning 
experience regarding how best to use such planning techniques, what modi- 
fications are required and what elements are missing, etc. This necessi- 
tates a comparison of the plan with what was actually done and an analysis 
of the reasons for deviations. It is important to know whether the devia- 
tions from the original plan were due to conceptual reasons, or factors in 
the local situation, or pragmatic operational constraints. 
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This study aims at examining the. application of the Scenario: analy- 
sing and commenting on deviations from it, and trying to draw lessons 
for future communication planning exercises. The presentation - in the 
best tradition of systems analysis - relies considerably on charts, tables 
and figures which are largely self-explanatory, rather than on detailed 
descriptions. 
THE PLANNING SCENARIO 
Description 
As mentioned earlier, the planning exercise was to be based on a 
Scenario prepared specially for this project. The Scenario attempts to 
take a systems view of the planning process. It had two purposes: to 
serve as a guide for the planning team, and to be used as a reference 
frame and norm for evaluation. It is based on securing a compromise bet- 
ween, careful pre-planning and scheduling, and flexibility. It also tries 
to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision making within its planning 
strategies, taking account of pragmatic as well as theoretical constraints. 
It contains a detailed break-down and description of each task, and 
is scheduled on a week-by-week basis. Three main stages of work are 
identified: policy-making, strategic planning and phased operational plan- 
ning. This work is seen to flow through three different levels, which are 
identified as: the communication planning team, development agencies, and 
policy-making bodies. 
The Scenariö also contains a clear note that its time-scales and 
activities are not inviolate. The need and desirability of responding 
to unforeseen pressures and making changes in the light of new knowledge 
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are explicitly recognised 
Planning Network 
The summarised network of the planning process as envisaged in the 
Scenario is presented in Figure I. It is seen fromm this that the Scenario 
aimed basically at a step-by-step process, by and large proceeding to a 
new activity only when all the previous ones had been completed. Thus, 
little parallel effort and no iterative processes have been envisaged. 
Conceptual Base 
The conceptual base of the Scenario can be summarised as follows: 
1. It is based mainly on a "linear-sequential" flow of activities. 
Thus, a logical step-by-step process is assumed. 
2. A static model is implied: specific thought does not seem to be 
given to the possibility of changing policies or objectives during 
the 10 to 12 years time-frame considered for the project. 
3. Continuous consultation and discussion with the government, and 
participative/interactive decision-making are essential parts of 
the overall scheme. 
4. The planning process is built around communication policies and 
objectives, which are assumed to be already in existence. 
5. Active interest and involvement of the government is assumed 
as a basis for all the work. 
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A later section examines this conceptual base, and the assumptions 
implicit behind it, in relation to reality. 
Strategy 
The Scenario assumed that the starting point of the project would 
be a draft policy statement, prepared before the arrival of the project 
team in Afghanistan. This would be ratified formally at the policy level 
within two weeks, so that the team could then go on to targets, goals and 
objectives. The strategy was to proceed systematically, step-by-step 
from these to a final plan. 
It was envisaged that at a number of major points in the planning 
process there would be consultations and discussions with appropriate 
government authorities, especially through the meetings of a formal 
Coordination Committee. This would be in addition to the close involve- 
ment. and collaboration of the counterpart team working on a full-time 
basis. At a few specific points, discussions with a policy body were 
also envisaged. The strategy was to get guidance on only crucial issues 
from the policy makers and to settle all other operational and planning 
issues at lower levels, where more frequent consultations would be 
possible. While directions and choices would have to be made all the 
time, a specific policy decision from the government would be required 
only at one point: choosing the preferred strategic option. 
The mode of operation of the project would be that the team leader 
and deputy team leader would more or less stay throughout the project, 
while other international consultants would come in for brief periods. 
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THE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT 
In order to understand the constraints on the planning process and 
the deviations from the original plan, it is crucial to have some apprecia- 
tion of the environment within which the planning exercise was carried out. 
Planning is affected by three kinds of variables: conceptual, operational 
and situational. The first two of these are dealt with in other sections 
of this paper; here, the situational factors that influenced the planning 
process are listed. A discussion of their effect in terms of changes 
from the original plan are discussed separately in a later section. 
The situational problems (and only problems are mentioned here) can 
be broadly classified into three categories: data/demography problems, 
cultural problems, and socio-economic/political problems. It should be 
clarified that these were problems for this project and most of these are 
common to almost all developing countries. It is clearly recognised that 
these arise from historic circumstances and are inevitable concomitants 
to under-development: no criticism is implied or intended. The main 
problems are summarised below: 
Data/Demography Problems 
1. Lack of data; Little data exists on several crucial factors 
such as number and spread of radio receivers, radio listening 
habits, literacy figures for each area, detailed demographic 
data (estimates exist, but are disputed; the first national 
census is due only in 1978), etc. Even where data does 
exist, its reliability is often in doubt. 
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Cultural Problems 
2. Alienation problems: As in most developing countries, the 
foreign-educated and/or "western"-culture-oriented admini- 
strators and technocrats in Kabul probably have little 
empathy or understanding of their own rural residents. 
Thus, depending on their subjective insights is not neces- 
sarily a good replacement for the non-existent data. 
3. Language difficulties: The fact that none of the inter- 
national consultants knew the local language did not prove 
to be a major problem. However, it certainly impeded free 
and easy communication with counterparts. Also, it increased 
the "adjustment period" of the consultants and hindered the 
early establishment of rapport with counterparts and with 
environment. Most importantly, it caused operational delays 
since documents had often to be translated from English 
into Dari and vice-versa. 
4. A traditional bureaucratic administrative system: 
As in most developing countries, Afghanistan too is saddled 
with the typical problems of a traditional and inflexible 
bureaucratic system of administration. It is characterised 
by: 
(i) strong "territorial" boundaries between Ministries/ 
departments - reflected especially in an unwillingness 
to discuss problems of other departments 
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(ii) lack of horizontal coordination between Ministries 
(iii) little delegation of power or authority 
(iv), a "dependence syndrome", caused possibly by massive 
aid programmes and foreign inputs (t'vo thirds of the 
present Seven Year Plan is foreign-financed), resulting 
in an unwillingness to take the initiative or to make 
decisions. 
(v) a bureaucratic reward and punishment system, which 
punishes wrong decisions or actions, but overlooks 
sins of omission. This reduced initiative and risk- 
ft taking. 
(vi) poor information flow between and within Ministries. 
Socio-economic/Political Problems 
5. Priority to physical inputs: An understandable, though exag- 
gerated, importance seemed to be placed on all physical inputs 
as opposed to planning. The result for this project was a 
seeming lack of priority -and even interest - at higher levels 
in communication planning. This was in marked contrast to 
the priority and importance given to the setting up of physical 
facilities - the TV station, for example. 
6. Overwhelming importance of immediate problems: In any developing 
country, where mere existence itself is a day-to-day problem for 
a majority of the population, the need to focus effort on present 
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problems is obvious. However, from the point of vier; of a 
long-term planning project, this can be a problem. 
THE ACTUAL PROCESS 
Network 
Since the draft policy document was not ready when the project started, 
ft 
the original plan contained in the Scenario had obviously to be modified. 
A new PERT/CPM chart was therefore prepared by the team. As work progres- 
sed, changes had to be made even in this modified network. A simplified 
version of the network representing the actual planning process is shown 
in Figure 2, and this best summarises the actual experience in the execution 
of this project. This simplified network does not show the meetings and 
discussions held with various levels of the government at a number of times 
during the project. These are indicated in Figure 3 (in next section). 
Description 
The first few weeks were taken up by the process of trying to deter- 
mine the overall communication policy of the country. Since no clearly 
defined and articulated communication policy seemed to exist, this task 
had to begin with data collection. Based on various policy documents 
of the government (the Constitution, Seven Year Plan, speeches by impor- 
tant national leaders, etc) and interviews with important officials, a 
draft paper on communication policy was prepared. This raised certain 
specific policy questions and the intention was to get answers to these 
from a Minister-level policy body. In the absence of such a body for 
this project, and delays in meeting individual Ministers, definite 
answers could not be got immediately. In view of the time constraints, 
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the team decided to go ahead on other fronts without awaiting high-level 
policy guidance. This mode of working simultaneously on different tasks 
had to be followed throughout the project. 
. Since the tasks of getting the overall communication policy and 
objectives seemed to be rather difficult and time consuming, it was 
decided to try and determine these on a sectoral basis. This decision 
was also based on information that, by and large, different sectors were 
free to make their own communication policies and objectives within the 
broad general framework of overall government policy. Accordingly, 
efforts were initiated to determine the communication policies and 
objectives of each relevant sector. Based on these sectoral inputs, an 
attempt was made to put together an overall picture in terms of communi- 
6 cation policy. However, it became clear that a sectoral - as opposed 
to global - approach would have to be used. Accordingly, goals and 
target audiences were determined on a sectoral basis. None of these 
existed: they had to be "created". Existing sectoral strategies too 
had to be determined, and goals and targets revised in the light of 
these. This was an iterative process involving policies, objectives, 
goals and targets. Based on these, preliminary future sectoral strategies 
and operational plans were formulated. 
Some areas of overlap and duplication between sectors was noticed 
and this issue (with possible options) was referred to the policy level. 
In the absence of immediate decisions on all these issues, the team went 
ahead by assuming the choice of a particular option. 
After choosing from the various possibilities a preferred strategy 
for each sector in consultation with representatives of that sector, 
detailed sectoral operational plans were prepared along with a preliminary 
- 11 - 
macro-I-framework. The finalisation of an evaluation framework preceded 
these tasks. Sectoral plans were then integrated into a final overall 
macro-framework. In some cases this required some modification of the 
sectoral plans and thus this was basically an iterative exercise. Simul- 
taneously, a preliminary overall phased plan was evolved and the main 
recommendations were discussed with the government. Based on these, a 
preliminary report and final overall phased plan were prepared. After 
this, the writing of the final report was taken up. 
Counterparts 
Full time counterparts were not available at any point in the project. 
Consultations and discussions had, therefore, to be carried out on an ad-hoc 
basis and through two formal committees which were set up: a Communication 
Planning Council (CPC) and a Presidents' Communication Council (PCC). 
Both had representatives from all the concerned Ministries and agencies; 
the CPC representatives being operating-level personnel, and the PCC con- 
sisting of departmental heads (Presidents). During the six-month project, 
the CPC met five times and the PCC four times. Efforts to form a policy- 
level group at Ministerial or sub-Ministerial level did not succeed and 
policy discussions were limited to meetings with individual Ministers (three 
such meetings were held throughout the project duration). 
In spite of efforts to get guidance or approval of the general thrust 
of the plans from the policy level, Minister-level meetings could be held 
only once mid-way through the project and then only at the stage when the 
report was already finalised. 
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Decision-making 
The lack of full-time counterparts meant that the work was carried 
out not by a joint team, but basically by foreign consultants - though, 
of'course, with frequent consultations and discussions with government 
officials. As a result, the foreign consultants implicitly had to make 
a number of decisions, in spite of the original plan to involve counter- 
parts at all stages of the planning and decision-making processes. 
To determine policy choices, the team adopted the method of preparing 
a paper outlining the issues and giving possible options. This worked, 
but only to a limited extent. The main problems were: 
(i) Many of the issues transcended the Ministerial boundaries 
and thus required inter-Ministerial discussions, which did 
not take place. 
(ii) Since no formal policy-level body was formed for the project, 
the process of getting views and guidelines even from indi- 
vidual Ministers proved to be a time-consuming one. Rather 
than allow these problems to bring work to a standstill, 
further tasks were undertaken by assuming the choice of a 
particular option. 
ANALYSIS OF DEVIATIONS FROM THE SCENARIO 
This section presents the deviations made from the original scenario 
in the actual process of planning. These deviations were due to a number 
of reasons: some pragmatic, others situational and a few conceptual. A 
comparison of the networks for the plan and for the actual process (Figures 
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1 and 2) indicate the differences. For ease of reference and under- 
standing, Figure 3 presents a summarised form of the planning process 
as originally envisaged and as actually carried out. In this, exact- 
ness has been traded off for simplicity, but the basic process in each 
case has been faithfully adhered to. 
Conceptual Deviations: 
Policy: The Figures highlight the step-by-step, linear-sequential mode 
of the original plan, in contrast to the approach of tasks-in-parallel 
adopted in reality. It also shows the considerable time which had to 
be devoted to the task of determining communication policies. In terms 
of both time and effort, this was a major deviation from the Scenario 
which had assumed that a draft policy statement would be ready even 
before the project started, so that it would only need to be discussed, 
modified and formally ratified. The project team did draft a policy 
document in the first few weeks, but unfortunately this could not be 
discussed at the policy level for a long time. It was this delay that 
necessitated the strategy of working simultaneously on several fronts 
rather than on a task-by-task basis. 
However, while the initial reason for working simultaneously on 
policy, objectives, goals and targets was merely the result of opera- 
tional exigencies (the time constraint), later it was found to be a 
conceptual necessity. This was because a definite "communication policy" 
did not exist when the project started: it had to be created. 
The same was true of objectives and goals. In this process, the 
team found that the relationship between these was not a undirectional, 
I 
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linear-sequential one of the type shown below and assuinled in the Scenario. 
POLICY --4 GOALS & TARGETS -- ---) OBJECTIVES 
Rather, it was a complex interacting relationship, and each of the factors 
could be arrived at only on an iterative basis. Thus, the relationship 
can be symbolised as below: 
POLICY 
GOALS & TARGETS<r -ý OBJECTIVES 
It is debatable as to whether policy should (or even can) be influenced 
by objectives or by goals and targets; however, the fact is that in the real- 
world situation, "policy" is necessarily an amalgam of the desirable and 
possible, of philosophy and pragmatism, of achievable targets and populist 
goals. In such a situation, the interplay between the three (as shown above) 
is not only inevitable, but even necessary. In fact, the three can be con- 
sidered as part of a single package and not as easily separable, distinct 
units. This was the approach that the team was finally forced to adopt. 
In situations where a pre-defined, clearly articulated communication 
policy does exist, the. linear, unidirectional flow model may be valid. 
However, one should note that there are few countries in the world fulfilling 
this pre-requisite. In all other situations, varying amounts of iterations 
with other factors will be necessary before "policy" can be "created". 
In this context, it is also necessary to note that there are possible 
semantic problems with words like goals, objectives and strategies: these 
convey different concepts to different people. In many disciplines, 
strategy - for example - follows from policy, while goals and objectives 
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could be tactical, and therefore changing with time or with the situativ,, }. 
Temporal validity: A larger problem that arises for a long"-term planning 
project is the degree of immutability of policies and objectives. In the 
rapidly changing world environment , with exponential rates of change 
in 
technologies, can fixed policies and objectives be laid down at all? 
Especially in developing countries, the rate of change is extremely rapid, 
both in the technological and socio-economic spheres. Change can be even 
more rapid and drastic in the field of politics. In such cases, what is 
the temporal validity of a policy or of objectives? The Scenario is 
based on a static model, and so was the actual planning process. However, 
whether these models stand the test of time is yet to be seen. 
Planning philosophy: Another major deviation from the Scenario was in 
the very philosophy of planning. The scenario was based primarily on an 
"up-to-down" planning process. This "planning from above" was implicit 
in the logical flow from communication policies (overall) to objectives, 
goals, targets and alternative strategies. Though not explicitly stated, 
these seem to be at the global or total-system (as opposed to sectoral) 
level. In actual practice, the team was forced to follow a contrary 
course and resort to "bottom-up" planning: policies and objectives had 
to be determined at sectoral levels, since no overall communication policy 
existed. Having begun in this mode, it was carried further and even 
strategies were worked out only at the sectoral level. It was only after 
a preferred sectoral strategy had been selected, and operational plans 
prepared for each sector, that an, overall macro-framework was put together. 
Thus, though the process was not strictly a "bottom-up" one, it did 
involve a sectoral-to-global approach and not vice-versa. 
This is highlighted in Table 1 which compares the actual process and 
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DEGREE OF AGGREGATION: PLANNED AND ACTUAL 
Original plan Actual 
Policy Global Mainly sectoral 
Objectives Global Sectoral 
Goals Global Sectoral 
Alternative strategies Global Sectoral 
Preferred strategies Global Sectoral 
Macro framework Global Global 
Evaluation framework Global Global 
Phased plan Global, then Global, then 
sectoral sectoral 
Operational plan Global, then Sectoral, then 
sectoral global 
Report Global and Global and 
sectoral sectoral 
10 
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the planned one in terms of the degree of aggregation for each of the 
major steps. 
This approach of working mainly at the sectoral level was necessi- 
tated - as mentioned earlier - by the fact that communication policy, 
objectives, etc did not exist: they had to be "created". This process 
was a time-consuming one and it left less time than was originally 
envisaged for working out alternatives, choosing a preferred strategy 
and devising operational plans. The difference is illustrated in Table 2 
which compares the type of effort assumed in the Scenario with the actual 
one for each of the major steps. 
Situational Deviations 
Existence of a communication policy: The Scenario had implicitly assumed 
the existence of a communication policy and objectives. All that needed 
to be done, therefore, was to prepare a policy draft - based on existing 
documents - and to get it ratified. As mentioned in the previous section, 
this was not so in reality. It is debatable as to whether it is - in 
fact - a'common feature in most countries (in which case it is really a 
conceptual problem). As noted earlier, this seems to be a common feature 
rather than an exception, and therefore this author would rather classify 
this as a conceptual deviation. 
Counterparts: The fact that full-time counterparts could not be found 
has been mentioned in an earlier section. It is, however, important to 
note that the Scenario laid great stress on the international consultants 
working with counterparts as a joint team and having continuous consulta- 
tions with them. In actual practice, counterparts were available only 
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TABLE-2 
TYPE OF EFFORT ENVISAGED AND ACTUALLY REQUIRED FOR MAJOR ACTIVITIES 
Effort 
Activity Assume as 
existing Derive Create Decide 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Policy PA 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Goals pA 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Targets 
PA 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Objectives 
PA 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Alternative p 
strategies A 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Preferred p 
strategies A 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Macro p 
framework A 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Phased strategic 
P 
plan 
A 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Evaluation 
framework A A 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Operational P 
plan A 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
P 
Report 
A 
-------------------------------------------------- --------------- 
P: as originally planned (Scenario) 
A :, as actually done 
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on a part-time basis and the basic plans were drawn up by the inter- 
national consultants with only a little discussion and input from 
their counterparts. 
Decision-making: While the Scenario assumed basically only one crucial 
policy-level decision (on preferred strategies - see Table 2), it assumed 
frequent consultation with a Planning Body and a Coordination Committee. 
This was in addition to the four meetings proposed with the Policy Body 
and the continuousinteraction with the counterparts. These meetings 
would, in each case, provide the necessary inputs and guidance to change 
or modify plans and documents. In reality, the Policy Body never came 
into existence and the two committees set up at lower levels rarely provi- 
ded definite guidance or directions. Much of the decision-making was, 
therefore, done - implicitly or explicitly - by the international con- 
sultants. 
The Scenario implicitly assumed that decision-making is a logical, 
rational process which takes account of costs and benefits. However, 
as almost everywhere in the world, important decisions were based not on 
economic analyses, but on political or arbitrary factors. A specific 
example is the decision to invest in a colour TV system for the Kabul 
area. Since important decisions on such matters are inevitably made on 
extraneous considerations all over the world, this should really be con- 
sidered a conceptual, and not a situational, variable. 
Interest in the project: Contrary to the assumption implied in the Scenario, 
the government did not seem to have a great deal of interest in the project. 
While full cooperation was always forthcoming whenever asked for, the degree 
of importance given to the project seemed to be rather low. The symptoms 
of this - which concretely affected the project - included the great 
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difficulty experienced in getting to meet policy-level personnel. This 
could also be the reason for the lack of full-time counterparts and the 
non-involvement in decision making, though - clearly - other factors 
were probably more important in these instances. 
operational Deviations 
Non-availability of a draft policy document: The Scenario pre- 
supposed the availability of a draft document on communication policy 
before the start of the project. In fact, this was not available and 
the project had to begin with data/document collection for the prepara- 
tion of such document. The ensuing loss of time certainly had its own 
effect on overall project functioning and mode of operation. One immedi- 
ate impact was the need to work in parallel on various tasks; the fact 
that this was later found to be desirable is another story. 
Focal point: The plan was drawn up on the basis of the Planning 
Ministry being the focal point of the project; it was also assumed that 
the counterpart Coordinator would be from the Ministry of Planning. 
As it turned out, the Ministry of Information and Culture - and Radio 
Afghanistan (RA) in particular - was the focal point. The team was 
physically located in RA premises, and the counterpart Coordinator was 
the Technical President of RA. To what extent this change affected the 
project is not immediately clear; however, it does seem clear that the 
Planning Ministry may have been a more preferable base because of its 
inter-Ministerial and co-ordinating role. It may have also added to the 
prestige and importance of the project, since the Planning Ministry is 
responsible for deciding on fund allocations for all developmental 
activities. 
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Present problems and future plans: In some areas, this project faced 
the inevitable problem of focusing on the future as against solving (or 
helping to solve) immediate problems. Within the time constraints of the 
overall project, and especially the limited -time of most of the experts 
(as'opposed to the "generalists" who stayed throughout the duration of the 
project), it was clear that only one or the other could be thoroughly done. 
In spite of efforts to keep the focus on the basic task (the long term plan), 
there were some deviations into the field of immediate problems. To that 
extent, less time and effort were devoted to the primary planning task. 
Whether this is inevitable is a moot point: if it is, the conceptual design 
of the planning process will need to be modified. 
Assumptions and Reality: 
The Scenario was based on various assumptions - some conceptual, 
others situational and operational. This section has analysed how and 
why the actual process differed from the one envisaged in the Scenario. 
Table 3 summarises these and other factors in the form of a comparison 
between the important assumptions of the Scenario and reality. 
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TABLE -3 
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SCENARIO AND REALITY 
IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS OF SCENARIO REALITY 
Conceptual 
1. It is possible to draw up a 
long-term (10-15 years) 
communication plan. 
The possiblity has been proven; 
there is, however, the problem 
, of getting bogged down in the 
present. 
2. Communication planning is a 
systematic process that can 
be carried out in a "linear- 
sequential" mode. 
3. No mutual interaction exists 
between the main elements 
(policy, objectives, strategy): 
a one-way only relationship is 
assumed. 
4. International experts coming 
in only for brief periods and 
with no prior knowledge of the 
local situation can prepare a 
relevant long-term communica- 
tion plan. 
5'. Decision-making is based on 
rational, logical analysis: 
on cost-benefit studies, for 
example. 
Communication planning can be 
done in a systematic, pTanned 
manner, but the steps are often 
iterative and not sequential. 
There is interaction between 
these, especially when an explicit, 
coherent communication policy 
does not already exist. 
A plan has been prepared and hence 
the feasibility of this is proven. 
Its quality and relevance cannot 
be assessed at this stage. 
C 
Decisions on important and basic 
matters are made on arbitrary or 
political considerations. 
Situational 
6. A coherent communication policy 
exists, and can be culled from 
official documents. 
An explicitly, coherent communi- 
cation policy did not seem to 
exist: the task of trying to cull 
it directly from documents was an 
impossible one. 
7. The host country has a high 
level of interest in the 
communication planning 
exercise, and attaches 
importance to it. 
This, unfortunately, did not 
seem to be the case. 
continued ...... 
- 23 - 
TABLE -3 (contd. ) 
8. The host country has a desire 
to participate actively in the 
decision-making and alternative- 
choosing processes involved in 
communication planning. 
9. Full-time counterparts will be 
available; and the whole plan- 
ning process will be carried out 
by a joint national-international 
team. 
10. A high-level policy group can 
be convened to meet a few 
times (3-4 times) during the 
project to provide guidance 
and make decisions. 
Operational 
11. A6 months-long study can 
produce a good, long-term 
communication plan for the 
country. 
12. The media experts are 
required for a shorter 
time and can leave before 
the "user" sector experts. 
13. It is possible and desirable 
to have all "sector experts" 
(i. e. excluding the genera- 
lists) arrive at the same 
time. 
This was not evident - possibly 
because this was not considered 
an especially important project. 
No full-time counterparts were 
available, and much of the basic 
planning was done by the inter- 
national consultants. 
This was found to be impossible. 
The only Minister-level group 
that was convened met days before 
the end of the project. 
While 6 months is a very short 
period for producing such a 
plan and more time is certainly 
desirable, the project has 
shown that it is possible to 
prepare a plan-in 6 months. 
In retrospect it would have 
been better for the "user" 
sector experts to come before 
the media experts and finis 
most of their work (in terms 
of finally assessing media 
needs) before the media experts 
arrive - or at least before 
they leave. 
It is not possible, nor desirable 
(see 12 above). 
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COMMENTS ON THE PLANNING PROCESS 
Utility of the Scenario 
The extensive notes on deviations from the Scenario may lead to 
the impression that it was not very useful. This would be totally 
erroneous. Since the main purpose of this study is to provide a criti- 
que of the Scenario, it is but natural that problems in applying its 
planning framework have been highlighted. However, on the whole, the 
Scenario was immensely useful. 
Firstly, it provided a clear plan and direction at the inception 
of the project itself: a critical time when various pressures and the 
effects of "culture shock" can lead to frenzied but chaotic working, 
in the absence of a definite plan. 
Secondly, it provided a base to deviate from. For the essence 
of successful planning lies not in having a fixed, immutable plan, but 
in having a basic plan from which one deviates in a conscious and inten- 
tional manner as dictated by circumstances. In this case, for instance, 
a new plan and network was drawn up within the first few weeks of the 
project itself, but this new plan was based on the original scenario. 
Thirdly, it provided a detailed "work break-down structure" in 
the form of the tasks required to be carried out. Even as the original 
plan underwent various modifications and changes, this listing of tasks 
proved invaluable - both as inputs for new plans and as a check-list 
of work to be performed. 
Finally, except for the policy - objectives stage, the planning 
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framework could be applied - by and large - almost as designed. 
Thus, even though there were deviations - some of them important 
ones - from the Scenario, it proved to be very useful in guiding and 
planning the whole project. It has established the feasibility, utility 
and even necessity of having such planning frameworks for communication 
planning exercises. 
Policy formulation 
As mentioned earlier, -communication policy cannot be assumed to 
exist; if anything, the contrary assumption would be truer. Projects 
of this nature therefore have to begin with the painstaking and time 
consuming task of formulating or creating a coherent communication policy. 
Also, policy cannot easily be separated from objectives, goals and 
targets. In view of the interacting nature of these variables, and the 
difficulties inherent in trying to clearly separate one from the other, 
it may be necessary to consider them all together, as part of a single 
package, rather than as distinct, separate entities. This also implies 
a recognition that the relationship between them is not linear and 
sequential, but interdependent and iterative. 
Counterparts 
The absence of full-time counterparts undoubtedly affected the 
project. First, it decreased the extent of national involvement in 
the project and its decision-making. Second, it made difficult the 
acquisition of data, and thereby led to some delays in the overall 
schedule. Third, a considerable amount of-the time of the experts 
was spent in trying to find the right person in each of the sectors: 
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availability of full-time counterparts would have reduced substantially 
this waste of time. 
This is not a new problem and is one that has beset most inter- 
national projects all over the world. For example, an assessment of the 
Pre-Investment Study of Educational Mass Media carried out by UNESCO in 
Thailand (in 1973-74) indicated the problem of getting full-time counter- 
parts as a major one. 
Perceived Importance of the Project 
As noted earlier, the project did not seem to enjoy very great 
priority with the government. This affected the project in a number 
of ways, and this has been detailed elsewhere. Two tactical factors 
probably made the situation more difficult. 
The first was the fact that the project was located in and was 
being coordinated by Radio Afghanistan in the Ministry of Information 
& Culture, rather than the Ministry of Planning. 
The second was in relation to the start of the project. It may 
have been preferable for the first meeting - to "kick-off" the project - 
to have been chaired by a Minister. This could have had the subtle 
effect of demonstrating top-level support for the project and would' 
have "opened all doors" for the project personnel. 
Phasing of Experts 
The change i-n approach - caused by the lack of a policy document to 
start with - resulted in a problem in terms of the phasing and work of 
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the experts. Since the task of policy determination was intricately 
linked with goals, objectives and targets, the "generalists" from the 
international team (basically those who stayed through the whole 
project) had to work on all these issues. However, since policy, 
objectives, etc had to be determined on a sectoral basis (see Table 1), 
the "generalists" had to work on these with persons from each of the 
sectors. When this task was about three-quarters done, the "sectoral" 
experts arrived. As experts on specific sectors, they took over this 
task for their respective sectors. Inevitably, they had to repeat 
some of the work and many of the questions of the "generalists", and 
some resentment on the part of the contacts in each sector resulted. 
Also, the sectoral consultants were therefore not quite received with 
open arms and this led to some frustration on their part. 
Another problem related to the duration and phasing of the media 
consultants (experts on TV, films, etc) and user-sector consultants 
(health, rural development, agriculture, education, etc). There was 
only one user-sector consultant (though one other consultant did double 
up for a user sector too) and this was found to be a major shortcoming, 
especially in view of the lack of full-time counterparts from these 
(or any other) sectors. This one consultant came at the same time as 
the media consultants, who stayed for shorter durations and left earlier. 
As a result, the complete input of user sector media requirements could 
not be given to the media experts before they left. A better use of 
the consultants would have been possible if the user sector consultant 
had come before the media consultants, done some work on media require- 
ments - on his own, and in consultation with the media experts when 
they came - and then provided these as inputs to the media experts for 
their planning. "Some iteration in such cases - between the desirable 
and the possible - is obviously essential, and this can be done only 
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if the user sector requirý.,, ýint of media support is fed into the media 
experts planning. 
Background of International Consultants 
In the analysis of deviations from the Scenario and elsewhere, the 
main variables have been grouped into three main categories: conceptual, 
situational and operational. However, there is little doubt that person- 
nel factors - in terms of the background, experience and personality of 
the consultants - play an equally important role in planning processes. 
In some ways this can be considered an operational variable, but it is 
of such a different kind that it merits separate attention. 
This project was lucky to have an excellent group of consultants, 
most of whom had previous experiences of working in developing countries. 
However, one drawback was that few of the consultants had first-hand 
knowledge of how governments and administrators in developing countries 
work. Also, few of the consultants had any experience in actually 
implementing large-scale plans. 
Communication Policy and Strategy 
In spite of the time and effort spent by the team in the policy 
area, some basic issues were left untouched. For example, though 
feedback from the people to decision-makers was mentioned in the policy 
document prepared by the project team, it was implicitly assumed that 
the main purpose of communication was basically development-support. 
In view of the fact that the government accepted this approach, it may 
have been a valid assumption for Afghanistan. However, alternative 
purposes of communication - e. g., increasing participation, politici- 
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isation or conscientisation, etc - were not presented or discussed. 
Communication Research 
The final report laid considerable stress on research, including 
feedback, in the communications area. At present little data exists on 
effects and impact of different media and different programanes in 
Afghanistan. In the absence of such data, choice of media or media-mixes 
for particular uses has to be either arbitrary or based on experience 
elsewhere. Given the very different and unique culture of Afghanistan, 
the applicability of foreign findings is doubtful. In spite of this, 
the team had little choice and recommendations on media use had to be 
made on the basis of experiences in other countries. 
rnniri itcTnni 
The Communication System Planning Survey was a unique effort in the 
fields of communication planning and applied systems analysis. Systems 
analysis, though of comparatively recent origin, is a powerful tool and 
has been successfully applied in a large number of fields. However, it 
has so far been rarely - if ever - used for communication planning: 
mainly because large-scale communication planning is itself a new 
phenomenon. This project has definitely proven the practical applica- 
bility and usefulness of systems analysis for communication planning. 
It has also brought out the problems involved in terms of conceptual 
and methodological difficulties. The learning experiences from this may 
be useful as lessons for future projects, and that is the reason and 
hope of this study. This section therefore summarises some of the learn- 
ing experiences-and raises a few issues. 
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Learning Experiences 
1. Systematic planning procedures are feasible and useful in colimuni- 
cation planning. The planning framework must, however, be used as 
a base to deviate from and not as a given prescription; its direction 
and spirit are more important than its letter. 
2. The specific framework developed for this planning exercise was 
extremely useful, but it has some conceptual problems, and needs 
to be modified. 
3. Hardly anywhere does communication policy exist, in terms of a 
definite, coherent policy. Not only does it have to be "created", 
but also it is intricately linked with objectives, goals, targets, 
etc. 
4, Mainly (but not only)because of the above, communication planning 
cannot be considered as a "linear-sequential" process. Activities 
are often dependent on each other, and an iterative, tasks-in- 
parallel process is necessary. 
5. "Full-time counterparts" seem to exist only in theory. In reality, 
getting even part-time counterparts is a difficult task. 
6. It is desirable that the national focal point for such projects 
be a Ministry that already has certain inter-Ministerial coordina- 
ting functions - e. g., the Ministry of Planning. However, to 
promote close and regular interaction, it is desirable that the 
international "sector-experts" be physically located in the 
Ministry/agency that they are concerned with. 
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7. Involving local nationals in is good and necesc:, ry, 
but extremely difficult: they are just not interested enough. 
8. In a corimunication planning project, the "user sectors" (health, 
agriculture, etc) are of crucial importance; the composition of 
the international team should reflect this importance. 
9. While knowledge and experience of working in developing countries 
are important considerations in recruting consultants, knowledge 
of government systems and experience in implementation of large 
projects are also very desirable factors. 
10. Policy-level meetings are difficult to arrange if the project is 
not perceived as being especially important. Since this is often 
the fate of planning exercises (in which no hardware is delivered), 
in such cases it may be better to formalise some of these aspects 
in an appropriate document before the project even begins. Possibly, 
this could form a part of the Plan of Operation. 
Some Issues 
I. In a long-term planning framework, is it right to treat policies 
and objectives as immutable? In the rapidly changing socio-economic, 
cultural and - often. - political environment of developing countries, 
should not the plan itself provide for possibilities of changing policy 
and objectives? 
2. To take account of the above, is it possible to evolve ad nnamic 
(as opposed to static) model for planning? 
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3. How to get full-tine counterparts? Is it possible to conceive 
of a scheme in which UNDP/UNESCO pay an incentive, a salary 
supplement, to counterparts? This may "commit" the indivi- 
dual and create some pressure on the government to ensure 
that counterparts are really available on a full-time basis. 
4. How to get national involvement in decision-making? This is 
related to the perceived importance of the project, and the 
question therefore is: how to create a climate of. _importance 
for the project? One possibility is to take up only those 
projects in which the government is really and considerably 
interested. 
5. In a long-term planning exercise, how much time and attention 
should be devoted by the international consultants to the 
solution of immediate problems? While working on immediate 
problems helps the concerned Department and thereby helps 
develop good rapport with the international consultant, it 
does take attention away from the long-term perspective. 
Is there a generalised solution to this dilemma, or does it 
depend on personal and situational factors? 
6. Should the planning team seek to re-open issues on which 
decisions have apparently been already made by the govern- 
ment? 
7. In finalising the plan, how much should the team worry about the 
possibilities of implementation? Should the plan limit its recom- 
mendations-only to ones that are/will be favoured by the govern- 
ment? How does the team determine - or should it at all - what is 
- 33 - 
politically feasible and what suggestions stand a Ue{: 'c-'r 
chance of being implemented? 
Further Work 
The Communication System Planning Survey in Afghanistan and other 
work undertaken by UNESCO (and others) elsewhere has led to a great deal 
of learning with regard to communication planning. However, this Survey 
itself has indicated the need for further work - both conceptual and 
empirical - in this area. Some of the issues that need to be studied 
further have been mentioned above, and more will surface in the process 
of further study itself. The increasing realisation of the importance 
of communication planning will, one hopes, lead to further work in this 
field and lead to both - improved techniques and better results. 
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Process Evluation 
Evaluating the process of planning, as distinct from the outcorn, e 
of planning and action, is, if not original, at least very rare in 
practice. There are numerous studies in both developed and developing 
countries of sumnative evaluation of communication projects (') y for-Ra- 
tive evaluation - i. e. the evaluation of products of projects, such as 
broadcasts, printed material, etc., in a formative stage, before final 
decisions on content and style have been made - is less common, but 
nevertheless has been carried out enough for some experience and ground- 
rules to be established (2); but the evaluation of the process of planning 
and setting up a system of communications for development purposes is so 
rare that there are no models or guidelines on which to base such a 
practice. Indeed, there are very few authoritative, personal, or straight- 
forward descriptive accounts of the planning of such projects, never mind 
systematic and objective evaluation. 
Yet the need for systematic evaluation of the planning process is 
very great. Each year, large sums of money are channelled through inter- 
national agencies, national government aid programmes and private foun- 
dations for providing technical assistance for the planning of various 
development projects. At considerable expense, teams of foreign experts 
are recruited, sent out to developing countries for several months, a 
report is prepared for the national government, and then - what? Often, 
the report is put away, forgotten or deliberately ignored. Sometimes, 
the report is accepted by the national government, and funds may be 
sought from external agencies. In a comparatively few cases, the reports 
actually get implemented, although they may have been modified beyond 
. _3_ 
recognition fron the original proposals. Even then, there is no guo rO-'I- 
tee that the project will be successful in achieving its airs, once 
implemented . 
It is there ore essential to understand better the process of 
planning for development projects, so that as far as possible proce- 
dures which put projects at risk are avoided, and principles and 
procedures which increase the chances of needed and worthwhile projects 
being successfully implemented are identified. One possible way of 
doing this is to try to evaluate the process of planning on one such 
project, to provide a basis of experience for future projects which 
can actually be transferred. 
A Communication Plan for Afghanistan 
In 1977, UNESCO was invited by the Afghanistan government to draw 
up a communication plan for development in Afghanistan for the next 12 
years, a period which would cover the next five-year development plan, 
plus the period covered by the existing national development plan. 
Responsibility for the provision of technical expertise for the drawing 
up of the communication plan was delegated to UNESCO's Division of 
Development of Communication Systems. The Chief of the Section of 
Communication Planning and Studies in the Division, Alan Hancock, was 
at the time developing a theoretical framework for planning for communi- 
cation development. Since the Afghan communication plan itself would 
require careful preparation, it was seen as a good opportunity to test 
the theoretical planning framework in the field. This was agreed with 
the field project leader, Lesley Sargent. 
4 - 
The Nature of the P1 anni nq Fra mcwor 
The planning framework is described in full by Hancock (3), but 
it is necessary to summarise the basis of the framework and to analyse 
it for the purpose of evaluation. Basically, the hypothesised planning 
framework had four separate but related ele; -, lents. The first was an 
identification of basic principles which appear to have been associated 
with the successful planning of previous communication projects. These 
principles were set against an analysis of eight major educational 
communication projects, which either had good documentary evidence about 
the planning process, or with which Hancock had been closely associated 
during the planning stages. These projects were: 
Open University (United Kingdom) 
Agency for Instructional Television (USA) 
Children's Television Workshop (USA) 
Educational Media Service (Singapore) 
Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting 
Development (Malaysia) 
Group Resources of Women (Tobago) 
Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (India) 
Educational Television Service (El Salvador) 
These were chosen to provide a range of institutional forms, from 
local to national levels, a variety of geographical locations, and 
differing levels of success in planning and implementation. The basic 
principles were also compared with an analysis of the planning process 
for a UNESCO pre-investment study on educational media provision in 
Thailand. 
-5- 
The second element in the rramework was the drawing up of a thco 
retical and logical sequence of planning events'and activities, necessary 
for the development of a satisfactory communication plan. The planning 
sequence, at this stage, was largely linear, in that one step logically 
followed another. In practical terms, though, this does not take account 
of the realities of planning, which involve discussion, changing of 
earlier decisions, and post-hoc analysis or identification of aims, etc. 
In order then to take into account the need for a flexible approach to 
planning, a third element modified the framework to build in concepts of 
horizontal and vertical integration of planning (horizontal, to ensure 
that all relevant departments, sections and Ministries affected by the 
plan were involved in the planning process; vertical, to ensure that all 
relevant levels within a Ministry or sector were also involved). 
The fourth and final element - one commonly found in development 
planning projects, but not usually based on such a thorough prior theo- 
retical approach - was the production of an operational plan -a scenario - 
of how the planning project should develop in the field. This scenario 
resulted in a timetabled sequence of 33 activities to be carried out in 
the 25 weeks allocated to the field planning activities. 
The Task of Evaluation 
The fact that the planning framework has at least four separate 
elements raised a number of problems from the point of view of evalua- 
tion. It would be tempting, for instance, to base the evaluation on 
the extent to which the reality of the planning exercise matched the 
projected scenario. However, the final scenario which the team of 
foreign experts recruited by UNESCO were to use as a guide to its 
activities was not in practice a "pure" derivation of the planning 
-0- 
frameýlork, by any means. Quite apart from it being modified and 
restricted to take account of practical mattccrs like the need to 
compress, for financial reasons, the planning process into as short 
a time as possible, the scenario was a result of constantly changing 
relationships and plans between UNESCO, UNDP, the Afghan government, 
and agencies willing to fund the planning project. 
Perhaps more importantly, the rejection of the whole planning 
framework, if the reality did not fit the scenario, would be too crude 
a method of evaluation. There might well be important elements of the 
framework which would stand up well to the field experience, even if 
the scenario itself should turn out to be unsatisfactory. 
On the other hand, the scenario must be a starting point for the 
evaluation. A comparison between the scenario and what actually happened 
should indicate points of incongruence, identify assumptions which turned 
out to be incorrect, and planning strategies which appeared to be imprac- 
tical in the Afghan situation. It is an empirical starting-point for the 
evaluation of the framework. 
Thus, the evaluation, as well as relating the scenario to what 
actually happened, and identifying reasons for events turning out the 
way they did, must also seek to relate these events to the other three 
elements of the framework. The evaluation must also attempt to explain 
the extent to which events which do not fit what the framework would 
predict are due to the unique circumstances of Afghanistan, or are 
likely to be general to developing countries. Perhaps most important 
of all, the evaluation must examine the internal logic of the framework, 
and the relationship between the four elements of the framework for 
possible sources of incongruence between predicted and actual events. 
-7- 
Therefore, there are several tasks which have to be accomplished 
in the process evaluation. The first is to obtain as accurate an account 
as possible of what actually happened during the planning survey. The 
second is to obtain as far as possible explanations or hypotheses for 
divergences between the scenario, the predictions from the framework, 
and what actually happened. The third is to identify how much such 
divergences are likely to be due to the particular situation in Afghanistan 
at the time, or how much such divergences are likely to be general probleýnims. 
Lastly, the evaluation must analyse to what extent these explanations or 
deductions will influence or demand changes to the various elements of 
the framework. Finally, it should be noted that the evaluation is con- 
cerned primarily with the extent to which the theoretical framework 
stands up in the field, rather than with evaluation of the whole process of 
the planning exercise for communications development in Afghanistan, 
although the two are obviously closely linked. 
Methodology 
As mentioned before, there are few precedents to follow. Basically, 
the method used has been a form of participant observation, as control- 
led and systematic as possible, supported by semi-structured interviews 
with project personnel, and the careful collection and filing of records. 
The evaluation was carried out by myself, as one of the specialists 
recruited by UNESCO to work on the planning survey team. As well as being 
responsible for planning proposals in the education sector, I also had, 
as part of my contract, responsibility for evaluation of the planning 
framework. Before the field-work began, I was already familiar with the 
planning framework which had been proposed. I had also worked before on 
a similar communication planning project, in Thailand, so I was to some 
-8- 
extent aware of some of the problems 1ikoly to be faced, and had sc e 
base for comparing the Afghan situation with that for another c velop- 
ing country. Also, being a full member of the team, with my own sectoral 
area of responsibility, I was directly aware of the real constraints of 
the field-work on the framework, and the extent to which the framework 
assisted or otherwise my own area of work. Also, as a full member of 
the team, I had direct and easy access, on an informal and friendly basis, 
both to other foreign specialists on the team and in other agencies, and 
to Afghan nationals in the education sector with whom I was working (for 
a period of three months). In this way, it was possible to obtain, at 
least indirectly, reactions of various people concerned to the way in 
which the planning survey was being carried out, and also to obtain a 
good knowledge of the way decision-making was carried out in the Afghan 
government sector. 
As well as this informal observation, formal, semi-structured inter- 
views were held with six of the seven foreign specialists on the team whose 
field-work extended for more than two weeks, at the end of their mission, 
before leaving Afghanistan. The team leader was interviewed in England 
after all the field-work had been completed, and the final report had 
been drafted. 
The team leader kept a daily diary. Although the diary was personal 
and its confidentiality was maintained, the team leader was able to draw 
on this to verify points of detail and to support some of the more general 
conclusions he made during his interview. 
Records of all committee meetings, including minutes, notes of 
meetings with Ministers and senior government officials, briefing or 
"action" papers prepared by members of the project team, notes of the 
_g_ 
project team's staff meetings, and other papers relevant to the planning 
survey, were carefully maintained and 'made available for the evaluation. 
Mid-way through the project , when six members of the teem had spent 
at least one month each on the project, a staff meeting was held speci- 
fically to discuss the evaluation of the planning survey so -far. 
Members of the teaui were told at the beginning of their mission that 
there would be an attempt made to evaluate the planning process as it 
happened, but it was also made clear that the evaluation was not concerned 
with the individual performance of members of the team, but with the 
structuring of the planning exercise. All the foreign specialists approved 
of the idea of such an evaluation, although some were rather sceptical 
about whether it was possible to carry out, or whether it would make much 
difference to future projects. Members of the team had been sent the 
scenario in advance of their mission, but, with the exception of the team 
leader, they were not given the planning framework in full, partly because 
of bulk, and partly because it was not thought necessary for the foreign 
specialists to be aware of the theoretical basis of the framework. Indeed, 
it wasthought that a more independent evaluation of the planning process 
would be achieved if they were unaware of some of the assumptions behind 
the framework. 
The Scenario 
For reasons already outlined, we have to start with the scenario. 
The scenario provided the team leader with operational guidelines as to 
what had to be done, the order in which things were to be done, and the 
time when they had to be done. To quote: 
- 10 - 
"The scenario is based on two maln priiicipies. It sce<s, 
in the first place, to secure a compromise betv, eeri careful pre- 
planning and scheduling, and flexibility: to profit from do- 
tailed creativity, leaving the planning tebm with genuine res- 
ponsibility and decision-making capacity. At the same time, 
it tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision-making 
within its planning strategies, taking account of pragmatic as 
well as theoretical constraints ... Figure 1 therefore traces 
the course of the survey through its separate planning phases, 
in relation to both planning and decision-making forums. Table A 
relates these activities more specifically to the phased intro- 
duction of planning consultants, and to the chronology of the 
study. " (4) 
Figure 1 and Table A are both here reproduced. 
In addition to the network, the scenario also makes a number of 
important proposals for providing the necessary organisational structure 
to enable discussion and decision-making to take place. First of all, 
Hancock makes a basic distinction in his theoretical framework between 
planning and decision-making or policy-making. Policy and decision- 
making is concerned primarily with the setting of objectives, determina- 
tion of priorities, and decisions to implement. Planning is concerned 
with the preparation of plans, strategies for the efficient and equitable 
use of communications, and for the realisation of communications policies. 
He makes the following observation: 
... (i) planning, especially systems planning, is 
dependent upon the clear formulation of objectives, and 
objectives cannot be articulated with any precision unless 
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The Scenario: TABLE A 
A, - tivi'y D scrintion of Activity Team T";, ý , hershi. p 
(Summary 
5-6 Discuss draft policy statement 
,. -with counterparts 
Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
2 7 Discuss with Planning and Policy 
Body and Modify 
3 o-9 ncpand to include goals and 
Team Leader 
targets 
Deputy Leader (Economist) 
Discuss and modify with Planning 
Body 
Systems Analyst 
4 10 Derive and State Objectives 
5 11 Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
6 12-13 Quantify Objectives 
Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
7 14 Formulate alternative strategic 
8 14 approaches 
9 15 Review alternatives with full 
team 
10 16 Discuss with Planning Body and 
Modify 
11 17-18 Prepare Format for Decision- 
Makers 
Team Leader 
Discuss with Policy Body and 
Select Preference Deputy Leader - Economist 
12 19-20 Evolve macro framework 
Rural Com. Expert 
Discuss with Planning Body Telecom. Expert 
and Modify Radio-TV Progr. Expert 
13 21 JEvolve phased strategic plan Print & News Ag. Expert 
14 ?2 Discuss with Planning Body and Film & A-V Expert 
Modify Evaluation Expert 
15 23- Research for Operational Plan 
16 25 Evolve evaluation framework 
J 
Systems Analyst 
Prepare Plan for decision-makers 
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TABLE A (conk'd) 
WI k Pc-t ivity Descri wt ioY- of AcJ_ itsi ty 
(äumrnary) 
17 26 Review strategic plan with 
policy body and modify 
18 27 Prepare detailed 
19 27 Operational Plan 
20 28 Discuss with Planning Body 
and Modify 
21 29 Synthesise Report 
22 30 Review Report with Planning 
Body and Modify 
ý3 31 Prepare Report Format for 
Decision-Makers 
24 32 Review with Policy Body 
25+ 33 Finalise and Submit Report 
Tyr m 1rTCffl1O T1 
}, T) ) 
Team Leader 
Deputy Leader - Economist 
Ru:: al Corn. Expert 
Telecom. Expert 
Fwaluat i on Expert 
Team Leader 
Deputy Leader - Economist 
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overall goals and policies are clearly understood. -, While 
policies may exist, and be discussed, therefore, without 
planning, planning cannot be expected to take place with- 
out policies. " 
Hancock also makes the distinction between communication planning 
and development planning, the latter being defined as planning for a 
reduction in inequalities. He sees communication planning for develop- 
ment as implying the use of communication resources and technologies 
as part of this process. In practical terms, as far as the scenario is 
concerned, the distinction between communication policy, development 
planning and communication planning reflects the different groups or 
sectors to be covered by or involved in any communication planning 
survey. 
Therefore, in order to provide an organisational structure which 
will bring together the various groups and sectors necessary for the 
development of a national communications plan for development, Hancock 
proposed in the Afghan scenario a number of arrangements. These were: 
1. A team made up of external (foreign) specialists and full- 
time counterparts (at a middle professional level) from the 
various ministries concerned with communication issues (to cover 
communication planning). 
2. A permanent officer or representative of the Ministry of 
Planning should be appointed, if possible on a full-time basis, 
as a member of the communication planning team. 
3. A small ad hoc committee formed within the Ministry of 
- 16 - 
Planning, to review part ; culzr drafts roduccd by the team, 
and to relate these to central plannin issues. 
4. An inter-ministerial Co-ordinating Committee should 
be formed, to ensure that sectoral opinion is adequately 
voiced. (This arrangement, and points 2 and 3 above, would 
cover development planning). 
5A high-level body, under the Office of the Presidency, 
convened to discuss major policy issues arising during, or 
as a result of the survey, at a Cabinet level. 
It should be noted that these proposals differ in some 
respects from the official project document agreed between 
UNESCO and the Afghan government. In the project document 
there was: 
- no specific insistence upon full-time professional 
counterparts for the external team; 
- no distinction was made between planning and policy- 
making bodies, especially in the discussion of a 
Co-ordinating Committee. 
In addition to these suggestions, the scenario included a brief 
description of each of the tasks to be carried out each week. 
This then was the ground-plan for the planning exercise. What 
actually happened? 
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THE FIELD EXPERIENCE 
The Communication System Planning Survey 
First of all, it is important to establish that the formal require- 
ments of the project, as agreed between UNESCO and the Afghan government, 
were clearly met. Apart from reducing the period of planning from 12 to 
8 years, all the goals were met. A substantial three-volume report, 
containing analyses of the present situation, suggestions for develop- 
ment of communication policies in user sectors and media agencies, 
costed proposals for external assistance, and proposals for inter-sectoral 
co-ordination of communication planning, were all submitted after exten- 
sive discussion and participation with the relevant national working 
groups. Although the report was apparently well-received by the Afghan 
government and the various agencies and Ministries concerned, the full 
impact of the study, which was distributed in March, 1978, will not be 
known for a number of years. 
However, what is of immediate concern in this evaluation is the 
extent to which the planning framework helped or otherwise the develop- 
ment of an acceptable and practicable communication plan for Afghanistan. 
First of all, a brief description of the main events that occurred, of 
relevance to the framework, will be given. Secondly, an account will 
be given of the way the various arrangements and tasks set out in the 
scenario worked out in practice. Finally, this will be used to identify 
those parts of the framework which require revision, and some sugges- 
tions for revision, where appropriate. 
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(a} °ecruitrn' nt of forei{fin sjnocialists and r tiorlal counterp is ý... ýý. _ 
fir.. 
UNESCO recruited three broad categories of foreign specialists for 
the survey: three "generalists" - the team leader, the deputy team 
leader, and the systems analyst, who arrived a month ahead of the rest 
of the foreign specialists, to carry out Phase 1 of the scenario, 'Poiicy 
Making; four media sector specialists - broadcasting, films and audio- 
visual, telecommunications, news and press; and two development sector 
specialists - rural development, education. All these specialists were 
to be concerned with Phase Two - Strategic Planning - and the team leader, 
deputy team leader, and the two development sector specialists would be 
concerned with Phase Three - Preparation of Operational Plans. With the 
exception of the News and Press specialist, who was delayed due to sickness, 
all foreign specialists were recruited and took up post on time. None left 
early. 
At the same time, national counterparts were appointed to work with 
the foreign specialists. Table B summarises the appointments of speci. - 
alists and counterparts. The foreign specialists were located in Radio 
Afghanistan, which provided office accommodation, translation and liaison, 
and transport facilities. Overall liaison for the project was supplied 
by Radio Afghanistan's President for Technical Affairs. 
The three generalists arrived six weeks ahead of the other special- 
ists, and in addition to working on Phase 1 of the project, also dealt 
with practical arrangements, such as locating and getting counterparts 
nominated, making contact with the relevant Ministry departments and 
other developiient agencies and projects, and securing office accommodation 
and secretarial services. 
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TABLE B: RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN SPECIALISTS AND 
NATIONAL COUNTERPARTS - CRIGINI^L ARRANiGP_, Lr, lT 
COUNTERPARTS (S) BY 
ARRIVAL DEPARTURE FOREIGN SPECIALIST DEPARTMENT 
June December Team Leader 
June December Deputy team leader/ 
economist 
June October Systems analyst 
August October Broadcasting Radio Afghanistan - production 
Educational broadcasting 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rural development (2) 
August October Film and Audio-Visual Afghan Films 
Department of Culture 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
August November Telecommunications Ministry of Communications 
Radio Afghanistan-transmission 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
October November News Agency and Press Bakhtar News Agency 
Newspapers 
Rural development (2) 
Public health (2) 
August November Rural development Agriculture 
Women's organisation 
Adult education 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Educational broadcasting 
Adult education 
August November Education and evaluation Radio Afghanistan-audience 
research 
Agriculture 
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The three Phase 1 members of the tear, were able to ensure that 
each of the relevant Ministries had appointed at least one counterp . rt 
before the arrival of the second phase specialists. However, no doubt 
because of uncertainty as to the exact scope of the project and of the 
exact role expected of counterparts, several Ministries or departments 
suggested more than one counterpart. Also, as the Phase 2 specialists 
got into their work, they found it necessary to split up the work bet- 
week themselves rather differently. 
Consequently, the following specialist/counterpart relationship 
developed, with each specialist working with one or two main counterparts, 
although even then practice varied considerably from sector to sector: 
TABLE C: FOREIGN SPECIALISTS AND NATIONAL COUNTERPARTS - 
FINAL ARRANGE14ENT 
FOREIGN SPECIALIST 
Broadcasting 
Film and Audio-Visual 
Telecommunications 
News Agency and Press 
COUNTERPART(S) - BY DEPARTMENT 
Radio Afghanistan - production 
Afghan Films 
Ministry of Communications 
Radio Afghanistan - transmission 
Bakhtar News Agency 
Rural development 
Education and evaluation 
Rural development (2) 
Public health (2) 
Agriculture 
Women's organisation 
Educational broadcasting 
Adult education 
The device 'of using counterparts, together with foreign specialists, 
on a partnership basis, is an important part of the framework. Counter- 
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parts are seen as the means by which planning discussions, knovrl edge of 
planning procedures, and most important of all, national involvement in 
the planning exercise, are permeated through the system at all levels. 
The counterparts will remain after the foreign experts have gone, and 
therefore should be able both to understand the background to the plan- 
ning issues, and also to carry through the operationalisation of the 
plans for communications development. 
Unfortunately, however, this aspect of the framework did not work 
out as planned. This was in no way due to lack of co-operation on the 
part of individual counterparts. Although of course there were varia- 
tions, most counterparts were extremely helpful, courteous, and indeed 
willing to provide assistance as best they could. There were however a 
number of practical and structural constraints that prevented the specialist/ 
counterpart relationship from working as planned. 
First of all, the counterparts could not work full-time with special- 
ists. They all had their own work to do, often in departments with a 
heavy load of work which could, for various reasons, only be done by the 
counterpart. For instance, in Adult Education, the main counterpart was 
responsible for the development of adult literacy materials for a large 
project scheduled to begin in 1978. This work had to be her main priority, 
rather than the development of plans for the next 12 years. In any case, 
because some foreign specialists had to cover several departments or 
Ministries, it was necessary for them to have more than one counterpart. 
This was a particular problem for the development sector people, above all 
the rural development specialist, who had to cover in the original plan 
five different ministries. 
Perhaps more importantly, in the Afghan context, the counterparts were 
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not at the right level. It is necessary here to digress a little in 
discuss a crucial aspect of Afghan culture (at least at the time of 
the study), because this has implications for many different aspects 
of the framework. Decision-making in Afghan ministries operates on an 
extremely hierarchical basis. Decisions are only made at the top. 
Almost no decisions of any importance are made below the level of a 
departmental head in an Afghan ministry (called a President). Even 
then, many decisions which to a Western observer may appear to be 
trivial are likely to be referred to the Minister or Deputy Minister, 
particuarly if it involves departure from normal practice, or a new 
development. As the team leader pointed out in the final report, the 
ideal level for the counterpart would have been the sectoral president. 
However, given the Afghan system, this was clearly impossible. 
Presidents of sectors already have impossible work-loads, and a regular 
day-to-day involvement with foreign specialists was clearly out of the 
question. 
Another unfortunate consequence of this situation was that, in 
general, the counterparts did not adequately liaise between the team 
of foreign specialists and their presidents. Often, they were unaware 
themselves of policy within their own department, and if they were able 
to get in to see their president, their own operational difficulties 
and requirements were likely to take precedence over reporting on the 
team's work. 
Partly as a consequence of the hierarchical nature of decision- 
making, and partly because the information did not usually exist, counter- 
parts were often unable to carry out one of the main functions laid down 
for them in the framework, which was to provide data for the foreign 
specialists on facilities and policies, particularly if the information 
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required going outside the narrow sector for which they th: mselves w Y2 
responsible. Where policy did not exist, not only were counter ,. r! t-s 
unable to take such a decision theimmselves, but most were reluctant even 
to indicate what it might be. As already mentioned, they were sometimes 
unaware of the existence of faci li `ifs information or policy, even when 
they did exist. 
Lastly, with two exceptions, most counterparts were not fully involved 
with or committed to the planning exercise. Particularly since most counter- 
parts were working at the operational level, immediate problems naturally 
took precedence over long-term planning. Furthermore, in most cases, their 
Ministry or department, while perhaps approving of the idea of such planning 
in principle, had not requested or sought such an exercise. In one or two 
cases (Afghan Films and Adult Education, for instance) foreign specialists 
felt they had to do something practical to help, in order to get into the 
relevant department and win their co-operation. The two exceptions were 
Radio Afghanistan and the Educational Broadcasting Department of the 
Ministry of Education. In these two sectors, counterparts were always 
available and keen to work with the foreign specialists. In both cases, 
though, these departments had pressing short-term problems which the 
planning exercise would obviously help resolve - both were due to open 
a new service in six months time, and both were desperately short of 
trained personnel and resources. 
Finally, there was one crucial gap on the counterpart side. There 
was no regular official counterpart from the Ministry of Planning. This 
led to a number of problems. It was extremely difficult for the team 
to get into the Ministry to see high-level officials. The team leader 
tried for six weeks to arrange a meeting with the Deputy Minister, who 
then complained that he was not being consulted enough about the exercise. 
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This does however indicate that even though counterparts were not a le 
to play as full a role in the planning exercise as intcndcd, t is never'- 
theless still vital for such people to be appointed from the key minis- 
tries and departimients. 
Indeed, there is a need for much more consideration to be given by 
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both international agencies and host countries to the role of Counterparts 
for planning projects. It took the team leader and his colleagues several 
weeks to arrange for counterparts and it was clear that, even then, counter- 
parts were unsure of their role. Some team members felt that the local 
United Nations Development Programme office, with its understanding of 
the Afghan government and cultural system, could play a more direct role 
in advising on the choice of counterparts, and in briefing Ministries about 
what is expected from counterparts. 
(b) Establishment of means for the development and agreement of communi 
cation planning. strategies and policies. There were three levels at 
which it was attempted to create structures for deciding on planning 
strategies and policies: Ministerial, Departmental (i. e. presidents), 
and operational. 
The project was formally attached to the Ministry of Information 
(of which Radio Afghanistan was a department). However, there were only 
two formal meetings arranged between the team leader and the Minister. 
The first was held in September, and was attended by five presidents from 
the Ministry, two U. N. D. P. officials, and the team leader and deputy team 
leader. The main purpose of the visit was to obtain advice on government 
communication policy, (a set of questions having been sent to the Minister 
by the team in advance of the meeting). At this meeting, the team reques- 
ted the Minister to arrange an inter-ministerial meeting of Ministers in 
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November to discuss the team's mD. jor proposals. This the. Minister 
promised to do. 
The second meeting was held in November. This was short, and 
lasted just 20 minutes, before a cabinet meeting. In fact, several 
attempts to hold this second meeting were frustrated. The team leader 
was trying to get arrangements for an inter-ministerial meeting agreed 
and finalised. In the end, the inter-ministerial meeting never occur- 
red, at least during the period of the project. 
i 
Mention has already been made of the meeting with the Deputy Minister 
of Planning (the Minister had been assassinated while the project was 
being carried out). Several meetings were also held with Ministers in 
the Ministry of Education. The Minister was ill during the length of 
the project, but two meetings were held with each of the two Deputy 
Ministers respectively. Access was easier to this level in the Ministry 
of Education, because of the need for the Ministry to provide two hours 
a day of educational television from March, 1978, and inevitably the team 
was drawn into preparing short-term advice, and negotiations for technical 
assistance. However, the main requirement from the team was for the 
Ministry to set up an advisory committee of presidents from the Ministry 
of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, and Radio Afghanistan, 
to discuss priorities for educational programming. This meeting was 
arranged, between presidents within just the Ministry of Education, in 
September. (In the event, it met only once, devolving all responsibility 
for educational broadcasting to the president of educational broadcasting). 
Nevertheless, it was possible for the team leader, the deputy team leader, 
and the education sector specialist to meet the Deputy Minister at the 
end of the project, to discuss the main proposals, and also to discuss in 
September the overall priorities for educational broadcasting with the 
Deputy Minister. 
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Apart from these meetings, it was not possible for any other 
meetings to be arranged at a Mi ni stcri al l eveli with members oF the 
planning team. 
At the president of department level ,a Presi dent s' Corrununi ca ti ors 
Council was established, to assist with the project. Presidents from 
14 different departments, plus three representatives from three other 
departments, were members. It was hoped that the Council would meet 
once a month, but in fact it met three times during the project. Table D 
sets out attendance at the meetings. 
TABLE D: MEETINGS OF PRESIDENTS' COMMUNICATION COUNCIL 
NO. OF MEMBERS 
ATTENDING 
Pres- Others Total idents 
Full Afghan membership 14 3 17 
DATE AGENDA ITEMS 
August 1st Discussion of sec- 84 12 
tor objectives 
and communication 
policies 
Sept. 26th Likely demand for 65 11 
media from each 
sector 
Oct. 24th Five inter- 369 
sectoral proposals 
from team 
The stated aim of the Presidents' Communication Council was to con- 
firm the accuracy and authenticity of the information collected through 
the Communication Co-ordination Council, and to guide the direction of 
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the study. In practice, though, the team caý, Ie to export thr Preside m: s 
Communication Council to resolve or agree to communication policies 
identified or proposed by the team. Unfortunately, however, this did 
not in general occur. 
At the first meeting, each of the sectors gave useful additional 
information about policies and clarified where possible points on which 
the team were not sure. The meeting also provided an opportunity for 
sectoral presidents to find out about the policies of other departments 
or sectors, if they did not know these already. It was also used by the 
team to requestfurther information about counterparts and strategic 
planning. 
At the second meeting, the Presidents were asked to specify their 
likely demand for different media. However, although a form setting out 
the information required had been circulated prior to the meeting, it 
was received by most presidents only a day or two before the meeting. In 
spite of this, a number of sectors were able to respond in general terms, 
but it was clear that, for most sectors, it was going to be difficult 
to provide this information, because a number of broader policy issues, 
involving several sectors, needed to be resolved first. For instance, 
educational radio broadcasts would depend to a large extent on the provi- 
sion of sets being increased. 
At the third meeting, the Presidents' Communication Council was asked 
to consider five major proposals formulated by the planning team, that cut 
across or required agreement from a number of sectors. This was a particu- 
larly important meeting for the planning team, since these proposals were 
seen by the team as essential foundations for the development of an inte- 
grated communications planning strategy for Afghanistan. The five proposals 
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were as follow : 
- the issue and shared use of community radio sets 
- the estabiishmont of a permanent Communication 
Co-ordinating Council 
- the establishment of a communication and audience 
research service 
- the establishment of an inter-agency system of 
training centres for village level workers 
- the establishment of a "wall newspaper" containing 
development information from all agencies 
It was clear from the discussion which took place after the brief 
introduction of each proposal that in Afghanistan, it was going to be 
very difficult to get different Ministries or agencies to share facili- 
ties, if it meant loss of autonomy. However, the proposals were discus- 
sed, and the planning team did get an accurate reflection of how the 
proposals were likely to be received, even if the probable reactions 
were not to the liking of the planning team. 
The team leader was very upset about the outcome of the third 
meeting, in particular. It can be seen from Table D that although 
overall attendance had dropped only slightly from the first meeting 
(from 12 to 9), the level of representation had declined considerably, 
only three presidents attending the October meeting (and one of these 
left after half an hour). Given the difficulty being felt at this stage 
of getting contacts at a Ministerial level, it was considered all the 
more disappointing that clear-cut decisions, especially regarding co- 
operation between sectors, could not be reached through the Presidents' 
Communication Council. 
However, if attendance of presidents to the Council meetings was 
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disappointing, generally presidents were accessible to individual memi', ers 
of thhý: planning team who wished to see them. On several occasions, in 
fact, presidents themselves requested meetingswith members of the team, 
either to keep themselves personally informed, or to seek advice or 
assistance on particular issues. 
Finally, the last structure devised to obtain wide involvement of 
nationals in the project was the establishment of a Communication Planning 
Council. In all, 15 different agencies were represented on this Council. 
Members of this Council were used as information sources for the develop- 
ment of a communication policy and objectives statement. Members were 
operational personnel at the "director" level - persons involved in the 
daily execution of communication activities for their respective mini- 
stries. The Council met six times between June and September (roughly 
every two to three weeks). Table E summarises attendance at meetings, 
and Table F indicates the extent of involvement of various departments 
and individuals. 
It can be seen from Table E that, although there was a slight drop 
(from 19 attending the first meeting, which was slightly unusual, being 
the first, and therefore attracting several presidents as well, to 13 for 
the last), the numbers of individuals attending held up well. The number 
of departments represented decreased from 11 for the first meeting, to 8 
for the last. However, some which were not represented at the first 
meeting were represented at later meetings, and vice-versa, 15 depart- 
ments in all being represented in at least one meeting. 
However, more than just token participation was required. As one 
of the Afghan members pointed out in the second meeting, "irregular 
attendance by a section could cripple the project's effectiveness", and 
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TABLE E: MEETINGS OF Mi4M1JNICATION PLANNING COUNCIL 
ATTENDANCE 
DATE TOPIC Individ uals Depts. 
June 21 Introduction to project- 19 11 
request for information 
on current comm. policy 
July 11 Links between CPC and 15 11 
Presidents explained- 
request for specific 
sectoral objectives 
July 25 Depts. reported on their 16 11 
general objectives, tar- 
get audiences, main obs- 
tacles to communication 
Aug. 13 Request for sectional 15 10 
budget data-2 groups 
discussed overlap between 
sectors and problems of 
facilities 
Aug. 22 Continuation of earlier 14 10 
discussion, around 
specific questions 
Sept . 19 Four problem areas raised 13 8 for discussion 
(Attendance refers to Afghan nationals only - UNESCO team members were 
also present at each'meeting) 
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it was agreed by the Communication Planning Council me;:. bxors that the 
Chairman (a President from Radio Afgh. ý; i istýan) should get in touch with 
any missing members, and that UNESCO team members should also try and 
ensure that sectors were represented. Table F indicates the extent to 
which continuity of Afghan membership of the Communication Planning 
Council was achieved: 
TABLE F: CONTINUITY OF ATTENDANCE AT CPC MEETINGS 
NO. OF 
TIMES NO. OF INDIVIDUALS ATTENDING 
DEPARTMENT/MINISTRY REPRESENTED 65 4 3 times 
Radio Afghanistan 6 22 
Bakhtar News Agency 6 1 1 
Educational Broadcasting 6 1 
Afghan Women's Association 5 1 1 
Min. of Communications 5 1 
Min. of Agriculture 5 1 
Adult Education 4 1 
Rural Development 4 
Afghan Film 4 
Dept. of Journalism, Kabul 
University 3 1 
Min of Health 3 1 
Central Statistics Office 3 1 
Min. of Information - 
Publications 3 
Min. of Planning 3 
Arts and Culture 1 
In all, 35 different individuals from Afghan government agencies 
attended CPC meetings. Of these, 15, from 10 different agencies, attended 
at least half the CPC meetings. Virtually all the relevant Ministries and 
Departments were represented at half the meetings, and ten were represen- 
ted at two-thirds of the meetings. Although the team leader was disap- 
pointed that attendance was not greater, it does seem that attendance was 
at least as good as could be expected, given the day-to-day pressures on 
the operational people who were members of CPC, and the rather unfamiliar 
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and sometimes threatening concept - in Afghan culture - of a lagre inter- 
ministerial committee at this level o. f represerntation. Certainly, the 
CPC did ensure that at least someone in each sector was aware of what the 
UNESCO team were proposing and thinking, and had the opportunity to put 
forward their own sector's views and information, if he wished. 
It is more difficult to judge the more qualitative aspect of the extent 
to which the CPC led to avoidance of overlap, and co-operation between dif- 
ferent departments. It was a constant frustration for the UNESCO team, or at 
least the team leadership, that during both the CPC and the Presidents' 
Communication Council meetings, there was so little apparent willingness to 
co-operate between the different sectors. This is an important cultural con- 
cept to which we shall return again, but it has to be taken into considera- 
tion that for CPC members, a decision to co-operate or share facilities with 
other sectors was not only a very unusual phenomenon which, where it had been 
tried, had usually resulted in an eventual loss of control over facilities 
and their non-use, but was also a policy decision which could only be taken 
at a much higher level. In any case, it would be unrealistic to think that 
as a result of five or six such meetings, such a radical cultural change 
would occur. On the other hand, frank and sometimes heated discussions on 
the need for, and possibility of, co-operation and the use of shared facil- 
ities did occur, sector objectives, and obstacles to the effective use of 
communications in each sector, were discussed, and it would be surprising 
if those 15 members who regularly attended went away without a much better 
understanding of the communication planning process, the possible roles of 
communication in development, and the likely advantages and disadvantages 
of co-operation and shared use of facilities. 
There is one final aspect of structuring for the planning exercise 
which turned out, in the opinon of most of the foreign specialists, to 
have been an important part of the planning exercise. This was the 
management of the foreign specialists in the field. To some extent , of 
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course, this depends on the qualities of the team leader, but there rc 
several steps taken which greatly enhanced the coherence of the teal c 
foreign specialists, and facilitated the development of proposals v)hich 
cut across sectoral interests. First of all, office accommodation was 
secured at Radio Afghanistan, which provided desk space for all the 
consultants in two rooms, close to each other. Therefore most specialists 
were able to meet each other on a daily, working basis. Secondly, during 
Phase 2 and 3, when there were usually at least six foreign consultants 
working on the project at any one time, regular weekly staff meetings were 
held, usually with an agenda and an opportunity for each specialist to 
report to the others on his or her progress, problems and discoveries. 
These meetings were held by most of the specialists to be extremely valu- 
able. It enabled frustrations to be talked through and shared, but most 
of all it allowed for an interchange of experiences of how Afghan culture 
worked, and of the development of a common approach and understanding of 
communication planning. 
This last point is important. One definition of a foreign special- 
ist is an ordinary person a long way from home. One or two of the team 
had not worked before for any extensive period of time in a developing 
country. Most, while specialists in their own field - broadcasting, 
education, etc. - were not necessarily communications planners. Most of 
the specialists had difficulty in understanding the scenario and the 
philosophy behind it, and found it difficult to come to grips with the 
development of a total system. It would not be too exaggerated to say 
that communication planning is a strange idea even to experts. None of 
the foreign specialists was an expert in Afghan culture. Therefore 
regular staff meetings, and the occasional field trip that was arranged, 
were essential components of the planning exercise, to share and develop 
experience, and to help each other grope towards a common approach. 
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(C) The scenario net, ork. Fie f cre describing what actually happen' d, 
it is necessary at this stage to probe into the proposed scenario a 
little more, so that both the predicted events and the nature of the 
scenario are clearly understood. First of all, the listing of tasks, 
and their sequencing, are of course only guidelines. Departures from 
the network were expected. Secondly, to allow for a simplified summary, 
the crucial liaison with Afghan ministries, etc., (through the various 
organisational structures discussed above) have been omitted, to allow 
a clear identification of the actual planning tasks proposed in the 
network. 
(i) preparatory period. Before the fieldwork began, there were 
four listed tasks, involving UNESCO secretariat and research 
assistance time. Basically, this was the collection of basic 
background data on Afghanistan, and, more crucially, a draft 
communication policy statement, derived from an analysis of 
existing policies, statements, the constitution, etc. 
(ii) phase 1. This would cover the first eight weeks of the project 
(from June 20th to August 14th, in practice). The main tasks 
in this phase were to be: 
- discussion and modification of the draft policy 
statement with the Planning Body 
- expansion of policy statements to goals and 
targets 
- detailed statement of communication objectives 
for each sector, in quantified terms 
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- the TOt'j",: Aation of alternative strategic approach, -.. 
This phase would be carried out primär-: ly by the team 
leader, the deputy team leader, and the counterpart team. 
These, after consultation and discussion of course with the 
various Afghan decision-making bodies, would therefore be 
more or less solely responsible for identifying and speci- 
fying precisely communication o2 licy. 
(iii) phase 2. This would cover the next nine weeks of the project 
(from August 15th to October 16th). The rest of the team were 
scheduled to commence on August 15th, leaving at the end of this 
phase, except for the rural development and education specialist. 
The main tasks in this phase were to be: 
- prepare format or document for the presentation of 
alternative strategic approaches for the government 
- select the preferred strategies 
- evolve a phased strategic plan in outline for 
the chosen option or mix of options 
- research basic data required for operational plan 
- prepare format or document for the presentation 
of the strategic plan for the chosen option for the 
government 
- 
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(i v) phase 3. This would stretch over the last eight weeks of the 
project (from October 17th to December 18th). The main 
tasks for this stage were: 
- prepare a detailed operation plan for the chosen 
options, including costings, manpower, Financing, 
phasing networks, etc. 
- writing of the report 
The rural development and education specialist were to remain for 
the first four weeks to finalise the operational plans in their sectors, 
and the team leader and deputy team leader would remain to write the 
report. 
The planned scenario, however, never really got beyond the first of 
the 33 planned tasks. The first stumbling block was the formulation of 
a draft communications policy statement for Afghanistan. This should have 
been available before Phase 1 began, and, according to the scenario, "it 
must be complete, and agreement reached generally, by Week 11 (September 
4th) at the latest". The statement was not available at the start of the 
project, nor was there one already in existence in Afghanistan, at least 
in an explicit form. thus, one of the main tasks of the team leader was 
first of all to try, from an analysis of the constitution, speeches of the 
President, and discussion with various Afghan ministries, to derive a 
policy statement, then secondly to get it endorsed. A six-page, typed 
memorandum was prepared by the team explaining the steps taken in this 
regard. 
Arising from the first meeting between the UNESCO team and department 
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hea: is on June 21st, a -;; '. -stionnaire was sent to each sector requesting 
a listing of sc-ctoral c::: imunication policies. The response was very poor; 
even the few questi ronr-; -r r es that were returned had little information of 
use or relevance. After several attempts, the team leader managed to get 
a meeting with one of the Presidents from the Ministry of Planning on 
July 13th. Although he gras unable to give any specific policy guidance, 
he did clarify that, b<;; ically, each Department was free to make its own 
policies, so long as they were within the broad policies enunciated in 
the Constitution, etc. 
Fortunately, two days earlier, at the first "business" meeting of 
the Communication Planning Council, the team had already decided that 
because of the time constraints, each department should be asked clearly 
to state its specific sectoral (as distinct from communication) objectives 
and target audiences. Thus, without waiting for finalisation of the 
communication policy statement, the team had decided to move on to the 
"objectives" phase. 
In this way, derived from the information provided by each sector 
and discussions with Afghan officials, on August 10th the team produced 
a draft paper on Communication Policies and Objectives. However, it 
indicated a number of areas of duplication and overlap, and a number of 
overall policy issues were clearly still to be resolved. Since at this 
time a high-level policy body had not been established (nor, in fact, at 
any time during the project), on the advice of the PCC it was decided to 
approach the Minister of Information. To force through decisions more 
quickly, the team prepared a document assuming certain policy decisions, 
unless informed otherwise. A meeting eventually took place with the 
Minister on September 3rd. Two of the policy issues were resolved on 
the spot. The third, concerning the duplication of effort at the village 
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level, could only be resolved through a meeting of several mini stars, 
which the Minister promised to arrange. This however did not take place 
during the life of the project. However, a Communications Policies and 
Objectives in Afghanistan statement, in a revised form as a result of 
this meeting, was drawn up and included in an annex to the team's report. 
This statement was, however, never formally endorsed by the Afghan 
government (except by default). Furthermore, being couched in very 
general terms, and being finalised as late as it was, it proved to be 
of little use to the sectoral specialists who arrived in August. 
The second, and not unrelated, departure fron the scenario was 
the failure of the Phase 1 team to have determined and quantified the 
sectoral objectives by the time the Phase 2 members arrived. The scenario 
states: 
"It is assumed that all team members will have been 
given in advance of their arrival a full set of briefing 
documents ... The new documentation should include the 
agreed formulation of policies, the statement goals, targets 
and objectives, and what has so far been prepared in the 
way of alternative strategies ... it must be understood, 
and accepted by the team, that the time available does 
not allow for any radical changes of direction. The formu- 
lation of policies and their translation into goals, tar- 
gets and objectives, must be taken as a sine qua non ... 
local data will have to be accepted largely on the evalu- 
ation of the counterpart team". 
The only documentation received on arrival, therefore, was the 
scenario, the background data, and the returned questionnaires from 
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each departnent on its goals and target groups. The pr°obl eni was that 
most departments did not have a communications policy. Some had limited 
communications facilities, but these had been provided to meet short- 
term requirements for specific projects, ar. d nearly all facilities had 
been bought from funds from overseas aid for such projects. What the 
sectors did have (though even then often only in the most general terms) 
was a sectoral policy, or set of priorities, for development tasks arid 
target audiences. The media sectors also, of course, had general policies, 
but these were related primarily to their own survival or expansion, and 
not to development goals, except in the vaguest of terms. 
The first task therefore of the Phase 2 development specialists 
was to derive a set of sectoral communication policies - in other words, 
to suggest how the use of communications media could assist in the achieve- 
ment of the development priorities of the different departments. The 
media specialists on the other hand concentrated on technical and manage- 
ment aspects - how to improve the technical efficiency of Afghan Films, 
training and organisational structures for Radio Afghanistan for the 
introduction of television, development of telecommunications and news 
agency transmission system. 
The team leader provided a suggested format for the development of 
strategy options in each sector at a staff meeting on September 11th. 
Although way behind the schedule of the scenario, this date was still too 
early for the two development sector specialists, who were still trying 
to sort out the overall development objectives, in specific, quantified 
terms. Nevertheless, by the end of September, most of the specialists 
had put forward a set of alternative proposals for communication projects, 
if not policies, within their respective areas. It is important to note 
here that the three Phase 1 members of the team were all unanimous in 
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their opinicn that this was a task that could only 1ýýv bean dote by 
sector specialists, since it involved analysis first of overall sectoral 
objectives, combined with a knowledge of the potential of couiimuni- 
cations media for development. 
The next problem was to get the proposals discussed and options 
chosen. The proposals were circulated to Presidents of the various depart- 
ments at the end of September. It was in practice difficult to get a 
detailed discussion of the various proposals with individual presidents, 
although this did vary from department to department. Reactions varied 
from complete acceptance without any discussion to total avoidance of 
any discussion or even consideration of the proposals. Language was 
obviously a problem. Some of the proposals were lengthy and detailed. 
Foreign specialists had to rely largely on interpreting or guessing the 
real reaction to proposals. 
It was however possible as a result of the stages worked through so 
far to begin to draw out from the discussions and various sectoral proposals 
a number of general, strategic proposals, which cut across sectors. Thus, 
at the Presidents' Council Meeting of October 24th, it was possible to put 
forward for discussion five major inter-departmental proposals. These 
would, however, in most cases, such as the establishment of regional training 
centres for village-level workers, facilitate many of the individual sectoral 
proposals. As already mentioned, reactions of both the CPC and the PCC to 
the sharing of resources and the development of co-operative inter- 
departmental projects were not encouraging. 
The problem with both the individual sectoral proposals and the 
more general, inter-departmental proposals was one of official endorse- 
ment. Because of the failure to set up a high-level policy body with 
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powers to choose, endorse, or reject projects, it was impossible to d¬ve lop 
one strategic plan. ,: Eat resulted was a whole set of proposals, both sec- 
toral and general , but without any determined attempt to set priorities, 
or a total systems plan for corýmmunications, as envisaged by the scenario. 
However, it was possible to develop operational plans for the projects 
proposed, including costs, manpower and training, and phasing networks. 
In the education sector, it was also possible to draw up a detailed oper- 
ational plan for the introduction of an educational television service. 
SOME JUDGEMENTS 
Weaknesses and Strengths of the Framework 
This section will be even more interpretative than earlier parts of 
the evaluation, and therfore particularly open to discussion and more 
tentative. 
1. Cultural factors. It is necessary to examine a little more 
closely the extent to which aspects peculiar to Afghanistan affected the 
framework. The hierarchical nature of decision-making in the government 
had several consequences. Firstly, decisions were always referred upwards. 
Secondly, below Ministerial level, there were likely in any one Ministry 
to be up to 15 or 20 presidents, all attempting to get the Minister's 
attention or decisions. Inevitably, then, it took time to get even meet- 
ings arranged. Thirdly, there was a reluctance to make decisions which 
created precedents or suggested initiative. While this may be true of 
most governments, it was exceptionally pronounced in Afghanistan. The 
team leader was moved to write in the report: 
" ... members of the team improved in their ability to 
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understand the seeming reluct. c, rice of the individýje. ls to provi ,:., 
information or to comment on proposed plans. This self- 
protectiveness in a society coping with many difficult prob- 
lems is understandable. The individual's fear of reprisal 
appears to be stronger motivation than hope that he will be 
rewarded by a system which can afford few monetary induce- 
ments. A salary scale which pays a department president the 
equivalent of perhaps $80 a month does not leave much scope 
between this and a bare subsistence level to offer incentives 
for enterprise. Job security is more important than innova- 
tion. " (5) 
Fourthly, sectoral autonomy was particularly strong, making arrange- 
ments or plans requring co-operation or the sharing of facilities between 
departments particularly difficult. Again, the team leader commented: 
The sectoral 'chief' exacts almost feudal loyalty of 
his people and, in the bureaucratic sense at least, he is 
likely to punish undue consorting with other sectors or 
sharing with them proprietory information or facilities ... 
It would appear that the 'committee' structure so beloved 
by Western politicians and educators is not a viable 
decision-making machine in Afghanistan. In the first place, 
the member of the conference is speaking not for himself 
but as a representative of his agency. He is thus reluctant 
to express any view unless specially so commissioned by his 
superior. For a subordinate to attempt to guess what such 
a decision may be is not considered a wholesome exercise ... 
And this is not the way to make plans anyway (say the social 
mores): plans are made by the leader and carried out by his 
subordinates; strong leaders do not parley - they act. " (6) 
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depend very largely on co-operation between sectors, on people havi rig 
the authority to make - and being w%tilling to rake - decisions, on the 
willingness of individuals to subordinate narrower sectoral interests 
to a broader, common good. It is dangerous to assume that Afghanistan 
is massively an exception amongst developing countries. While it may be 
more extreme, some of the tendencies can be found in many organisations, 
both in developed and developing countries. Hierarchical planning and 
sectoral, autonomous empires are not unique to Afghanistan. At the same 
time, any planning framework must take account of "local" decision- 
making practice. The question of course is how much a planning exercise 
should seek to change this. This is a fundamental question about the aims 
behind development, but if a country does want technological innovation, 
and particularly the large scale application of communications technology 
to development problems, then it seems probable that changes in the 
process by which decisions are made will also be necessary. 
Planning is more a process than a product, and maybe the introduc- 
tion or pressure to change to more appropriate decision-making processes 
for communications application is itself one of the most important object- 
ives of a communications planning exercise. However, it must take as a 
starting point the way that decision-making occurs in the country, and 
work from this towards new structures. The planning framework was valu- 
able in that it suggested and led to at least some examplesof appropriate 
decision-making processes, but the failure to work from the top (i. e. 
the Ministers) down in the initial stages was no doubt a major handicap 
to getting the decisions required by the scenario. 
2. The Nature of Planning and Decision-Making. Irrespective of 
the unique Afghan factors, the field test raises some serious questions 
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of some of the assumptions about planning and dec. s? on-mal; na in the 
scenario. First of all, it was clear that communications policies did 
not exist, either implicitly or explicitly, in Afghanis-tan when the 
project began. Indeed, the main result of the exercise, and perhaps 
its most important outcome, was that it forced through consideration of 
communications policies in various sectors, and related these to devel- 
opment goals. Indeed, in most of the development sectors, people were 
unaware of the role that communication media could play in achieving 
their development goals. It was unrealistic then to assume that communi- 
cation policies were there already, to be handed down and given to the 
team when it arrived. One of the major functions of the team was to 
assist the various sectors in the development of communication policies. 
Indeed, on reflection, it should appear self-evident that such a 
project would not have had such a strong justification if Afghanistan 
did have clear communication policies. Knowing what you want to do 
is always much harder than doing it. This of course does not mean that 
there were no communication policies at all. Radio Afghanistan and 
Bakhtar News Agencies had their own policies, but these had not been 
related to specific development goals and objectives, except for 
increasing national cohesion and identity. Until communication policies 
are related to specific developments, there will obviously be difficul- 
ties in getting such development departments as agriculture, health, 
education, etc., to take a communication planning exercise seriously. 
However, relating communication policies to development goals (or 
perhaps better, the other way round) turned out to be more difficult 
and technical than anticipated. According to the scenario, this was 
to have been done during Phase 1 by the team leader, the deputy team 
leader, and the counterparts. This they could not do, though, and had 
to await the arrival of the two development sector specialists. Most 
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of the specialists were required earlier than suggested by the fra , ork. 
To some extent, the broadcasting, film and audio-visual, mews agency 
and telecommunications specialists would all have benefited had develop- 
ment sector goals and target audiences been more clearly defined earlier. 
At the same time, the potential for media enabling various development 
goals to be met more quickly or at less cost needed to be explained 
by development sector specialists, and could not be done by the counter- 
parts. The development sector specialists and the media specialists 
also had to check out for themselves much of the data and information 
provided by counterparts, particularly in terms of quantifying object- 
ives, getting a comprehensive picture of existing media facilities, and 
identifying priorities. 
Perhaps one of the major disappointments was the failure to get 
counterparts to work in the way intended. 
The idea of placing responsibility on to national counterparts for 
the *collection of information, identification of existing policies, and 
feeding back between the foreign specialists and more senior government 
officials and Ministers the thinking and development of, and reactions 
to, the project, is desirable for two reasons. It ensures involvement 
and continuity after the foreign specialists have left, and it is 
desirable that counterparts should themselves be part of the decision- 
making process, taking what they believe to be valuable from the project, 
and rejecting what they believe to be unsuitable. 
Unfortunately, it did not work out like that. Partly the reason 
was cultural, but also partly technical. Very few counterparts, even 
in the media sectors, had the necessary information, training or back- 
ground to develop a policy within their sector for the application of 
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communications technology to develo : ment goals, without substantial 
gn specialist assistance. 
(If they had possessed such a back- fore ic, 
ground, one %%,, iders why foreign specialist assistance would have been 
needed in the first place). For these reasons, it was a serious mis- 
take within the framework to assume that policies and data could be 
ready for when the development sector specialists arrived. Their 
assistance was needed to do this. 
Indeed, the most serious weekness of the framework is the sequencing 
and nature of the network (Figure A). Although it was accompanied by 
qualifying statements about it being only a guide, and the need for it to 
be used flexibly, it did turn out to be much too linear and too simplified 
in practice in its assumptions about the planning process. It certainly 
did not reflect a cyclical approach to planning. One must question 
seriously the "normal sequence of planning by objectives, moving from 
policy to goal statement, strategic and operational planning, prototyping 
and implementation. " This is an ideal, a post-hoc rationalisation of a 
much more involved and complex process which, if charted out in detail 
in advance, will almost certainly be impossible to follow, if an acceptable 
project document is to be achieved. Of course, it is valuable for a team 
to have a model of what they should be aiming for, but this particular 
network did not reflect the reality of planning. In particular, the 
search for a statement of national communications policy held up the 
progress of the project, and at such a global level, it is doubtful whether 
it would have been very meaningful or helpful in any case towards the 
development of a national communications system. It could be argued that 
such a policy should be built from the ground up, in response to sectoral 
needs, but aiming to avoid overlap and duplication. The network proposed, 
however, assumed an overall communications policy which would be inter- 
preted and applied downwards. Even in as hierarchically organised a system 
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as the Afghan c overriment, such an approach was jus L not practical 
especially when no such policy existed in any case. 
Lastly, the network does not allow sufficiently for planning being 
an on-going process. Obviously, in a project limited to a specific period 
of time, specific projects and proposals for the use of communications 
media must be put forward, and decisions are required from government 
officials during the lifetime of the project to enable such proposals to 
be made within the overall context of existing government policy. Howw, wever, 
government is an on-going process, with an ever-shifting frame of policy, 
priorities, and political philosophy. The network relied too much on quick, 
one might say hasty, "once-off' decisions from government about a range 
of policies which needed careful consideration and discussion, particularly 
since they were usually put forward in a foreign language. The network 
emphasises too much products, in the way of projects, ending with a single 
"preferred" communication strategy, and not enough on process, i. e. 
establishing permanent structures within government which would facilitate 
the planning process to accommodate changes in policy (although it must be 
said that the team did end up by proposing a number of such structures. ) 
In some ways, then, it may have been better to have reversed the 
sequence of Phases 1 and 2, but even that would suggest perhaps a too 
linear approach. Certainly, it would have been better to reduce the 
eight-week phase 1 period, just bringing in the team leader four to six 
weeks in advance to make practical arrangements and find and brief 
appropriate counterparts. The development sector specialists should 
then arrive, followed two to four weeks later by the media sector 
specialists. As well as aiming to suggest specific projects and goals 
for communications media, the team should aim at suggesting structures 
to improve the planning and utilisation of communications media for 
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development. Perhaps at the end of the project, the government may wish 
to synthesise an overall communications policy statement, as a result of 
the discussions and proposals that have taken place, unless, of course, a 
clear communications policy had already been decided before the project. 
3. The Failure to Involve High-Level Decision-Makers. This is a 
much more intractable problem than the sequencing and steps in the net- 
work. Again, the failure was partly due to the structure of government 
in Afghanistan, but also, if not due to the framework, the failure to 
involve high-level decision-makers was at least partly due to some of the 
basic principles not being observed (through no fault of the team or 
the UNESCO secretariat). The failure to get close involvement with the 
Ministry of Planning was crucial. The Ministry of Planning heavily 
influences the allocation of resources for development projects. Several 
of the foreign specialists believed that the reason for the difficulty 
in getting in to see Ministers was because the project was not offering 
tangible resources, in the sense of immediate development projects. It 
had no carrots to offer. As one foreign specialist put it: 
"We've been trying to get to see Ministers for weeks, 
but the Japanese were here for four days, saw five Ministers, 
and sold them a complete TV system. " 
The involvement of the Ministry of Planning on a closer basis would 
at least have ensured that the team's work was seen in the context of 
allocation of resources and priorities between sectors. However, the 
project was attached to the Ministry of Information, and located within 
Radio Afghanistan. It is not clear from where the political push for a 
comunication planning survey originated, ' either within or outside the 
Afghan g& ýrent Certainly, ''the Ministry of Information - and also the 
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Educational Broadcasting department of the Ministry of -Education - ipre 
most interested, but the project clearly did not have a higher level 
of political support or status; there was no senior Minister rooting for 
it. It was therefore all the more important for it to have been located 
in the Ministry of Planning, to ensure that it was not seen as a sectoral 
project, mainly concerned with the Ministry of Information's interests. 
However, even if the project had started with the full support of 
the Ministry of Planning, there would have been problems in getting high- 
level involvement. One reason why it was difficult to get Ministers 
together, it was suggested by one member of the team, was due to the 
tense political situation in Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, there are serious practical problems in getting high- 
level involvement. Long-term planning exercises do not have the urgency 
of day-to-day problems that Ministers have to tackle, nor do they offer 
immediate prospects of grandiose schemes which bring political rewards. 
How much time can such a project really expect of Ministers? It was 
suggested that Ministerial involvement is needed only twice: at the 
beginning and at the end, the first time to give the project a political 
push, the last time for endorsement of or clarification of policy. It 
would seem though that where there is little devolution of responsibility 
for decision-making, a mid-term meeting of Ministers would also be needed. 
Whatever detailed proposals though that are made for Ministerial involve- 
ment, this should be written into the official project agreement between 
UNESCO and the national government. 
In the. end, the project was also helped by the attitude of most of 
the other international or external development agencies in Afghanistan. 
The 4 rl d.. dank, UNICEF . and some other agencies made it clear that they 
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would wait for the outcome of the planning survey before committing then- 
selves to a number cf development projects, and in the later stages of 
the project, as proposals were coming forward, the support of these other 
agencies did increase Afghan interest in the project. Co-operation and 
co-ordination between planning surveys and the development agencies is 
crucial, and should be planned for from the beginning. 
3. The Success of the Framework. Although there is substantial 
criticism of the detail of the network, particularly the sequencing and 
the assumptions about the way policy gets decided, the overall approach 
of the proposed framework was clearly right, within the context of an 
external, technical aid project. The emphasis on precision in policies, 
quantification of objectives, participation in planning, validation of 
proposals by the government, and practical operational plans, proved 
invaluable as goals to which the team should strive. It made clear, 
particularly to the team leader, what the team should try and do, even 
if the route suggested was not usually appropriate. The approach 
suggested by or underlying the framework led to a number of outcomes, which 
many would consider to be desirable in a development project: 
(a) The project proved to be an invaluable educative process - 
it made Afghans at all levels of government think more clearly 
about what they wanted, needed and expected from communications 
in assisting development 
(b) The project did involve people at an operational level, 
and a number of people at the president level (i. e. heads of 
government departments). Influence on this level of govern- 
ment, in a country as politically unstable as Afghanistan 
was at the time, is important. While Ministers may come and 
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go, the operational people are more permanent, and may them- 
selves become heads of departments later. 
(c) The project did succeed in eliciting goals, difficulties 
in existing communications, and an understanding of the way 
decision-making operated in Afghanistan. It did enable the 
team to obtain an accurate idea of Afghan priorities, and 
to react to and plan for these priorities. In the end, the 
plan did take account of what the Afghans wanted - e. g. an 
educational television service - even if the team did not 
agree with the priorities. The CPC, and to a lesser extent, 
the PCC, and also the counterpart arrangements, did work 
to the extent that they did in the end provide the team with 
the information it needed, even though these arrangements 
were less successful in eliciting policy decisions and endorse- 
ment of proposals and policies suggested by the team. 
(d) Although there was less involvement of Ministers than was 
necessary, the project was clearly right to push for their 
involvement. Without it, no communication plan would stand 
a chance of being implemented. 
(e) The scenario was very useful to the team leader for 
setting out steps that could be taken to force the team to. 
push for the identification of clear sectoral objectives, 
consultation with Ministries, counterpart involvement. 
Although the team was strong enough to ignore the scenario 
when it did not fit the circumstances, it did provide 
clear goals to aim for. It cannöt be'assumed that foreign 
specialists are clear in what is required in the development 
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of a communication planning survey, and such guidance is nec- 
essary. On the other hand, there were times when members of 
the foreign team were close to frustration and despair from 
their inability to get near to what the scenario suggested, 
so changes are necessary. 
(f) The scenario did help the team to come forward with 
pragmatic, practical proposals, both for projects, and for 
planning processes and procedures. Some of these might have 
happened in any case, but there seems little doubt that the 
scenario did help to produce a coherent and comprehensive 
planning survey. It is also important to note that, despite 
their doubts and criticisms about many aspects of the scenario, 
all the foreign experts were convinced of the need and value 
of the planning exercise for Afghanistan. That is not always 
a feeling found amongst foreign specialists working on devel- 
opment projects, and even less so on planning projects. 
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